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ABSTRACT OF THESIS
The aim of the present thesis is basically twofold. First, to examine from the 
International Law viewpoint the 1974 Turkish Intervention of Cyprus; 
actually whether there are any grounds upon which Turkey may rely in order 
to establish the legality of intervention. Second, to explore the legal 
consequences of the intervention. In this way, the dissertation would be 
forward-looking as prospects for a future settlement of the Cyprus issue 
would be analysed in the light of Public International Law.
Although Turkey’s 1974 intervention has been the subject of much comment, 
a fresh study is warranted. This is so, because the present analysis will take 
advantage of information not available to many of the earlier commentators. 
Extensive research has been conducted in the Public Records Office 
examining available Foreign Office and War Office Files relevant to the 
study. Greek Cypriot politicians have been interviewed who gave their own 
exposition of the events surrounding the issue, and will be cited where 
relevant. Greek as well as Turkish material has been thoroughly studied and 
shall also be included in the study. Needless to mention that massive 
International Law works are quoted in detail, thus making possible the 
application of legal principles to the issue under examination. Furthermore, 
this new study is distinctive and even imperative, in that it ranges beyond the 
question whether the intervention was lawful to consider the legal 
consequences which flowed from it, and looks to the future exploring 
prospects for a just and viable settlement to the Cyprus Issue.
It is noteworthy that the thesis is broad enough to comprise analysis of 
various branches of the academic field of international law such as the 
International Law of Armed Conflict and the Use of Force, International 
Organizations, the Law of Treaties, International Law Theory, Statehood, 
Human Rights, Conflict resolution, Foreign Policy and even Constitutional 
Theory.
The Doctoral Thesis will be divided in three Parts and comprise eight 
Chapters.
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PARTI
ORIGINS
CHAPTER I
DIPLOMATIC CONTEXT OF THE CYPRUS QUESTION
CHAPTER I: DIPLOMATIC CONTEXT OF THE CYPRUS QUESTION
(1) The period up to 1960 
1.1. Brief Historical background
The History of Cyprus begins with the Neolithic times going back to the 6th 
millennium. 1 With the discovery of copper in Cyprus early in the third millennium 
B.C. the history of Cyprus enters into a new period, the Bronze period 2500-1500 
B.C.2
The most important event during that period was the arrival of Achaean- 
Mycenaeans around the middle of the second millennium and the Mycenaean culture, 
previously flourishing in the island of Crete was now introduced into Cyprus. The 
extent of the Mycenaean influence has been shown by the archaeological findings- 
tombs, vases and other remains, as well as excavations of Mycenaean cities in the 
Eastern coast of Cyprus, in the province of Famagusta.3 Before the end of the second 
millennium more Greek colonists arrived to live in Cyprus while others on the east 
and west of Asia Minor. According to history, cities of Cyprus were founded by 
heroes of the Trojan war such as Salamis by Teucer, brother of Ajax, Paphos by 
Agapenor from Arcadia, Idalium by Chalcanor, Lapithos by Praxandros of Laconia 
and others.4 The Greek colonization was very extensive and this is supported by 
Herodotus, who says that the inhabitants of Cyprus had come from Athens, Argos, 
Arcadia, Salamis.5 The Greek colonists brought with them the Greek culture and way
1 See Karageorghis: Cyprus, Geneva 1968, pp. 34-35; Spyridakis, A Brief History o f Cyprus, Nicosia, 1974.
2 Contra Denktash. In his Prologue to The Cyprus Triangle, he places the year 1571 A.D., date at which Cyprus 
came under the Ottoman rule, as the starting point of the island’s early history. For the legal implications of this 
assertion, see Chapter 5 below.
3 Stanley Casson, Ancient Cyprus, London , 1937; Spyridakis, A Brief History of Cyprus, supra, pp. 6-8; 
Karageorghis, Cyprus, supra, pp. 62-63. On the question whether Alasia refers to the whole of Cyprus or a 
particular city and regarding the dispute about Alasia, ibid. p. 64. See also Hill, A History of Cyprus vol. I, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1940, pp. 39-49
4 Homer speaks of Cinyras, the King of Paphos, who gave Agamemnon, the Commander-in-Chief of the Greek 
forces against Troy, a decorated suit of armour, and King Cinyras is praised by the Greek poet Tyrtaeus (7th 
century B.C.) and Pindar (5th century B.C.).
5 Besides the Greeks, Phoenicians from Syria also came to Cyprus not earlier than 1000 B.C. and settled in the 
coast, particularly in Kition. But, as Professor Gjerstad, of the Swedish archaeological Expedition, points out, 
there exists a fundamental difference between the Greek and the Phoenician settlements in that the former were 
the result of mass migration and aimed at political occupation and cultural penetration whilst the latter were of a 
strictly commercial character.
of living, including their political ideas and manner of administration. The 
autochthonous inhabitants, the Eteocyprians (a technical name given by 
Archaeologists to differentiate the uncivilised population of Cyprus from their 
civilised descendants) accepted the Greek culture. On the model of the Greek city 
states and following the Mycenaean system of government many kingdoms have been 
established in Cyprus. Diodorus Siculus, the historian, refers to nine such kingdoms in 
the middle of the fourth century.
The Cyprus kings following the Mycaenean precedent were at the same time 
high priests, judges and generals and the institution of Kingship was hereditary. 
Gradually the institution of the assembly of the people, the ecclesia, was developed to 
which the king was referring matters of administration for consideration.6 
The Kings of Cyprus retained their autonomy under the Egyptians and the Persians 
from the sixth century to the end of the fourth century B.C. even after the heroic but 
unsuccessful revolt under King Onesilus in the fifth century B.C. who tried to unite 
the Cypriots against the Persian domination.
Next important King who united the cities of Cyprus under the leadership of 
Salamis was its King Evagoras the First. Evagoras carried a ten year war against the 
Persian yoke and during that struggle was greatly assisted by the Athenians who made 
him a citizen of Athens. Evagoras is the most important statesman in the History of 
Cyprus who not only maintained and spread the Greek culture throughout Cyprus but 
transmitted it to the neighbouring countries.7
The kings retained their sovereignty over their own cities during the time of 
Alexander the Great. When after his death in 323 B.C. a dispute arose over the 
possession of Cyprus between his successors Ptolemy and Antigonus, the kings of 
Cyprus were divided some of them supporting the former whilst others supporting the 
latter, but eventually Cyprus came under Ptolemy who shortly afterwards was 
proclaimed as King Ptolemy.
6 See Casson, Ancient Cyprus, ante, pp. 143-157; Spyridakis, A Brief History o f Cyprus, ante, pp. 11, 16-22, 
where reference is made to the most important kings such as Evagoras and Onesilus of Salamis and Cinyras of 
Paphos.
7 Isocrates, the friend and the tutor of his son Nicocles, considered Evagoras as the ideal ruler and described him 
as such in three orations which he presented to Nicocles. As to the three orations of Isocrates see Hill, A History 
of Cyprus, ante, p. 216, note 5, who refers to Forster, Isocrates Cypriot Orations, Oxford, 1912.
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Cyprus remained under the Ptolemies for two and a half a centuries and during that 
time achieved a great degree of culture and prosperity.
Cyprus was occupied by Rome in 58 B.C., as Greece had been occupied earlier 
(c. 146 B.C.) and became part of the province of Cilicia governed by a proconsul. 
Among the early proconsuls was the famous orator Cicero. Under Augustus Cyprus 
became an imperial province.
The introduction of Christianity to Cyprus was the most important event during 
this period of the Roman rule. On his first missionary journey in 45 A.D. Paul 
accompanied by Barnabas, a Cypriot, and Mark landed at Salamis and preached the 
new religion. The conversion to Christianity was completed by the beginning of the 
fifth century through the great ecclesiastical figures of the time, St. Barnabas, Lazarus, 
Spyridon of Trimithus, Philon of Karpasia, Tychon of Amathus and Epiphanios of 
Constantia.8
On the laying of the foundations of the Byzantine Empire, in 330 A.D. Cyprus 
received special attention and protection by the emperors of Byzantium.9 When 
Cyprus was a Byzantine province, the Arabs, who had accepted the religion of Islam 
raided at intervals Cyprus from the seventh to the tenth centuries and caused great 
destruction. But the Arabs never made an organised attempt to occupy Cyprus or 
acquire sovereignty over it and their activities were limited to looting and taking 
prisoners.10
The Byzantine period of Cyprus came to an end with the reign of Isaac 
Comnenos.11 Throughout the Byzantine period the Greek character of Cyprus was 
preserved in all its manifestations.12 Richard sold Cyprus to Guy de Lusignan, King of 
Jerusalem and thus Cyprus became a Frankish Kingdom. The Lusignans ruled for 
about three hundred years (1192-1489) on the feudal system, all privileges belonging
8 See Spyridakis, A Brief History o f Cyprus, ante, pp. 43-46; Hill, A History of Cyprus, ante, pp. 247-48.
9 The mother of Constantine the Great visited Cyprus and established Churches including the monastery of 
Stavrovouni where, according to the tradition, she left pieces of the cross upon which Christ was crucified: see 
Hill, A History o f Cyprus, supra, p. 246 note 3 for the various versions.
10 For the Arab raids see further, Spyridakis, A Brief History of Cyprus, supra, pp. 90-102; Hill, A History of 
Cyprus, op. cit., pp. 291-296.
11 Isaac Comnenos was expelled from office by the King of England Richard Coeur de Lion on his way to the 
Holy Land as one of the leaders of the Third Crusade. The arrival o f Richard and the events which followed are 
vividly described by St. Neophytos, one of the eminent ecclesiastical writers of the time.
12 For the legal implications of this assertion see below Chapter 5.
10
to the nobles whilst the people were oppressed without participation in the 
administration. The system of administration was alien to the people of Cypms. 
During the Frankish period the Greek Orthodox Church was in a state of persecution 
as the Latin Church was trying to subjugate it.13 The last Queen of the Lusignan 
dynasty Catherine Comaro ceded Cypms to Venice In 1489, when the Lusignan 
domination of Cypms ended.14 The Venetian occupation of Cypms had a purely 
military purpose that of defending the Venetian interests from any dangers that might 
come from Egypt and the Turks.15
The Turks, who had captured Constantinople inl453, invaded Cypms with 
powerful army in 1570 and, in spite of the defence put up by the Venetians, they 
captured Nicosia in the same year and in 1571 Famagusta fell after a heroic resistance 
of the Venetian commander Marcantonio Bragadino. After the capture of Nicosia, but 
especially after the fall of Famagusta, unprecedented acts of atrocities followed, 
property was looted and most of the important churches such as St. Sophia, and St. 
Catherine in Nicosia and in Famagusta were converted to Moslem mosques. And 
remained as such to nowadays. Hill, in his History of Cypms after referring to Nicosia 
at which the massacre and looting went on for there days, writes that “the reader may 
be spared description of horrors which were such as usually occurred at the capture of 
any Christian city by the Turks”16 and after the fall of Famagusta observes that “the 
history of Cypms is rich in episodes of horror, and this was an age inferior to no other 
in barbarity: but as an example of cold-blooded ferocity, in which the childishness of 
the savage combines with the refinements of the sadist, the martyrdom of the hero of 
Famagusta by Mustafa Pasha yields the palm to none. It was inspired not by 
momentary fury, but by deliberate bloodlust. Some details may have been exaggerated 
by anti-Moslem sentiment, but the main facts are not open to doubt”.17 
The Turkish conquest brought many radical changes to Cypms. In spite of the 
atrocities the Turks supported the Greek-Orthodox Church, which replaced the Roman
13 See Hill, A History o f Cyprus, ante, pp. 1059-1061.
14 For a genealogical table of the house of Lusignans see Cobham, Excerpta Cypria, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press 1908, pp. 168-169; Hill, A History o f Cyprus, vol. Ill, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
1948 pp. 1156-1157.
15 On this, see Hill, A History o f Cyprus, ibid., pp. 765-877.
16 Ibid. p.984.
17 Ibid. pp. 1033-1034.
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Catholic as the official Church of the island.18 The Archbishop of Cyprus was given 
similar privileges as those conferred on the Patriarch at Constantinople.19
The Turkish rule in Cyprus ended in 1878. By the Convention of the defensive 
alliance between Great Britain and Turkey with respect to the Asiatic provinces of 
Turkey signed at Constantinople on the 4th June 1878, Turkey consented to assign the 
island of Cyprus to be occupied and administered by England for enabling her to make 
the necessary provision for executing her engagements under the Treaty. By an Annex 
to this Convention signed at Constantinople of the 1st July 1878 between the same 
Contracting Parties the conditions under which England would occupy Cypms are 
provided and provision was made that “if Russia restores to Turkey Kars and other 
conquests made by her during the last war in Armenia, the Island of Cypms will be 
evacuated by England and the Convention of the 4th June 1878 will be at an end”. By 
an additional article signed at Constantinople on the 14th August 1878, it was agreed 
between the High Contracting Parties that for the term of the occupation and no longer, 
full powers were granted to Great Britain for making Laws and Conventions for the 
Government of the island and for the regulating of its commercial and consular 
relations and affairs.20 In July 1878 Cypms was occupied by Great Britain.
The main purpose of this short historical narrative has been to show that during 
all the years of foreign occupation many conquerors passed through Cypms and she 
came across many cultures. Although they left their traces, which may be witnessed 
by the various silent monuments, nevertheless Cypms never has lost its own character 
or identity.21
1.2 Legal Questions arising out of the British Occupation
18 Spyridakis attributes this to a political motive as the Turks did not want to provide the European powers with 
any excuse for intervention after the battle of Lepanto in 1571 ( A Brief History o f Cyprus, ante, p. 151).
19 The Patriarch was recognized not only as the religious head of his religious community but also as the 
political chief master and King taking the place of the former emperor. As the head of his religious community 
he represented it before all state and diplomatic authorities with which he was corresponding. The Patriarch was 
entitled to impose ecclesiastical taxes and to adjudicate on disputes between members of his flock of a civil 
character. The ethnarchical mission of the Church was attributed by Theodore Papadopoulos to historical needs 
and not religious requirements (see Theodore Papadopoulos, Orthodox and Civil authority, Journal o f  
Contemporary History, 1968 p. 201).
20 The text of the Convention is given in Hill, A History of Cyprus vol. IV, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1952 pp. 300-301, of the Annex at p.301-302 and of the Additional Article at p.302.
21 Stanley Casson correctly observes that it will be incorrect to say that Cyprus has absorbed anything; she rather 
absorbed and then transformed (Ancient Cyprus, ante, p.2).
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There is no unanimity as to the legal position of Great Britain in respect of 
Cyprus during the period from its occupation in 1878 till the annexation in 1914. A 
view was expressed that Great Britain acquired a de facto  though not a de jure  
sovereignty over Cyprus under the Convention. The concept of sovereignty, as 
supreme authority which is independent of another authority, coincides with that of 
the political power and has different aspects. In so far as it excludes the dependence 
upon any other form of authority of another state, sovereignty is independence. It is 
external independence with regard to the liberty of action outside the borders of a 
State in its intercourse with other States and internal independence with regard to the 
liberty of action inside the borders. As regards the power of a state to exercise 
authority over all persons and things within its territory, sovereignty is territorial 
supremacy (dominion, territorial sovereignty). 22 With respect to the territorial 
sovereignty three theories were expounded especially in international law.
One theory supports that territory is the object of State power .According to the 
writers supporting this theory (Oppenheim, Lauterpacht in the U.K.) the territory is an 
object over which the State exercises a true right. According to the second theory, 
which extensively is accepted in Germany (by Jellinec) and was introduced in Greece 
by the late Professor Saripolos, territory is a constituent element of the concept of the 
State. The territory is not a part of the possessions of the state but a prerequisite of its 
existence. A third theory inspired by the Austrian school (Kelsen, Verdross) maintains 
that the territory should be immune from any juristic or geographical element and 
should be approached from the angle of the exercise of the competence of the state 
ratione loci. Under this theory the relations of the colonial territories to the 
metropolitan State territory could be better explained.
The supreme authority which the State exercises over its territory would seem to 
suggest that on one and the same territory there can exist only one full sovereign State 
and that two or more sovereign States on one and the same territory are an 
impossibility. But the controversy over the non-divisibility of sovereignty, prevalent
22 Oppenheim-Lauterpacht p. 286; Starke, An Introduction to International Law, London ,1972, p. 106; Hall, A 
Treatise in International, law, Oxford, 1924, pp. 56-58.
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in the sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was dying out in the nineteenth 
century especially with the appearance of colonialism.
Among the examples of the divisibility of sovereignty is the case where one 
state actually exercises sovereignty which in law is vested elsewhere, as where a piece 
of territory is administered by a foreign power with the consent of the State to which 
the territory belongs. In this respect reference is made to the position of Cypms from 
1878 to 1914 under British administration and that of Bosnia and Herzegovina from 
1878 to 1908 under the administration of Austria-Hungary23 where a cession of 
territory has for all practical purposes taken place although in law the territory 
belonged to the former owner state.
This is bome out by the provisions of the Convention itself under which Turkey 
assigns the administration of the Island of Cypms to Great Britain, an expression 
which denotes transfer of title, whilst at the same time provision is made in the Annex 
for the eventual return of Cypms on the fulfilment of certain conditions.24 That 
sovereignty was remained in Turkey was never disputed by Great Britain on taking up 
the administration of the island.25 The occupation of Cypms lacked juristic precision 
but it was analogous to protectorate in the sense that it fell within the designation of a 
country under protection of Great Britain.26
23 See Oppenheim-Lauterpacht, International Law, ante, p.455, where it is observed that “such nominal 
sovereignty is not totally devoid of practical consequences”. See also the observations of Phillimore, 
Commentaries upon the International Law vol. I, London, 1879, pp. 131-132.
In the Case concerning the Light House in Crete and Samos the Permanent Court of International Justice held in 
October 1937 that notwithstanding the very wide autonomy conceded by Turkey to the islands of Crete and 
Samos these territories must be regarded as having been under Turkish sovereignty in 1913 with the result that 
Turkey could properly grant or renew concessions with regard to these islands. In a dissenting Opinion Judge 
Hudson, regarding this point said that “a juristic conception must not be stretched to the breaking point, and a 
ghost of hollow sovereignty cannot be permitted to obscure the realities of the situation”( P.C.I.J. Series A/B 
No.71).
24 See Roberts-Wray, Commonwealth and Colonial Law, London, 1966, p. 28. A very wide jurisdiction was 
granted to Britain to administer Cyprus, during the period it had the administration of the island.
5 The British Government did not wish to ask the sultan to alienate territory from his. sovereignty. It has been 
asserted that until the annexation Great Britain refused to extend the protection of her consuls to Cypriots 
resident outside the island (see Hill, A History o f Cyprus, ante, Vol. IV p. 285); O’Connell, International Law 
Vol. I, London, 1965, 354:“the British government in fact acknowledged that it had no intention of alienating 
territory from the Sultan’s sovereignty”. The British Foreign Secretary was also of the opinion that the transfer 
of the island to the Great Britain had all the incidents of cession for so long as the British occupation lasted 
(O’Connell, Legal Aspects of the peace treaty with Japan, British YB.I.L., 1952 vol. XIX, 423, p.426)..
26 See Oppenheim-Lauterpacht, International Law supra, p.455, note 2; O’Connell, International Law, supra; 
Roberts-Wray, op.cit. (considers as doubtful whether, in English Law, Cyprus could accurately be regarded as a 
territory under the Sovereign’s protection and points out the difficulty of grouping Cyprus with other territories 
by referring to pre-1915 Acts of Parliament).
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Great Britain immediately after the outbreak of war with Turkey in 1914, 
annexed Cyprus by Order in Council of the 5 th November 191427 and as from that date 
Cyprus formed part of the Her Majesty’s dominions.28
Cyprus, when annexed, had been under British administration since 1878. Such 
annexation in time of peace without the consent of the State which in law owns the 
territory is unlawful and it is of doubtful legality in war.29 In any event the annexation 
was recognized by Turkey by article 20 of the Treaty of Lausanne 1923. Turkey 
furthermore, by Article 16 o f the same treaty renounced all rights and titles 
whatsoever over or respecting inter alia the islands other than those over which the 
sovereignty is recognised by the present Treaty {and therefore over Cyprus as well) 
and by Article 27 Turkey was precluded from exercising any jurisdiction in any 
political, administrative or legislative matter outside the territory of Turkey, on any 
national of a territory put under the sovereignty of the other signatory Powers (as in 
the case of Ottoman subjects in Cyprus).
1.3 British constitutional proposals for Cyprus
On the assumption of the government by the Labour party in 1945 the 
Secretary of State for the Colonies stated that it was proposed to seek opportunities to 
establish a more liberal progressive regime in the internal affairs of the island. For this 
purpose a Consultative Assembly was convened in 1947 but the response was 
discouraging. These constitutional proposals though constituting a step towards self- 
government were inspired by an imperial spirit and were inconsistent with the ideals 
for which the Second World War had been fought and the declared promises during 
and after the War by the British government. The limitations imposed by the 
constitutional proposals and the powers reserved to the Governor with respect to
27 The Cyprus Annexation Order in Council 1914, Statutory Rules and Orders Revised 1924, No. 1629, vol. II 
pp. 577-578. During World War II Great Britain offered to transfer Cyprus to Greece in exchange for Greek 
support for Serbia an offer which was later withdrawn.
28 It is an indication that the United Kingdom did not subsequently deny the Enosis to the Greeks of Cyprus 
because of any strategic agreement with Turkey, but on other grounds which will be discussed later in this 
Chapter.
29 Oppenheim-Lauterpacht, International Law, ante, p. 567, note 3.
30 For details of the Plan, see Kyriakides, Cyprus, Constitutionalism and crisis Government, University of 
Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, 1968, pp. 30-32.
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defence and external affairs had not left any room for their acceptance. The Greek 
Cypriots under the leadership of Archbishop Leontios had decided that their future 
aim should be Enosis and only Enosis (Union with Greece). An aim followed by his 
successors Makarios II and Makarios III.31 The demand of Enosis was becoming more 
persistent and on the 15th of January 1950 a plebiscite was held, under the aegis of the 
Ethnarchy Council, among Greek Cypriots, at which 96 % of the persons taking part 
in it voted for Enosis of Cyprus with Greece.
In the meantime the British Government announced that she intended to 
introduce a constitution as a first step towards self-government, an announcement 
which was met by the immediate reaction of the Greek Cypriots. For overcoming such 
reaction and winning their cooperation the British thought that the best way was to 
carry with her some good will from Greece and Turkey and for this purpose she 
decided to invite Greece and Turkey to send representatives to a conference to be held 
in London and collaborate for an agreement there. The theme of the conference was to 
cover all the common interest of the three powers on the eastern M editerranean.32 
The proposed Conference was held without the approval of the Archbishop who 
publicly declared that the convening of such a conference is a trap and a means of 
undermining Greece’s appeal to the United Nations. It is significant that at the 
Conference, Macmillan, the British Foreign Secretary, frankly admitted that: “it is an 
undoubted anomaly and it is in our view wrong that while so many other parts of the 
world have made steady progress in the art and practice of self-government there has 
been no comparable advance in Cyprus. We must put this right. Internal self- 
government has to be the first aim.”33 The Greek Foreign Minister Stephanopoulos 
supported the application of self-determination to Cyprus,34 whilst the late Zorlu, the 
Turkish Foreign Minister, maintained that it was not right to consider the Cyprus 
question from the angle of the present day composition of the people and the guiding 
principles should not be the consideration of the majorities and minorities but rather
31
32 Eden’s, Memoirs London 1960, p. 197; See also debates in the House of Commons in Parliamentary Debates 
(Hansard), H.C. Debates 12947-1948 vol. 451 col. 2159-2162.
33 Cmd 9594 (Miscellaneous No. 18 1955). The Tripartite Conference on Eastern Mediterranean and Cyprus, p. 
13.
34 Cmd pp. 17-18.
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the granting of full equality to the two groups. Furthermore he added that the status 
quo should be maintained in Cyprus. If this were to be upset then the island should 
revert to Turkey 35
In broad lines it was proposed a Constitution providing for an Assembly with an 
elected majority, a proportionate quota being left for to the Turkish Cypriot 
community and for the progressive transfer of the departments to Cypriot Ministers 
responsible to the Assembly with the exception of foreign affairs, defence and security 
which will be left for the Governor. A proportion of the ministerial posts would be 
reserved for the Turkish Cypriots.
There was no agreement regarding the future international status of Cypms and 
confronted with this deadlock the Conference came to an end.36
The Greek Cypriots undertook then an armed struggle for the satisfaction of their 
demands. The Governor was substituted by Field Marshall Sir John Harding, Chief of 
the Imperial General Staff, who on arriving to Cypms started protracted negotiations 
with the Ethnarch Archbishop Makarios in an attempt to find a solution to the problem. 
The proposals put forward by the British Government during the talks, as far as the 
constitutional problem was concerned were as follows
(a) Though the British Government admits that the principle of self-determination 
may be applicable to Cypms nevertheless her position was that it was not a 
practical proposition on account of the situation then prevailing in the Eastern 
Mediterranean.37
(b) The details of the constitution would be a matter for a discussion between the 
representatives of all sections of the population. Nevertheless the following 
points were clarified by the British Government
35 Cmd 9594 p. 25.
36 Eden’s Memoirs, ante p. 4101; Cmd. 9594 supra p. 42; comments on the Conference by Kyriakides, Cyprus, 
Constitutionalism and crisis Government, ante, pp. 39-41.
37 The British Government would be prepared to discuss the future of the island with representatives of the 
people of Cyprus when self-government has proved itself capable of safeguarding the interests of all sections of 
the community (correspondence exchanged between the Governor and Archbishop Makarios, Cmd. 9708, p. 3); 
for these talks see S.G. Xydis, Cyprus, Reluctant Republic, The Hague 1973, pp. 44, 95, 206 note.
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(i) She offers wide measure of democratic self-government and to this end she 
proposed the drawing of a new and liberal constitution in consultation with 
all sections of the community.
(ii) The constitution would enable the people of Cyprus through responsible 
Cypriot Ministers to assume by suitably phased process, control over the 
departments of Government except those relating to foreign affairs and 
defence which would be reserved to the Governor and the public security 
which would be also be reserved to the Governor for as long as he deems 
necessary.
(iii) The constitution will provide for an Assembly with an elected majority.
(iv) A Cypriot Premier would head the new administration who would be
chosen by the Assembly with the approval of the Governor. Ministerial 
portfolios would be allocated by the Premier subject to a constitutional 
provision relating to participation of Turkish ministers in the Council of
Ministers.
(v) There would be proper safeguards for the rights of the individual citizens.38
Eventually no agreement could be reached, not only on the constitutional question 
but also on other matters.39.
The British Government concentrated on the action necessary to prepare a 
working plan for self-government of Cyprus and for this purpose entrusted Lord 
Radcliffe to prepare and submit constitutional proposals for Cyprus. Such was the 
report submitted by Lord Radcliffe.40
By his constitutional proposals Lord Radcliffe recommended that a diarchy for 
Cyprus consisting of the section of subjects reserved for the Governor, comprising 
foreign affairs, defence and internal security, and the self-governing section
38 Cyprus: Correspondence exchanged between the Governor and Archbishop Makarios, Cmd. 9708 p. 8; 
Kyriakides, Cyprus, Constitutionalism and Crisis government, supra, pp.42-44.
39 As a r result the Archbishop, together with the Bishop of Kyrenia and other churchmen was deported to the 
Seychelles. The armed struggle, however, continued. See the prophetic speech of Earl Attlee when he said “I 
hold no brief for the Archbishop, but I remember that the rebels of the past generally tend, sooner or later, to be 
Prime Ministers in the British Commonwealth” (Parliamentary Debates-Hansard, House o f Lords Debates vol. 
196 col.462).
40 See Constitutional proposals for Cyprus, Report submitted to the Secretary o f State fo r the Colonies Cmnd.
42.
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consisting of the Legislative Assembly, the cabinet and the Judiciary and 
comprising all matters other than the reserved ones.
The Legislative Assembly would consist of a Speaker, a Deputy Speaker appointed 
by the Legislative Assembly and 36 other members out of whom 6 would be 
nominated from among members of the minority communities and 30 elected 
members (6 voters on the Turkish communal roll and 24 elected voters on the 
general roll). The Legislative Assembly would pass all the Bills dealing with self- 
government matters that shall become Laws on being assented to by the Governor. 
The executive power of the self-governing section would be exercised by a cabinet 
consisting of the Chief Minister, appointed by the Governor from among the 
members of the Legislative Assembly and enjoying the largest measure of general 
support in the Assembly and five other Ministers appointed by the Governor on the 
recommendation of the Chief Minister from among members of the Legislative 
Assembly. There would be also a Minister of Turkish Cypriot Affairs, appointed 
by the Governor at his discretion from among the members of the Legislative 
Assembly elected by the voters on the Turkish Cypriot communal roll, who will be 
responsible for the office dealing with Turkish Cypriot affairs.
Regarding the Judicature there would be a Supreme Court consisting of the 
Chief Justice who is appointed by the Governor after consultation with the Chief 
Minister and two other judges, or such increased number of members as may be 
provided by law, being uneven, appointed by the Governor after consultation with 
the Chief Justice.
The Attorney-General would be appointed by the Governor on the 
recommendation of the Chief Minister and his appointment would be revoked 
accordingly.
A tribunal of Guarantees would be established, the members of which would be 
appointed by the Governor in consultation with the Chief Justice and the Chief 
Minister. Membership of the Tribunal shall include an equal number of the Greek 
Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots under the chairmanship of a person who would not 
be either Greek Cypriot or Turkish Cypriot. The Tribunal would deal with 
individual complaints against acts of the administration.
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His conclusions are pertinent, even today. For this reason the relevant paragraphs 
of this Report are quoted in full:
“27. I have given my best consideration to the claim, put before me on behalf of 
the Turkish Cypriot community that they should be accorded political 
representation equal to the of the Greek Cypriot community. If I do not accept it I 
do not think that it is out of any lack of respect for the misgivings that lie behind it. 
But this is a claim by 18% of a population to share the political power equally with 
80% and, if it is to be given effect to, I think that it must be made on one of the 
two possible grounds. Either it is consistent with the principles of a constitution 
based on liberal and democratic conceptions that political power should be 
balanced in this way, or no other means than the creation of such political 
equilibrium will be effective to protect the essential interests of the community 
from oppression by the weight of the majority. I do not feel that I can stand firmly 
on either of these propositions.
28. The first of embodies the idea of a federation rather than unitary state. It would 
be enough to accord to members of a federation equality of representation in the 
federal body, regardless of the numerical proportions of the populations of the 
territories they represent. But can Cyprus be organised in this way? I  do not think 
so. There is no pattern territorial separation between the two communities, and 
apart from  other objections, federation o f communities seems to be a very difficult 
constitutional form .41 If it is said that what is proposed is in reality nothing more 
than a system of functional representation, the function of in this case being the 
community life and organization and nothing else. I find myself baffled in the 
attempt to visualise how an effective executive government for Cyprus is to be 
thrown up by a system in which political power is to remain permanently divided 
in equal shares between the two opposed communities. Either there is stagnation in 
political life, with the result frustration which accompanies it, or some small 
minority group acquires an artificial weight by being able to hold the balance 
between the two main parties. My conclusion is that it cannot be in the interest of
41 Emphasis my own. On Federalism see Chapter VII, below.
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Cyprus as a whole that the constitution should be formed on the basis of equal 
political representation for the Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriot communities.
29. Does the second ground lead to a different result? I do not think so. To give an 
equal political strength in a unitary state to two communities which have such a 
marked inequality in numbers- an inequality which, so far as signs go is likely to 
increase as decrease- is to deny to the majority of the population over the whole of 
the field of self-government the power to have its will reflected in effective action. 
Yet it might be well right to insist on this denial if the constitution could not be 
equipped with any other means effective of securing the smaller communities in 
the possession of their essential special interests. Not only do I think that it can be 
equipped with such means by placing those interests under the protection 
independent tribunals with appropriate powers and relying only to a limited extent 
on direct political devices, but I think that the legalist solution which this depends 
on is in fact better suited to provide the protection that is required, and it does not 
have the effect of denying the validity of the majority principle over a field much 
wider than that with which special community interests are truly concerned”.
The Radcliffe constitution was not accepted either by Archbishop Makarios or by 
the Greek Government.42 The armed struggle in Cypms continued.
Sir John Harding was succeeded as Governor by Sir Hugh Foot whose links 
with the island date back to 1943 when he was Colonial Secretary. It was the 
Governor’s ideas that mainly inspired the Macmillan Plan which was announced 
on the 19th of June 1958 43 Sir Hugh Foot summarised its aims in a broadcast to the 
troops of Cypms:44 “It may be summarised in three sentences. First, we want to 
give the best possible deal to all the people of the island. Second we want to bring 
the three Governments of Great Britain, Greece and Turkey together in a joint 
effort to make sure that they get it. Third, we believe that this can only be achieved 
by Great Britain given a definite and determined lead to break the vicious circle 
from Cypms which has suffered so long”.
42 For the details of the Radcliffe Constitutional Plan, see Kyriakides, Cyprus, Constitutionalism and Crisis 
Government, ante, pp. 45-48.
43 Sir Hugh Foot, A Start in Freedom, London, 1964, pp. 159-163.
44 Ibid. p. 168
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Under the Macmillan Plan a partnership scheme was proposed for Cyprus-
partnership between the two communities in the Island and also between the
Governments of the United Kingdom, Greece and Turkey. For this purpose:
(a) The Greek and Turkish Governments will each be invited to appoint a 
representative to cooperate with the Governor in carrying out the Plan.
(b) The Island will have a system of representative Government with each 
community exercising autonomy in its own communal affairs. To this end 
there would be a separate House of Representatives for each of the two 
communities, which will have the final legislative authority in communal 
matters.
(c) Authority for internal administration other than communal matters and internal 
security will be undertaken by a Council presided over by the Governor and 
including representatives of the Greek and the Turkish Governments and six 
elected members drawn from the Houses of Representatives, four being Greek 
Cypriots and two Turkish Cypriots.
(d) The Governor, acting after consultation with the representatives of the two 
Governments will have the reserve powers to ensure that the interests of both 
communities are protected;
(e) External affairs, defence and internal security will be matters specifically 
reserved for the Governor acting after consultation with representatives of the 
two Governments;
(f) Such representatives will have the right to require legislation which they 
consider discriminatory to be reserved for consideration by an impartial 
tribunal.45
It is to be noted that the proposed constitutional arrangements not only did not satisfy 
the national aspirations of the Greek Cypriots, but brought Turkey to share the 
administration of Cyprus. It should be recalled that by the aforementioned provisions 
of the Treaty of Lausanne Turkey renounced any rights of Sovereignty over Cyprus.46
45 Cyprus : Statement o f policy Cmnd. 455 pp. 2-3. Details as to the surrounding circumstances of the 
preparation of the Macmillan Plan and its contents see Xydis, Cyprus, Reluctant Republic, op. cit., pp. 130-143.
6 See further Eden, Memoirs, op. cit. p. 413. There exist instances of administration of a territory. Usually the 
condominium of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan is referred to under the agreement of Great Britain and Sudan of
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Early in 1959 negotiations were held in Zurich between the Greek and the 
Turkish Governments for the purpose of finding a solution.47 On the 11th February 
1959 an agreement was reached at Zurich between the Greek and the Turkish Minister 
for the establishment of an independent State, the Republic of Cyprus. At a 
Conference held in London in February 1959 attended by the Prime Ministers of Great 
Britain and Greece, the Turkish Foreign Minister, the Foreign Ministers of Great 
Britain and Greece and the representatives of the Greek Cypriot communities a 
Memorandum with documents annexed to it setting out the foundations of the final 
settlement of the problem of Cyprus was signed and adopted on the 19th February 
1959 48 A joint constitutional commission prepared the Constitution of the Republic of 
Cyprus and London joint committees prepared the draft treaties giving effect to the 
conclusions of the London Conference. Agreement was reached on all points on 1st 
July 1960 49 The Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus was signed at Nicosia on the 
16th of August I96050 by the then Governor on behalf of the British Government, by 
representatives of the Governments of Greece and Turkey, by Archbishop Makarios, 
on behalf of the Greek Cypriot community, and Dr. Fazil Kutch on behalf of the 
Turkish Cypriot community and was put into force on that date.51
January 19, 1899 signed at Cairo.,(see Oppenheim-Lauterpacht, International Law, ante, p. 453, note 4). For 
other instances see Oppenheim-Lauterpacht, International Law, supra, pp.453-455. For instances of common 
control of territory see Roberts-Wray, Commonwealth and Colonial Law, ante, pp. 53-54, O’Connell, 
International Law, ante, pp. 352-353.
47 For details of the circumstances which led to the Zurich Agreement see Sir Hugh Foot, A Start in 
Freedom,ante, pp. 176-179; Xydis, Cyprus, Reluctant Republic, ante, pp.359-419.
48 See Conference on Cyprus signed at Lancaster House on February 19, 1959, Cmnd 79 p. 4. The documents 
annexed to the memorandum were: (a) Basic structure of the Republic of Cyprus pp. 5-10, (b) the Treaty of 
Cyprus pp. 10-11, (c) additional article to be inserted inn the Treaty of Alliance between the Republic of Cyprus 
and Greece and Turkey p. 11, (d) declaration made by the Government of the United Kingdom of February 127, 
1959, pp. 11-123, (e) additional article to be inserted in the Treaty of Guarantee p. 13, (f) declaration made by 
the Greek and Turkish Government Foreign ministers of the 11th February 1959 p.13, (g) declaration made by 
the Representative of the Greek Cypriot community on February 19, 1959 p. 14, (h) declaration made by the 
representative of the Turkish Cypriot Community p. 174. (i) declaration made by the Representatives to prepare 
for the new arrangements in Cyprus pp. 14-15. For details of the conference see Xydis Cyprus, Reluctant 
Republic op. cit. 00. 420-460; Ehrlich ante. pp. 20-35.
49 The Treaty of Establishment between the United Kingdom, Greece and Turkey and the Republic of Cyprus 
with its Annexes.
50 Cyprus Act 1960 section 1 , Republic of Cyprus Order in Council 1960 SI. 1368/1960 appointing the 16th day 
of August, as the day of the coming into operation of the Constitution.
51 Why the British denied Enosis? From 1951 onwards the Greek Government made it clear that in return for 
Enosis it was quite willing to grant Britain whatever bases she required either in Cyprus itself, or on the Greek 
mainland. This made the connection between Western defence and the necessity for continued British 
sovereignty problematical. One British Official summed it up as follows: “If we link Cyprus with NATO and 
implicitly admit its value lies in its usefulness for NATO purposes we destroy the case for the retention of the 
sovereignty by the U.K. on strategic grounds. As NATO base Cyprus could just as well belong to Greece as to
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1.4 The Structure and legal peculiarities of the Constitution
The structure provided by the Agreement was based on the recognition of the 
existence of two communities, the Greek and the Turkish- who in spite of their 
numerical disparity were given equal treatment. The aim was to ensure that each 
community participates in the exercise of the functions of governm ent.52 The official 
languages of the Republic are the Greek and the Turkish ones.53 For each community 
a Communal chamber is established exercising legislative and administrative power 
on certain restricted subjects relating to religious matters, educational, cultural and 
teaching matters, and instances of courts dealing with civil disputes relating to 
religious matters and personal status and on matters relating to institutions of purely 
communal character and having a right to oppose taxes and fees on members of their 
respective communities in order to provide for the respective need of bodied and 
institutions under the control of the communal chamber.54
The President of the Republic shall be a Greek Cypriot and the Vice-President 
of the Republic a Turkish Cypriot elected separately by universal and secret ballot.
The President and the Vice-President of the Republic jointly exercise executive power 
in respect of subjects exclusively laid down in the Constitution except on certain 
occasions, address messages to the House of Representatives, and exercise the 
prerogatives of mercy in respect of members belonging to their own community.
The President and Vice-President of the Republic either jointly or separately have a 
right of return of any law or decision of the House of Representatives or of the
us. Our whole case depends upon our need for Cyprus as an extra-NATO base for our own purposes in the 
Middle East (PRO, Foreign Office, FO 371/117653)In defining the core NATO area in 1949 special care had 
been taken to exclude Cyprus, although this fact was not communicated at the time to Greece or Turkey. Such 
an exclusion was not affected by the entry of the latter two countries into NATO during 1952. (PRO FO 
0371/1117631). In the British mind it was because Cyprus, was a Crown Colony and that the United Kingdom 
therefore possessed tenure in the island, that they were adamant as to the legitimacy and continuance of their 
sovereignty. The most signal proof of this came in July 1954 when British Middle East Headquarters covering 
both Land and Air Forces was formally transferred from Suez to Cyprus. See Public Record Office, British 
Cabinet Minutes C 54 245, 21.7.54: “In a top secret briefing in 1950, British military chiefs of staff spelled out 
the importance of Cyprus”. See also Robert Holland, Britain and the Revolt in Cyprus, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1998.
52 Such principles permeated through the whole constitution structure. It is obvious that these separatist elements 
were inspired by the Macmillan Plan. An equal status is given to the Greek community, representing the 80% of 
the population with the Turkish Community, representing the 18% in many respects.
53 Cyprus Constitution, Article. 3.7
54 Ibid. Articles 86-90. The communities are given the right of special relationship with Greece and Turkey 
respectively including the right to receive subsidies for educational, cultural, athletic and charitable institutions 
belonging to the community and of obtaining and employing if necessary schoolmasters, professors or 
clergymen provided by the Greek or Turkish Government, as the case may be. (Ibid, Article 108).
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Council of Ministers, respectively, for consideration and of final veto against any Law 
or decision of the House of Representatives or any decision of the Council of 
Ministers relating to foreign affairs, defence or security as defined in Article 50 of the 
Constitution.
The main executive organ is the Council of Ministers. There shall be seven 
Greek Cypriot Ministers and Turkish Cypriot Ministers nominated by the President 
and the Vice -President of the republic respectively but appointed by them jointly. 
The Council of Ministers is the highest organ in the Republic for formulating policy 
and exercising the executive power in all respects except for the specific subjects 
allotted to the President and the Vice-President of the Republic, to Ministers and the 
Communal Chambers respectively.
The President and the Vice-President jointly promulgate the laws or decisions 
of the House of Representatives and the decisions of the Council of Ministers and 
each one of them separately is doing the same in respect of the laws or decisions of 
the Communal Chamber of his own community. Before such promulgation the 
President and the Vice-President in respect of any law or decision of the Communal 
Chamber to his own community may refer to the Supreme Constitutional Court for its 
opinion any law or decision or any part thereof, which appears to be inconsistent with 
constitutional provisions.
The House of Representatives President shall be a Greek Cypriot and the Vice- 
President a Turkish Cypriot and shall be elected separately by the representatives of 
the Greek community and the Turkish Community respectively. In case of vacancy in 
either office an election shall take place and the functions performed by the eldest 
Representative of the respective Community.
The House cannot be dissolved either by the President or the Vice-President but only 
by its own decision. The laws and decisions of the House of Representatives shall be 
passed by a single majority of the Representatives present and voting. Any 
modification of the Electoral Law and the adoption of Law relating to the 
municipalities and imposing taxes shall require a simple majority of the
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Representatives elected by the Greek and the Turkish community respectively taking 
part in the vote.55
The judicial power of the Republic is exercised by the Supreme Constitutional 
Court and by the High Court and its subordinate Courts.
The Supreme Court shall consist of a President and a Greek and Turkish Judge, 
citizens of the Republic, all of them appointed by the President and Vice-President of 
the Republic.56 The main Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court relates to whether a law or 
decision of the House of Representatives is either totally or partly contrary to 
constitutional provisions. If a law or decision is declared by the Supreme 
Constitutional Court as unconstitutional, the law or decision is annulled. In the case of 
any law before promulgation such law or decision is not promulgated and in case of a 
reference by a trial Court on a point raised by a party to judicial proceedings the law 
becomes inapplicable to such proceedings only.57 The Supreme Constitutional Court 
has exclusive jurisdiction to adjudicate finally on a recourse made to it on a complaint 
that a decision or omission of any organ, authority or person exercising any executive 
or administrative power is contrary to the Constitution or any law or is made in abuse 
of power, in which case the Court, may annul or confirm such act.58 Any decision of 
the Supreme Constitutional Court on any matter within its competence shall be 
binding on all courts, organs, authorities and persons.59
55 Ibid, Article 78.
56 Unlike other countries where it exists a Constitutional Court, the Cyprus Constitutional Court consists (or 
used to consist before 1964) of only three judges, out of whom its President is not a citizen of the Republic. In 
the German Federal Republic the Federal Constitutional Court consists of federal judges and other members as 
regulated by law (Art. 94 of the German Constitution, Peasley: The Constitutions of the Nations vol. HI Europe 
Part I The Hague, 1968, p. 69). In Italy the Constitutional Court is composed of fifteen judges nominated in the 
manner provided by article 135 of the Constitution ( Peasley: The Constitutions o f the Nations, supra, p. 523). In 
Turkey the Constitutional court consists of fifteen judges regular and five alternate members elected in the 
manner provided by Article 145 of the constitution (Ibid. vol. II Asia Part 2 p. 1118).
57 The law is not annulled erga omnes, the U.S. system being adopted (see Schwartz, Constitutional Law, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1955, p. 9; Southerland, How and Brown, Constitutional Law, vol. I, 
Boston, 1961, p. 112). Therefore, the principle of the separation of powers, adopted by the Constitution is 
maintained, as the decision of the Supreme Constitutional Court declaring a law or a provision as contrary to the 
Constitution is of judicial and not of a legislative character. On the contrary, in Italy the declaration of a law as 
unconstitutional operates erga omnes (Article 136 of the Constitution). The same applies in Turkey (Article 152 
of the Constitution) and in Austria (Article 140 of the Constitution).
58 Cyprus Constitution, Article 146.
59 Ante, Article 148.
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The High Court, on the other hand, is the highest appellate court and has also 
power to issue of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition and certiorari.60
The independent officers of the Republic are the Attorney-General assisted by 
his Deputy, the Auditor-General assisted by his deputy and the Governor of the 
Issuing Bank assisted by his deputy, all of whom are appointed by the President of the 
Republic. The first two are not removable from office except on the same grounds and 
through the same procedure as a Judge of the High Court.61
The public service shall be composed as to seventy per centum of Greeks and 
as to thirty per centum of Turks. There shall be a Public Service Commission 
consisting of a Chairman and nine other members appointed for a term of six years by 
the President and the Vice-President seven of whom shall be Greeks and three shall be 
Turks. It shall be the duty of the Commission to make the allocation of public offices 
between the two communities and to appoint, promote, transfer and exercise 
disciplinary control over, including dismissal or removal from office, public officers.62
Under the Treaty of Guarantee the Republic of Cyprus undertakes to ensure the 
maintenance of its independence, territorial integrity and security as well as respect 
for its constitution and it undertakes not to participate in whole or in part in any 
political or economic union with any State whatsoever or to promote the partition of 
the Island (Article l) .63 Part II of the Constitution deals with human rights and mainly 
based on the European Convention.64
It is made clear that the Constitution of Cyprus was imposed upon its people by 
the Zurich Agreement. It is therefore, of the character of a granted constitution, which 
the monarch, in past centuries, consented to grant to his people, but is rather 
inconsistent with the prevailing principles of democracy, by which the power is
60 The High Court constitutes also the Supreme Council of Judicature for the appointment, transfer, removal and 
disciplinary control over the judges of the subordinate courts (Ibid Article 157).
61 Ibid., Articles 112, 121.
62 Ibid., Articles 122-125.
63 By the Draft Treaty of Alliance the three Parties undertake to co-operate for their common defence and resist 
any attack or aggression directed against the independence and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus. 
For this purpose a Tripartite Headquarters shall be established on the territory in which Greece and Turkey shall 
participate by a military contingent of 950 Greeks and 650 Turks officers and men. In the Treaty of Alliance 
provision is made for the operation of the Tripartite Headquarters.
See Tomaritis, The European Convention of human rights in the legal order o f the Republic o f Cyprus, 
Nicosia 1976, pp. 10-15; Idem, The Human rights as recognised and protected by law with special reference to 
the law of the Cyprus, Cyprus Law Tribune, parts 4-6, p.3; Idem, The right to freedom of movement and 
residence specially under the law of the Republic of Cyprus, Cyprus Law Tribune, Nicosia, 1974, parts 1-3.
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exercised by the people.65 But it is not only the manner in which the Constitution was 
granted that is against the principles of public law but also the contents of the 
Constitution as such which rather go against established principles of international law. 
The right of self-determination of peoples as developed from World War I and 
adopted by the Charter of the United Nations66 and the International Covenants67 
consists in the liberty of peoples68 to determine their own government without any 
foreign intervention- internal self-determination- and on the external field their future- 
external self-determination. The right to self-determination is denied to the people of 
Cyprus by the constitutional provisions whereby the constitutional structure created by 
the Zurich Agreement shall remain unalterable by any means and that the Basic 
Articles of the Constitution cannot be amended by way of variation, addition or 
repeal.69 These provisions are contrary not only to the principles of public law70 and 
constitutional practice,71 but go against the purposes of the U.N. Charter.
65 See the judgment of Chief Justice Marshall in the case Marbury v. Madison U.S. Constitutional Supreme 
Court. Reference may be made to the constitutions of the 19th century as the constitutions of Belgium 1831, 
Article 25, 31, Greece 1864, Articles 21 and land France 1848 Article 1. In the 20th century most of the 
constitutions adopted the principle of sovereignty of the people. See, inter alia, the constitutions of Austria, Art. 
1; Bulgaria, Art. 1 and 2; Finland, Art. 2; France 1958, Art. 1 and 2; Basic Law of the Federal Republic o f  
Germany, preamble; German Democratic Republic, preamble; Greeece (1975) Art. 1.3; Ireland, preamble and 
Art. 1; Italy, Art. 1; Burma, preamble; India, preamble; Turkey, preamble where reference is made to the 
Turkish nation; Libya, preamble.
66 U.N. Charter Articles 1, 2 and 55; See also Bassiouni, Self-Determination as a general principle of 
International Law, American J.I.L. (1971) 61, pp. 31-35.
67 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966.
68 The concept of “people” presupposes a territory and permanence of a group of persons linked together by 
certain bonds on such territory.
69 Cyprus Constitution, Article 182.1.
70 Since the time of the French Revolution the right of the people to revise and alter their constitution has not 
been challenged. See Article 1 of Title VII of the French Constitution of 1791 (Peaslee, The Constitutions o f the 
Nations, ante p. 31). The special provision for revision is hereby provided as a guarantee that the alteration is 
processed after mature consideration, but such restriction may be considered as of a political rather than legal 
character.
71 According to constitutional practice a constitution may be revised either unrestrictively (as the constitution of 
Switzerland (Art. 118) and of certain Latin American States) or subject to certain conditions relating either to 
the revisional organ and the procedures to be followed or the imposition of a time limit before the expiration of 
which no revision can take place (as the constitutions of Greece of 1964, 1911 and 1927 and the constitution of 
the United States (Art. V) which could not be revised before 1808) or to certain provisions which could not be 
revised in any event (such as the provisions of the form of government or specifically provided articles as under 
the constitutions of Italy (Art. 139), and of France (1958) (Art. 89)).
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A lot of debate has erupted on the issue whether Article V of the Treaty of 
Guarantee is in accordance with international law principles. This matter stands 
beyond the scope of the present chapter.72
The constitutional provision relating to the decision-making competence of the 
Public Services Commission in case of appointment, promotion, transfer and 
discipline of public officers belonging to one of the communities by an absolute 
majority of the members of the Commission including a fixed number of votes of its 
members belonging to such community, amounts to the exercise of a right of veto by 
the latter and the communal criteria contravene universal criteria.
As regards the constitutional provision relating to the proportion of the 
participation of the Greeks and Turks in the composition of the Public Service, the 
implementation of such provision creates situations leading to a deadlock. The Public 
Service Commission, in considering appointments and promotions, is obliged not to 
use criteria such as the qualifications, and suitability of the candidate, because it has to
n o
take into account the Community to which the candidate belongs.
The final veto accorded to the President and Vice-President against any law or 
decision of the House of Representatives or decision of the Council of Ministers 
relating to foreign affairs or certain matters of defence is against the principle of the 
separation of powers and could bring the President and Vice-President in direct 
conflict with the Legislature.74
The constitutional provision regarding the replacement of the President of the 
Republic in case of his temporary absence or incapacity, not by the Vice-President, 
but by the President of the House of Representatives not only is by-passing the Vice-
72 Article IV of the Treaty provides, inter alia: “In so far as common or concerted action may not prove possible, 
each of the guaranteeing powers reserves the right to take action with the sole aim of re-establishing the state of 
affairs created by the present Treaty”. For representative, but by no means exhaustive, bibliography on the 
matter by authors of the two communities, see respectively Tomaritis, Whether the resort to force or armed 
intervention would be justified either under the Charter or customary international law, Cyprus Today, vol. III. 3 
Supplement, 1964, p.2; Zotiades, The Treaty of Guarantee and the principle of non-intervention, Cyprus Today 
vol. Ill (1965) pp. 5-8; Necatigil, The Turkish Position in International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1993), p. 109 seq.
73 The rigid provision about the ratio of participation in the public service is against the internationally accepted 
principle of the right of every one of equal access to the public service of his country (Universal Dclaration of 
Human Rights Article 21(2); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966, Article 25 (c)).
74 In the U.S. the President has only qualified negative prerogative commonly called a “suspensory veto” but 
actually it is a right of return for the Bill for reconsideration (Constitution o f  the U.S.A.-, Schwartz,
Constitutional Law, ante, p. 99; for instances of its use, see Binkley, The man in the White House, Baltimore, 
1959, pp. 175-176).
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President, but also hinders the continuity of the smooth functioning of the executive 
power. The election, on the other hand, of the President of the Republic by the Greek 
Community and of the Vice-President by the Turkish Community and of the President 
of the House of Representatives by its members belonging to the Greek Community 
and of the Vice-President of the House by its Members belonging to the Turkish 
Community, instead of uniting the people of Cyprus and allowing the Greeks and 
Turks to co-operate friendly, they draw them apart.
But what is unprecedented is the division of justice in the sense that a court 
trying a case the litigants of which belong to one community shall consist only of 
judges belonging to that community.75
The complicated character of the Constitution of Cyprus has been stressed by 
various authors. Professor Stanley de Smith wrote: “The Constitution of Cyprus is 
probably the most rigid in the world. It is certainly the most detailed and (with the 
possible exception of that of Kenya’s new constitution) the most complicated. It is 
weighed down by checks and balances, procedural and substantive safeguards, 
guarantees and prohibitions. Constitutionalism has run riot in harness with 
Communalism. The Government of the Republic must be carried on, but never have 
the chosen representatives of a political majority set so daunting an obstacle course by 
the constitution makers”.76
In the face of this situation, whereby Articles of the Constitution prevented 
Government from functioning smoothly, Archbishop Makarios, by a letter of the 30th 
November 1963 to the Vice-President, submitted a thirteen-point memorandum. By 
this he suggested measures to remove some causes of inter-communal strife. 77
75 Such a division is not only detrimental to the course of justice, but tends to render the judges communally 
minded and suspicious of one another. Further, it tends to shake the confidence of the public in the 
administration of justice.
76 S.A. de Smith, -The Commonwealth and its Constitutions, Penguin Books, p. 295.Reference may also be 
made to the Constitution of India with 395 Articles.
77 The proposals were also communicated to the Governments of the three Guaranteeing Powers. For the letter 
together with the memorandum containing the proposed amendments, see The Cyprus Question: A Broad 
Analysis, Press and Information Office, Nicosia, 1969, pp.9-20. Makarios was encouraged to take this course by 
the then British High Commissioner Sir Arthur Clark, who went so far as to make suggestions on the proposed 
letter, (see generally Glafkos Clerides, My Deposition, ante). On the proposals see also Kyriakides, Cyprus, 
Constitutionalism and crisis Government, ante, pp. 104-109; Ehrlich, International Crises and the Role of Law, 
ante, pp. 57, 118-119.
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The President put forward the following points:
(1) The right of veto of the President and Vice-President to be abandoned;
(2) The Vice-President of the Republic to deputise for the President in case of his 
temporary absence or incapacity to perform his duties.
(3) The Greek President of the House of Representatives and its Turkish Vice- 
President to be elected by the House as a whole and not, as at present, the 
President by the Greek Members of the House and the Vice-President by the 
Turkish Members of the House.
(4) The Vice-President of the House of Representatives to deputise for the 
President of the House in case of his temporary absence or incapacity to 
perform his duties.
(5) The constitutional provisions regarding separate majorities for enactment of 
certain laws by the House of Representatives to be abolished;
(6) Unified municipalities to be established;
(7) The administration of justice to be unified;
(8) The division of the Security Forces into Police and Gendarmery to be 
abolished;
(9) The numerical strength of the Security Forces and of the Defence Forces to be 
determined by a Law;
(10) The proportion of the participation of Greek and Turkish Cypriots in the
composition of the Public Service and the Forces of the Republic to be modified
in proportion to the population of Greek and Turkish Cypriots;
(11) The number of Members of the Public Service Commission to be reduced from ten 
to five;
(12) All decisions of the Public Service Commission to be taken by majority;
(13) The Greek Communal Chamber to be abolished.
2. Inter-communal Conflict analysis
Despite the fact that the Cyprus Question has been treated as an international problem 
in world politics, I think that in order that an adequate picture may be drawn, it is
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78necessary to examine foreign policies in conjunction with domestic developments. I 
shall therefore discuss the character of ethnic strife in Cyprus by pointing out the 
factors, internal as well as external that caused the strife.
2.1 The Roots of political Partition79 in Cyprus
The Ottoman conquest of Cypms 1571 altered the demographic character of the island 
by transplanting there a population different from the Greek native one in terms of 
culture, ethnic origin, language, and religion. It further contributed to the 
consolidation of the Greek population and to the revival of the role of the Orthodox 
Church under the Millet system.80 So, it sets the roots of the present conflict by 
establishing bi-communalism in Cyprus. Therefore under the millet system the Church 
of Cyprus became the spokesman in the political, economic, educational and religious 
affairs of the Greek Cypriot community.81 Also, by the middle of the nineteenth 
century, the Church became the leader of Greek Cypriot nationalism.
The historical record in Cyprus, though, is full of instances of intermarriage and 
common opposition to oppressive administration.82 How, then, did nationalism 
brought the point of political division? The first is to be found in the internal role 
played by the Orthodox Church in the context of the British Colonial rule. Britain 
controlled Cyprus from 1878 until 1960 when independence was granted to the island. 
On the assumption of the administration of Cyprus, the Greek Cypriot community was 
mobilised under the leadership of the Orthodox Church and the pursuit of the enosis 
aim. The last quarter of the 20th century was one of nationalism in Greece under the
78 The distinction between domestic politics and international relations is only an analytical one; foreign policies 
do not operate in a vacuum but are conditioned by the domestic realities of the States involved. As covert and 
overt forms of intervention are increasingly becoming a core element of the foreign policies of the major powers 
today, the mystique of neo-imperialism tends to obscure the fact that intervention and imperialism in their subtle 
contemporary forms are possible to a considerable extent because of the domestic conditions in the “host 
country provide the needed opportunities.,(Paschalis Kitromilides, From Coexistence to Confrontation: The 
Dynamics o f Ethnic Conflict in Cyprus, in Michael Attalides ed., Cyprus Reviewed .Nicosia, 1976).
79 For a definition of political partition, see International Studies Association, Comparative Interdisciplinary 
Studies Bulletin, 1975, Vol. 4, No. 4, pp. 4-6: “the division of formerly unified political units into new entities 
based on ethnic and cultural identity, a deliberate political action taken by internal or external elites”.
80 See Spyridakis, A brief History o f Cyprus, ante, pp. 46-56.
81 On this, Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey (London, 1968), p.335. On the role of the Church see 
Stanley Kyriakides, Cyprus, Constitutionalism and crisis Government, op. cit. pp. 8-12. Also on religion and 
class as internal factors of conflict, see A. Pollis, Colonialism and Neo-colonialism: Determinants of Ethnic 
Conflict in Cyprus, in Kitromilides and Worsley, Small States in the Modern World, N icosia, 1979), p.48.
82 See Admantia Pollis, Intergroup Conflict and British Colonial Policy, Comparative Politics, July 1973, pp. 
582-7. On the Cryptochristian group of the Cypriot Linobambakoi in the Ottoman Society, see R.M Dawkins 
The Cryptochristians of Turkey, Byzantion, vol. VIII (1933) pp. 247-275.; A.C. Aimilianides, The Evolution of 
the Law of Greek Mixed Marriages in Cyprus, (in Greek) Kypriakai Spoudai, Vol. II (1938)
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impact of the Megali Idea,83 which also affected the Greek Cypriots. Most of the 
territories sought by Greece under the Megali Idea were under the Ottoman mle. The 
ensuing rivalry between the two States instigated nationalistic behaviour. The British 
arrival encouraged the Greek Cypriots that Britain, as it did in the case of the Ionian 
Islands, would react favourably to their demands for Enosis.84 Their hopes were soon 
frustrated by the British unwillingness to respond to these very demands.85 The Enosis 
movement was thus intensified. The British policy was to formalise ethnic divisions, 
which lead to a clash of the communities. The policies with respect to the 
communities were manifested in the following areas:86 (a) The Legislative Council, 
where each of the communities was given certain degree of proportional 
representation, in addition to the appointed representatives of the Governor. This 
Council became not only a vehicle of politicisation of the two communities, but also 
the one of enhancing their nationalist rivalries. Given that the Greek Cypriot majority 
was neutralised by the coalition of the British appointed and Turkish Cypriot 
representatives; (b) the expanded and segregated educational system of Cyprus, which 
also became a promoter of nationalism. This was particularly true among the Greek 
Cypriots who utilised personnel, instruction materials, and so on from Greece; (c) the 
use of symbols of national identification, such as the flying of Greek flags. Therefore 
the absence of national integration of Cypms was the outcome not only of Cyprus’ 
Ottoman background, but mostly of the deliberate colonial policy, which (i) 
exacerbated existing linguistic, religious and ethnic differences; (ii) destroyed , by its 
vertical separation of the two communities, the horizontal bonds that had developed 
across the communities, whose task became the promotion of their respective national 
interests; (iv) gave rise to separate political alliances to the people of the two Cypriot
83 The Great Idea: The movement to liberate and unify the unredeemed sections of the Hellenic world to the 
motherland. It guided Greek foreign policy during the nineteenth and the first half of the 20th century. See 
Adamantia Pollis, The Megali Idea: A Study in Greek Nationalism (Ph. D Dissertation , Johns Hopkins 
University, 1958).
84 For the Ionian Islands case see C.W.J. Orr, Cyprus Under British Rule (London: R. Scott, 1918), p. 160.
85 Britain did offer Cyprus as an inducement to Greece for her entry into World War I on the side of the Allies in 
1914. By the time Greece entered into the War in 1917 the British offer had been withdrawn. See Alexander 
Pallis, Greece’s Anatolian Ventures and After (London: Methuen Press, 1937), pp. 8-11, 37.
86 The analysis is that of Professor Van Coufoudakis and is here adopted and quoted verbatim.
33
communities; and (v) gave rise to the demands by both groups to control the various
87aspects of their communities fate, and their claims to a separate political autonomy. 
Therefore the roots of political partition were set during the period of the British 
administration. Subsequently, when, in the aftermath of the 1931 rebellion in Cyprus, 
Britain introduced legislation in order to eliminate the demands of the Greek Cypriots 
for Enosis, these legislative measures intensified the more the nationalist aspirations 
of the Greek Cypriots, as well as the leadership role of the Church. When the Enosis 
plebiscite was held among the Greek Cypriots in 1950, the Enosis became the sole 
aim of the Greek Cypriot nationalists of all political ideologies, while the Church 
remained the most influential national factor in the political affairs of the island.
2.2. The external factors of Political Partition
In the period 1954-1958 the trend toward political partition on Cyprus was enhanced 
by these factors88: (a) the confrontative activity between the two communities, 
particularly after 1957; (b) the clash between Turkey and Greece in NATO and the 
United Nations on behalf of their respective communities on Cyprus, and the 
suppression of the Greek minority in Turkey;89 (c) the international environment in the 
1950s. Proposals for the settlement of the dispute based on political partition were put 
forward. Britain attempted to encourage the Turkish claims to the island on strategic 
grounds,90 and by emphasising the priority of her own strategic needs97
87 See Coufoudakis, Essays on the Cyprus Conflict, (New York: Pella Publishing Company, 1976), p.34.
88 It has to be noted, however, that Greece and the Greek Cypriots pursued wrong tactics. For example the 
underestimation of Turkey, the United States, the international environment of the 1950s and whether and how 
the goal of enosis could be'achieved through international diplomacy.
89 See the government sponsored riots against Greeks living in Constantinople (Istanbul) at the end of the 
Tripartite Conference on the Eastern Mediterranean and Cyprus, held in London, on August 29, 1955, a crime 
for which the Prime Minister Menderes and his associates were convicted by the Turkish Military Tribunal after 
the 1960 coup.
90 See the role of Turkey in NATO and as a promoter and participant in CENTO. Also, the Turkish argument of 
encirclement by islands controlled by Greece. Thus, Turkey urged either no change in the status quo or that 
Cyprus revert to Turkey. Finally the Turkish position focussed on the division of Cyprus between Greece and 
Turkey (see Van Coufoudakis, Essays on the Cyprus Conflict, supra, p.36, note 25)..
91 Cyprus is located forty miles south of Turkey and sixty miles west of the coast of Syria. It is an important 
location in relation to Israel, the Suez Canal, and the Aegean Sea. The location is important for radio 
communications, the monitoring of Soviet (Russian) naval activity and so on. As John Campbell points out in 
his Defence o f the Middle East: Problems o f American Policy (2nd ed. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1960), 
pp. 198-199, “Cyprus may not be the best substitute for Britain’s Suez base which was lost in 1954. Cyprus 
lacks harbours adequate for large ships, and, as the 1956 Suez invasion showed, Cyprus by itself could not 
support large-scale sea and air operations. But Cyprus remains an important headquarters and communications 
centre; it has valuable airfields for tactical air power; and important supporting facilities for limited air 
operations in the eastern Mediterranean...is ideally located on the doorstep of the Middle East but beyond the 
reach of Arab nationalism and untouched by the conflicts of the Arabs with other Middle Eastern nations...” In
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in the region, as well as those of the United States and the various Western regional 
alliances over the Greek Cypriot aim of Enosis.
Britain’s proposals for the resolution of the dispute comprised elements of partition. 
Therefore, Macmillan’s plans for Cyprus, as well as that of R adcliffe92 provided for 
the institutionalisation of external powers in the political affairs of Cyprus, and 
suggested the establishment of separate communal institutions. The persistence of 
Britain to settle the Cyprus issue along the lines of the Second Macmillan Plan inl958 
was the main factor,93 which led Greece embark upon secret talks with Turkey the 
conclusion of which was the Zurich and London Agreements of February 1959. The 
Agreements institutionalised communalism and the involvement of external forces in 
the affairs of the State.94 This should not be surprising in view of that these 
Agreements were negotiated by external Powers.95 
The new constitution became the catalyst of communal conflict.
the aftermath of the 1956 Suez invasion Britain reassessed her strategic position interests and policies. For the 
place of Cyprus in this context, see, Great Britain, Defence, Outline o f Future Policy, Cmnd.124 ,H.M 
Stationery Office, April, 1957. Apart from Campbell’s comments, see also George Harris, Troubled Alliance 
(Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1972), pp. 49-65.
92 For the First Macmillan Plan see Great Britain, The Tripartite Conference on the Eastern Mediterranean and 
Cyprus, Cmnd. 9594, H.M. Stationery Office, 1955, pp. 31-35. For details of the second Macmillan Plan, see 
Great Britain , Cyprus, Statement of Policy, Cmnd. 455, June, 1958.For the 1956 Radcliffe proposals see 
Stationery Office, Great Britain, Constitutional Proposals for Cyprus, Cmnd. 42, H.M Stationery Office, 
December, 1956.
93 There were other factors which led to the London and Zurich Agreements: the British decision to relinquish 
its sovereignty over Cyprus is discussed in Thomas Ehrlich, Cyprus, 1958-1967: International Crises and the 
Role o f Law (New York and London: Oxford University Press, 1974), pp.7-35. Some of Britain’s reasons were: 
her changing strategic needs in the aftermath of the 1956 Suez invasion and EOKA’s struggle; the domestic and 
international pressures created by the Cyprus Question. Turkey accepted the idea of the Zurich settlement with 
the apparent willingness of Greece to drop the aim of Enosis; the economic and political problems facing 
Menderes at home; the overall inability in the Middle East in 1958 and Turkey’s fear of further deterioration of 
its position. With regard to Greece, the causes were the inability to achieve her diplomatic aims in the U.N.; the 
fear of a possible partition of Cyprus; the repercussions of the Cyprus issue on the outcome of the 1958 Greek 
elections.
94 The three of the major documents signed in London on February 1959, are: (a) The Basic structure of the 
Republic which guarantees constitutionally Cypriot bi-communalism. The President and Vice-President have 
final veto powers independently over all important political matters. A 70:30 ratio governs the distribution of all 
public offices including the Cabinet, the civil Service and the Legislature. There are separate Municipalities and 
Judicial systems, (b) The Treaty of Guarantee under the terms of which, Britain, Greece and the Turkey 
guarantee the independence, territorial integrity and the constitutional structure of the Republic. The three 
Guarantors are allowed (Article IV) to take action jointly, or independently if negotiations among them fail, to 
restore the status quo created by these Agreements, (c) The Treaty of Alliance between Cyprus, Greece and 
Turkey, which included the stationing of Greek and Turkish forces on the island.
95 For the Greek view of the constitutional negotiations, see Stephen G. Xydis, Cyprus, Reluctant Republic, ante, 
pp. 342-40. The author has had access to the archives of the Greek Prime Minister Karamanlis and Foreign 
Secretary Averoff-Tossiza.
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On November 30, 1963, President Makarios presented the Vice-President a set of 
thirteen points of proposed amendments to the Constitution. The proposals aimed at 
removing some of the obstacles, which had appeared in the administration of the 
State.96 The proposals were rejected first by Turkey and then by the Turkish Cypriots. 
The inter-communal strife which broke out in December 1963 marked the political 
division of the island.97 The breakdown of the republic was manifest in various ways. 
Two important and obvious ones were (a) the Turkish Cypriot officials withdrew from 
the Cypriot Government, and (b) United Nations and British Peace keeping forces 
created protected areas for the Turkish Cypriots in the cities, as well as enclaves in 
limited areas of the northern part of the island. Although under the auspices of 
UNFICYP98 some progress had been made in some parts of the administration and co­
operation between the two communities prior to the 1974 Turkish Intervention of
96 The fields of constitutional tension are discussed in Thomas Ehrlich, Cyprus 1958-1967, pp. 36-60; Idem, 
Cyprus, The Warlike Isle’: Origin and Elements of the Current Crisis, Stanford Law Review, Vol. 18 (May 
1966), pp. 1021-1097; Stanley Kyriakides, Cyprus, Constitutionalism and Crisis Government, ante, pp.72-103.
97 Some initiatives were taken up to give a halt to the inter-communal fighting. Examples may be provided by (i) 
the London Conference of January 15, 1964, sponsored by the United Kingdom; (ii) threats of Turkish unilateral 
armed intervention; (iii) a limited British Peacekeeping operation; (iv) U.S. President Johnson’s letter of 
December 26, 1964, to Makarios and Kuchuk, and the letter of dated June 5, 1964 to the Turkish Prime Minister 
Inonu. Some important parts of this last letter are hereby quoted: “I am gravely concerned about the information 
which I have had through Ambassador Hare from you and your Foreign Minister that the Turkish Government is 
contemplating a decision to intervene by military force to occupy a portion of Cyprus. I wish to emphasize, in 
the fullest friendship and frankness, that I do not consider that such a course of action by Turkey fraught with 
such far reaching consequences, is consistent with the commitment of your government to consult fully in 
advance with the United States. It is my impression that you believe that such an action by Turkey is permissible 
under the provisions of the Treaty of Guarantee of 1960.
I must call your attention, however, to our understanding that the proposed intervention by Turkey would be for 
the purpose of supporting an attempt by the Turkish Cypriot leaders to partition the island, a solution which is 
specifically excluded by the Treaty of Guarantee. Further, that treaty requires consultation among the guarantor 
states. It is the view of the United States that the possibilities of such consultation have by no means been 
exhausted in this situation and that, therefore, the reservation of the right to take unilateral action is not yet 
applicable. I must call to your attention also, Mr Prime Minister, the obligations of NATO. There can be no 
question in your mind that a Turkish intervention in Cyprus would lead to a military engagement between 
Turkish and Greek forces. Secretary of State Rusk declared at the recent meeting of the ministerial council of 
NATO in the Hague that war between Turkey and Greece must be considered as literally “unthinkable”. I wish 
also Mr. Prime Minister, to call your attention to the bilateral agreement between the United States and Turkey 
in the field of military assistance. Under Article TV of the agreement with Turkey of July 1947, your 
government is required to obtain United States consent for the use of military assistance for purposes other than 
those for which such assistance is furnished. The United States cannot agree to the use of any United States 
supplied military equipment for the Turkish intervention in Cyprus under the present circumstances... The 
United Nations forces could not prevent such a catastrophe (the text may be found in Clerides, My Deposition, 
ante, p. 115-118).
98 UNFICYP was the peacekeeping force established by Security Council Resolution 186 (1964) of March 4, 
1964. A mediator was also appointed to facilitate settlement of the dispute.
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C yprus,99 UNFICYP proved unable to eliminate inter-communal fighting. It is 
noteworthy that under the superintendence of the United Nations the Turkish Cypriot 
enclaves remained intact for a decade, thus containing the division between the two 
communities.100
In our discussion of the role of external factors in the Cypriot inter-communal 
strife, it is necessary to examine at some length the role of foreign Powers, especially 
Turkey, Greece and the United States respectively. The interrelation between domestic 
and international politics thus becomes clear in the analysis of the interaction between 
the two Cypriot ethnic communities, Greece, Turkey and the United States.
With regard to Turkey, and the Turkish Cypriots, the Turkish Cypriot 
community was subordinated to Turkish policy makers. Turkish Government control 
over the Turkish Cypriot community was achieved through several means, including 
penetration of some Turkish Cypriot institutions, economic dependence of the 
community on Turkey, and the formation of irregular Turkish military groups. The 
Turkish troops on the island exceeded the number inscribed in the Zurich 
Agreements. 101 Turkish Officers trained all Turkish Cypriot men in Turkish 
nationalism. The Turkish Defence Organization, TMT, a terrorist group dedicated to 
“Cyprus is Turkish” or to taksim (partition) was supported by Turkey and led by a 
Turkish officer from the mainland.102 After the creation of the Turkish enclaves, the 
Turkish government annually subsidized the Turkish Cypriot community.103 It has 
been asserted that in an effort to enforce its policy of segregation, the Turkish 
government subsidized the Turkish Cypriots, some of whom were refugees from the
99 See the Report of the Secretary General prior to the intervention, United Nations Security Council, Report by 
the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Cyprus (for the period 2 December 1973 to 22 May 
1974), S/11294, pp. 14-16.
100 See further, Stegenga, The United Nations Force in Cyprus (Columbus: Ohio University Press, 1968). For 
subsequent developments, including the Mediator Galo Plaza proposals see United Nations Security Council, 
Report o f the United Nations Mediator on Cyprus to the Secretary-General (S/6253, 26 March, 1965).
101 See Stephens, Cyprus: A Place o f Arms, London, 1966, p.200, where he estimates that in 1965 Turkey had 
about 1000 men in Cyprus and the Turkish Cypriots some 12,000 men under arms. There is no reason to assume 
that the number was reduced in later years. Other estimates place the number of Greek troops at 10,000 (Thomas 
Ehrlich, Cyprus, International Crises and the Role o f Law, ante, p. 99). See also Attalides, Relations between 
Greek and Turkish Cypriots, in Perspective, Proceedings of the International Symposium on Political 
Geography, Nicosia, 1976.
102 James Hughes, The Cypriot Labyrinth, New Left Review (June 1965), pp.49-50.
103 Denktash, R., A Short Discourse.on Cyprus, Nicosia, Cyprus, undated, p. 25: In 1972 Rauf Denktash claimed 
that for eight years, “Turkey has been paying the salaries of every single Turk in the Turkish administration; 
Turkish Cypriot refugees have lived on Turkey’s aid and live in houses built by Turkey, resulting from the fact 
that the Makarios government refused to recognise the Turkish Cypriots’ legitimate rights”.
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December 1963 events, thus reducing the economic pressure for leaving the Turkish 
enclave and working in the Greek sector.104 There was considerable criticism of the 
Turkish Cypriot leadership, particularly by opposition leader Barberoglou for the 
leadership’s segregationist policies, and for repression of Turkish Cypriots. The ability 
of the opposition to speak without constraints, to organise and promulgate their 
opinion among the Turkish Cypriot community was severely limited by the activities 
of the Turkish defence Organisation-TMT. Terrorist bombings and assassinations 
committed by TMT members have been reported from 1962. In 1962, Ahmet Gurkan, 
editor of Turkish Cypriot newspaper Cumhuriyet and Ayhan Hikment, a lawyer, both 
friendly to the Greek Cypriots, were found murdered,105 while in 1966 a Turkish 
Cypriot trade union leader , Kavazoglu, was murdered together with a Greek Cypriot 
union official. In the 1975 TMT agents terrorized the Turkish Cypriot population in 
the Greek area, and they threatened the Turkish Cypriots with reprisals if they mixed 
with Greek Cypriots or did not move to the area occupied by the Turks. By the fall of 
1975, of the 8,000-9000 Turkish Cypriots in the Greek area, approximately 200-250 
remained.106 An opinion has been said to the extent that TMT and EOKA B have 
served the same function within their respective communities. TM T’s goal of taksim 
has complemented EOKA B ’s goal of Enosis; a fulfilment of both goals would divide 
Cyprus with the largest area going to Greece.107 While TMT has served the interests 
of Turkey and EOKA B the interests of Greece, both in turn have served the interests 
of the United States.108
Turkey has publicly declared her control over the Turkish Cypriots. In 1963 when 
Kutchuk received Makarios’ proposals for constitutional amendment, he was willing 
to take them into account, but Turkey at once stopped him from doing so.109 In 1967 
Kutchuk was attacked by those in favour of partition and defended his policies 
through a newspaper of his own. The Government of Turkey then ordered him to stop
104 Adamnatia Pollis, Colonialism and Neo-colonialism: Determinants of Ethnic Conflict in Cyprus, in 
Kitromilides and Worsley, Small States in the Modern World, ante, p. 63.
105 See Hughes, The Cypriot Labyrinth, New Left Review, ante, pp. 49-50.
106 Adamantia Pollis, Colonialism and Neo-Colonialism: Determinants of Ethnic conflict in Cyprus, supra, p.65.
107 Ibid. p.65
108 Ibid.p. 65
109 Stephens, Cyprus: A Place of Arms, ante, p. 180.
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opposing the Turkish nationalists.110 Under rather curious circumstances, Kutchuk 
was ousted in 1969 and replaced by Rauf Denktash, who was seen as a reliable 
advocate of Turkish Foreign Policy and ally of the Western States.
The Turkish Cypriot reality cannot be said as being representative of the attitudes or 
goals of the Turkish Cypriot community.
With regard to Greece and the Greek Cypriots, similar attempts to control the 
Greek Cypriot leadership, and to bring Cypriot policies into compliance with the U.S. 
and Greek Foreign Policy were made on part of Greece. However, the Greek Cypriot 
leadership went against these attempts. Makarios pursued a line contrary to the aims 
of the Greek and U.S Foreign Policies.111 Makarios was able to maintaian high degree 
of independence for the Greek Cypriot political system, because mainly of the support 
by two political parties, namely EDEK and AKEL, the Socialist and Communist party 
respectively.
During the dictatorship in Greece (1967-74) Makarios struggled to achieve 
maintenance of the independence of the Cyprus Government in view of the military 
junta’s attempts to impose a totalitarian regime on the Greek Cypriot community. The 
Greek junta put forward a variety of political stratagems: announcing that Athens was 
the centre of Hellenism and demanding that Makarios replace his cabinet officers with 
those acceptable to the Papadopoulos regime; setting up the Cypriot bishops to 
demand resignation of Makarios as president, on the allegation that he had 
contravened ecclesiastical law and threatening his excommunication. Makarios 
compromised to some extent. He replaced two cabinet ministers, ignored the bishops, 
in fact he had them defrocked112- and eventually attacked Ioannides in public.113 The 
failure of political pressure on Cyprus led the Greek regime to rely increasingly on the 
threat and use of force as a means of attaining domination over the Greek Cypriots. As
110 Purcell, Cyprus, New York, 1969, p.378
11 ^ or an illuminating account of the tension and conflict between the Cypriot leadership of Makarios and the 
Greek Governments see Xydis, The Psychological Complex, in Xydis et al. Makarios and his Allies, Athens: 
Gutenberg, 1974, p.28.
112 The New York Times, 15 July 1973. The three bishops were defrocked by the Middle East Synod on 14 July , 
1973.
113 One such letter-considered the precipitating factor for the Cyprus coup of July 15, 1974-was sent by 
Makarios to the Greek dictatorship days before the coup against his regime. In it he specifically accused the 
Ioannides regime of planning his assassination and he demanded the withdrawal of the Greek officers from the 
National Guard-a demand he had refused to make for the previous six years (see the Observer, July 7,
1974 and The New York Times, July 16, 1).
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a result Cyprus had been constantly in a state of civil strife, not between the Greek and 
Turkish Cypriots though, but between the Greeks themselves. The military force of 
the Cypriot community was the National Guard, which was manned by Greek Officers 
from mainland Greece. Particularly during the office of Papadopoulos these officers 
were selected for their loyalty to Papadopoulos, their fascist ideology and their 
opposition to Makarios.
The significance of the use of force as a factor shaping historical developments were 
the activities of the EOKA terrorist bands. Under directions from Greece these bands 
were reorganised in 1971 as EOKA B, and like their Turkish Cypriot counterpart, 
directed their activities against their fellow nationals while receiving external support 
from Greece and from the United States.114 Grivas, the guerilla leader of the EOKA in 
the 1950s when it operated as a nationalist anti-colonial movement, who had returned 
to Greece after independence, returned to Cyprus in 1964 after apparently accepting 
the Acheson Plan,115 was expelled by Makarios, and returned once again with the 
approval of Papadopoulos in 1971. Then EOKA B mounted a propaganda campaign 
for Enosis, assassinated supporters of Makarios, and planned assassinations and coups 
to oust Makarios with the assistance of the officers of the National G uard .116 Clearly 
Malarios had a broad political base, but, little way of force to protect his position. The 
Palace Guard he had organised and a police force loyal to him had few arms and 
supplies which could not go against the power of the well supplied and financed 
EOKA B and the Greek officered Cypriot National Guard It was the EOKA B and the 
National Guard117 that Greece used as its instruments of force to attain its aims in 
Cyprus. The Papadopoulos dictatorial regime had set as one of its goals the settlement
114 On C.I.A. involvement, see Laurence Stem, Bitter Lessons: How we Failed in Cyprus, Foreign Policy, Vol. 
19 (Summer 1975), pp. 43, 52. The author strongly implies that the CIA may have transmitted funds through 
Greece to EOKA B using Andreas Potamianos, a wealthy Greek Cypriot, as the intermediary; J. Bowyer Bell, 
Violence at a distance: Greece and the Cyprus Crisis, Orbis, Vo;l. 18, No. 3 (Fall 1974), p. 796, discusses the 
fact that the EOKA was trained by KYP, the Greek C.I.A. See also Christopher Hitchens, Detente and 
Destabilisation: Report fro Cyprus, New Left Review, 94, November-December 1^75, pp.61-73.
115 See Van Coufoudakis, United States Foreign Policy and the Cyprus Question: A Case Study in Cold War 
Diplomacy, in Theodore Couloumbis and Sallie Hicks (eds.), U.S. Foreign Policy Toward Greece and Cyprus, 
Washington, D.D.C, The Center for Mediterranean Studies and the American Hellenic Institute, 1975, pp. 123- 
124..
116 For details, see Adamantin Pollis, Colonialism and Neo-colonialism: Determinants of Ethnic Conflict in 
Cyprus, Kitromilides and Worsley, Small States in the Modem World, ante p.69.
117 See The Guardian, October 8, 1973 on planned coups against Makarios which became common. A major 
coup attempt against him in February 1971 was followed by another attempt in 1973.
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of the Cyprus crisis, a settlement which should be satisfactory to both Greek and 
American interests. Cyprus was to become destroyed as a non-aligned country with a 
strong communist force (AKEL) since this posed a potential threat to western security 
interests in the eastern Mediterranean. Abortive coups and failed assassination 
attempts against Makarios became commonplace. Finally, shortly after the death of 
Grivas in January 1974, a coup was executed against Makarios.
It is now necessary to examine the role of the United States in the ethnic 
conflict of Cyprus. Although at times Greek and Turkish national interests have been 
and are in conflict, most sharply of on the question of the oil in the Aegean, both are 
members of NATO and both have been client States of the United States. The foreign 
policy of both Greece and Turkey has been to strengthen their own interests in view of 
the danger posed by a non-aligned Cyprus with a strong communist party, by soon 
incorporating Cyprus in within the Western military alliance. Time after time Greece 
and Turkey have agreed on a solution to the Cyprus conflict only to find 
implementation turned down by Makarios. It was Greece and Turkey who agreed on 
the constitution of 1960, and who agreed on the Acheson Plan in 1964 and it was 
Greece and Turkey that in June 1971 at a NATO meeting apparently made a secret
1 I Q
agreement to end the independence of Cyprus and partition the island. Highly 
suspicious is the mounting evidence that the two communities had arrived at an 
agreement in July 1974 retaining Cyprus’ independence prior to the coup against 
Makarios.119
The status of the Greece and Turkey as client states of the United States sets the 
context within which their policy vis-a-vis Cyprus was formulated. Therefore, the 
United States was a major determinant of developments within Cyprus. Shortly after 
the 1963 inter-communal strife on the island, the United States initiated direct 
negotiations with the Cypriot Government and put forward the Acheson-Ball Plan as a 
solution. This Plan, would have united Greece with a large part of the island, whereas 
the northeast part would become mainly a Turkish Base under Turkish sovereignty.
118 See Coufoudakis, United States Foreign Policy and the Cyprus Question: A Case Study in Cold War 
Diplomacy,,ante. p. 126.
119 Adxdaamnatia Pollis, Colonialism and Neo-Colonialism, Determinants of Ethnic Conflict in Cyprus, in 
Kitromilides and Worsley, Small States in the Modern World, ante p.71.
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This proposal, accepted by Turkey and Greece, was rejected by Makarios, who faced 
pressures towards this direction by the Communist Party (AKEL). The Prime Minister 
of Greece George Papandreou then reversed his first position on the matter and 
declared support of M akarios’ view, thus rejecting the Acheson Plan.120
A major determinant of the United States foreign policy was its willingness to 
settle the Cyprus problem within the perceived American interests.121 An independent 
non-aligned Cyprus was and is viewed by the United States as a potential threat to her 
interests and President Makarios has been labelled the “Castro” of the 
M editerranean.122 The urgency of incorporating Cyprus into NATO became more 
immediate after the Arab-Israeli war of June 1967 and the continuing Middle East 
crisis. It was perhaps a sense of urgency also that prompted the United States to 
support the coup of July 1974 in Cyprus and to approve the Turkish invasion.123
3. Foreign involvement 1960-1974: U.S. Foreign Policy on Cyprus
The role of the United States in the Cyprus dispute has been of utmost importance. 
This has been especially so from 1960 onwards. It would therefore be necessary to 
thoroughly examine its role. The present section constitutes overwhelmingly an 
analysis of the American policy toward Cyprus.
120 See A.G. Xydis, The Psychological Complex of the Cyprus Question, in A.G. Xydis et al. Makarios and his 
Allies, ante, pp. 35-38.
121 Adamantia Pollis, Colonialism and Neo-Colonialism, Determinants of Ethnic Conflict in Cyprus.in 
Kitromilides and Worsley, Small States in the Modern World, ante, p.72.
122 See David Fairhall, Bitter Lemons, Guardian (London), May 29, 1974, for a discussion of the strategic value 
of the British bases in Cyprus to NATO. On Makarios, see Stephens, Cyprus: A Place o f  Arms, op. cit. pp.200- 
201 .
123 This view has been expressed by Adamantia Pollis, Colonialism and Neo-Colonialism: Determinants of 
Ethnic Conflict in Cyprus, in Kitromilides and Worsley, Small States in the Modern World, supra, p.72. For 
other view see below, section 3 of the present Chapter. The former U.S. Ambassador to Greece, Henry Tasca, 
has testified before the House Select Committee that the CIA was the U.S. representative in Greece during the 
Ioannides dictatorship. Taylor Belcher, former U.S. Ambassador to Cyprus testified that senior Cypriot officials 
knew that the CIA was paying Ioannides to subsidize EOKA B. Summary of testimony transcripts provided 
upon request from the House Select Committee on Intelligence, October, 1975. See also Christopher Hitchens, 
Detente and Destabilization: Report from Cyprus, New Left Review, op. cit.
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3.1. U.S. Policy in the Colonial Period of the Cyprus Question
For the sake of completeness, it need be said that the internationalisation of the 
Cyprus question in 1954, affected the American interests in a number of ways. First, 
as an inter-allied dispute Cyprus threatened the cohesion of the Western Alliance after 
the Greco-Turkish entry into Nato.124 Second, it undermined the military cooperation 
of Greece and, to a lesser extent, Turkey with the United States. Third, on numerous 
occasions the acuteness of the Greco-Turkish conflict over Cyprus brought threats of 
war between the two partners of NATO. Such a conflict would bring about irreparable 
damage to NATO’s South-Eastern flank and would risk possible Soviet involvement. 
Fourth, the Cyprus conflict had an important outcome in domestic politics of the three 
allies, and especially Greece. In the latter case, by 1958, the issue of Cyprus 
threatened to undermine the political system so carefully constructed under American 
auspices in the aftermath of the Civil War and the security commitments agreed125. 
Fifth, the Cyprus Question was a cause of embarrassment of the Western Bloc in the 
United Nations and an issue to be exploited by Soviet propaganda. Sixth, there was 
the presence of AKEL, the Communist party of Cyprus. The party was well-organized, 
had influence in local, politics, with popular support. AKEL was therefore given an 
opportunity to extend their influence on the island.126
John Foster Dulles viewed Turkey as an indispensable component for both the defence 
of the Eastern Mediterranean and the extension of the Western power in the Middle 
East. Thus the policy dilemma created by the Cyprus dispute for the United States had 
to be resolved along lines that would not risk the alienation of Turkey.
124 The Protocol of accession of Greece and Turkey in NATO was signed in October 17, 1951, and both states 
assumed full membership in the organization.
125 See Theodore Couloumbis, Greek Political Reaction to American and NATO Influences (New Haven and: 
Yale University Press, 1966), pp. 53-60, 22119-132. The possibility of a Greek withdrawal from NATO was 
openly advocated by the Greek Conservatives in the by 1958 in response to the United States and NATO ‘s 
attitudes in the Cyprus Question.
126 From the early days of this dispute the United States was also interested in the elimination of the Communist 
influence in Cyprus. See Thomas Adams, Akel: The Communist Party of Cyprus (Stanford: Hoover Institution 
Press, 1971.) See also Coufoudakis, The U.S. Policy toward Cyprus: A study in Cold War diplomacy, ante, pp. 
133, fn. The means utilized were: the military, economic, and diplomatic support to Turkey against Soviet 
pressures 1945-47; the Truman Doctrine and Marshall plan as applied to Greece and Turkey; the establishment 
of the stable governments in Iran and Greece; the creation in February of 1946 of the sixth Fleet as a major 
diplomatic and military deterrent in the region, and the integration of Greece and Turkey in bilateral alliance 
agreements.
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Cyprus did not become a concern of the United States until the early 50s when the 
attempt of Greece was toward internationalisation of the Cyprus dispute because of 
Britain’s unwillingness to discuss the question of Cypriot independence and Enosis 
with Greece. Various Greek Governments during the World War II and the immediate 
post war period had expressed interest in the future of Cyprus. But their political and 
economic dependence on Britain and the United States, had kept them from openly 
challenging British control of Cyprus. On several occasions Dulles, repeatedly 
attempted to dissuade Greece from such steps and pressured Greece to abandon its 
appeal to the United Nations.127 But Dulles also introduced some new directions to 
American policy that have remained constants of American approach to the Cyprus 
Question. These new directions were that Turkey had an equal interest in the future of 
the island.128 Department of Defence Planners stressed the value of Turkey to the 
Western System of Alliance.129
3.2 The independent Republic of Cyprus and the United States
The 1950 London and Zurich agreements had been greeted with satisfaction and relief 
in the United States.130 After the 1963 crisis, minority community was determined to 
maintain the status juris of the 1959 and the special position it granted to the Turkish 
Cypriots. This crisis undermined the relationship that had developed between Cyprus 
and the United States during the 1960-63 period. The United States tried to bring 
about the return to the 1960 status quo. Any settlement though would have to be 
acceptable to all those who signed the Zurich Agreements. The American interests 
were heightened by the Soviet presence in the area. Given the Soviet flee in the region,
127 For instances of he early pressures exerted by Dulles on the officials to drop the 1954 appeal to United 
Nations see Xydis, Cyprus: Conflict and Conciliation , 1954-1958 ( Columbus: The Ohio State University 
Press), pp. 197-22.
128 By the second half of the 1956 the United States had quietly advocated partition for solving the Cyprus 
problem.
29 Each of the partners sought to justify the need to American support for their claims on Cyprus in the interests 
of an allied unity, security, and the country’s reliability in its western commitments. Assuming that Britain had a 
major role in the dispute, by its emphasis on the Turkish factor, it contributed to the Turkish negotiating 
intransigence and strengthened the American perception of Turkey’s importance; further it urged Turkey and 
the United States to repel Greek pressures. Greece caught in the situation of promoting anti-communist policies 
in order to gain the American sympathy. (Harris, Troubled Alliance, ante, pp. 549-65.)
m The New York Times, in an editorial on February 20, 1959, (p. 2), called the Agreements “a resounding 
success for enlightened statesmanship that will be welcomed in the free world.” The U.S. Department of State, 
in turn, observed that “a mutually satisfactory solution of the Cyprus issue should restore peace on the island 
and strengthen the ties among the countries and the peoples involved” (p 3).
44
Cyprus, whether within the context of NATO or with closer ties with Britain, could 
provide the United States with unsinkable bases in the Mediterranean.
The United States thus reflected the American preference for quiet diplomacy and 
limited internationalisation of the Cyprus question.131 This was necessary not only to 
avoid the irrevocable breakdown of the political system of the State, but also to 
eliminate conditions that could be exploited by AKEL and the Russians. The grave 
anxiety expressed by President Johnson in his letters of December to Makarios and 
Kuchuk, appeals by the Greek, Turkish and British Governments, and the limited 
peace-keeping effort undertaken by British troops at the request of the Cypriot 
government had not restored peace on the island. The London Conference was 
convened on the 15 January 1964. Duncan Sandys132 raised the issue of broadening 
the British Peace-keeping Force on the island by the participation of other NATO 
countries. The United States proved receptive to the British suggestion. Turkey was 
too. General Lemnitzer, the Commander of NATO at the time, at the request of 
Lyndon Johnson, postponed the impending Turkish action and set the stage for the 
unveiling of the NATO plan for Cyprus, following a trip to Greece and Turkey. As 
Philip Windsor clearly show s,133 this plan was in reality an Anglo -Am erican creation. 
By providing for both a NATO peacekeeping force and a mediator, the sponsors 
expected to help stabilize the situation on the island and seek a settlement that would 
safeguard western interests as well as those of Turkey. Thus, through limited 
internationalisation in the NATO and under Anglo-American direction, the dispute 
would be contained and managed.134 The Anglo-American NATO Plan for Cyprus 
failed, much like the London Conference, despite the acceptance of the Plan by the 
guarantor states, and the heavy pressure exerted by George Ball upon Makarios. 
Cyprus, though, readily accepted UNFICYP, an international peacekeeping force 
funded and manned largely by NATO members, but controlled by the Security
131 Through American mediators, Presidential initiatives, and handling the dispute through NATO.
132 Colonial Secretary of State for Commonwealth Affairs and the presiding officer at the Conference Robert 
Kennedy, in London during the Conference, had further discussed with the British their NATO peacekeeping 
proposal. (Coufoudakis, U.S. Foreign Policy Toward Cyprus: A Study in Cold War Diplomacy, ante, p. 139, fn. 
52).
133 NATO and the Cyprus Crisis, Adelphi Papers, No. 14 November 1964, p. 13.
134 The original plan called for a NATO force of some 10,000 men for a period of three months. It would 
involve at least 12000 U.S. troops as well as troops of the three guarantor powers. See Windsor, NATO and the 
Cyprus Crisis, supra.
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Council of the United Nations.135 UNFICYP had not managed to deal with the 
increased levels of armaments of the two communities, the infiltration of military 
personnel by all sides, or to stop the Turkish bombing of the raids of 1964 and 
successive Turkish invasion threats. But, UNFICYP has contributed to the lessening 
of the possibility of a broader confrontation over Cyprus, and thus the need for an 
overt NATO /  US intervention. Secondly, the United Nations Peace Keeping Force, 
by contributing to the pacific perpetuation of the dispute, provided the United States 
with the opportunity to seek settlements without pressures.
3.3 The Acheson Plan
The possibility of Greco-Turkish war in Cyprus, and the interest shown by the 
Soviet Union over Cyprus, in view of Makarios’s appeal to the U.S.S;R for help 
during the Turkish invasion threat of 1964, urged the American national security 
officials to seek to bring about a permanent settlement of the Cyprus Question. This 
was the main aim of the Acheson Plan.
George Ball openly pressured the U.N Secretary-General to sponsor a new 
American mediation effort under Dean Acheson. Another Johnson letter was sent to 
the Greek Government, introducing the proposal, which actually warned Greece that 
the United States would stand aside if Turkey intervened in Cypms, thus causing a 
war that Greece was bound to lose according to American estimates. Prime M inister’s 
Papandreou’s reluctant acceptance was also motivated by the tension on Cyprus, 
which had its apex the bombings early in August 1964.
The Acheson Plan provided for Enosis, thus satisfying the needs of Greece, and 
safeguarding the Turkish strategic interests as well as those of the United States.
The definition of the Plan, on behalf of Acheson, by George Ball, who drafted it 
together with Talbot, was as follows. Cypms, was seen as a threat to the United States 
interests because (a) of a potential Turkish intervention and thus an unavoidable 
Greco-Turkish War; (b) it has weakened the ties of Greece and Turkey to the United
135 In the discussion that opened on February 18, 1964, at the Security Council, the United Nations States and 
the Britain endorsed the idea of an international force under the control of the Security Council.
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States; (c) it has strengthened the position of AKEL and the U.S.S.R on Cyprus; (d) it 
has created a serious problem to the United Nations; (e) it has undermined NATO. For 
these and in order to remove the threats, the proposed settlement of the Cyprus 
Question should be achieved through Enosis with: (1) territorial compensation by 
Greece to Turkey; (2) a Turkish military presence on Cyprus; (3) resettlement and 
repatriation of Turkish Cypriots that desire to do so; and 4) pledges by Greece to 
apply the Lausanne Treaty minority provisions on the Turkish Cypriots; disarm all 
irregulars; eliminate AKEL’s influence.136 In defining further the Greek concessions 
to Turkey on Cyprus, Acheson proposed at the end of July, 1964 (a) the full sovereign 
cession to Turkey, in perpetuity, of a large area of Cyprus for military bases. These 
base areas were located in the Karpasia peninsula of Northeast Cyprus; (b) up to two 
cantons to be established for the Turkish Cypriots with full local administration in 
their control; (v) an international body to observe the application of human rights 
provisions, with NATO exercising an enforcement role in case of violations. In terms 
of other territorial exchanges, the original proposals included the cession of the Greek 
island of Kastellorizon to Turkey. 137 As the negotiations progressed Acheson 
presented the some revisions of his plan in an attempt to overcome some of the 
objections of the Greek government. He thus proposed: (a) a fifty-year lease for the 
Turkish bases on Cyprus instead of in perpetuity; (b) the area to be delimited by a 
North- South line in West of the village of Komi Kepir in Northeast Cyprus; (c) 
instead of formal cantonal divisions to provide for Turkish Cypriot eparchs (prefects) 
with Turks to administer local affairs in the heavily Turkish Cypriot areas of the 
island.138 The Plan was rejected by the Cyprus Government under pressures by her 
AKEL Party, and was subsequently turned down by Greece, too.
Some political observations need be made with regard to the Acheson Plan. Firstly, 
Acheson proposed that no formal agreements be signed between Greece and Turkey 
requiring Greek Parliamentary and Cabinet control approval. Instead the sovereignty 
of Cyprus would be terminated by a unilateral declaration of enosis by Greece. To 
ensure that prearranged strategic concessions to Turkey would be made, a secret
136 Coufoudakis, U.S. Foreign Policy Toward Cyprus: A Study in Cold War Diplomacy, ante p. 114.
137 Coufoudakis, U.S Foreign Policy Toward Cyprus: A Study in Cold War Diplomacy, Ibid, p .l 15
m Ibid. p. 115.
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NATO protocol would be drawn up in advance. Secondly, Washington trusted the 
Greek government to deal firmly with Communism in Cyprus.139 Thirdly, Grivas 
secretly returned to Cyprus under Greek auspices in June 1964 to take charge of the 
Cypriot Armed Forces and provide a Conservative countervailing force to Makarios. 
Ball, with secret meetings with Grivas, gained his endorsement of a plan for union of 
Cyprus to Greece, with bases being turned over to Turkey and eventually to NATO.140
3.4 The events leading to 1974 and the U.S. role
Another event of crucial importance was the Lisbon meeting of the NATO 
Foreign Ministers of 3-4 June 1971, which, according to Soviet and Cypriot sources, 
under the changing strategic conditions in the Mediterranean, formalized the Greco- 
Turkish Agreement to terminate Cypriot independence by partitioning the island.141 
Their determination to resolve the Cyprus Question was publicly manifested in the 
recognition of that their continued friendship and cooperation was dependent upon 
resolution of the Cyprus Problem ,142 Papadopoulos further declared that the Cypriots
139 Foley in his Legacy o f Strife: Cyprus from Rebellion to Civil War, Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1964, pp. 184- 
185, says: “George Papandreou was a traditional Liberal and therefore trustworthy in the eyes of the United 
States. When it became apparent that the Centre Union Party was falling under the control of his son Andreas 
Papandreou, whom the United States saw as unreliable the United States moved swiftly to overthrow 
Papandreou.” It makes one wonder, however, whether they really favoured ascent of Andreas to the Premiership.
140 Coufoudakis, U.S. Foreign Policy Toward Cyprus: A Study in Cold War Diplomacy. Supra, p. 116. It has to 
be noted that the U.S. used Greece for the promotion of their own aims, and stressed that the anti-communist 
feelings of Greece and the U.S. were best served by eliminating Makarios and that only through an Acheson- 
type settlement would the nationalist aspirations of Greece ever be realised. It is for this purpose that Grivas 
returned to the island to organize the Cypriot National Guard, and also Greek Army Units were secretly 
dispatched. Ibid, p. 122.
141 Coufoudakis, U.S Foreign Policy Toward Cyprus: A Study in Cold War Diplomacy, ante, p. 126.
142 Illuminating is the report by Stem in his work The Wrong Horse, Intervention: “The Meeting in Lisbon was 
conducted between the Turkish Foreign Minister Olcay and Greek Foreign Minister Palamas. Nothing was 
drafted at the meetings, but they seemed rather promising then as said a high-ranking Turkish Diplomat who 
participated in the sessions. There was a great effort on the part of both sides to eliminate the misconceptions. 
We insisted that the Greeks get rid of the misconceptions of a unitary state in Cyprus which was foreign to the 
original conception of the sovereign state. The Greeks hinted indirectly that if worse came to worse, instead of 
breaking relations between Greece and Turkey they might be agreeable to a kind of separation, a territorial 
arrangement might be envisaged with a large base for Turkey so that the Turkish Cypriots would feel more 
secure. The population would be left as it was.” These secret talks were conducted first in Lisbon and later in 
Paris under the cover of NATO conferences. Two foreign ministers and their advisors met for what were called 
“bilateral lunches” held discreetly in their respective embassies. No Notes were taken.
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had to resolve their differences in a manner acceptable to Greece and Turkey.143 How 
did the United States view these developments and especially those of 1971? In June 
1972 Department of State analysts had concluded that Greece and Turkey were 
favourably disposed to double enosis (i.e. partition proposals) although it was 
proposed that the United States should restrain Greece and Turkey from any 
premature moves toward partition. Department Officials did not foreclose the 
possibility of an eventual double Enosis. Such a settlement would not be dangerous to 
American interests if Makarios could be induced to accept it. Thus the consensus 
reached among Department of State officials was that the Makarios problem should 
essentially be left to Greece.
A new supply of Czech weapons for the Cypriot police arrived in Cyprus in 
late January 1972 and this gave Athens the pretext for the delivery of a nine- 
point .ultimatum to Makarios on February 19.144 The note mainly demanded the 
surrender of the equipment to the UNFICYP, thus leaving the Greek officered Cyprus 
National Guard as the strongest force in Cyprus; (b) the recognition of Cyprus that 
Athens is the national centre of Hellenism and that Cyprus is only part of the Greek 
nation (her implication being that Cyprus should accede to the Greek guidelines and 
not act as an independent State), (c) the recognition of the reconstruction of the 
Cypriot Government into one of national unity drawn from all segments of the 
nationalist Greek Cypriot public to assure confidence in the relations between Athens 
and Nicosia. The demand clearly implied the elimination of pro-independence figures 
such as Foreign Minister Kyprianou, and the introduction of Grivas and his supporters 
into the Cypriot Government. The act failed. The only compromise of Makarios was 
to force Kyprianou to resignation. Grivas did not go against Makarios having 
understood both his weak position and also that he was being used by Athens to 
implement a policy that was against his lifelong goals. Bitter, he remained in the 
island in charge of terrorist groups hoping to induce Makarios to give up his
143 See the Papadopoulos interview in the Millet newspaper of Istanbul, May 30, 19741 and related comments by 
Turkish Government officials.
144 See Coufoudakis, supra,p. 127
49
independence policy.145 Grivas’s activities, though, undermined Makarios influence 
and as long as they did not create a threat of Greco-Turkish confrontation thus 
promoted the interests of the U .S.146
The latest phase of the Cyprus Question was hugely a result of Makarios 
determination to reassert his control over the Cypriot National Guard and Greek 
Officers. Thus Makarios letter to the Greek President General Gizikis requesting the 
removal of these Officers became the catalyst that brought to a climax twenty -five 
years of uneasy Greek-Greek Cypriot relations. Makarios underestimated the 
determination of Colonel Gizikis in Athens as well as the intentions of Washington. 
The subsequent overthrow of Makarios was based on the Plan HERM ES.147 The 
opportunity was then provided for Turkey to intervene militarily basing her 
intervention on the legal premise of Article IV of the Cyprus Treaty of Guarantee.148 
Kissinger, Foreign Secretary of the U.S. at the time was the pre-eminent figure in the 
formulation of public policy in the United States in view of the preoccupation of 
President Nixon with the Watergate affair. It is here submitted, perhaps for the first 
time that the long-standing friendly relations between Kissinger and Ecevit was a 
decisive factor taken into account in the U.S Foreign Policy decision not to prevent 
the Turkish intervention from being w aged .149
145 Until his death in early 1974. He lead EOKA B, a mall band of loyalists from the independence (or enosis 
struggle) since the 1950s.
146 Cypriot and Israeli sources have acknowledged the extensive deployment and active involvement of 
American Intelligence operatives on Cyprus. See Coufoudakis ante, p. 182
147 Colonel Ioannides was the author of the plan Hermes and the leading members of the last military junta had 
served in Cyprus during 1963-64 with the Greek forces that had been dispatched to Cyprus at the time. He 
strongly disliked Makarios’s ties with the non-aligned nations, the U.S.S.R. and the AKEL. During his service 
in Cyprus he had met and become friends with Nicos Sampson and shared fears, aspirations and concerns. The 
latter was installed as President of Cyprus following the overthrow of Makarios. For detail of Ioannides Plan 
Hermes see the Athenian newspaper. Hellas, April 21, 1970.
148 See Chapter n, below. For an American view advocating for the legality of the Turkish Intervention in 
Cyprus 1974, see Arthur Hartmann’s interview (in what was his first public statement on the Cyprus Question 
since 1974) to the Greek Cypriot journalist Yannis Kareklas, Cy.B.C. TV Political Affairs Programme, 20th July 
2002. Arthur Hartmann, Adviser to the U.S. Department of State at the time, drafted various Memoranda on the 
Cyprus Problem for Foreign Secretary Henry Kissinger.
149 Ecevit, has been Fellow at the Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, and had Kissinger as his 
Supervisor. An apologist of Kissinger, though, asserts the following, which is indicative of what Kissinger 
allegedly believed: “The statesman skill was demonstrated in his capacity to choose well among the options he 
detected. All choice involved risk; all choice was based on conjecture... one could not be certain of the results... 
The policy maker was the risk taker; there was no way to guarantee his success... (As Viet Nam shows the 
decision was made to run those risks, in the belief that the alternatives, while less dangerous, promised results 
that could not be satisfactory...” (Guarbard, Kissinger, Portrait o f a Mind, (New York 1973) p.277.
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It would be interesting, though, to see, albeit briefly, the role played by Sisco, 
the U.S. Ambassador, who tried to avert the crisis by consulting directly with Ankara 
and Athens governmental officials. It is submitted though that these consultations 
cannot amount to the “joint consultations” envisaged by the Cyprus Guarantee Treaty 
Article VI in case of violation of the Constitutional order of the State, and at any rate 
the frankness of Sisco’s intentions have been doubted. He had met with Ecevit in 
London, and his last words to him at Heathrow airport were: “Don’t do anything until 
we consult again”. 150 Having gone to Athens immediately afterwards and had 
discussions with Ioannides, Armed Forces Chief of Staff General Bonanos and Prime 
Minister Androutsopoulos, flew back to Ankara. At a meeting with the Turkish 
National Security Council, he asked Ecevit, who was an accomplished poet: “You 
have given all your life to humanitarianism. Now as a result of your decision a lot of 
people are going to be dead. Why can’t you wait fourty-eight hours?” The reply was 
that the Turks did not want to repeat the mistakes of 1964.151
It is worth noting though that Ioannides and his closest advisers were preparing 
orders for submarine and aerial attacks on the invading Turkish forces, whose first 
amphibious landing was being hampered by adverse weather However, unbeknown to 
Ioannides, a mutiny was beginning to form among his top military commanders who 
were against full-scale war with Turkey. There were strong indications afterward that 
the American intelligence establishment in Athens was now monitoring the generals’ 
revolt against Ioannides. Afterward, the deposed head of the junta was to charge 
through his attorneys that the generals conspired with the Americans in what the 
attorneys regarded as a treasonous scheme to betray his orders. It was also alleged 
through the CIA that the Turks would not invade if the coup on Cyprus were cleanly 
executed.152
150 Stem The Wrong Horse, Intervention, p .l 18.
151 At dawn, Sisco stood alone on the tarmac of the airport in Ankara, awaiting a plane back to Athens. A 
Turkish armada was steaming toward the Northern coast. Deeply by his humiliating ordeal in both capitals, 
Sisco contacted Washington and suggested that he return home. Kissinger’s response, recalled by a member of 
the Washington task force who inadvertently intercepted the traffic, was to threaten that he would go to the East 
Mediterranean himself to take over the crisis mediation. It was not clear whether the Secretary was joking or not. 
(Stem The Wrong Horse, Ib id , pp.20).
152 Stem, The Wrong Horse, ante. p. 21. On the role of the US. in the events Of 1974 see also Brendan O’Malley 
and Ian Craig, The Cyprus Conspiracy, London, Tauris Press: Benjamin Rosenthal, who led a House of 
Representatives examination of U.S. foreign policy during these events, said Washington must share the blame
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Next chapter will examine the legality of the Turkish Intervention in Cyprus 1974.
for the crisis because of the encouragement it gave the Greek junta that sponsored the coup in Cyprus. He said 
that “the seizure of power by the Greek Colonels in 1967 was the only case in 25 years of NATO’s history 
where a functioning democracy had been turned into a military dictatorship. But Washington had established 
relations with the junta, claiming disingeniously that a trend towards constitutional rule had been established 
and made Greece the Eastern Mediterranean base for the sixth fleet. Why in the crucial week of 15 July 1974 
did not the United States publicly demand a reversal of acts by the Greek dictatorship which clearly produced a 
disaster bound to involve our country.?” Greek American Senator Paul Sarbanis and Americans should be 
deeply concerned by the State Department’s failure, despite repeated warnings from many sources, to take 
action to avert the subversion of and effective partition of Cyprus. He damned the administration for failing to 
support Makarios, which would have preserved the peace and stability; for failing to prevent the first Turkish 
military intervention by denouncing the coup and pressing Ankara to hold back- as Johnson had; and for failing 
to limit and restrict the Turkish military action once it had begun. (Craig The Cyprus Conspiracy, supra)
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CHAPTER II: LEGAL EVALUATION OF THE TURKISH 
INTERVENTION: THE ARGUMENT FROM THE TREATY
OF GUARANTEE
The Present C hapter exam ines the legality  o f te Turkish in tervention o f Cyprus
1974 from  the Treaty o f G uarantee o f the Cyprus Republic. A s it w ill appear
later on, the m ain argum ent o f Turkey to justify  the in tervention w as based on
the T reaty o f G uarantee provisions.
E arly  in  the m orning o f the 20th July  1974, Turkey, availing itse lf o f the coup d ’ 
etat o f the 15th July  1974 engineered by the G reek m ilitary ju n ta  (then ruling 
G reece) to  overthrow  the dem ocratically  elected  President A rchbishop 
M akarios1, proceeded to an arm ed attack2 by air and by sea 
against the independent and sovereign Republic o f Cyprus.
(1) Turkish Justifications fo r the Intervention and Claims regarding 
the Treaty
V arious justifications w ere given by the Turkish  leadership for the purposes o f 
the intervention. The then Prim e M inister o f Turkey M r. E cevit m ade the 
follow ing official statem ent according to the statem ent o f the Perm anent 
R epresentative o f  Turkey M r. O lcay at the m eeting o f the Security C ouncil o f
1 Glafkos Clerides, in his book, Cyprus: My Deposition (Nicosia, 1990, vol. Ill, p. 343) states the following 
about the motives of the conspirators : ‘Bluntly, the real objectives of the conspirators were to oust Makarios 
and his Government in order to proceed with direct negotiations with Turkey, and use the good offices of the 
United States, to achieve Enosis of the major part of Cyprus with Greece, conceding a smaller part of Cyprus to 
Turkish sovereignty. At no time did the Greek junta have in mind to declare Enosis unilaterally and to accept the 
risk of having a military conflict with Turkey.
2 The meaning of “armed attack” was considered in the Nicaragua case, I.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 14 para. 195.
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the  20th Septem ber 1974:
“ The Turkish arm ed  fo rces  started this m orning an operation o f  peace  in 
C yprus in order to p u t an end  to struggle o f  decades o f  years brought about by  
extrem ist elements.
D uring  the last steps o f  the Cyprus tragedy, these extrem ist elem ents started  
m assacring  their own people, the Greeks.
It is adm itted  by everybody that the last coup has been staged  by the dictatoria l 
regim e o f  A thens. A s a m atter o f  fa c t  it w as m ore than a  coup: it was a vio len t 
an d  fla g ra n t violation o f  the independence o f  the Republic o f  Cyprus a n d  o f  the 
international treaties on which the Republic was founded .
Turkey is co-guarantor o f  the independence and  the constitu tional order o f  
Cyprus. Turkey taking action is fu lfilling  her legal responsibility. The Turkish  
G overnm ent has no t resorted to the arm ed action until a fter all the o ther m eans 
w ere tried a n d  p ro ved  unsuccessful. This is not an invasion but an ac t to p u t an  
end  to invasion. The Turkish arm ed fo rces  w ill no t open f ir e  unless being f ir e d  
at.
I  am  addressing all the G reeks in Cyprus who have been the victim s o f  
atrocities, o f  terrorism  and  dictatorship: bury in the p a s t the dark  days o f  
inter-com m unal enm ities and  strife which w ere resorted  to by the terrorists 
themselves. Join hand  in hand with your Turkish brothers to speed  up the
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victory  and  together bu ild  up a new  fre e  and  happy Cyprus ” .
In  o ther statem ents he said that the objective o f the operation w as to overthrow  
the regim e w hich toppled A rchbishop M akarios; when, how ever, he w as asked 
to  say w hether the intention was to restore A rchbishop M akarios to pow er he 
declined to answ er, as he declined to state w hether Turkey in tended pulling out 
its forces after gaining control o f the island.
In a Turkish governm ent com m unique issued im m ediately  after the intervention 
by  the Turkish  Em bassy in  London it was stated that Turkey  as one o f the 
guarantor pow ers had decided to carry out its obligations under article IV  (2) o f 
the T reaty  o f  G uarantee with a view  to safeguarding the security o f life and 
property  o f  the Turkish com m unity and even that o f m any G reek C ypriots.4 
The m ain argum ent put forw ard by  Turkey in  order to ju stify  the 1974 m ilitary 
in tervention in  Cyprus is based  on the Treaty o f G uarantee o f  the Cyprus 
Republic. The Treaty, signed on 16 A ugust 1960 betw een the U nited 
Kingdom , G reece, Turkey, and the Republic o f Cyprus, form s an integral part o f 
the constitutional order o f the R epublic.5 By A rticle  I, the R epublic o f Cyprus 
undertook the obligation to m aintain its independence, territorial integrity, and 
security as w ell as respect for its Constitution. U nder article II, Greece, Turkey 
and the U nited  K ingdom  guaranteed the independence, territorial in tegrity  and
3 S/PV, 1781, 86
4 For the text of the communique see The Turkish Yearbook o f International Relations, 14 (1974), p. 125.
5 Article 181 of the Constitution provided that the treaty guaranteeing the independence, territorial integrity, and 
constitution of the Republic “shall have constitutional force”.
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security  o f the R epublic o f C yprus and also the state o f affairs estab lished  by  the 
basic  articles o f the Constitution. A rticle IV, w hich constitutes the strongest 
basis o f the Turkish  argum ent provides the follow ing: “In  the even t o f  a  breach  
o f  the provisions o f  the p resen t Treaty, Greece, Turkey and  U nited K ingdom  
undertake to consult together w ith respect to the representations o r  m easures 
necessary to ensure observance o f  those provisions.
In  so  fa r  as com m on or concerted action m ay no t p rove  possible, each o f  the 
three guaranteeing Pow ers reserves the right to take action w ith the sole aim  o f  
re-establishing the state o f  affairs created  by the p resen t T rea ty”.
Turkey  first declared that intervention had  been to  guarantee the 
independence o f the island. A ccording to Turkey, the coup governm ent o f M r. 
Sam pson w as no m ore than a puppet regim e under orders from  G reece, ready to 
rule the end o f the island’s independence and to annex it to G reece.6 In a 
Turkish  governm ent com m unique o f 20 July  it w as stated  that “the Turkish 
com m unity in the island can no longer tolerate this situation w hich offends 
hum an dignity and threatens the lives and the very ex istence o f its greater 
m ajority, and they, therefore, anticipate Turkey as a  G uarantor Pow er, to 
liberate them  as soon as possible” .The Turkish governm ent w ent on to state
6 See Necatigil, The Turkish Position in International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993) p. 109; see 
also (1974) 11 U.N. Monthly Chronicle 9 (at the Security Council which was conveyed at the requests of the 
Secretary General and the Cypriot representative, Archbishop Makarios, who managed to flee the country and 
was still recognized as the legal head of state, denounced the coup as a flagrant violation of Cypriot 
independence and sovereignty, and urged the Council to call upon Greece to withdraw her officers and end its 
invasion of Cyprus).
7 The Turkish Yearbook of International Relations, ante, p. 130 (italics supplied).
56
that the “Turkey as one o f the guarantor pow ers had  the decided to carry ou t its 
obligations under article IV (2) o f the Treaty w ith a view  to safeguarding the 
security o f life and property o f the Turkish com m unity and even that o f m any 
G reek C ypriots” 8 . The Turkish C ypriot leader R auf D enktash w rote that 
‘Turkey, as one o f the guarantors o f the Cyprus Republic, could  not accept the 
fa i t  accom pli against the independence and sovereignty o f the republic, nor 
could it stand by and w atch Turkish C ypriots being killed” .9 H e also says that 
Turkey w as left w ith no alternative but to m ove alone under A rticle  4 (2) o f  the 
T reaty  o f  G uarantee to pro tect the independence o f the island and to pu t an end 
to  the terrib le destruction o f life and property .10 D enktash further alleges that the 
Turkish villages w ere being attacked throughout the island by m obile units o f 
the N ational Guard, the pattern o f the onslaught resem bling that o f 1963.11
(2) Treaty o f Guarantee and International Law
W hat is o f crucial im portance and need be exam ined is w hether unilateral 
m ilitary  in tervention m ay be conferred by  treaty right. In  o ther w ords w hether
8 ibid. p. 130
9 Denktash R., The Cyprus Triangle (Nicosia, 1972), p. 68.
10 Ibid. p.68 (It is said therein that “Turkey sent a peace force which landed in northern Cyprus”).
11 Ibid. pp. 69-70. The following is an excerpt from a report sent by Terence Smith from Limassol at the time 
and published in the Herald Tribune on 25 July 1974: “On the sun-baked dirt floor of the Municipal Soccer 
Stadium here, about 1,750 men from Limassol’s Turkish enclave and the surrounding Turkish villages are 
penned behind cells of barred wire. Their days are spent sheltering under the scorching sun that sends 
temperatures into high 90s. Although the men are dressed in street clothes and claim to be civilians, they are 
being held as prisoners of war by the Greek Cypriots”; Denktash, The Cyprus Triangle, supra p.71.
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such a righ t (even if  expressly stipulated) is in  accordance w ith the principles o f 
Public International Law.
2.1 Theories on the Legality of Military Intervention by Treaty Right.
It is com m only accepted in  academ ic theories that arm ed in tervention is legal
w hen is done on the basis o f a right provided for by treaty. The legality  o f such
an intervention finds support in  the overw helm ing m ajority  o f academ ic
w ritings, at least before the passing o f the U.N. C harter.12
V attel is one o f the advocates o f such a view. A lthough he supports the
principle o f  non-intervention, w hich he considers as flow ing from  Sovereignty-
“the m ost precious principle that states ought to safeguard”- accepts the
exception o f in tervention provided for by treaty .13
Phillim ore, also w riting in  the nineteenth century, considers in tervention
legal, in  case this is guaranteed by treaty righ t.14
D iena, w hile is o f the view  that intervention violates the sovereignty and 
territorial in tegrity  o f states, regards intervention provided for by  treaty as an 
exception to  the ru le  o f non-intervention.15 The preceding view s are also shared 
by O ppenheim ,16 L aw rence,17 H odges,18 and W estlake19 am ong others.
12 Potter notes that the majority of experts on the subject matter readily tends to consider as legal any 
intervention provided for by treaty. (1930) II Recueil des Cours, p. 657.
13 See Vattel, E. de, Le Droit des gens ou principes de la loi naturelle appliquee a la conduite et aux affaires des 
Nations et des Souverains (Paris: 1863) p.22.
14 See Phillimore, R., Commentaries upon International Law (London, 1879), vol. I, p.474.
15 See Diena, Diritto Internationale (Milano, 1900) p.
16 See Oppenheim, International Law, War and Neutrality, Vol. II (7th ed. H. Lauterpacht, London ,1952) p. 307.
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G reek  w riters also hold  the aforem entioned view s. Seferiades, having 
said  that states have no right to in tervene in  the internal affairs o f  other states, 
conceded that in tervention under a treaty  is legal.20
Tenekides, though states that the w ell established principle o f non-in tervention 
has been  considerably strengthened by  the U nited  N ations C harter, w rites the 
follow ing: ‘International Law  exceptionally  accepts in tervention i f  this is based 
upon  agreem ent freely entered in to  o r treaty  providing for in tervention  in  
special circum stances’.21
Professor B row nlie w rote that States m ay law fully  confer by treaty  a righ t to 
in tervene by the use o f arm ed force w ithin  the territorial o r o ther legally  
perm itted  lim its o f their jurisdiction. They m ay also g ive a d  hoc  consent to the 
entry o f foreign forces on their territory, to the passage o f foreign  forces and to
17 See Lawrence, T.J., The Principles o f International Law (London , 1920) p. 121-23: “If a State has accepted a 
guarantee of any of its possessions, or of a special form of government , it suffers no legal wrong when the 
guaranteeing state intervenes in pursuance of the stipulations entered into between them. It is perhaps to this 
right to intervene in pursuance of a treaty that the course of action adopted towards Greece by the allied powers, 
Great Britain, France, and Russia, during 1915-1917, must be referred”. By the Treaty of London 1863, Greece 
was put under the guarantee of these powers as a ‘monarchical, independent, and constitutional state. Greece, 
entered the great war on the side of Great Britain and her allies. The majority of the nation was enthusiastically 
in favour of the Entente cause, and of giving effect to a treaty with Serbia (an ally of Great Britain, France and 
Russia) under which Greece was bound to assist Serbia in the event of war between Serbia and a third power. 
On October 2, 1915, the British and French governments landed 150,000 troops at the Greek port of Salonika. 
They did this, with the hearty approval of Minister Venizelos and of an overwhelming majority of the Greek 
populace for the purpose of aiding Serbia, that was at war with Austria and Germany.
18 See Hodges, The Doctrine of Intervention (New York, 1915)
19 See Westlake, J. International Law (Cambridge University Press 1910) Vol. I, p. 304: “The questions arising 
from reciprocal rights and obligations of states, it is said, are determined in a notable measure by the body of 
what are called political treaties, which are nothing else than the temporary expression of transitory relations 
between the different national forces. These treaties bind the freedom of action of the parties so long as the 
political coalitions which produced them remain without change”.
0 See Seferiades, Public International Law (Athens, 1926), Vol. I, p.319, and (1930) 34 Recueil des Cours, p. 
389.
21 See Tenekides, Vima (Greek Newspaper, 26.1.1963), p. 5; to the opposite direction goes the view expressed 
by the International Law Professor Constantopoulos by which the UN Charter expressly prohibits intervention 
(Constantopoulos, Public International Law, Thessaloniki 1962, Vol. I, p.278).
59
operations by  foreign forces on their te rrito ry .22 Therefore, the charge o f 
aggressive w ar against T hailand was disregarded by the International M ilitary 
T ribunal at Tokyo on the ground that consent was given to the passage o f 
Japanese forces through Thailand.23 B row nlie gives som e exam ples indicating 
tha t a righ t to intervene by force on the territory o f another state could properly 
b e  conferred by  treaty. A rticle 3 o f the T reaty o f 22 M ay 1903, betw een Cuba 
and  the U nited  States provided: “The governm ent o f  Cuba consents that the 
U nited States m ay exercise the right to intervene fo r  the preserva tion  o f  Cuban  
independence, the m aintenance o f  a governm ent adequate fo r  the pro tec tion  o f  
life, property, a n d  individual lib e r ty ...”24 The T reaty o f Friendship  betw een 
Persia and the R .S.F.S .R ., signed on 26 February 1921, provided as follow s in 
A rticle 6: “I f  a th ird  p arty  should  attem pt to carry out a po licy  o f  usurpation by  
m eans o f  a rm ed  intervention in Persia, or i f  such P ow er should  desire to use 
Persian Territory as a base o f  operations against Russia, o r i f  a Foreign P ow er  
should  threaten the fro n tiers  o f  Federal Russia or those o f  its A llies, and  i f  the 
Persian G overnm ent should  not be able to p u t a stop to such m enace a fter  
having been once ca lled  upon to do so by Russia, R ussia  shall have the right to 
advance h er troops into Persian interior fo r  the purpose o f  carrying out the 
m ilitary operations necessary fo r  its defence. Russia  undertakes, however, to 
withdraw  its troops fro m  Persian territory as soon as the danger has been
22 Brownlie, International Law and the Use o f Force by States (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963) p.317.
23 Judgment, Sohn, Cases and Materials on United Nations Law, pp 916-17.
24 This provision, however, did not appear in the later treaty of 29 May 1934: 28 A.J.I.L. (1934), Suppl., p. 97.
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rem o ved ”. 25 A nother exam ple is the G eneral T reaty o f F riendship  and Co- 
O peration  signed by the U nited States and Panam a on 2 M arch 1936. A rticle 10 
provided: “In case o f  an international conflagration or the existence o f  any  
threa t o f  aggression w hich w ould endanger the security o f  the Republic o f  
P anam a or  the security o f  the Panam a Canal, the G overnm ents o f  the U nited  
States o f  A m erica and  the Republic o f  Panam a w ill take such m easures o f  
preven tion  and  defense as they m ay consider necessary fo r  the pro tection  o f  
their com m on interests” . A n identical provision in  A rticle 7 o f the T reaty  o f 
1903 w as the basis for the U nited States arm ed intervention in  Panam a in 1904 
for the purpose o f restoring order.26 Further, the A greem ent signed betw een 
Egypt and the U nited K ingdom  on 19 O ctober 195 4 27, provided for the 
evacuation o f  B ritish forces from  the Suez C anal area. The U nited  K ingdom  
was given the righ t to re-enter the area w ith m ilitary forces given an attack was 
m ade against by a State w hich was a m em ber o f the A rab C ollective Security 
Pact, or Turkey.
D espite the above, the principles o f self-determ ination28 and equality o f States29 
as stipulated in  the U.N. C harter have put into doubt the right o f  m ilitary
25 Art. 1 of a Treaty of Guarantee and Neutrality between Persia and the U.S.S.R., signed in 1 Oct. 1927, 
confirmed the Treaty of 1921. Asoviet statement of Oct. 1958, referred specifically to the Treaty of 1927; The 
Times, 3 Nov. 1958.
26 Oppenheim, International Law, ante, p.307; Brownlie, International Law and the Use o f Force by States, ante, 
p. 320.
27 Cmd. 9298 (1954), abrogated by Egypt 1 Jan. 1957 (A.J.l.L. (1957), p.672).
28 U.N. Charter Article (12): “To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principles of 
equal rights and self-determination of peoples...”.
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intervention conferred by Treaty. A  num ber o f  ju rists  have denied that such a 
treaty  is valid. N evertheless, in B row nlie’s view , the righ t o f forcible 
in tervention on the territory o f a state m ay still be law fully  conferred by  treaty .30
2.2 Arguments for the legality of intervention envisaged by Treaty
(i) Legitim ate lim itation o f  a S ta te 's  sovereignty.
It has been said  that m ilitary  intervention, constituting involvem ent in  the 
internal affairs o f a state, violates the principle o f sovereignty. H ow ever, if  
interventioh is done on the basis o f a treaty right, the sovereignty o f the state 
against w hich the intervention is launched is not violated, because the treaty  
righ t o f intervention suggests legitim ate and legal lim itation o f the state’s 
sovereignty.31 G iven that the state itse lf has accepted  the dim inution o f its 
sovereignty, the intervention m ust be legal. U nder such circum stances the state 
is obligated to accept the intervention. Contrary to  the above argum ent, it has 
been asserted that a treaty envisaging a righ t to in tervene is illegal, because it is 
in  violation o f general principles o f law. Since international law  acknow ledges 
the principle o f independence o f states, it com es that a state has the obligation 
o f self-preservation. The treaty envisaging in tervention deprives a state from  the 
exercise o f self-preservation and adm inistration.32 B ut those w ho advocate for
29 U.N. Charter Article 2(1): “The Organisation is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its 
Members”.
30 Brownlie, International Law and the Use o f Force by States, ante, p.321; Oppenheim, International Law, ante, 
p.307; Jessup, 32 A.J.l.L. (1938), p. 117.
1 On this, Lawrence, The Principles o f International Law, supra, pp. 118-119.
32 See Thomas and Thomas, Non Intervention: The Law and its Import in the Americas (Dallas, 1956), p. 91-92 
(where it is argued that the state is even deprived of its international personality). Indeed, whether a state, under 
these circumstances, maintains to the utmost its independence and sovereignty, remains controversial.
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the legitim ate lim itation o f sovereignty o f the state conceding a righ t o f m ilitary 
in tervention, say that there is no such thing as obligation to self-preservation.33 
In  the Austro-G erm an Custom s Union Case , Judge A nzilotti, in  a separate 
O pinion, w ent so far as to assert that according to general international law  each 
S tate is free to deny its independence, also described as sovereignty {suprem a  
po testa s ), and even its ow n existence.34
(ii) Volenti non f i t  injuria
M ost authors base the legality  o f intervention by  treaty righ t upon the consent o f 
the state agreeing to the grant o f a righ t o f intervention to another state. The 
legal axiom  volenti non f i t  injuria  is not only  a theoretical construction, bu t has 
constitu ted the legal basis o f interventions in  state practice.35 
Proponents o f this legal axiom  also suggest that entering into treaties is a  right 
o f independent states, w hich m ay by w ay o f treaty confer a right o f intervention 
to another state in  the sam e w ay as they m ay by in ternational agreem ent 
concede part o f their territory to a third state.36 Thus, a state not only gives aw ay 
its sovereign rights, but, on the contrary, exercises its sovereign righ t o f
33 See Lawrence, The Principles o f International Law, supra, pp. 118-119: “Sometimes an independent state 
finds itself obliged to submit for a while to restraints imposed upon it by superior force, as when Prussia was 
forbidden by Napoleon in 1808 to keep an army of more than 40,000 men. Such limited and temporary restraints 
upon the freedom of action of a state are not held to derogate from its independence. The same thing may be 
said of the authority assumed by the U.S. on the American continent. There can be no doubt that in America a 
position of primacy has been assumed by the U.S. But occasional deference to these authorities does not deprive 
a state of its independent position under the law of nations”; Winfield, The Grounds of Intervention in 
International Law, (1924) 4 British YBIL, pp. 155-159.
34 Advisory Opinion, (1931) 41 P.C.I.J. Reports, Series A/B, p.59.
35 Instances of the kind are the Soviet intervention in Hungary 1956, the joint intervention of Great Britain, 
France and Israel in Egypt 1956, and the intervention of the United Kingdom in Jordan 1958.
36 See Thomas and Thomas, Non-intervention: The Law and its Import in the Americas, ante, p. 96.
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concluding  a treaty. In the W im bledon Case , the Perm anent C ourt o f 
In ternational Justice held  that “the right o f entering into international 
engagem ents is an attribute o f  State sovereignty” .37 In the P erry C ase , w hich 
appeared  before the Suprem e C ourt o f the U nited  States, C hief Justice H ughes 
stated  in  his judgem ent: “the right to m ake binding obligations is a com petence 
attaching  to sovereignty” .38
(iii) Pacta  sunt servanda
O ne view  dictates that since the intentions o f tw o or m ore states coincide in  an 
In ternational A greem ent, so that a right to intervention o f one o f  the contracting 
parties into the internal affairs o f the other m ay be agreed, law  regulating their 
relations is therefore created. This law  is binding. In  accordance w ith the 
princip le  o f pacta  sunt servanda  the contracting parties are obliged to fulfil the 
term s o f the A greem ent.39 Interventions are illegal, unless the intervening 
state acquires special righ t to intervene according to public international law  
principles.
Thus, it could be argued, the binding force o f international treaties m ay be  said 
to sufficiently  form  the basis o f the legality o f in tervention accorded by  treaty. 
Furtherm ore, the legality o f intervention o f this sort m ay be grounded upon the 
re levan t principle o f m odus et conventio vincunt legem. The rationale behind
37 (1923) 1 P.C.I.J. Reports, Series A, p. 25
38 (1934) 294 U.S. Supreme Court Reports, p.330, 353-354. To the same effect, see the Opinion of the 
Permanent Court of International Justice in the Case of the Greco-Turkish exchange of populations in 1923 
(1923, 10 P.C.I.J. Reports, Series B, p.21).
39 See Harvard University Law School, Research on International Law, (1935) 29 American J.I.L., Supplement 
Part III Law of Treaties, p. 671.
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th is very  legal principle is that, g iven the lack o f a unified in ternational 
legislature, the creation o f legal rules governing relations betw een m em bers o f 
the in ternational com m unity  depends to a great degree on in ternational 
conventions, w hich do create legal relations am ong the parties to  a convention. 
M odus e t conventio  v incunt legem , like pacta  sunt servanda  is a generally 
recognized  principle, on condition that the content o f the treaty is in conform ity 
w ith  legitim acy.
U pon  the three argum ents m entioned so far, a strong case for the legality  o f 
m ilitary  in tervention provided for by treaty  right m ay be built up. Consequently, 
w e could  assert, at this stage, that T urkey’s m ilitary in tervention in  Cyprus 1974 
w as a legal act according to international law  principles; that A rticle IV (2) o f 
the Cyprus T reaty  o f G uarantee, even if  expressly authorized unilateral arm ed 
in tervention, w ould be perfectly  law ful. N evertheless, in  the subsection to 
follow , I shall attem pt to present view s going against this assertion.
2.3 Arguments against the legality of intervention provided for by Treaty right.
(i) G eneral P rinciples o f  Law
A  valid  treaty  presupposes law ful provisions. It is true that states have the 
capacity, by  virtue o f sovereignty, to conclude treaties on any m atter w hatever.
It is equally  true, how ever, that in  the international legal order there exist legal 
rules, w hich states -parties to a treaty- cannot, and should not, ignore. This v iew  
is pointedly  expressed by the legal m axim  privatorum  conventio  ju ris  publico
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non derogat. The rationale underlying this ax iom  is that the in ternational 
com m unity, like every w ell ordered society, should see to the law ful and m oral 
coexistence o f its m em bers. A s Lauterpacht very w ell pu t it: “ the parties 
conclude a treaty not in  a legal vacuum , but against a background o f existing 
ru les o f international law ”.40 It m ay be true that the treaty  has to  be in terpreted 
by  reference to the intention o f the parties. B ut the in tention o f the parties m ust 
be in terpreted  by  reference to rules o f in ternational law, in  so far as their 
application has not been expressly excluded.41 A long sim ilar lines, V erdross 
w rote that “no jurid ical order can adm it treaties betw een ju rid ica l subjects 
w hich are obviously in  contradiction o f the ethics o f a certain  com m unity” .42 
A ccording to these general princip les o f  law, a treaty com prising unlaw ful 
provisions is void  (turpes stipulations nullius esse m om enti).43 U nquestionably, 
general princip les o f  law  are in force under in ternational law ;44 custom ary law, 
the history  o f international arbitration and A rticle 38(1) o f  the Statute o f the 
International C ourt o f Justice attest to their legal valid ity .45
40 H. Lauterpacht, The Function of Law in the International Community (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1933), p. 109.
41 Ibid. p. 109. The above considerations, Sir Hersch Lauterpacht observes, will perhaps suggest to the reader a 
certain criterion for gauging the relative importance of the first two paragraphs of the enumeration of sources of 
law to be applied by the Permanent Court of International Justice according to Article 38 of its Statute. In 
particular, he may be inclined to think, not without good reason, that the order in which the first two sources of 
law have been placed, although technically correct, is not necessarily indicative of the function which they fulfil 
in the process of bringing about the decision.
42 A. Verdross, Forbidden Treaties in International Law, (1937) 31 American J.I.L., p. 572.
43 Corpus Juris Civilis, The Digest of Justinian, translated by Charles Henry Monro (Cambridge: The University 
Press, 1904-1909) 26 Pandects, 43,1 and 57 Pandects 17,2.
44 See Verdross, Forbidden Treaties In International Law, supra, p.572.
45 Article 38 (1) (c): “The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law such disputes 
as are submitted to it, shall apply: the general principles of law recognized by civilised nations”.
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T he question w hich naturally  follow s is which  are those international law
principles v iolation o f w hich renders a treaty void  ? Answ er: the perem ptory  
norm s o f  international law  otherw ise know n as ju s  cogens. The basis o f  these 
principles m ay be found in  natural law. A rticle 53 o f the V ienna C onvention on
the Law  o f Treaties, signed at V ienna in  196946, provides as follows: “A  treaty  
is vo id  i f  a t the tim e o f  its conclusion conflicts w ith  a perem ptory norm  o f  
international law. F or the purposes o f  the p resen t C onvention , a perem ptory  
norm  o f  general international law  is a norm  accepted  and  recognized by the 
international com m unity o f  States as a w hole as a norm  fro m  w hich no  
derogation is perm itted  and  w hich can be m odified  only by a subsequent norm  
o f  general international law  having the same charac ter”.47 The definition o f a 
perem ptory  norm  is m ore skilful than appears at first sight. A  ru le cannot 
becom e a perem ptory norm  unless it is “accepted and recognized (as such) by 
the international com m unity o f states as a w hole”, a requirem ent w hich is too 
logical to be challenged. A t present very few  rules pass this threshold.48 There is 
considerable agreem ent on the prohib ition  o f  the use o f  fo rce , o f  genocide,
46 The Vienna Convention is the outcome of the work of the International Law Commission and two sessions of 
the united Nations Conference on the Law of Treaties held in 1968 and 1969.
47 Text in ILM 8 (1969), 679; American J.I.L., p.875; Brownlie (ed.) Basic Documents in International Law 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985), p. 388.
48 Oppenheim, International Law Vol. I (9th ed. Sir Robert Jennings QC and Sir Arthur Watts QC London: 
Longman, 1996) p. 1292: “There is no general agreement as to which rules have this character”; Sir Arthur Watts, 
The International Law Commission, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999 pp. 740-1: “ The view that in the 
last analysis there is no rule of international law from which States cannot at their own free will contract out has 
become increasingly difficult to sustain, although some jurists deny the existence of any rules o f jus cogens in 
international law, since in their own view even the most general rules still fall short o f being universal”; H. 
Lauterpacht’s Report on the Law of Treaties, YBILC (1953), ii, pp. 154-5; Waldock’s Report, YBILC (1963), ii, 
pp. 52-3; Sinclair, The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (2nd ed. 1984) pp. 203-41; Rozakis, The 
Concept o f Jus Co gens in the Law of Treaties (1976)
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slavery, o f gross violations o f  the righ t o f people to self-determ ination, and of
racial discrim ination . O thers w ould include the prohibition o f to rtu re.49The 
In ternational Law  C om m ission, in its com m entary on the draft o f the V ienna 
C onvention, identified the C harter’s prohibition o f the use o f in ter-S tate force as 
a “conspicuous exam ple” o f ju s  cogens. 50 T he C om m ission’s position was 
quo ted  by the International C ourt in  the N icaragua case .51 In his Separate 
O pinion, P resident Singh underscored that “the principle o f non-use o f force 
belongs to  the realm  o f ju s  cogens”.52 Judge Sette-Cam ara, in  another Separate 
O pinion, also expressed the firm  view  that the non-use o f force can be 
recognized  as a perem ptory ru le .53 D espite som e reservations, this position 
seem s to  be the prevalent at present.54 In the relevant draft o f the  International 
L aw  C om m ission, it is indicated that treaties providing for use o f force in  
v io lation  o f  the principles o f the U N  Charter, treaties for the com m ission o f acts 
w hich constitute crim es under international law , treaties providing for slave 
trade, p iracy  ju re  gentium , and genocide, m ay be cited as exam ples o f treaties
49 In the Barcelona Traction Case 1970, in an obscure obiter dictum, the International Court of Justice referred 
to ‘basic rights of the human person’, including the prohibition of slavery and racial discrimination and the 
prohibition o f aggression and genocide, which it considered to be ‘the concern of all States’, without, however, 
expressly recognizing the concept of jus cogens. However, in its Advisory Opinion in the Legality o f Nuclear 
Weapons Case, the ICJ did not find it a need to address the question whether universally recognized principles 
of international humanitarian law (applicable in time of armed conflict) are part of ju s cogens as defined in 
Article 51. (35 I.L.M., 1996, p. 828, para.83).
50 Report of the International Law Commission, 18th Session, [1966] II YBILC 172, pp. 248-9, 261.
51 Nicaragua Case (Merits) I.C.J. Rep. 1986, p. 14
52 Ibid., p. 247
53 Ibid., p. 199
54 See American Law Institute, 1 Restatement o f the Law: The Foreign Relations Law o f the United States 28 
(3rd ed., 1986; L. Henkin, Chief Reporter).
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that conflict w ith perem ptory norm s o f general international law. A nother view  
appears to be that a ru le  o f ju s  cogens can be derived from  custom .
In view  o f the above, it could be argued that the ru le  o f general
international law  prohibiting the unilateral use o f  force, especially  as la id  dow n 
by A rticle  2(4) o f the U.N. Charter, constitutes ju s  cogens.55 The International 
Law  C om m ission observes that the prohibition o f the threat or use o f  force 
undoubtedly constitutes perem ptory norm  o f international law  “from  w hich 
states cannot derogate by  treaty arrangem ents” .56 Thus, th is legal ru le  cannot be 
invalidated by an international treaty. A  pact o f aggression concluded betw een 
A rcadia and N um idia against U topia w ill not only be stigm atized as a violation 
o f the Charter, as well as general international law, but it w ill also be void  ab
c n
initio. A uthors such as G uggenheim , w ho see international law  as dependent 
upon the consent and agreem ents o f states, re ject the perem ptory nature o f 
international custom ary law  rules. C ontrary to this position, M cN air  w rites that 
states are not capable o f evading perem ptory norm s o f international law  by the 
conclusion o f special treaties.58 A rticle 103 o f the U .N . C harter m ay be cited as
55 This peremptory norm may further be said to stem from the principle of state sovereignty.
56 See U.N. Doc. A/5509, Supplement No. 9, p. 11-12; Watts, The International Law Commission, ante, p.741: 
“Some members of the Commission felt that there might be an advantage in specifying some of the most 
obvious and best settled rules of jus cogens. Examples suggested included (a) a treaty contemplating an unlawful 
use of force contrary to the principles of the U.N. Charter.
57 See G.G. Fitzmaurice, “Third Report on Law of Treaties”, [1958] II Y.B.I.L.C. pp. 20-40; Dinstein, War, 
Aggression, and Self-Defence (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), p. 103. 1979 Dig.
58 See McNair, The Law o f Treaties (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1961), p. 215: “There are, however, 
many rules of customary international law which stand in a higher category and which cannot be set aside or 
modified by contracting States; it is easier to illustrate these rules than to define them. They are rules which 
have been accepted, expressly or tacitly, by custom as being necessary to protect the public interests of the 
society of States or to maintain the standards of public morality recognized by them. For instance, piracy is 
stigmatized by customary international law as a crime, in the sense that a pirate is regarded as hostis humani 
generis and can lawfully be punished by any state into whose hands he may fall. Can there be any doubt that a
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evidence o f the existence o f a perem ptory norm  o f international law  going 
against the conclusion o f treaties providing for unilateral m ilitary in tervention.59 
F rom  the above discussion it m ay be inferred  that article IV (2) o f the Cyprus 
T reaty  o f G uarantee conflicts w ith ju s  cogens and is legally  invalid. A s a result, 
one could argue that Turkey m ay not claim  a right for unilateral m ilitary 
intervention conferred by the Treaty o f G uarantee. Even i f  the T reaty expressly 
provided for such a right (w hich is not the case), this w ould again be in  plain 
violation o f perem ptory norm s o f international law. On the o ther hand, a 
possible counterargum ent could be that Cyprus w as not a m em ber o f the U nited 
N ations at the tim e w hen the Zurich and L ondon A ccords w ere signed, and so 
the rules o f ju s  cogens as em bodied in the U.N. C harter could no t have been 
applicable to the new ly bom  Cyprus Republic. In  answ er to such possible 
allegation, it m ay be asserted that the perem ptory rules o f  international law  laid 
dow n by the U.N. C harter w ere nevertheless applicable to  all other signatory 
States to the T reaty  o f Cyprus; Turkey, Greece, and the U nited  K ingdom  were
treaty whereby two States agreed to permit piracy in a certain area, or against the merchant ships of a certain 
State, with impunity, would be null and void? Or a treaty whereby two allies agreed to wage a war by methods 
which neglected the customary rules of warfare?” Also, authors like Georg Schwarzenberger, representing more 
or less a traditional view of international law, assert that treaties should not conflict with a peremptory norm of 
general international law (jus cogens), as the principle is expressed in the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties, 1969: “Notwithstanding the absence in international customary law of rules o f jus cogens or of any 
rule requiring compliance of treaties with jus cogens, Article 64 of the Vienna Convention of 1969 on the Law 
of Treaties provides that if  a new peremptory norm of general international law emerges, any existing treaty 
which is in conflict with it becomes void and terminates” (Georg Schwarzenberger and E.D. Brown, A Manual 
of International Law, 6th edn., London, 1976, pp. 139-40).
59 U.N. Charter, Article 103: “ In the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Members of the United 
Nations under the present Charter and their obligations under any other international agreement, their 
obligations under the present Charter shall prevail”. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969 
provides that the rules which it sets out regarding the rights and obligations of states parties to successive 
treaties relating to the same subject matter are subject to this Article; see generally Oppenheim, International 
Law Vol. I, ante, p. 1216; Goodrich, Hambro and Simons, Charter o f the United Nations (3rd ed., 1969), pp. 
614-17, Kelsen The Law o f the United Nations (1950), McNair, The Law o f Treaties, ante, p. 216-18.
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already m em bers o f the U nited N ations O rganization at the tim e, clearly  bound 
by its principles. O f course as soon as C yprus becam e a U N  m em ber state 
(in fact long before the 1974 Turkish intervention), the principles o f the 
U nited  N ations -in c lu d in g  ju s  cogens- w ere to be directly  a p p licab le .60 
A nother objection to the applicability o f ju s  cogens in  the case o f Cyprus, m ay 
be phrased as follows: A rticle 65 o f the V ienna C onvention relates to the 
procedure to be follow ed w ith respect to invalidity, term ination, w ithdraw al 
from , o r suspension o f the operation o f a treaty. The C onvention, w hich 
incorporates the principle o f the ju s cogens into the law  o f  treaties, m akes it 
m andatory to refer a dispute to the International C ourt o f Justice for a decision. 
A rticle 66 states that if, under paragraph 3 o f A rticle 65 no solution has been 
reached w ithin a period o f tw elve m onths follow ing the date on w hich the 
objection was raised, any o f the parties to a dispute concerning the application 
or the interpretation o f articles 53 may, by a w ritten application, subm it it to the 
International C ourt o f Justice for a decision unless the parties by com m on 
consent agree to subm it the dispute to arbitration. On this basis, one line o f 
argum ent is put forw ard (in fact by N ecatigil),61 that in the absence o f  a ruling
60 This may form a separate argument against the legality of intervention provided for by Treaty right. Given the 
conventional character of the UN Charter, two treaties conflict: the UN Charter itself on the one hand, and the 
Cyprus Treaty of Guarantee, on the other. In such a case the Charter, considered as ‘higher’ law, prevails. The 
supremacy of the Charter over any other international agreement is established by Article 103 (UN Charter). Art. 
103 refers both to past and future treaties conflicting with the Charter of the UN (on this last point, see McNair, 
The Law of Treaties, ante, p.218: “This provision contains no limitation as to time and operates both 
retrospsctively and prospectively”; Oppenheim, International Law, Vol. I (9th ed. Jennings and Watts), ante, p. 
1216: “Article 103 is widely accepted as establishing the supremacy of the obligations of the Charter over any 
other contractual agreement of the members whether past or future, and whether between members inter se or 
with non-member states”; Oppenheim-Lauterpacht, International Law Vol. I (7th ed. H.Lauterpacht) ante, p.807.
61 See Necatigil, The Turkish Position in International Law, ante, p .l 18.
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o f the International Court, a treaty, such as the T reaty o f  G uarantee, should not 
be p resum ed to  be invalid  as being in conflict w ith a perem ptory norm  of 
in ternational law. In o ther words, the presum ption should be in  favour o f the 
valid ity  o f  a treaty  until there is a jud icia l ruling to the contrary. This procedure 
has no t been  invoked by  the R epublic o f Cyprus.
(ii). Treaties reached under D uress or Inequitable Treaties 
The legal position o f the Cyprus G overnm ent, as later expressed in  the U nited  
N ations by  M r. K yprianou, then Foreign M inister, was that the “C onstitution 
w as fo isted  on C y p ru s ... The com bined effect o f the C onstitution and the T reaty  
o f G uarantee is that a situation has been created w hereby the constitutional and 
political developm ent o f the Republic has been arrested at its infancy and the 
R epublic as a sovereign State has been placed in  a strait jack e t” .62 The M inister 
o f  Foreign  A ffairs also argued that the treaties “w ere im posed on the C ypriot 
people  (thus) m aking the international legal doctrines o f unequal, inequitable 
and un just treaties relevant” . The resulting legal conclusion, according to M r. 
K yprianou, was that the 1960 A greem ents w ere “unequal and inequitable 
treaties, as a resu lt o f w hich they cannot be regarded as anything but null and 
vo id .”63
62 UN SCOR, 1098th meeting, 5 Aug., 1965, para.20 (1964).
63 UN SCOR, 1235th meeting, para.25 (1964).
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A ccording to O ppenheim , real consent is a condition o f the validity o f a 
treaty.64A n expression o f consent procured by  the coercion o f its representative 
through acts or threats d irected  against h im  is generally  agreed to be w ithout 
legal effect, and A rticle 51 o f the V ienna C onvention on the Law  o f Treaties so 
provides: the T reaty is void  not m erely voidable.65 A ny treaty signed by a state 
under pressure exerted by  another state is void.66 A rticle  32(a) o f  the H arvard  
D raft C onvention on the Law  o f Treaties,
states: ‘D uress involves the em ploym ent o f c o e rc io n ...I f  the coercion has been 
directed against a person signing a Treaty on behalf o f  a State, and o f w ith 
know ledge o f this fact the treaty  signed has been  ratified  by tha t State w ithout 
coercion, the treaty is not to be considered as having entered into by  the State in 
consequence o f duress’.67
The argum ent o f the Cyprus governm ent im plies that unequal treaties- 
agreem ents im posing burdens on states in  unequal bargaining positions- are in 
them selves void. H ow ever, the Cyprus G overnm ent representatives never
64 Oppenheim-Lauterpacht, International Law, ante, Vol. I, pp.802-803; Oppenheim, International Law Vol. I 
(9th ed. R.Jennings and A.Watts), ante, London: Longman, 1996), p. 1290.
65 See Oppenheim, International Law, supra, p. 1290; H. Lauterpacht, Private Law Sources and Analogies o f 
International Law (London 1927) p. Brownlie, International Law and the Use o f Force by States, ante, pp. 404- 
6; Watts, The International Law Commission, ante, p.737: “There is general agreement that acts of coercion or 
threats applied to individuals with respect to their own persons in their personal capacity in order to procure the 
signature, ratification, acceptance or approval of a treaty will unquestionably invalidate the consent so procured”.
66 See relevant discussion in Oppenheim-Lauterpacht, ante, Vol. 1, p. 802; H. Lauterpacht, Private Law Sources 
and Analogies of International Law, supra p. 74; McNair, The Law of Treaties, ante, p. 209, (1927) 26 MLR, pp. 
139-151; Brierly, (1936) 58 Recueil des Cours, pp. 203-210.
67 Harvard Law School Research on International Law, ante, p. 1148; Grotius maintained that ‘the law of nature 
required that there ought to be freedom of choice by the parties, and that their consent should not be induced by 
fear'(De jure belli ac pads, ante, Book II).
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pressed this position  to its logical conclusion, that the 1960 settlem ent was 
void.68
(iii) Sovereign equality
A rticle 2(1) o f the C harter o f the U nited N ations declares that ‘the O rganization 
is based on  the principle o f sovereign equality o f all its m em bers’. It has been 
stated that the obligation o f the Treaty o f  G uarantee ‘to keep unalterable in  
perpetuity  the constitutional structure and o rder’ purports to deprive C yprus o f 
one o f the fundam ental requirem ents o f a state as an integral person, internal 
independence and territorial suprem acy’. 69 This point is further elaborated; 
article IV  o f the Treaty o f G uarantee conflicts both  w ith custom ary international 
law  and w ith article 103 o f  the U N  C harter by violating the principle o f 
‘sovereign equality’ as laid  dow n in article 2(1).70
Indeed, the Republic o f Cyprus does not have the capacity to am end the 
fundam ental o r so called ‘B asic A rtic les’ o f its C onstitution. H ow ever, absence 
o f  pow er o f a state to change its constitution m ay no t affect its sovereign
68 Ehrlich, International Crises and the Role o f Law, Cyprus 1958-1967 (Oxford, 1974), p.48: “In part, the 
logical reason may have been concern that Turkey and the United Kingdom would respond that if the settlement 
was invalid then Cyprus was still a British colony. But no one seriously urged that position; the Republic of 
Cyprus had been a member of the United Nations for over three years and its ‘sovereign equality’ was 
recognized by the Charter. Much more important, there were strong pressures from at least Turkey and England, 
and probably Greece as well, against abrogation of all the Accords.
69 C. Tomaritis, Cyprus and its Constitutional and Other Legal Problems (Nicosia, 1977), pp. 58-59.
70 Tomaritis, ibid., pp. 42, 60. See also A. J. Jacovides, Treaties Conflicting with Peremptory Norms of 
International Law and the Zurich-London Agreements (Nicosia, 1966), pp. 15-28.
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equality . A lso, absence o f such pow er is not regarded as being incom patible 
w ith  the concept o f independence, a necessary requirem ent for statehood.71 
B y now , there should be no doubt that unilateral m ilitary in tervention provided 
for, even  expressly, by treaty righ t is not in  accordance w ith public international 
law  principles.
(3)Did theTreaty o f Guarantee purport to authorize military action?
T he proper interpretation o f  certain expressions in  the 
w ording o f  A rt. 4  is the subject o f great controversy. ‘R epresentations’ m ay 
sim ply be a request to com ply w ith a duty, but they cou ld  also take the form  o f a 
threat o f violence, as and w hen the duty bound does not behave as it should.72 
T he w ord ‘m easures is also am biguous; as A rticles 41 and 4273 o f  the U nited 
N ations C harter dem onstrate, it m ay m ean actions o f a peaceful although 
coercive nature, as well as those w hich involve the use o f  force.74 
T erm inological differences culm inate over the interpretation o f the right o f each 
o f the guaranteeing pow ers to take action. A  vexed question rem ains w hether 
the phrase to take action  m ay also im ply m ilitary action. The G reek side, as one 
w ould easily  guess, answ ers in  the negative. The Turkish side, o f  course, in  the 
affirm ative. The form er is o f the view  that nothing in  the T reaty  w arrants a
71 See Crawford, (1976) 48 British Year book o f International Law, p.93, at 123-4.
72 N.Ronzitti, Rescuing Nationals Abroad Through Military Coercion and Intervention on Grounds o f Humanity 
(Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1985) p. 128.
73 UN Charter, Article 42: Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would 
be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea or land forces as may be 
necessary to maintain international peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and 
other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations.
74 Ronzitti, supra p. 128; Necatigil, supra p. 131.
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fo rcib le  in tervention by Turkey. C riton T om aritis Q .C., form erly A ttorney- 
G eneral o f the Cyprus R epublic holds that irrespective o f  the valid ity  o f the 
T reaty  o f  G uarantee, from  the pream ble and the provisions o f w hich it appears 
tha t the guaranteeing pow ers w ere aim ing at the protection o f their own 
in terests than the interests o f  the Republic o f  Cyprus, its A rticle IV  invoked by 
T urkey  does not grant the righ t to  o f arm ed intervention to  the guaranteeing 
Pow ers.75 N ecatigil, says that the second paragraph o f the article in  question, by 
prov id ing  for the right o f any o f the  guaranteeing pow ers to take action , is 
s tronger in  term s than the first paragraph.
If  only  unilateral intercession w as envisaged, then there w as no reason  w hy the 
second paragraph should not expressly speak o f the right to unilateral 
in tercession  o r . .. diplom atic representation. U pon this rationale, one could 
conversely  that neither a right to unilateral m ilitary action is expressly  provided 
fo r by A rticle  IV (2).76
Thus, g reat d ifficulty  arises over ascertaining the in tentions o f the Treaty 
drafters w hich becom es even m ore acute in view  o f the very  lim ited  sources o f 
inform ation  on the m atter. The Treaty o f G uarantee w as initialled  a t the end o f 
the Z urich  Sum m it betw een G reece and Turkey o f 5-11 February 1959; its 
content, how ever, was d isclosed only after the London C onference.77 The
75 Tomaritis, Whether any resort to armed intervention in Cyprus would be justified either under the Charter or 
under customary international law, (1964) II Cyprus Today, p.2.
76 The Textual or “plain meaning” approach to Treaty Interpretation does not seem to be helpful in this case. It 
should be noted, however, that the International Court of Justice has more than once pronounced that the textual 
approach is regarded by it as established law (see, for instance, the Admissions case, I.C.J. Reports 1948, p. 57, 
and the Competence case, I.C.J. Reports 1950, p. 4).
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participants d id not draw  up an official record o f the sum m it and the 
inform ation available is unfortunately little. H ow ever, S tephen X ydis, shades 
light to the events. H is account is the outcom e o f interview s w ith  the G reek 
representatives78. A ccording to Xydis, Turkey subm itted a draft to the G reek 
counterpart, probably  after consulting the U nited K ingdom . The draft allow ed 
the right to take unilateral action, w ithout having previously determ ined if  a 
com m on or concerted action was in  fact possible.
“A t a certain  poin t o f the negotiations”, X ydis goes on, “the Turkish side 
w anted specific reference to  the right o f resort to ‘m ilitary’ action for the 
purpose o f restoring the state o f affairs established by  the treaty. The G reek 
side , how ever, contended that resorting to m ilitary action w as prohibited  by the 
U.N. C harter and was perm issible only under a decision o f the Security C ouncil, 
if  at all. Finally, the text w as draw n up in  its present form , w ith  the Turks 
alw ays having possible resort to the ultim a ratio  in m ind, in  contrast to  the 
Greeks w ho did no t” .79
77 See Conference on Cyprus: Documents signed and initialled at Lancaster House on February 19, 1959, 
Cmnd.679, Miscellaneous No. 4, London, HMSO, 1959, pp. 5, 10.
78 S.G. Xydis, Cyprus reluctant Republic (London 1973)
19 Ibid. pp. 409-410. On this point see also D. Bitsios, Cyprus: The Vulnerable Republic (1975), p. 102; to the 
same effect, of interest is a report sent by Averoff, Foreign Minister of Greece, to Prime Minister Karamanlis, 
briefing him on the points that had arisen during the preparatory London talks: ‘ The most serious point that had 
arisen concerned paragraph 2 of the Treaty of Guarantee, which provided that each of the guarantors could act 
unilaterally in order to safeguard the constitutional order if the other guarantors did not agree as to the manner in 
which they should act. At the meeting of 12 February, obviously after consulting legal experts, the point was 
raised by the British that this provision was incompatible with the UN Charter and perhaps would prevent 
Cyprus from becoming a UN member. Mr Zorlu, Mr Palamas, Greek expert on UN matters, and Mr Averoff 
argued that there was no incompatibility. Mr Averoff declared, however, that should any article of the Zurich 
Agreements create difficulties for the entry of Cyprus to the UN it should be amended in such a way as to 
remove the difficulty’ (Story o f Lost Opportunities, ed. p. )
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M ore illum inating perhaps are the Security Council D ebates o f 1963 and 1974. 
In  1963, T urkey m ilitarily  in tervened in Cyprus allegedly to p ro tect the lives o f 
the Turkish Cypriots who had  engaged in  a bloody conflict against the G reek 
C ypriots.80 A  ‘Joint Peace-M aking Force under B ritish com m and (to its credit) 
operated in  Cyprus tow ards the end o f 1963 and the beginning o f 1964. It was 
com posed o f contingents from  the three G uarantor States. This Peace-M aking 
Force had the task o f helping the C ypriot G overnm ent in  its efforts to  bring 
about peace betw een the tw o com m unities. In  critical debates o f 1964 on the 
Cyprus question, representatives o f Turkey at the U nited N ations repeatedly  
stated that their governm ent’s freedom  o f action derived from  the T reaty  o f 
G uarantee, w hose validity  was incontestable.81 The C ypriot G overnm ent 
position was stated by the then Foreign M inister, M r. Spyros K yprianou. H e 
said that his governm ent firm ly rejected  T urkey’s in terpretation o f article 4  o f 
the Treaty o f G uarantee. 82 M ore interesting is the view  o f  the G reek 
representative. In  answ er to the Cyprus representative, w ho dem anded a 
declaration from  the G uarantor States on the question w hether the treaty gives 
the righ t o f unilateral m ilitary intervention, he said: ‘D o w e the G reek 
governm ent- think that this article givesus the righ t to intervene m ilitarily, and 
unilaterally w ithout the authorization o f the Security  C ouncil? The answ er is
80 More of the international dimensions of the inter-communal strife, see below, chapter VI.
81 19 UN GAOR 29th Session, 23 Sept. 1974 (A/PV 2793), paras. 123-5.
82 19 UN SCOR, 27 Feb. 1964, S/PV 1098, para. 16. On another occasion, he said that the Treaty of Guarantee 
contains provisions which are contrary to the UN Charter and is consequently void (20 UN SCOR, 5 Aug. 1965, 
S/PV 1235, para.25).
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“n o ” ’.83 Even m ore interesting and, indeed, revealing w as the statem ent o f the 
B ritish  governm ent representative. Firstly, he  said that “it was no t under article 
IV  o f the Treaty o f G uarantee that the U nited K ingdom  G overnm ent sent its 
troops to Cyprus. W e sent our troops because they w ere asked fo r and because 
they w ere generally  considered to be necessary and helpful in preventing further 
serious strife.”84 Furtherm ore, he em phasised ‘the action provided for in  article 
IV (2) o f the Treaty o f G uarantee can only be taken in  the  event o f  a breach o f 
the provisions o f the Treaty, that is, in circum stances in  w hich there is a threat 
to  the independence, territorial integrity or security o f the R epublic o f Cyprus as 
established by the Basic A rticles o f its Constitution; a righ t o f intervention for 
this purpose, and for this purpose alone, is provided for in  the Treaty. B ut the 
question o f m ilitary  in tervention under article IV  o f the T reaty o f G uarantee 
w ould never arise i f  all concerned p la yed  their p a r t as they have undertaken to 
do  (em phasis added).’85 This very statem ent is quite clear. I f  the attitude o f all 
the States concerned was in  accordance w ith the com m itm ents undertaken resort 
to force w ould not be necessary. In  case this should no t happen, the problem  
arises o f restoring the state o f affairs created by the T reaty  o f G uarantee, if  need
Q / '
be by m easures w hich m ight com prise the use o f force.
83 19 UN SCOR, 1097™ meeting, 25 Feb. 1964 (S/PV 1093), para. 168. In his view, the Turkish military 
intervention was aimed at invasion and, in the long run, the partition of the island.
84 S/PV. 1098, February 27, 1964, pp. 48-50. See also E. Lauterpacht, British Practice in International Law
85 ibid. pp.42-46. The representative of the British Government interestingly went on to say that ‘the legal effect 
of the provisions of article IV of the Treaty of Guarantee, as in the case of other legal provisions, will depend on 
the facts and circumstances of the situation in which they are invoked, and there is nothing in article IV to 
suggest that action taken under it would necessarily be contrary to the United Nations Charter’.
86 See N.Ronzitti, Rescuing Nationals Abroad through Military Coercion and Intervention on Grounds of 
Humanity, ante, p. 124.
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H ow ever, it is, I consider, necessary to refer in  this regard  to the legal advice 
given by Sir E lihu L auterpacht to the Cyprus G overnm ent after a consultation 
in  L ondon on 25 January 1964.
Lauterpacht considers that the Treaty o f G uarantee is valid. H e does not, 
how ever, consider that the T reaty o f G uarantee gives the righ t to arm ed
87intervention.
On 20 July 1974, during the debates before the Security  Council, the G reek 
C ypriot representative put forw ard that Turkey’s action contravened the treaty 
Itself, as w ell as the U N  Charter. H e argued that the right to take action  denotes 
only the application o f peaceful m easures and, furtherm ore it does not include 
arm ed aggression, w hich is forbidden to m em ber states, except in  case o f self- 
defence.88 The Turkish representative, on the other hand, stressed that the 
Treaty o f G uarantee gave Turkey the righ t to take m ilitary action, aim ing at 
establishing constitutional adm inistration in the island and protecting the rights 
o f the Turkish C ypriots89. The G reek governm ent’s attitude was less clear and 
partly  contradicted the 1964 declaration. It did not m aintain that A rticle IV (2) 
d id not allow  the right o f intervention. Instead, the G reek representative pointed 
out that for unilateral action to be considered law ful, it w ould have to take place
87 Eli Lauterpacht, Written Opinion, 1964 (the Opinion may be found in G. Clerides, Cyprus: My Deposition, 
ante, Appendix f  pp. 386-7)
88 UNSC S/PV 1781; UN Monthly Chronicle 1974, vol. xi, No.8, 21-3. He proceeded to state that even though it 
could be assumed that the treaty gave a right to take military action, this right could be resorted to only for the 
protection of the Constitution.
9 Necatigil, The Turkish Position in International Law, ante, p i 13.
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only after the collapse o f negotiations betw een the three G uarantor States and 
w ould have to have the sole aim  o f re-establishing the status quo ante.90 One 
could therefore allege that it w ould seem  the G reek governm ent d id  not deny 
existence -u n d e r A rticle V I(2)- o f a right o f m ilitary intervention, but, rather, 
that it contested its vindication in  the particular case.91
The U nited K ingdom  did not take up a position w ith regarding the content o f 
o f A rticle IV (2) o f  the T reaty o f G uarantee.
N evertheless, great light is shed on the B ritish position b y  the debates before the 
H ouse o f Com m ons, particularly  by a report prepared by the Select Com m ittee 
appointed to conduct an exam ination the Cyprus situation.92 The F oreign  
Secretary rep lied  in  the follow ing m anner to the M em bers o f Parliam ent who 
asked h im  w hether, under A rt. IV(2), the U nited  K ingdom  had the righ t to use 
force as and w hen there was a breach o f the Treaty o f G uarantee: ‘I dare say 
legally  w e h ad ’.93 F rom  a careful reading, though, o f the Select C om m ittees 
records, the Foreign M inister seem ed to hesitate; not because he w as no t o f the 
opinion that A rticle IV  o f the Treaty o f G uarantee gave a righ t to  m ilitary 
intervention, but because he doubted if  it w as w ise from  a political standpoint to 
use such a right.94 The parliam entary C om m ittee stated: ‘B ritain  had  a legal
90 U.N. Doc. S/PV.1781, 20 July 1974, p.82 (where it is stated: ‘neither of those prerequisites has been 
fulfilled...exhaustion of consultations did not precede the Turkish attacks nor were Turkey’s plans aimed at the 
status quo ante, but, obviously, at the permanent occupation of large portions of Cypriot territory’).
91 See N.Ronzitti ante, p. 121.
92 See, Report from the Select Committee on Cyprus together with the Proceedings o f the Committee, Minutes of 
Evidence and Appendices, Session 1975- 76, Ordered by the House of Commons to be printed, 8th April 1976, 
H.M.S.O., London.
93 Ibid., However, it has to be noted that the U.K., according to the Report of the Parliamentary Debates, would 
only intervene in order to overthrow the Sampson regime and protect the lives of the Turkish Cypriots.
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righ t to intervene, she had a m oral obligation to intervene, she had  the m ilitary  
capacity  to intervene. She did not intervene for reasons w hich the governm ent 
refuses to g ive .’95 In  a recen t H ouse o f Lords D ebate on  the  Cyprus question, 
L ord  C aradon referred to article IV  o f the T reaty o f G uarantee and said these: 
‘H aving signed the treaty w ith the authority o f H er M ajesty ’s G overnm ent I 
have naturally  w atched subsequent events in  the island o f  Cyprus w ith dism ay 
and sham e that w e should have given an undertaking and have failed so 
sham efully to carry it ou t’.96
A part from  the U nited N ations debates and the U nited K ingdom  Parliam entary 
Papers so far considered, the available travaux preparatoires are o f  little help on 
ascertaining the intentions o f  the Treaty drafters concerning w hether 
intervention m ust be by  peaceful m eans alone o r it m ay consist o f  m easures 
am ounting to the use o f force. E ven so, there exist docum ents o f considerable 
gravity w ith regard  to this point. D uring discussions by the London Joint 
C om m ittee97, o f one particular annex, nam ely, A nnex C on  the status o f forces, 
the G reek delegation proposed the inclusion o f a provision dealing w ith the 
settlem ent o f disputes. The Cyprus O fficial C om m ittee, in  w hich the view s o f
94 It may be inferred that several statements (the present one included) of the United Kingdom, although not 
without a degree of ambiguity, lead one to believe that, in the eyes of the UK, Article IV permits military 
intervention on the part of the Guarantor States.
95 Report from the Select Committee on Cyprus together with the Proceedings of the Committee, Minutes of 
Evidence and Appendices, Seassion 1975-76, supra, p. x (emphasis added).
96 Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), House o f Lords (Official Report), vol. 44, No. 80, 20 Apr. 1983, 618.
97 The London Joint Committee, on which the United Kingdom, Greece, Turkey, the Greek-Cypriot and Turkish 
Cypriot communities were represented, was engaged in drafting the Treaty of Establishment of the Republic of 
Cyprus.
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W hitehall D epartm ents are coordinated, considered the m atter and concluded 
that the m ost satisfactory proposal was that a disputes article covering the whole 
T reaty and its A nnexes should be included in  the Treaty  o f E stablishm ent.98 
follow ing is the o f the said article:
“A n y  question o f  d ifficulty as to the interpretation or application o f  the 
provisions o f  the presen t Treaty shall be settled  as fo llow s:
A ny  question or difficulty that m ay arise over the application or operation o f  
the m ilitary requirem ents o f  the United K ingdom , o r  concerning the
provisions o f  the p resen t Treaty in so fa r  as they a ffect the status, rights 
and  obligations o f  United K ingdom  fo rces  o r  any o ther fo rce s  associa ted  with  
them  under the term s o f  this Treaty, or o f  Greek, Turkish a n d  C ypriot forces, 
shall ordinarily be settled  by negotiation between the tripartite H eadquarters o f  
the R epublic o f  Cyprus, Greece and  Turkey and  the authorities o f  the arm ed  
fo rce s  o f  the U nited K ingdom ".99 So, if  any such controversy cam e about (and 
actually did com e about in the subsequent years) the in terested  parties w ould be 
under an obligation to settle their differences by  m eans o f peaceful negotiation 
and therefore resolve any difficulty regarding in terpretation o f T reaty  provisions 
on arm ed forces rights and obligations. It m ay be deducted that the need  for 
proper in terpretation o f Art. IV(2) should be resolved in  this context. Further, 
the above m entioned article provides a m echanism  by w hich a tribunal is set up
98 See letter from Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, Legal Adviser to the Foreign Office, to the Rt. Hon. Sir Reginald 
Manningham-Buller, Q.C., M.P., Attorney-General. {Foreign Office (F.O.) 371/152871, Public Records Office}.
99 F.O. 371/15289, Public Records Office.
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in  order to decide on m atters w hich negotiation cannot settle.100 
U nfortunately, the provisions o f this article have not been com plied w ith  by 
Turkey either before the events o f 1963-67 or her in tervention in  C yprus 1974. 
Furtherm ore, since the textual or teleological m ethods o f in terpretation do not 
seem  to be that helpful in  the present case, the principle o f effectiveness m ay be 
applicable. A ccording to the principle o f effectiveness (et re t m agis valeat quam  
pereat), the words ‘take action’ should logically  be in terpreted in  such a way as 
not to conflict w ith the U N  C harter provisions and be likely to  cause practical 
difficulties to the C onstitutional structure, thus m aking it unw orkable.
B e the case w hat it may, it m ust be noted at this stage that a cardinal m istake101 
was com m itted by  the G reek side at the prelim inary discussions in  London 
betw een the Foreign M inisters o f G reece, Turkey, and the U nited K ingdom , 
prior to the signature o f the 1959 A ccords. H ad the G reek side supported the 
view  of the B ritish side that A rticle 2 o f the T reaty o f G uarantee was 
incom patible w ith the U N  Charter, it w ould have been possible to define the 
term  “take action” in  such a w ay as clearly to exclude m ilitary  intervention. 
This w ould have been necessary in  order to m ake the treaty com patible w ith the
100 Ibid., ‘Any question or difficulty as to the interpretation or application of the provisions of the present Treaty 
on which agreement cannot be reached by negotiation between the military authorities in the cases described 
above, or by negotiation between the parties concerned through the diplomatic channel, shall be referred for 
final decision to a tribunal appointed for the purpose, which shall be composed of four representatives, one each 
to be nominated by the United Kingdom Government, the Greek Government, the Turkish Government, the 
Government of the Republic of Cyprus, together with an independent chairman nominated by the President of 
the International Court of Justice.
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U N  C harter.102 In fact, the Legal D epartm ent o f the UN, w hen the Treaty was 
subsequently deposited  w ith the U N  Secretariat, gave an opinion that the term  
“take action” could not be interpreted to m ean m ilitary action. Such an 
in terpretation w ould m ake the Treaty  com patible w ith the U N  Charter, and by 
virtue o f its provision that in  the event o f a conflict betw een the provisions o f 
the C harter and the any article o f the Treaty, the C harter prevails, m ilitary 
intervention w ould be ruled  out.
P resident Clerides sum m arized the m atter quite pointedly and need be cited: 
“Legally, a definition excluding the m eaning o f  m ilitary intervention was not 
necessary, but po litica lly  it was imperative. The po litica l history o f  the w orld  
shows that all aggressors a ttem pt to allege a justifiab le  right fo r  their ac t o f  
aggression. A  treaty w hich gran ted  the right o f  unilateral “action ” could  be 
used to create confusion, and  during that confusion tem porarily ju s tify  actions  
which otherw ise w ould have been m anifestly an undisputed act o f  aggression. 
This is exactly w hat happened in 1974, when the Turkish fo rces  invaded Cyprus, 
after the m ilitary coup o f  the G reek jun ta , which destroyed  the constitutional
103order o f  the Cyprus R ep u b lic”.
101 This grave mistake is well spotted by Mr Clerides in his Cyprus: My Deposition, ante, p.75.
102 ibid. p.75.
103 ibid. p.75; As pointed out by a Greek-Cypriot scholar in international relations, “the particular circumstances 
of 1974 had made it necessary for Turkey to intervene, and her initial intervention was a legal one” (M. 
Evriviades, 1975 10 Texas International Law Journal, p.264).
85
(4) Criteria set by the Guarantee Treaty and the conduct o f Turkey
A n answ er to the crucial question w hether Turkey could, indeed, ju stify  her 
m ilitary  intervention on the basis o f Art. IV (4) o f the C yprus T reaty  o f 
G uarantee is now  im perative. L et us assum e that the T reaty o f G uarantee did 
purport to authorize m ilitary action (though this m ay not be the case).
B y Art. 4, the Treaty o f G uarantee expressly provides for jo in t consultations 
betw een Greece, Turkey and the U .K., before any action is taken follow ing such 
a Treaty. The m achinery o f jo in t consultations should have been  put in  practice 
and only on  a failure o f such consultations could unilateral action have been 
undertaken. O bviously, this m achinery w as not initiated. A s a m atter o f 
undeniable fact, the Turkish  Prem ier, M r B ulent Ecevit, flew  to London on  17 
July  1974 to seek B ritish coordination under the G uarantee Treaty. It w as m ade 
clear that if  B ritain  was unw illing to act (w hich w as the case) Turkey was in  a 
position to intervene on her o w n .104 A s M r. Callaghan, the B ritish Foreign 
Secretary, said at the G eneva Conference, before G reece could  be brought into 
the picture as guarantor, Turkey undertook unilateral action in  Cyprus.
The com m unication o f view s betw een the Turkish  and G reek G overnm ents via 
the m ediation initiative o f M r. Sisco, the U .S. U nder-Secretary o f  State, cannot 
be alleged to am ount to the consultations envisaged by  A rt. 4.
104 Necatigil, The Turkish position in International Law, ante p.94
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O n another point, in  these term s spoke the U nited  K ingdom  representative 
during a Security C ouncil debate on the situation in  Cyprus, February  1964, in  
answ er to the question o f the Cyprus governm ent delegate: “Is it the view  o f the 
G overnm ents o f G reece, Turkey and the U nited K ingdom  that they  have a right 
o f m ilitary in tervention under the T reaty o f G uarantee in  view , in  particular, o f 
the C harter?” 105 H ere is w hat he said: ‘7  should  like to draw  the attention o f  
m em bers o f  the C ouncil to the nature o f  the right p ro v id ed  fo r  in article IV  (2) 
o f  the Treaty o f  G uarantee and  the lim itations p la ced  on the exercise o f  that 
right by that article. The right w hich is reserved to the guarantor pow ers is not 
an unlim ited right o f  unilateral action but-and here I  quote- uthe right to take 
action w ith the sole aim  o f  re-establishing the state o f  affairs created  by the 
Treaty".
It follows that the extensive nature o f the Turkish intervention was itse lf in 
contravention to the Treaty o f G uarantee provisions, particularly  A rticle 
IV (2 ).107 It m ay also be said to have been contrary to A rticle II, by w hich 
Turkey, G reece and the U nited K ingdom  undertook ‘to prohib it activity aim ed 
at prom oting directly or indirectly  either union o f Cyprus w ith any other State 
o r partition  o f the island’. The de facto m ilitary occupation and division o f 
C yprus until now adays clearly  violates the above provision.
105 U.N. Security Council, 1097thy Meeting, Provisional Verbatim Record, S/PV. 1097.
106 Lauterpacht, British Practice in International Law, ante, pp. 8-9.
107 The area of the so called “Attila line” comprises the whole of the northern part of Cyprus, covering 37% of 
the territory of the Republic. The most important natural resources, most of the orchards of olive groves, the 
most important mines, ports including the main ones of Famagusta, Kyrenia and Karavostassi, the main water
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E ven if  there was initial justification  for m ilitary in tervention by  Turkey (and, 
indeed there was), such justification  had faded aw ay on M r. C lerides’ accession 
to pow er in Cyprus (and the dism issal o f the dictatorial regim e). C lerides 
represented the reestablishm ent o f legality and C onstitutional Order. But, even 
if  such a proposition is objected to, once the G eneva C onference o f the 
G uarantor Pow ers was convened in  25th July 1974, and diplom atic initiatives 
w ere engineered in the context o f the Treaty o f G uarantee itse lf for the re­
establishm ent o f constitutional governm ent, the Turkish  arm ed intervention 
should perhaps have com e to an end. Further, at the second round o f the G eneva 
talks, w hen the U nited K ingdom  was satisfied w ith the assurances given by the 
G reek C ypriot delegation for fair resolution o f the Cyprus problem , and security 
o f the Turkish Cypriots, the Turkish m ilitary forces should have term inated their 
operations.108*
Further, it w ould not be a paradox to classify the T reaty  o f G uarantee as a 
Regional A rrangem ent for the m aintenance o f peace and security, w hich is first 
am ong the purposes o f the U nited N ations O rganization .109 So Turkey could 
rely  upon this argum ent for unilaterally using force in  C yprus 1974. A 
counterargum ent lies in A rticle 53 o f the U N  Charter, w hich provides that ‘no
resources, the most breathtaking archaeological sites and tourist centres are included within the area occupied by 
the Turkish forces.
108 On the Geneva Conferences, see generally Clerides, Cyprus: My Deposition, ante-, Necatigil, The Turkish 
position in International Law, ante.
109 See Necatigil, The Turkish Position in International Law, ante, p. 126.
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enforcem ent action shall be taken under regional arrangem ents or regional 
agencies w ithout the authorization o f the Security C ouncil’. Security  Council 
authorization for Turkish in tervention was never g iven .110
(5) The subsequent actions o f Turkey
M ention has already been  m ade to the extensive nature o f  the Turkish 
in terven tion .111 H ow ever, it is necessary to explore a b it m ore w hether T urkey’s 
subsequent actions m ay be justified , even if  the initial Turkish  in tervention was 
rendered  law ful by the Treaty o f G uarantee. The answ er to this question  seems 
to be in  the negative because o f the following.
Firstly, despite the fact that the Turkish G overnm ent w as assured at the G eneva 
C onference for the reestablishm ent o f constitutional governm ent and the safety 
o f the Turkish Cypriots, Turkey proceeded to a second round o f m ilitary  action. 
Explaining the reasons w hich, in  h is view , necessitated the second operation, 
the Turkish Prem ier said:
“H aving reached the conclusion that there is no use but only harm  in 
m aintaining the appearance o f  continuing a conference that is being  
internationally obstructed and  the deliberations o f  w hich are unilaterally  
violated, Turkey has considered it her duty to fu lfil  by h e rse lf her prerogatives
110 See MacDonald, International Law and the Conflict in Cyprus, 1981 Canadian Yearbook of International 
Law, p. 29: “I conclude that the 1974 invasion of Cyprus was in contravention of international law; for for an 
invasion to be legal it must be consistent with the provisions of the United Nations Charter, whether express or 
implied; compliance with a treaty, on its own, is insufficient to render an invasion consistent with Article 2(4) of 
the Charter.
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and  duties as a guarantor pow er, and  her responsibilities concerning the 
independence o f  Cyprus as w ell as the rights and  security o f  the Turkish Cypriot 
people.
The action now  undertaken by Turkey is a t least as rightful and  legal as the
action she started  on July 20, as a guarantor p o w er  and  strictly w ithin the
bounds o f  her authority as such pow er, fo r  the sam e conditions exist today as on
the 2 0 th Ju ly  -  conditions that fo rm ed  the basis o f  the rightfulness and  legality o f
her action. This new  Turkish action is as legitim ate as Turkey 's initial m ove and
110is its logical conclusion  ”.
In v iew  o f  the preceding discussion in  this section, the second phase o f the 
arm ed cam paign o f Turkey was not as rightful and  legal as  her action o f  July  20. 
The T hird  R eport o f the U.K. H ouse o f C om m ons Foreign A ffairs C om m ittee 
1987 attests to the validity o f this assertion.113
Secondly, The m ass killing and brutal treatm ent o f  innocent G reek C ypriot 
civilians during the hostilities, the uprooting o f others from  their hom eland and 
subsequent reduction to the tragic status o f refugee, the unascertained fate of 
m issing persons, the destruction o f cultural property, and the occupation until
111 See p. 36 above.
112 Quote from the Turkish Prime Minister, Mr Ecevit’s statement on 14 August 1974 (Hurriyet and Milliyet 
newspapers, 15 August 1974); see also Mr Ecevit’s letter to R.Denktash, leader of the Turkish Cypriot 
community, in R.Denktash, The Cyprus Triangle, ante, Appendix 13.
113 Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), House o f Commons, No.23, 1986-87, para. 99: “it is our view -evidently 
shared by most o f the international community- that the extention and entrenchment of the Turkish occupation 
of northern Cyprus in August 1974 and subsequently, was illegal both in terms of the 1960 Treaties and in terms 
of the UN Charter and general international law”.
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now adays o f large part o f the Cyprus Republic territory ra ther seem  to argue 
against a valid  invocation o f the Treaty o f G uarantee A rticle V I (2) by Turkey. 
W hatever the answ er to the question w hether the Turkish in tervention was 
rendered law ful by the T reaty  o f G uarantee, it needs saying that the 
hum anitarian law  o f arm ed conflict as w ell as the European C onvention on 
H um an R ights still apply to  the Turkish invasion and subsequent m ilitary 
presence in  Cyprus.
Thirdly, the subsequent establishm ent o f the so called Turkish  Federated  State 
o f Cyprus (TFSC) in  1975, and o f  the “Turkish Republic o f N orthern  C yprus” 
(TRN C) in  1983, both acts condem ned by the international com m unity ,114 rather 
suggest that the real aim  o f  the Turkish intervention was not so m uch the 
restoration o f constitu tionalism  or the protection o f the Turkish  Cypriot 
com m unity ;115 it could probably be the case, that the intervention was also 
dictated by other considerations.
(6 ) Stance taken by the International Community
It is notew orthy that the Parliam entary A ssem bly o f the C ouncil o f  Europe, by
R esolution 573 o f 29 July 1974, affirm ed that the Turkish m ilitary  intervention
114 The U.N. Security Council in Resolution 367/1975 “regrets the unilateral decision of 13 February 1975 
declaring a part of the Republic of Cyprus would become Federated Turkish State”. The U.N. General Assembly 
Resolution 37/253 of 20 May 1983 reads: “The General Assembly deploring the fact that part of the territory of 
the Republic of Cyprus is still occupied by foreign forces...demands the immediate withdrawal of all 
occupation forces from the Republic of Cyprus; considers that the de facto  situation created by the force of arms 
should not be allowed to influence or in any way affect the solution of the problem of Cyprus”.
115 See MacDonald, International Law and the Conflict in Cyprus, ante, p.37: “ It is concluded that, even if there 
is jurisdiction in customary international law or in the provisions of the Charter for the intervention in 1974, or
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was the exercise o f a righ t em anating from  an international T reaty  and the 
fu lfilm ent o f a legal and m oral obligation. H ow ever, the m em ber states did not 
m aintain  this view  after the second round o f m ilitary operations.
The R esolutions o f the U.N. Security Council and G enaral A ssem bly indicate 
that the Turkish invasion w as an illegal act. M ention shall be m ade only  to some 
o f them  w hich characteristically  stress the unlaw fulness o f  the m ilitary 
in tervention .116 Security  Council R esolution 353 (1974), passed  on the 20th o f 
July 1974, reads as follows:
“7. Calls upon all States to respect the sovereignty, independence and  
territorial integrity o f  Cyprus;
2. Calls upon all parties to the presen t fig h tin g  as a f ir s t  step to cease all 
fir ing ..;
3. D em ands an im m ediate end  to fo re ig n  m ilitary intervention in the R epublic o f  
Cyprus that is in contravention o f  paragraph 1 above; ”
Subsequent R esolutions o f 1974 have confirm ed R esolution 353. In Resolution, 
the Security Council, having m ade reference to Res. 353, stated “that a ll States 
have declared their respect fo r  the sovereignty, independence and  territorial 
integrity o f  C yprus”.
for a continued presence in Cyprus, such continued presence over a protracted period of time is rendered legally 
doubtful by the Security Council resolutions adopted in regard to Cyprus since 1974”.
116 See the Resolutions of the Security Council 353(1974) of the 20th July 1974, 354(1974) of the 23rd July 1974, 
355(1974) of the 1st August 1974, 358(1974), 359(1974) of the 15th August 1974, 360(1974) of the 16th August 
1974, 361(1974) of the 30th August 1974, 364(1974) of the 16th December of 1974.
The Geneva Conference at its first phase sought to find ways and means for carrying the above resolutions into 
effect, especially the Resolutions 353(1974) and 354(1974) for attaining a cease fire agreement. It has, however, 
exceeded its authority in that, though the Security Council demanded the immediate withdrawal of the Turkish
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The Security C ouncil by R esolution 365 (1974) adopts G eneral A ssem bly 
R esolution 3212117, and by 367 (1974) reaffirm s 365 o f  the Security  Council 
and G eneral A ssem bly’s 3212. R esolution 367 includes the follow ing:
“Calls once m ore on all States to respect the sovereignty, independence, 
territorial integrity and  non-alignm ent o f  the Republic o f  Cyprus and  urgently  
requests them, as w ell as the parties concerned, to refrain fr o m  any action  
w hich m ight prejudice that sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and  
non-alignm ent, as w ell as fro m  any attem pt a t partition  o f  the island or its 
unification w ith any o ther country; ”
It is notew orthy that, although the U nited N ations R esolutions do not expressly 
go against the Turkish invasion, they am ply illustrate that the in tervention was 
an illegality. Further, it should be stressed that the w ords “calls upon” , used in 
the Resolutions, have, according to som e scholars, b inding fo rce .118
CONCLUSION
In spite o f the above, it seem s difficult to m e to overlook the, adm ittedly, strong 
argum ents advocating for the legality o f arm ed intervention accorded by  treaty
forces, in the Geneva Conference the three Foreign Ministers of Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom were 
content in agreeing that measures should be taken for their reduction by stages.
117 UN General Assembly Resolution 3212 (1974): “1. Calls upon all states to respect the sovereignty, 
independence, territorial integrity and non-alignment of the Republic of Cyprus and to refrain from all acts and 
interventions directed against it; 2. Urges the speedy withdrawal of all foreign armed forces and foreign military 
personnel from the Republic o f Cyprus and the cessation of all foreign interference in its affairs;”
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right, especially the ones prem ised upon the principles o f pacta  sun t servanda  
and, perhaps m ore im portantly, volenti non f i t  injuria. The latter surely indicates 
the vital ro le  p layed by states them selves in  the determ ination o f  their ow n fate 
and the developm ent o f international relations. Sim ultaneously, one should not 
overlook the particular and com plex circum stances surrounding the 1960 
Zurich-London A greem ents, m ainly the various interests o f the parties to the 
Cyprus Treaty. N evertheless, having regard  to the equally pow erful argum ents 
m ilitating against unilateral arm ed intervention envisaged by  treaty, it m ay be 
clearly concluded  that Turkey should not have exercised a righ t o f  intervention 
in  Cyprus, 1974; how ever, such a proposition could rem ain subject to criticism , 
in  view  o f the peculiarities o f  the Cyprus issue.119
It should be noted finally that the above discussion is especially  im portant in 
view  o f the contem porary effort to reach a peaceful settlem ent to the Cyprus 
issue. In w hat w ay is it useful?
One o f the m ost im portant aspects o f the Cyprus p roblem  is that o f Security. 
W ould the Cyprus people like G reece and Turkey to guarantee the 
independence and in tegrity  o f the Cyprus State w ithin the fram ew ork o f a
118 Goodrich and Hambro, The Charter o f the United Nations, ante, p. 545.
1I9Ronzitti, clearly adopting a pro-Turkish view, cites Wengler: “a treaty providing for a right to intervene 
against the will of a future government of the other State is regarded as prohibited by a jus cogens rule of 
general international law. Nonetheless, an exception may be valid if intervention is permitted to secure the 
upholding of an arrangement among different peoples each other exercising its right of self-determination, to 
live together in one State”. He then concludes that Wengler’s observation fits perfectly the case of Cyprus”. 
(Rescuing Nationals Abroad through Military Coercion and Intervention on Grounds of Humanity, ante, p. 134). 
For the issue of self-determination and its application to the Cypriot Communities, see below Chapters IV and 
VII of the present thesis.
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settlem ent? This, I think, given the unhappy past w ould not be a good idea. If, 
how ever, it w ould be deem ed necessary that these tw o States p lay  a significant 
ro le  in the security o f the island, then I w ould propose that a regional 
arrangem ent be reached along the lines o f the existing T reaty  o f G uarantee, but 
expressly  excluding unilateral m ilitary intervention.
W ould  we like the B ritish sovereign bases to rem ain  on the island, even if  this 
w ould appear to be a possibility? D espite the troubled relations betw een Britain 
and Cyprus in  the uneasy years o f  the 1950s, w hich by  now  have been 
overcom e (and, if  not, they should be), the British presence on the island is, in  
m y view , indispensable. The British have a crucial ro le  to  play in  the 
m aintenance o f security, bu t they should give explicit assurances (in  the form  of 
a legal docum ent, if  need be) that they w ould not allow  repetition  o f the bloody 
events o f 1974.
Furtherm ore, w hat w ould be the future o f the com m on D efence doctrine, as it 
now  functions, betw een G reece and Cyprus? W ould that be affected  by security 
arrangem ents in  the context o f a future settlem ent o f the C yprus issue? These 
m atters should be thoroughly exam ined by  all interested  parties. The C yprus 
G overnm ent especially should pro ject drafts considering these pressing strategic 
im plications.
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It rem ains the case that survival is o f u tm ost im portance for a nation. In 
international affairs, as in the C yprus case, strategy considerations should be 
taken into account in  conjunction w ith international law, the latter providing a 
basis for international politics and conversely the form er conform ing to 
international legality.
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CHAPTER III
LEGAL EVALUATION OF THE TURKISH 
INTERVENTION OF CYPRUS:
THE ARGUMENT FROM HUMANITARIAN 
INTERVENTION
CHAPTER III: LEGAL EVALUATION OF THE TURKISH 
INTERVENTION: THE ARGUMENT FROM 
HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION
A  pow erful argum ent em ployed by the Turkish Prim e M inister E cevit to  justify  
the  intervention in  Cyprus was that o f hum anitarian intervention.
In  order that concrete conclusions m ay be draw n regarding the legal valid ity  o f 
th is argum ent, a clear answ er need be given to the notorious question: is there a 
righ t o f (unilateral) hum anitarian intervention?
H um anitarian intervention m ay be defined as the proportionate use o f force by 
governm ents in  order to prevent serious violations o f fundam ental hum an rights 
o f  individuals in another State w ho w ould readily  consent to  such a m ilitary  
operation. A ccording to O ppenheim , ‘w hen a state com m its cruelties against 
and  persecution o f its nationals in  such a way as to deny their fundam ental 
hum an rights and to  shock the conscience o f  m ankind, in tervention in  the 
interests o f hum anity m ight be legally  perm issib le’. 1 The vexed question of 
hum anitarian intervention w ill now  be thoroughly exam ined in  the ligh t o f state 
practice, relevant rulings o f  the International C ourt o f Justice (if any), and the 
theoretical approach to the m atter as presented by  academ ic debates, and 
w ritings o f those learned in the law  in general.
1 Oppenheim’s International Law (9th ed. Sir Robert Jennings and Sir A. Watts, Longman 1996) p.442; 
H.Lauterpacht’s rationale for humanitarian intervention is that ‘ultimately peace is much more endangered by 
tyrannical contempt for human rights than by attempts to assert, through intervention, the sanctity of human 
personality’ (International Law and Human Rights, London: Stephens & Sons p. 32);
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(1) Sovereignty v. Human Rights
A t first sight there is a legal duty to refrain  from  the internal affairs o f other 
states. Each state is bound to respect the sovereignty o f its neighbour states. 
This view  has its roots in  legal positivism . The Germ an philosopher W olff was 
the first to separate the international law  principles from  the ethics o f the 
individual. D e V attel, along sim ilar line o f argum ent said: ‘The duties o f a 
nation tow ards itse lf are o f purely  national concern, and no foreign pow er has 
any righ t to interfere. 2 G reat academ ic debate has erupted over the general 
prohibition o f the use o f force as stipulated in  A rticle 2(4) o f the U N  C harter,3 
especially  the w ording ‘against the territorial integrity  or political independence 
o f any S ta te’.4
It is necessary to  show that a righ t o f unilateral hum anitarian intervention is 
com patible w ith A rticle 2(4) o f the U N  C harter.5 The only exceptions to the 
general prohibition o f the threat or use o f force are the ‘inherent right o f 
individual or collective self-defence in  the face o f an arm ed attack against a 
S tate in  A rticle 51 o f the U N  Charter, and enforcem ent actions by the Security 
Council or by a regional organization or group o f States authorized to use force 
by the Security Council under C hapter V II o f the Charter. N either o f these
2 de Vattel, 'The Law of Nations’ (Washington DC, Carnegie Institution, 1916) I, iii, para.37.
3 See generally, Brownlie, International Law and the Use of Force by States, ante; Schachter, ‘The Rights of 
States to Use Armed Forces’ (1984) 82 Michigan Law Review, 1620;
4 Walzer proposed that ‘any use of force by one state against the political independence of another constitutes 
aggression and is a criminal act ’(Just and Unjust Wars, ante, p.61
5 UN Charter Article2(4): ‘All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of 
force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent 
with the Purposes of the United Nations’.
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provisions is applicable to unilateral hum anitarian intervention. Tw o argum ents 
m ay be em ployed: that a genuine hum anitarian in tervention w ould no t be a use 
o f force against the ‘territorial integrity or political independence’ o f  another 
state, or that it w ould not be ‘inconsistent w ith the Purposes o f the U nited 
N ations’. It is notew orthy that in  their com m entary on the Charter, G oodrich 
and H am bro observed that it is possible to construe the language as allow ing 
certain  lim ited uses o f force, such as a tem porary intervention for protective 
purposes.6 Teson, noting that the prom otion o f hum an rights is as im portant a 
purpose in  the C harter as the control o f international conflict, concludes that to 
argue that hum anitarian intervention is prohibited by A rticle 2(4) is a 
distortion.7
A rticle 2(4) m ust be read  and interpreted in  conjunction w ith the purposes o f 
the U nited N ations one o f w hich is the prom otion o f hum an rights. The 
Pream ble to the C harter reads as follows: ‘W e the peoples o f the U nited 
N ations de term ined ...to  reaffirm  faith  in fundam ental hum an rights, in  the 
dignity  and w orth o f the hum an person, in  the equal r ig h ts ...o f  nations large 
and s m a ll...’. A rticle 1(3) states: ‘To achieve international co-operation in  
solving international problem s o f an econom ic, social, cultural, or 
hum anitarian  character, and in prom oting  and encouraging respect fo r  hum an
6 Goodrich and Hambro, Charter o f the United Nations: Commentary and Documents (Boston: World Peace 
Foundation, 1946) p.68-69.
7 Teson, Humanitarian Intervention, ante, p. 151.
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rights and  fo r  fundam enta l freedom s fo r  all. ’ 8 Further, A rticle 55(c) o f the 
C harter declares that the U nited  N ations shall prom ote ‘universal respect for, 
and observance o f hum an rights and fundam ental freedom s for all w ithout 
distinction as to race, sex, language, or re lig ion’. M ore im portantly, by A rticle 
56 ‘all m em bers pledge them selves to take jo in t a nd  separate action  in co­
operation  w ith the O rganization f o r  the achievem ent o f  the purposes set fo r th  in 
A rtic le  5 5 ’.9 Further, P rofessor G reenw ood , in  a m em orandum  subm itted in 
response to a request from  the U.K. H ouse o f Com m ons Select C om m ittee on 
Foreign A ffairs in  connection w ith its hearings on the N A TO  intervention in 
K osovo 1999, quite pointedly  states: ‘The developm ent o f international hum an 
rights law  since 1945, through global agreem ents such as the Genocide 
C onvention and the International C ovenant on Civil and Political R ights and 
regional instrum ents such as the European C onvention on H um an Rights, has 
reached the point w here the treatm ent by a State o f its ow n population can no 
longer be regarded as an internal m atter. In  particular, w idespread and 
system atic violations o f hum an rights involving the loss o f  life on  a large scale 
are well established as a m atter o f international concern’.
The clear deduction from  the above should be that the righ t o f unilateral 
hum anitarian intervention is clearly  not incom patible w ith A rticle  2(4) o f the 
U N  Charter.
8 UN Charter, Article 1(3) (emphasis added).
9 UN Charter, Article 56 (emphasis added).
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A part from  the legal debate, how ever, I w ould suggest, from  the m oral 
standpoint, that the rights o f states under international law  derive from  
individual rights. The proper ro le  o f the state is to ensure protection o f the rights 
o f the indiv iduals.10 A s H ersch Lauterpacht very w ell pu t it, ‘states are like 
individuals; it is due to the fact that states are com posed  o f individual 
hum an b e in g s .. .The dignity  o f the individual hum an being is a m atter o f direct 
concern to international law ’.11 This is the true m eaning o f  the G rotian analogy 
o f states and individuals. Therefore, in  m y opinion, State sovereignty m ust give 
w ay to the protection o f hum an rights w henever these are flagrantly  v io lated .12 
In view  o f the preceding theoretical discussion in  this section, w hich is hoped 
not to  have been at a high level o f abstraction, I strongly subm it that states have 
a m oral right, to say the least, to unilaterally  in tervene in cases o f 
overw helm ing hum anitarian  necessity. The w ritings o f learned ju rists  should, in 
m y subm ission, be taken m uch m ore seriously in to  account, and perhaps cease 
to  be seen m erely as subsidiary sources o f public international law  (despite 
A rticle 3 8 (l)(d ) o f the IC J Statute). Further, State practice o f ancient tim es 
cannot be neg lected .13 The adoption o f the U N  C harter is not m eant to suggest 
that pre-charter international custom ary law  has autom atically  been  abrogated.
10 This presupposes a kind of social, what Rawls has called ‘hypothetical’ consent in his Theory of Justice.
11 H. Lauterpacht, ‘The Grotian Tradition in International Law’, ante p.27 (emphasis original).
12 Most legal scholars who are opposed to humanitarian intervention emphasizing the danger of abuse, are 
putting forward a policy objection rather than a principled argument. As Professor Greenwood very well put it 
in his Memorandum, ante, p. 5  ‘all rights are capable of being abused. The right of self-defence has undoubtedly 
been the subject of abuse but it is never seriously suggested that international law should not include the right of 
a State to defend itself.
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Instead, custom ary law  can, indeed, be considered as part and parcel o f  a unified 
international law  tradition; as living international custom , living law, w hich m ay 
still find appeal in  the m odern world.
In view  o f the above as w ell as post-C harter state practice on hum anitarian 
interventions, especially the B elgian and U .S. intervention in  the C ongo 1964, 
and the Indian invasion o f B angladesh 1971, it m ay be said that a right o f 
hum anitarian intervention did form  part o f international law  in  1974 (though it 
m ight be seen as a developm ent o f 1990s state practice) w hen Turkey m ilitarily 
intervened in Cyprus.
(2) State Practice
(a) Pre-Charter Unilateral Humanitarian Interventions
(i) Intervention o f  G reat Britain, France and  R ussia in a id  o f  G reek  
Revolutionaries
The jo in t intervention o f G reat Britain, France, and R ussia in  support o f the 
G reek insurgents against Turkish oppressive rule  is said as being the earliest 
exam ple o f true hum anitarian in terven tion .14 The treaty betw een the three 
Pow ers, signed in  London on 6 July 182715, lays dow n in its pream ble the
13 Thucydides, having detected the unchangeable character of human nature, ably predicted: ‘My work is not a 
piece of writing designed to meet the taste of an immediate public, but was done to last for ever’ (History of the 
Peloponnesian War, ante, Book I, para.22).
14 See Stowell, Intervention in International Law (Washington, DC: John Byrne & Co, 1921), pp.126-7;
Anthony D’ Amato, ‘The Invasion of Panama was a Lawful Response to Tyranny’ (1990) 84 A.J.I.L. 516, p.519.
15 This was the formalization of a protocol signed at Petersburg , 4 April 1826, by the Russian Chancellor, the 
Russian Ambassador to London, and the Duke of Wellington. It was then communicated to Paris where it 
gained support.
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grounds on w hich they justified  their in tervention.16 A ccording to  paragraph 1 
o f  the Pream ble, o f concern was “all the disorders o f anarchy caused  by the 
struggle, w hich both  im pede the com m erce o f the states o f E urope and gave 
opportunity  to pirates w hich not only expose the subjects o f the H igh 
C ontracting Parties to grievous losses, bu t also render necessary  m easures 
w hich  are burdensom e for their observation and suppression” . 17 Further, by 
paragraph 2 o f the Pream ble, tw o o f the Pow ers (G reat B ritain  and  France) “had 
received  from  the G reeks an earnest invitation to interpose their M ediation with 
the O ttom an Porte,18 and together w ith the Em peror o f Russia, anim ated w ith 
the desire  o f putting  a stop to the effusion o f  blood, and  o f  preven ting  the evils 
o f  every kind, had resolved to com bine and regulate their efforts w ith a view  to 
re-estab lish  peace-efforts dem anded no less by sentim ents o f  humanity, than by  
interests fo r  the tranquillity o f  E urope".19 The treaty was prim arily  an offer of 
m ediation  in  the transition to G reek autonom y.20
The N avy B attle o f N avarino took place on the 20th O ctober 1827 and ended 
w ith a serious defeat o f the Turkish forces, and w ithdraw al o f the Egyptian
16 Treaty between Great Britain, France, and Russia, for the Pacification of Greece, signed at London, 6 July 
1827 (Edward Hertslet, The Map o f Europe by Tredty, London: Butterworths, 1875, VOL. 1, PP.769-70.
17 See extensively John Westlake, International Law (2nd edition, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1910) p. 319 n 3.
18 Chesterman, in his Just War or Just Peace :Humanitarian Intervention and International Law (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2001) p. 29 n 167, says that “as the intervention took place within what was then 
Turkish territory, it is not an instance of intervention by consent”. With great respect, this view seems to be 
rather absurd. Who should have been expected to give consent to the joint humanitarian intervention of the 
Great Powers other than the insurgents themselves ? Is it conceivable that the Ottoman Porte could have 
consented to an intervention by European States in the territory of its Empire for the purpose of liberating its 
own oppressed subjects ? But, see below, at page 55, the particular circumstances under which the Sultan’s 
consent was given to the French intervention in Syria, 1860-1.
19 Emphasis supplied.
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arm y from  the M orea. Ian B row nlie dism isses the characterization o f  the action
21as an instance o f hum anitarian intervention as ‘ex  post facto ism ’ , saying that 
the governm ents o f the day d id  not refer to a legal justification  for in tervention22 
and that ju rists  and historians have ascribed num erous m otives to the action.23 
H e concludes that the substantial m otive w as the prevention o f  racial 
exterm ination in  the M orea, but this cannot be discussed ‘in  term s o f a legal 
concept w hich probably d id  not exist at the tim e’.24 A t this point, Professor 
B row nlie m anifestly contradicts him self. E arlier (in  the very sam e publication) 
he acknow ledged that a m ajority  o f nineteenth-century publicists recognized a 
righ t o f  hum anitarian in tervention.25 M ore im portant perhaps is his assertion 
that G reat B ritain  and France m ight have participated in  the action due to fears 
o f  unilateral in tervention by  Russia. This m ay throw  som e ligh t on the 
diplom atic background to the London Treaty. T here is evidence that Ibrahim ’s 
plan to com m it genocide in G reece was only a pretext for an alliance betw een 
B ritain  and R ussia against Turkey.26 N evertheless, during the m iddle stages o f 
the G reek Revolt, support fo r G reece was explained m ore on in  the context o f 
E u ro p e’s em otional interest. This was reflected in  the orders from  Lord Bathurst,
20 On this, see CW Crawley, The Question o f Greek Independence : A Study of British Policy in the Near East, 
1821-1833 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1930) p. 79.
21 Brownlie, ‘Humanitarian Intervention’, in John N Moore (ed.), Law and Civil War in the Modern World 
(Baltimore, Maryland: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974) p. 220.
22 Brownlie, ibid pp. 220-1; Brownlie, International Law and the Use o f Force by States (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press) p.339.
23 Brownlie, ‘Humanitarian Intervention’, supra, p.339.
24 Brownlie, ibid. p.339.
25 Brownlie, ibid. p.338.
26 Crawley, ante, pp. 49, 54.
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Secretary o f State for the Colonies, to Sir H arry  N eale, C om m ander-in-C hief o f 
the M editerranean Station, in  February 1826:
“H is M ajesty has long had  reason to lam ent the atrocities w hich have disgraced 
the contest in w hich G reece has been for m any years unhappily  
in v o lv ed .. .W hen it is understood, that, w hether w ith the consent o f the Porte or 
not, designs are avow ed by  Ibrahim  Pacha to extirpate system atically a w hole 
com m unity, to seize upon the w om en and children o f the M orea, to transport 
them  to Egypt, and to re-people the M orea from  A frica and A sia, to  change, in  
fact, that part o f G reece from  an European State, into one resem bling the States 
o f Barbary; H is M ajesty cannot, as the Sovereign o f  an European State, hear o f 
such an attem pt w ithout dem anding  o f Ibrahim  Pacha, either an explicit 
disavow al o f his ever having entertained such an intention, or a form al 
renunciation o f it, if  ever entertained” .27
Sim on C h este rm an ,28 argues that ‘the incident is at best a questionable 
precedent for the doctrine o f hum anitarian intervention. R ussian involvem ent 
had little to do w ith hum anitarian concerns and -d e sp ite  the public statem ents o f 
B ritish officials- it was this that served as the catalyst fo r in tervention’.29 Also, 
before em barking on an analysis o f the incident, he cites30 H istoricus  obviously 
in  an attem pt to support his view: “The em ancipation o f G reece was a high act
27 See Woodhouse, The Battle ofNavarino (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1965), pp. 35-6.
28 Clearly adopting a Brownlie approach to the subject matter.
29 Chesterman, Just War or Just Peace, ante, p.32.
30 ibid. p.28.
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o f policy above and beyond the dom ain o f law ” .31 U nquestionably, the jo in t 
intervention o f the G reat Pow ers was, indeed, a h igh  act o f policy. A nyone 
denying this reality  w ould sim ply do injustice to the actual facts. To deny the 
underlying strategic expediencies or com m ercial interests o f the intervening 
Pow ers w ould certainly be a m istake, but to assert that these have been the 
prim ary m otives, let alone the only  ones, to the jo in t m ilitary action undertaken 
w ould am ount to distortion o f history. Such an assertion w ould unjustifiably 
pu t into doubt the hum anitarian sentim ents o f the highly  c iv ilised Europeans. It 
w ould also m inim ize the decisive ro le  played by the G reat Pow ers in  the 
celebrated liberation and independence o f G reece, that since the conquest o f 
C onstantinople by the O ttom ans in  1453 had undergone the m ost onerous and 
disgraceful (albeit eventually glorious) period o f her history. Further it w ould 
m arginalize the ingenuity  and m agnanim ity show n by  brilliant B ritish leaders, 
especially  that o f G eorge C anning, then Prim e M inister. The contribution o f 
Canning to the freedom  o f H ellas has been duly respected and honoured by the 
G reeksThe jo in t in tervention o f G reat Britain, France, and R ussia  in  aid  o f the 
G reek insurgents, 1827, rem ains a paradigm  exam ple o f hum anitarian 
intervention, w hich put a halt to a m ajor hum anitarian catastrophe, thus 
affirm ing the sanctity o f hum an life.
(ii) French occupation o f  Syria, 1860-1
31 William Vernon Harcourt, Letters by Historicus on Some Questions of International Law: Reprinted from 
‘The Times’ with Considerable Additions (London: Macmillan, 1863) p.6.
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In  1860, thousands o f M aronite Christians w ere k illed  by M uslim s on M ount 
Lebanon, then part o f Syria but w ithin the O ttom an Em pire. A fter a m eeting o f 
the am bassadors o f G reat Britain, France, Prussia, Russia, and A ustria a 
convention was s igned .32 U nder the term s o f the C onvention, the Sultan, 
w ishing to stop, by prom pt and efficacious m easures, the effusion o f blood in 
Syria, and to show  his firm  resolution to establish O rder and Peace am ongst the 
Populations p laced under his Sovereignty, agreed to the d ispatch o f 12,000 
troops to Syria to contribute tow ards the reestablishm ent o f  tranquillity .33 
France was to provide h a lf the num ber. A  French force was sent, bu t cam e 
across restoration o f order by the O ttom an local governm ent. D espite  that, the 
French troops occupied parts o f Syria and w arships rem ained  in  the area from  
A ugust 1860 to June 1861. B row nlie includes this as the m ost likely  exception 
to  his general statem ent that international practice in the n ineteenth century 
discloses no genuine case o f hum anitarian intervention.34 H ow ever, it has been 
said that the m easures taken by the O ttom an Sultan m ade foreign intervention 
unnecessary  and suspicious in  view  o f the various interests o f European States 
in  the declining O ttom an Em pire. It has also been asserted that responsible for 
the strife w ere the C hristians.35 N evertheless, a crucial aspect o f  the incident
32 Convention Between Great Britain, Austria, France, Prussia, Russia, and Turkey, respecting measures to be 
taken for the Pacification of Syria, signed at Paris, 5 September 1860, in Hertslet, ante, p. 1455, Preamble 
paragraph 1.
53 Ibid. Art. 1.
34 Brownlie, International Law and the Use o f Force by States, ante, p.340.
35 See Thomas Frank and Nigel Rodley, ‘After Bangladesh: The Law of Humanitarian Intervention by Military 
Force’ (1973) 67 A.J.I.L. 275, p.282, citing the Minute of the British Commissioner to Syria, who remarked that 
‘the original provocation proceeded from the Christians’.
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w hich  renders it an instance o f hum anitarian intervention is the absence of 
in terest on part o f the parties to the action taken. A lthough it took place in  the 
con tex t o f F rench colonialism  in  the area, the occupying force departed when 
the  m andate cam e to conclusion. In  a protocol signed before the adoption o f the 
C onvention  B etw een G reat Britain, Austria, France, Prussia, Russia, and 
Turkey, the Pow ers declared “in the m ost form al m anner” that they w ould not 
seek  any territorial advantage, exclusive influence, or concession under the 
p re tex t o f the occupation. There should be no doubt that the concerns o f the 
Pow ers, especially  France, for the C hristian populations w ere purely 
hum anitarian.
(iii) U nited States Intervention in Cuba, 1898
T he US intervention in  C uba 1898 seems to be another instance o f 
hum anitarian  intervention in  state practice preceding the adoption o f the U N  
C harter. Stow ell refers to it as ‘one o f the m ost im portant instances of 
hum anitarian  in tervention’.36 Chesterm an, on the other hand, citing Fonteyne 
says that ‘...th e  action was but the flashpoint o f the broader w ar w ith Spain. In 
a m atter o f m onths, the Spanish navy was defeated. Spain had  relinquished the 
rem nants o f its em pire, the U nited States had established herself as a w orld
36 C Stowell, Intervention in International law, ante , p.481. It is also cited by Michael Reisman and Myres 
McDougal, ‘Humanitarian Intervention to Protect the Ibos’ in Lillich (ed.) Humanitarian Intervention and the 
United Nations (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1973), pp. 182-3. Oscar Straus, an American 
commentator, states that one would search in vain the records of the world’s history to find a more striking 
example of a war undertaken by any nation from motives singularly humane and free from selfish interests and 
purpose (Humanitarian Diplomacy of the United States, 1912 6 Proceedings o f the American Society o f  
International Law, p.50.)
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pow er, and C uba was an A m erican pro tectorate’.37 A trocities w ere com m itted 
by  Spanish authorities in  C uba attem pting to control the insurrection o f 1985. 
B eyond doubt, the Spanish policy o f forcing the population into concentration 
cam ps in  order to identify  revolutionaries instigated genuine outcry in  the 
U nited  States. A ccording to the estim ations o f Ferrell, about 200,000 Cubans 
perished w hile in  the concentration c a m p s .38 A nother factor leading to the US 
intervention was the destruction o f the US battleship M aine, probably  by a 
Spanish subm arine m ine.39
In his special m essage to Congress o f 11 A pril 1898, President M cK inley 
outlined three justifications for US intervention in the conflict: ‘the cause o f 
hum anity, protection o f US citizens, and self-defence’.40 A resolution was then 
passed, authorizing intervention because o f “abhorrent conditions w hich have 
shocked the m oral sense o f the people o f the U nited  States, have been a 
disgrace to C hristian civilization, culm inating, as they have, in  the destruction 
o f a U nited States battle ship 41 The goal o f the intervention w as to secure the 
independence o f Cuba.
Fonteyne, cited again by C hesterm an, does not include the intervention in C uba 
as an instance o f hum anitarian intervention as in  his view  it lacks a clearly
37 Apparently, a similar view was put forward by Michael Walzer in his Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral 
Argument with Historical Illustrations (New York: Basic Books, 1992) pp. 103-4.
38 Robert Ferrell, American Diplomacy: A History (New York: Norton, 1975), p. 350.
39 See Moore, A Digest o f International Law (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1906) vol. 6, 
pp. 181-4 (Report of Senate Committee on Foreign Relations).
President McKinley, Special Message to Congress, 11 April 1898, in Moore, ibid vol. 6, pp.219-20.
41 Ibid, vol. 6, p.226
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hum anitarian  m otive.42 But, such a view, it seem s to  me, could no t stand as 
valid  argum ent m ilitating against the characterization o f the intervention as 
hum anitarian. True, States m ay be driven to interventions by  ‘m ixed’ m otives. 
T his does not m ean that interventions under these circum stances m ay not be 
described as
It is interesting that Teson concludes his b rief survey o f pre-C harter practice by 
stating that the m ost im portant precedent for a righ t o f hum anitarian 
intervention is the Second W orld  W ar itself. 43 C iting M ichael W alzer’s ju s t 
w ar analysis o f the conflict,44 he argues that the ‘A llies fought F ascism  not ju s t 
because H itler and M ussolini engaged in  m ilitary aggression, bu t to defend 
dignity, reason, hum an rights, and d ecency ... against degradation, 
authoritarianism , irrationality, and obscurantism ’.45 This view  is too endorsed 
here, and, as T eson put it, the exam ple o f W orld  W ar II is ‘the paradigm  o f a 
ju s t w ar’.
(b) Post-Charter Unilateral Humanitarian Interventions
L et us now  turn to som e instances o f the post-charter S tate practice.
(i) Belgian and  US intervention in the Congo, 1964.
42 Fonteyne, ‘The Customary International Law Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention: Its current Validity 
Under the UN Charter’, (1974) 4 California Western I U  203, pp.210-11.
43 Ibid, pp. 178-9.
44 Michael Walzer, ‘World War II: Why was This War Different?’ (1971) 1 Philosophy and Public Affairs p.3
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In  1964, one th ird o f the C ongo cam e under the control o f a rebel group based 
in  Stanleyville. T he rebel forces took a thousand or so foreign residents hostage 
and threatened to k ill them. Peaceful efforts to free the hostages having failed, 
B elgian forces intervened w ith U nited K ingdom  logistical assistance and 
U nited States aircrafts. The troops w ere w ithdraw n after a successful operation. 
In the 1970s, the m ission was characterized as one o f the clearest m odem  
instances o f true hum anitarian intervention and one that should be v iew ed as 
law ful in  character.46 In a note to  the address to the Security  C ouncil, B elgium  
spoke o f  the m ission as being ‘a legal, m oral and hum anitarian  operation w hich 
conform s to the highest aim s o f the U nited Nations: the defence and protection 
o f fundam ental hum an r ig h ts .. .’47 The U nited States, in  a  letter to the Security 
Council stated ‘that the sole purpose o f this hum anitarian  m ission was to 
liberate hostages w hose lives w ere in  danger’.48 H ow ever, as H arris49 observes, 
the rescue operation was undertaken under the consent o f the Congolese 
G overnm ent and hence was not dependent upon any righ t to  hum anitarian
45 Teson, Humanitarian Intervention, supra, p. 178; Chesterman, on the contrary, says that although it may be 
argued that humanitarian concerns played a part in the Allied involvement in the war, they were nevertheless 
subsidiary to more traditional motives such as self-defence (Just War or Just Peace, ante p.28).
46 See Lillich, ‘Forcible Self-Help by States to Protect Human Rights’ (1967) 53 Iowa Law Review p.325
47 S/6063 (1964).
48 S/6062 (1964)
49 See Harris, Cases and Materials on International Law (London Sweet & Maxwell 1998) p.919.
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in tervention .50 A nother reason for the doubtful description o f the intervention 
as a hum anitarian one is that it took place in  the context o f colonialism .51
(ii). Indian Invasion o f  Bangladesh, 1971.
U ntil 1971, Pakistan consisted o f E ast and W est Pakistan, w ith India betw een 
the tw o parts. In  M arch 1971, east Pakistan declared itse lf independent under 
the nam e o f Bangladesh. A lthough the Pakistan arm y was initially  successful in 
suppressing the rebellion, rebel guerrilla forces launched a general offensive 
w ith  considerable success. A s there was evidence to suggest that India, which 
had  taken into its territory about one m illion refugees from  E ast Pakistan,52 had 
given  the guerrillas m ilitary assistance, Pakistani and Indian troops clashed in 
the border area (the Indian Prim e M inister Indira G andhi having first declared 
war). E ventually  Pakistan surrendered and B angladesh has since received 
recognition (that o f Pakistan included!) as an independent State. The Indian 
in tervention in  E ast Pakistan is com m only held  up as one o f the m ore 
prom ising exam ples o f hum anitarian intervention. Teson calls it ‘an alm ost 
perfect exam ple’; Fonteyne says that ‘it probably constitutes the clearest case
50 Evidence of this is the letter of Prime Minister Tshombe of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to the 
American Ambassador in Leopoldville dated 21 November 1964 (in Whiteman, Digest o f International Law, 
ante, Vol. 12, p.213).
51 On this point, see Thomas Frank and Nigel Rodley, ‘After Bangladesh: The Law of Humanitarian 
Intervention by Military Force’ (1973) 67 AJIL 275, P.288.
52 The International Law Commission summarized events as follows: ‘The principle features of this ruthless 
oppression were the indiscriminate killing of civilians, including women and children and the poorest and the 
weakest members of the community; the attempt to exterminate or drive out of the country a large part of the 
Hindu population; the arrest, torture and killing of students, business men and other potential leaders among the 
Bengalis; the raping of women; the destruction of villages and towns.
53 Teson, Humanitarian Intervention, ante, p.207.
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of forceful individual hum anitarian intervention in  this century’; 54 B ow ett 
includes it as the only possible illustration o f the practice in  the period  1945- 
86.55 In the Security Council, Ind ia’s representative stated that ‘w e have on 
this particular occasion absolutely nothing but the purest o f m otives and the 
purest o f intentions: to rescue the people o f E ast Bengal from  w hat they are 
suffering’.56 Ind ia ’s Prim e M inister w hen appealing to foreign governm ents for 
help said that the general and system atic nature o f inhum an treatm ent inflicted 
on the B angladesh population was evidence o f a crim e against hum anity’. It is 
not surprising that L illich stated that the in tervention was m orally  ju stified .57
(iii) Tanzanian Intervention in Uganda, 1978-9.
T anzan ia’s in tervention in  U ganda has been as a clear case, and indeed is, o f 
hum anitarian intervention. Long years o f anim osity betw een the U gandan 
dictator A m in and the President o f Tanzania N yerere culm inated in  1978, when 
U gandan forces occupied part o f Tanzania invoking self-defence. The 
Tanzanian President stated that this was an act o f war, and w ent on to  say that 
he had  the capacity and determ ination to h it Am in. The latter offered to 
w ithdraw  his forces. H ow ever, there was serious evidence that U gandan 
occupation had resulted  in  acts o f m assacre, destruction and rape. So the 
Tanzanian arm ed forces penetrated into Uganda, as A m in could  not be ‘let o ff’.
54 Fonteyne, The Customary Law Doctrine o f Humanitarian Intervention: Its Current Validity Under the UN 
Charter’, ante, p.204.
55 Derek Bowett, ‘The Use of Force for the Protection of Nationals Abroad’, in Antonio Cassese, ed. The 
Current Regulation of the Use of Force (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1986) p.50.
56 S/PV 1606 (1971) para. 186.
57 See Lillich, Humanitarian Intervention, ante. p. 114
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C onsequently , the dictatorial regim e o f A m in in  U ganda’s capital, Kam pala,
w as defeated  and deposed. T anzan ia’s President stated: ‘Those w ho say that 
T anzan ia  created a bad precedent are liars. W hat we d id  was exem plary  at a 
tim e w hen the O A U  found itse lf unable to condem n A m in. I think w e have seta 
good precedent inasm uch as w hen A frican nations find them selves collectively 
incapable  o f punishing a single country, then each country has to  look  after 
itse lf’.58 The international com m unity approved o f the in tervention .59 This is 
clearly  attested by the fact the new  regim e in  K am pala w as im m ediately 
recognized . There was no debate on the m atter either in the Security C ouncil or 
the G eneral Assem bly. Teson pointedly concludes that ‘on the w hole the 
T anzanian  action was legitim ised by the international com m unity’ 60 which 
‘v irtually  approved the Tanzanian in tervention’.61 
(v). A ssessm ent o f  State practice.
In  view  o f  the post-C harter State practice, there is evidence strongly suggesting 
the existence o f a custom ary international law  righ t o f unilateral hum anitarian
58 Keesing’s Contemporary Archives: Record o f World Events (hereinafter cited as Keesing’s) (1979) p. 29673.
59 The US Secretary of State Cyrus Vance stated: ‘Our position is very clear; we support President Nyerere’s 
position that according to which Ugandan troops must withdraw immediately’: ibid p.29669.
Teson, Humanitarian Intervention, ante, p. 187.
61 It is necessary, at this stage, to mention quickly some incidents in which humanitarian motives were indeed 
marginal; these very incidents should be viewed in the context of the Cold War.
(i) In 1968, Warsaw Pact forces purported to aid the people of Czechoslovakia. The humanitarian motives were 
rejected by the Security Council. Initially the USSR asserted that the Czech government leaders had requested 
its assistance in dealing with opponents of the regime. Afterwards, it put forward that the socialist community 
had a duty to intervene whenever socialism came under attack in a socialist state. This was to be called the 
‘Brzhnev Doctrine’. In 1956, the USSR invasion of Hungary (on which see S/PV.754, 1965 para.53) was 
condemned by the international community.
(ii) The 1964 intervention in Vietnam and 1965 intervention in the Dominican Republic fall within the same 
category of interventions.
(iii) The US interventions in Grenada 1983, and Panama 1989, though frequendy cited as cases of humanitarian 
intervention or as pro-democratic interventions, the US never invoked humanitarian intervention as justification 
for these actions.
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intervention. W e try to im pose order on diplom atic history. H um anitarian 
in tervention is the best explanation o f the Tanzanian action, for exam ple; in  the 
re levan t w ords o f D w orkin, ‘it is the one that interprets that piece o f history  in  
its  best ligh t’.62
It is notew orthy that the em ergence o f a custom ary international law  righ t o f
63 •hum anitarian intervention was further endorsed in  the N icaragua  case , which 
here  deserves som e elaboration. The C ourt held  that reliance by a State on a 
novel right or an unprecedented exception to the principle o f non-intervention 
m ight, if  shared by other states, tend tow ards m odification o f custom ary 
international law .64 A lthough the C ourt found that the argum ent derived from  
the preservation o f hum an rights in N icaragua cannot afford a legal justification  
fo r the conduct o f the U nited  States, w ent on to m ake a critical observation: ‘no 
doubt the provision o f strictly hum anitarian aid to persons or forces in  another 
country, w hatever their political affiliations or objectives, cannot be regarded 
as unlaw ful intervention, or in  any other w ay contrary to  international law .65 
This d ictum  clearly  paved the w ay for the establishm ent o f  a post-charter 
international custom  o f unilateral hum anitarian intervention. The ICJ, having 
reaffirm ed the criteria for the form ation o f new  rules o f custom ary international 
law  as laid  dow n in the N orth Sea Continental S h e lf  cases, provided a 
definition o f opinio juris, essential requirem ent to the creation o f  international
62 Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire (London: Fontana, 1986) p.87-113.
631.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 14.
64 Nicaragua (Merits) [1986] ICJ Reports p. 109, para.207.
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custom : ‘either the states taking such action or o ther States in  a position to react 
to  it, m ust have behaved so that their conduct is evidence o f  a b e lie f that this 
practice  is rendered obligatory by the existence o f  a rule o f  law  requiring i t ’66.
It seems that even the best cases o f hum anitarian intervention, such as 
Bangladesh  (1971), Uganda  (1978-79), lack the necessary  opinio  ju ris . The 
U .K . Foreign O ffice Policy D ocum ent No. 148 on H um anitarian Intervention  
is illum inating: ‘often the hum anitarian benefits o f an intervention are either 
not claim ed by  the intervening state or are only pu t forw ard as an  ex p o s t fa c to  
justification  o f the in te rven tion ... State practice, especially  since 1945, at best 
provides only a handful o f genuine cases o f hum anitarian  intervention, and on 
m ost assessm ents none at a ll’. The FCO  Policy D ocum ent concluded, in  a 
rather am biguous language, that ‘the best case that can be m ade in  support o f 
hum anitarian in tervention is that it cannot be said to be unam biguously  illegal’. 
H ow ever, a w idespread argum ent in  favour o f a right o f hum anitarian 
intervention is that it survived the passage o f the U N  Charter. It is  notew orthy 
that in  N icaragua , the ICJ noted that the C harter does no t cover the w hole area 
o f the regulation o f the use o f force in international relations. Particularly, 
A rticle 51 refers to the ‘inherent right o f self-defence’. B ow ett writes: ‘It is 
fallacious to assum e that m em bers have only those rights w hich the Charter 
accords them; on the contrary they have those rights w hich general
65 Ibid p. 114 para.242
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in ternational law  accords to them  except in  so far as they have surrendered 
th em  under the C harter’. The prohibition in  A rticle 2(4), B ow ett continues, ‘left 
the  rig h t o f self-defence unim paired’. Thus, it is hereby proposed  that a 
custom ary  right o f hum anitarian intervention is a legitim ate fo rm  o f self- 
defence or self-help. M ichael Reism an says: ‘because rights w ithout rem edies 
are no t rights a t all, prohib iting  the unilateral vindication o f  c lear violations o f  
rights w hen m ultilateral possibilities do not obtain is virtually  to term inate  
those r igh ts '.67 H ow ever, this statem ent does not interpret the scope o f  the righ t 
o f  self-defecne as a justification  for unilateral hum anitarian intervention.
If, how ever, this last argum ent finds no support, then an argum ent based on the 
h ierarchy  o f  international law  sources m ay be pu t forward. T reaties and custom  
are o f  equal au thority68. In the present case, there is obviously  a conflict 
betw een A rticle 2(4) o f the U N  Charter (itself an International Treaty) and an 
alleged em erging post-charter custom ary law  righ t o f hum anitarian  intervention. 
In  deciding this conflict, a basic principle (in fact, a general principle o f law ) 
m ay be applicable; N am ely lex specialis derogat legi generali (a special law  
prevails over a general law). ‘Special law ’, in  the present conflict, is the 
custom ary  righ t o f hum anitarian intervention w hereas ‘general law ’ is the U N  
C harter A rticle 2(4) provision laying dow n a general prohibition o f the use o f 
force. It m ay thus be argued that the form er (hum anitarian in tervention being a
66 Ibid. p. 109 para.207.
67 Michael Reisman, ‘Sovereignty and Human Rights in Contemporary International Law’ (1990) 84 AJIL 866, 
p.875.
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specia l k in d  o f forceful action) prevails over the latter. F or the purposes o f the 
p resen t analysis, it should be clear enough by now  that pre- as w ell as post- 
C harter State practice indicates, at least as far as I can see, the existence o f a 
custom ary  international law  righ t o f unilateral hum anitarian intervention. 
A dditionally , U N  practice has in  recent years w itnessed a trend towards 
hum anitarian  intervention or aid and need be looked at in  passing.
(c) Post-Charter UN Humanitarian Interventions.
The end  o f  the Cold W ar has transform ed the situation in  the U N  Security 
C ouncil, so that the w ay has been paved for hum anitarian interventions by this 
political institution.69 The approach o f the past that the U nited  N ations are not 
authorized ‘to intervene in  m atters w hich are essentially  w ith in  the dom estic 
ju risd ic tion  o f any state’ is not any m ore the international position. As the 
form er U N  Secretary G eneral Perez de C uellar stated, ‘we are w itnessing .. .the 
be lie f that the defence o f the oppressed in the nam e o f m orality  should prevail 
over frontiers and legal docum ents’.71
(i) Iraq, 1991
The period  after the defeat o f Iraq in  the K uw ait crisis, w itnessed risings o f the 
K urds in  the northern part o f the country, w hich w ere brutally repressed  by the
68 See Michael Akehurst, ‘The Hierarchy of the Sources of International Law’, 47 (1974-75) B.Y.B.I.L., p.273.
69 Instances of humanitarian intervention include, inter alia, the UN intervention in the former SFRY 1992, 
Somalia 1992, and Sierra Leone 1997-98.
70 UN Charter, Article 2(7).
71 (1991) 22 Diplomatic World Bulletin.
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Iraqi A rm y in  disregard o f the relevant G eneva C onventions provisions or 
hum an rights international instrum ents. The international com m unity  was 
particularly  m oved by the fate o f hundreds o f thousands K urdish  refugees 
abandoning their hom es. Security Council R esolution 688, 1991 stated that the 
Council condem ned the repression o f the Iraqi civilian population in Iraq. The 
UK, the U SA  and other states brought forces into Iraq in aid o f  the K urdish 
refugees. The U K  Foreign Secretary spoke thus about the m ilitary  operations 
purposes: ‘W e are vigorously pursuing this proposal for safe havens. O ur aim  is 
to create places and conditions in w hich the refugees can feel secure. W e are not 
talking o f a separate K urdistan or a perm anent U N  presence’.72 T he objectives 
o f the intervention were hum anitarian. As Professor G reenw ood very w ell pu t it, 
‘it is difficult to resist the conclusion that the intervening states w ere in practice 
asserting a right o f hum anitarian intervention o f som e k in d ’ .73 This conclusion 
is reinforced by  the statem ent o f the M inister o f D efence in  the H ouse of 
Com m ons w hen a ‘no fly ’ zone was im posed in  southern Iraq: ‘the zones w ere 
established to m eet situations o f severe hum anitarian n e e d \
(ii) Liberia, 1990
In 1990, a civil w ar betw een different factions brought about anarchy in the 
country. A  declaration issued by the Econom ic C om m unity o f  W est A frican 
States (ECO W A S) H eads o f  State, follow ing the despatch o f peace-keeping 
forces, read as follows: ‘...f irs t and forem ost to stop the senseless killing o f
72 H.C. Debates, Vol. 189, Col. 21; 15 April 1991.
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cinnocent civilian nationals and foreigners and to help the L iberian  people to 
resto re  their dem ocratic institu tions’.74 It is unclear w hether the governm ent o f 
L iberia  gave its consent to the in tervention.75 Again, as G reenw ood observes 
‘the  in tervention seem s to involve the assertion o f som e k ind  o f  right o f 
hum anitarian  in tervention’ 76
(iv) K osovo77, 1999
The situation in  K osovo involved serious violations o f hum an rights and there 
w as an im pending hum anitarian catastrophe w ell before the N A TO  action 
(undertaken to put a stop to the ethnic cleansing o f A lbanians) began. The 
Security  C ouncil R esolution 1160, adopted a year before the N A TO  operations, 
referred  to ‘intense fighting in  K osovo and in  particular the excessive and 
indiscrim inate use o f force by Serbian Security forces and the Y ugoslavian 
A rm y w hich  have resulted  in  the displacem ent o f over 230,000 persons from  
their ho m es’, 78 and dictated im m ediate steps to avert the ‘im pending  
hum anitarian ca tastrophe \  The U K  R epresentative to the U N  justified  the 
N A TO  m ilitary intervention, undertaken w ithout express authorization o f  the 
Security  Council, on the ground that a righ t to take m ilitary action in  case o f
73 Greenwood, ‘Is there a Right of Humanitarian Intervention?’, (1993) 49 (2) The World Today, p. 36.
74 UN Doc. S/21485.
75 For a detailed account of the facts see Greenwood, ‘Is there a Right of Humanitarian Intervention?’ ante, p.37.
76 Ibid, p.37.
77 For a brief account of the origins of the conflict, see Chesterman, ‘ Just War or Just PeaceV ante, p.207.
78 SCR 1199, 6th paragraph of the Preamble.
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overw helm ing hum anitarian necessity  is recognized by  in ternational law .79 In 
m y view , the use o f force by N A TO  was, indeed, not contrary to in ternational 
law  and w as justified  on  a right o f hum anitarian in tervention.80 
C onclusively, as G reenw ood stated, quite pointedly, ‘it is no longer tenable to 
assert that w henever a governm ent m assacres its ow n peop le ...in ternationa l law  
forbids m ilitary intervention altogether’.81
T he argum ent can be m ade, how ever, that the carrying ou t o f 
hum anitarian  intervention authorised by  the Security C ouncil m ay m ilitate  
against the existence o f a right to hum anitarian in tervention on part o f States. 
N evertheless, a counter argum ent w ould be that in case a State m akes use o f  its 
veto  pow er in  the Security C ouncil, thus disabling the latter from  taking m ilitary  
action w here hum an rights are clearly  violated, States m ay then  be capable o f 
in tervening unilaterally  to prevent the occurrence o f gross violation o f  hum an 
rights.
(3). Legal and Political Theory on Humanitarian Intervention
This subsection (of the second Part o f the present chapter) w ill address the 
fundam ental issue o f the m oral justification  o f hum anitarian  in tervention 
(helium ). A n inquiry into the ethical foundations o f the in ternational legal 
system . Indeed, the link betw een international law  and m oral philosophy is
79 See S/PV.3988 (1999) p. 12.
80 See further, the truly excellent Memoranda submitted by Professors Christopher Greenwood QC and Vaughan 
Lowe before the House of Commons Select Committee on Foreign Affairs,http://www.parliament.the- 
stationery-office.co.uk/pa/cml99900/cmselect/cmfaff; Hoffmann, Humanitarian Intervention (1977)
81 Greenwood, ‘Is there a Right o f Humanitarian Intervention?’, ante...
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consisten t w ith the G rotian tradition in  international law  w hich regards the Law  
o f  N ations as founded upon universal m oral values.
(a)Just War (Bellum Justum)
The origins o f hum anitarian intervention m ust be seen in  the context o f  w hether 
it is  ever law ful to w age war.
(i)W ar is no t in conflict w ith the Law  o f  N ature
C icero  has presented: ‘W hat can be done against force w ithout fo rce?’82 In 
U lp ian  w e read  : ‘Cassius w rites that it is perm issible to  repel fo rc e  by fo r c e , 
and this right is bestow ed by nature. From  this m oreover it appears that it is 
perm issib le  to repel arms by  m eans o f arm s’. That w ar is not in  conflict w ith 
the law  o f nature is proved from  general agreem ent.84 The ju ris t G aius says:
Of
‘N atural reason  perm its defence o f oneself against danger’. ‘F or there is ’, says 
Josephus, ‘that law  o f nature w hich applies in  the case o f all creatures, that they  
w ish to live; and therein lies the reason w hy we consider those as enem ies w ho 
clearly  w ish to rob us o f life ’.86
(ii) B ib lica l texts argum ents that w ar is com patible w ith the law  o f  the G ospel
82 Letters, XII, iii 1.
83 Digest, XLIII, xvi. 1. 27 (emphasis supplied).
84 Cicero, in regard to force used in the defence of life, wrote: ‘There is this law which is not written, but bom 
with us; which we have not learned, have not received , have not read, but which we have caught up, have 
wrung out from nature herself; a law regarding which we have not been instructed, but in accord with which we 
have been made; the law that if our life has been placed in jeopardy by any violence, or weapons of enemies, 
every possible means of securing safety is morally right’ (For Milo, iv. 10).
85 Digest, IX. ii. 4.
86 Jewish War, III, viii. 5.
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D espite the divine C om m andm ent given to M oses T h o u  shalt no t k ill’87, two 
other C om m andm ents o f the O ld Testam ent w hich seem  to conflict w ith the 
form er ones, to say the least, are hereby quoted: ‘A n eye for an eye, a tooth for 
a too th ’.88 D espite the call for love in  the N ew  T estam ent these provisions could 
still be held  valid. In  m y hum ble opinion, M oses (as w ell as m ankind) has been 
given the authority o f G od to enforce divine law  on earth.
On this rationale, transgressors o f law  may, if  necessary, be put to death. Indeed, 
com parison m ay be m ade betw een the right to w age w ar and the death  penalty. 
Being fervent exponent o f the latter, I w ould argue that w ar m ay be  justified  on 
the sam e grounds as is the penalty  o f death. If  the righ t to inflict capital 
punishm ent and to defend citizens by arm s against crim inals should be taken 
away, there w ould follow  a rio t o f crim es, and illegality am ong nations. Paul 
thus speaks: ‘I f  I have w ronged any one, and have com m itted  anything worthy
Q Q
o f  death, I refuse not to d ie ’. There are certain crim es for w hich justice  perm its, 
or even dem ands, punishm ent by death. I strongly subm it that it is in  the love o f  
innocent men  that both capital punishm ents and ju s t  wars have their origin. The 
w ords o f C hrysostom  on hum an punishm ents becom e here relevant: ‘m en do 
such things not in  cruelty bu t in  k indness’.90 There is, on the other hand, the 
consideration that we are bound to love our enem ies by the exam ple o f God.
87 Exodus, xx. 30.
88 Leviticus, xxiv. 20; Deuteronomy, xix. 21; see also: ‘Thou shalt love thy neighbour (that is an Israelite), 
Leviticus, xix. 18, ‘and shalt hate thine enemy, against whom the Jews are bidden to wage implacable war’ 
[Exodus, xxxiv. ii, Exodus, xxvii. 19; Deuteronomy, xxv. 19].
89 Acts xxv. II (emphasis added).
90 On First Corinthians, iii. 12; see also Seneca, On Clemency, Book I. Chap. ii.
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B ut the sam e G od inflicts punishm ents upon som e w icked m en even in this life. 
Further, a counter-argum ent m ay be phrased as follows: ‘G od is called  gracious, 
m erciful, and long-suffering’.91 Yet, it is C hrist h im self w ho inflicts severe 
punishm ents upon disobedient Jew s, and uncovers their hyp o cricy .92 The 
occasional w rath o f Jesus C hrist was im itated by the A postles, w ho used the 
pow er w hich had been given them  by G od for the punishm ent o f wrongdoers. 
Chrysostom , O n F irst C orinthians, iv. 21 states: ‘Shall I k i l l . . .For 
as there is a spirit o f gentleness, so there is a spirit o f severity’.
(b) War as punishment
Grotius, draw ing on the ideas advanced by G entili,93 adm itted a righ t to wage 
w ar for the purposes o f  punishm ent.94
Furtherm ore, I should like to subm it a proposition by  no m eans original, yet, as 
it will be shown, o f everlasting value. The m oral justification  for a ju s t w ar lie 
prim arily in  a deep feeling o f anger. A ristotle in  his m asterpiece Rhetoric  m ade 
the point explicitly: ‘anger is the hum an feeling w hich m akes a m an exact 
revenge  upon som eone who is thought to deserve i t ’.95 A nger, though according 
to som e view s the ugliest passion, form s proof o f the fact that hum an beings are 
m oral agents. It is evidence that people, being m em bers o f a m oral com m unity,
91 Exodus, xxxiv. 6.
92 Matthew, xxii. 7
93 Alberico Gentili, De jure belli [1612], (Classics of International Law; Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1933).
94 Grotius, De jure belli ac pads, (Kelsey ed. London, 1964) II, xx; Grotius also cites Augustine: ‘They think 
that they should decree the commission of crimes of such sort that if any state upon earth should decree them, or 
had decreed them, it would deserve to be overthrown by a decree of the human race’ (On Benefits, VII, xix,
9).Augustine’s statement may qualify as a powerful argument for humanitarian intervention.
95 The element of ‘Anger’ appears in the Homeric Epics, too (hence the wrath of Achilles in the Iliad).
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by  no m eans approve o f instances o f violation o f m oral and legal principles.96 
Therefore a ju s t w ar m ay be im plem ented as a m easure o f  ju s t  retribution  and 
deterrence, both theories o f punishm ent being applicable; such a proposition 
directly  fits the case o f hum anitarian in te rv en tio n .97 O n the one hand, 
intervention o f this k ind  can be launched as a m eans o f retribution against the 
State w hich violates the fundam ental hum an rights o f its ow n nationals; on the 
other, it m ay serve as vehicle for deterring hum anitarian catastrophe from  taking 
place in a given situation.
(c) War in the name o f  the oppressed
St A m brose had  w ritten that ‘he who does not keep harm  o ff a friend, if  he can, 
is as m uch in  fault as he w ho causes i t ’.98 G rotius and Gentili, w ho quoted St 
A m brose, entirely share this view . H ow ever, G rotius’ position differs from  that 
o f G entili, in  that, according to G rotius, the justice  o f w ar w aged on behalf o f 
oppressed subjects is clearly a legal right ra ther than a m oral duty. In  D e ju re  
belli ac p a d s , II, xxv, para.8, it is stated: ‘ I f  however, the w rong is obvious, in 
case som e Busiris, Phalaris, o r  Thracian D iom ede should  inflict upon his 
subjects such treatm ent as no one is w arranted in inflicting, the exercise o f  the 
right vested  in hum an society is not precluded. In  conform ity w ith this principle  
C onstantine took up arms against M axentius and  Licinius, and  other Rom an
96 This argument is not dissimilar to the one expressed above at p. 78 that love of the innocent is the motive for 
waging war.
97 It is submitted that only in this way can moral order be restored and international legality be preserved.
98 St Ambrose, De Officiis , I, xxxvi, para. 179.
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em p ero rs’. H ersch Lauterpacht refers to this as the ‘first authoritative statem ent 
o f the principle o f hum anitarian in tervention’.99
(d) H istorical Evidence o f  Humanitarian Interventions 
In  the m assive m aterial on hum anitarian intervention that I have gone through, 
the contribution o f Thucydides to the subject m atter has been unduly 
neg lec ted .100 Even G rotius scarcely m akes m ention o f h im .101 
The T hucydidean historical work, a m asterpiece o f political philosophy and 
science, sets an authoritative exam ple o f hum anitarian  in tervention in 
in ternational relations, "frie affairs w hich follow  should be seen in  the light o f 
the fac t that the G reek cities in  ancient tim es w ere States them selves.102 First, 
B ook IV  o f  the H istory o f  the Peloponnesian War, m ay at first sight be said to 
pose an exam ple o f hum anitarian intervention; on its w ay to Sicily the A thenian 
fleet w as m et w ith a sea storm, w hich forced the ships to seek refuge in  the 
Peloponnese (Pylos).103 As the w ar betw een A thens and Sparta w as at its apex 
the A thenian  navy m em bers w ere arrested by the Lacedaem onians. C leon, the 
A thenian dem agogue, forcefully  urged the A thenian A ssem bly for a m ilitary
99 Hersch Lauterpacht, ‘The Grotian Tradition in International Law’ (1946) 23 British YBIL 1, p.46.
100 See Phillipson, Coleman, The International Law and Custom of Ancient Greece and Rome (London: 
Macmillan, 1911), which, though a very good exposition of that period’s law, contains no hint of Thucydides.
101 Here is what he mentions: ‘In Thucydides the Corinthians find it just that “each party should punish its own 
subjects’” (De jure belli ac pads, ante, II, xxv, 1). Even this reference ignores the context in which these words 
have been spoken, and may therefore be misleading as regards the era’s State practice on intervention.
102 It is precisely because of the fact that the Greek cities were themselves recognized as States -albeit with 
common origins of blood, language, and religion- that the Peloponnesian War, though often described as the 
greatest ‘Civil War’ in antiquity, was in fact an international conflict.
Coincidently, more than two thousand years later, the Navy Battle of Navarino, described above, was to take 
place on the same spot, Navarino being the contemporary name of ancient Pylos.
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cam paign to prevent their fellow  citizens from  being m assacred. A lthough the 
incident m ay be better described as operation to save nationals abroad (since the 
A thenian prisoners o f w ar w ere not subjects o f the Spartans), it has generated 
the criteria for a legitim ate hum anitarian intervention as these w ere form ulated 
in  the speech o f the A thenian G eneral D em osthenes only a w hile before the 
com m encem ent o f the m ilitary rescue operation: ‘M en w ho have gathered in 
this venture, let no one o f you w ish to be esteem ed a m an o f rationality; but, 
instead, w ith plain  courage, w hich leaves no m om ent fo r  deliberation , let h im  
attack the opponents and even be optim istic that he w ill eventually  be victorious. 
W hen m atters reach a point o f overwhelm ing necessity , as the present case is, 
crude reflection is least needed in view  o f the instant d anger’.104 Secondly, in 
B ook I an account is given o f a clear instance o f hum anitarian intervention. The 
Island o f Lesbos (m em ber o f the A thenian Em pire-C om m onw ealth  or 
C onfederation o f city-states) revolted from  A thens.
T he A thenians set sail against the M ytilenians (inhabitants o f Lesbos), and 
w arned them  that if  they w ere to refuse an order to surrender, they w ould 
dem olish their fortifications. A n em bassy o f M ytilenians seeked the help o f 
Sparta thus: ‘Com e to the help o f M ytilene. It is our lives that w e are risking; an 
even m ore general calam ity w ill follow  if  you w ill not listen to  u s ’.105 The very
104 Thucydides, History o f the Peloponnesian War (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1972) Book IV, para. 
XXXVIII. (emphasis added). Note the striking similarity between the terminology used in this text, and the one 
employed in the Caroline Case 1840: ‘It will be for Her Majesty’s Government to show a necessity of self- 
defence, instant, overwhelming, leaving no moment for deliberation’. It makes one wonder whether Mr Webster, 
was a fervent reader of Thucydides !
105 Thucydides, History o f the Peloponnesian War, ante, Book II, para. 14
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basic criteria for hum anitarian intervention were in  th is case fulfilled: (i) the 
M ytilenians w ere subjects o f a State (A thens), (ii) they consented to the m ilitary 
intervention undertaken for their ow n sake, and (iii) they  faced im m inent danger 
o f hum anitarian catastrophe. The Spartans, indeed, d ispatched  a fleet w hich 
reached the coast o f Lesbos but never engaged in  fighting. The conservative 
foreign policy o f Sparta dictated that the m ilitary forces o f the State w ere to 
keep an eye on a possible R evolt o f the H elot population in  the Peloponnese. 
This affair serves, if  no t else, as an instance clearly show ing that hum anitarian 
disaster may, indeed, be the outcom e o f non-intervention, as it eventually  was 
w ith the M ytilenians. Therefore, hum anitarian in tervention in  cases o f  instant 
necessity is a must.
(4). Criteria and Conclusions on the Turkish Intervention
Given that States m ay exercise the right o f unilateral hum anitarian  intervention 
in  cases o f large-scale hum an rights violations, could  then Turkey ju stify  her 
1974 intervention o f Cyprus upon such a right? I w ould dear say a proposition 
that no G reek-C ypriot has so far articulated, nam ely that the T urkish  m ilitary 
operation could prim a  fa c ie  be seen as an exam ple o f hum anitarian  intervention. 
If  a coup was directed against the R epublic o f  C yprus by  T urkish  Generals, 
being G reek-C ypriot m yself, I w ould expect from  G reece to take m ilitary action 
and intervene in  order to protect the hum an rights o f the G reek-Cypriot 
com m unity and prevent any hum anitarian catastrophe from  taking place. One 
could argue that the lives o f the Turkish Cypriots w ere no t threatened in  1974 (a
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proposition  w hich m ay be true). H ow ever, le t us suppose that there existed  in 
1974 a m ost dangerous hum anitarian  em ergency involving large scale loss o f 
life. O n the other hand, as already noted, the Turkish operation m ay only  a t f ir s t  
sigh t be considered as an instance o f intervention to protect basic hum an rights. 
T he lim itations to the righ t should alongside be taken into account. First, a 
criterion, w hich renders hum anitarian intervention m orally and legally  justified , 
is that the victim s o f oppression w elcom e the foreign in tervention;106 there was 
no ind ication  that the Turkish Cypriots requested the protection o f Turkey. N o 
doubt, the Turkish C ypriots felt afraid and there is am ple evidence that they 
w ere in itially  p leased to see the Turkish army. H ow ever, the m ajority  o f them  
w ere eventually  displaced unw illingly from  their hom es and transferred  to the 
northern  part o f the island. A second criterion is that hum anitarian intervention 
m ust correspond to the dictates o f the proportionality  principle. The Caroline  
case principle m ay be seen as one that sets lim its to the use o f force in  general 
and calls for adherence to proportionality. The classic form ulation o f M r 
W ebster m ay in  this context be quoted: ‘. ..d id  nothing unreasonable or 
excessive; since the act is ju stified  by the necessity  o f self-defence, m ust be 
lim ited  by  that necessity, and kep t clearly w ithin i t ’.107 So the invocation by 
T urkey  o f hum anitarian intervention to  justify  her action should not be seen as 
iso lated  from  the extent to  w hich this very righ t was used  in  1974 by the
106 Walzer concedes that if the invaders are welcomed by a clear majority of the people, then it would be odd to 
accuse them of any crime at all (Just and Unjust Wars, ante, pp.213-214).
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Turkish troops, and, o f course, from  the consequences o f the intervention. The 
m ass killing and brutal treatm ent o f innocent G reek C ypriot civilians during the 
hostilities, the uprooting o f others from  their hom eland and  subsequent 
reduction to the tragic status o f refugee, the unascertained fate  o f  m issing 
persons, the destruction o f cultural property, and the occupation until now adays 
o f large part o f the C yprus Republic territory ra ther seem  to argue against a 
valid  invocation o f this sort o f righ t by  T urkey .108
107 See Oppenheim’s International Law 9th ed. ante, p.443, n.18, where the principle of proportionality is echoed 
in the phrase ‘the action taken is limited both in time and scope to the needs of the emergency’.
108 On the relevant Humanitarian Law of Armed Conflict {jus in bello) see below, Chapter IE.
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CHAPTER IV: THE TURKISH FEDERATED STATE AND THE
TRNC
In  1983 the Turkish C ypriot leadership proceeded to  a unilateral 
declaration o f the so called  Turkish R epublic o f  N orthern  Cyprus 
(“T R N C ”). M r D enktash, leader o f the Turkish  C ypriot com m unity, 
stated:
‘We are not seceding from the independent island of Cyprus, from the Republic, or 
will not do so if the chance is given to us to re-establish a b-izonal federal system. But, 
if the robbers of my rights continue to insist that they are the legitimate Government 
of Cyprus, we shall be as legitimate as they, as sovereign as they in the northern State 
of Cyprus’.1
It is the purpose o f this chapter to exam ine the legality  o f  this act in  
in ternational law, in  particular w hether recognition m ay be granted to the 
“T R N C ” .
(1) International community reaction to the “TRNC” 
Unilateral Declaration o f Independence
T he U nited N ations Security Council, in R esolution 367 (1974), w hich 
reaffirm ed R esolution 3212(X X IX ) o f the G eneral A ssem bly, expressed 
reg re t that the declaration regarding the creation o f the ‘T F S C ’ was aim ed 
at com prom ising the continuation o f negotiations betw een the two 
com m unities.2 Further, R esolution 367 called  upon all m em ber States to 
‘respect the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and non-alignment of the 
Republic of Cyprus and to refrain from any action which might prejudice that 
sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and non-alignment, as well as any 
attempt at partition of the island or its unification with any other country’.
1 S/PV 2500 of 18 Nov. 1983, p.31 Turkey recognised the “TRNC” on the same day it was proclaimed. 
The reasons for recognition are to be found in the statement of the Turkish Foreign Ministry o f 15 Nov. 
1983, which was circulated as U.N. Doc. A/36/602 of 23 Nov. 1983.
2 This “State” was not recognised by any State and its establishment seemed to be aimed primarily at 
improving the constitutional bargaining position of the Turkish minority (Dugard, Recognition in 
International Law, ante, p. 108).
131
The U nilateral D eclaration o f Independence o f  the “TR N C ”3 w as strongly 
condem ned by R esolution 541 o f the Security C ouncil, w hich saw  the 
U D I as an open violation o f the Cyprus R epublic T reaty o f G uarantee. 
Particularly, the Security Council:
‘1. Deplores the declaration of the Turkish Cypriot authorities of the purported 
secession of part of the Republic of Cyprus;
2. Considers the declaration referred to above as legally invalid and calls for its 
withdrawal;
6. Calls upon all States to respect the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity 
and non-alignment of the Republic of Cyprus;
7. Calls upon all States not to recognise any Cypriot state other than the Republic o f  
Cyprus.A
In S.C. R esolution 550 (1984) w hich reaffirm ed R esolution 541, the 
Security C ouncil stated that:
1. Reaffirms its resolution 541 (1983) and calls for its urgent and effective 
implementation;
2. Condemns all secessionist actions, including the purported exchange of 
ambassadors between Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot leadership, declares them 
illegal and invalid, and calls for their immediate withdrawal;
3. Reiterates the call upon all States not to recognise the purported State of the 
“Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus” set up by the secessionist acts and calls upon 
them not to facilitate or in any way assist the aforesaid secessionist entity;
4. Calls upon all States to respect the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity, 
unity and non-alignment of the Republic of Cyprus’.
It is notew orthy that the B ritish representative at the U nited  N ations 
stated these:
‘We recognise only one Cypriot State, the Republic of Cyprus under the Government 
of President Kyprianou. The Turkish action is incompatible with the state of affairs 
brought about by the Treaties governing the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus’.
3 On 15 November, 1983, however, the Assembly of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus, with the 
apparent support of Turkey, proclaimed the establishment of a new “State”-the Turkish Republic of 
Northern Cyprus. This entity was promptly recognised by Turkey, but no other State has given its 
recognition (Dugard, Recognition in International Law, supra, p. 109).
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Sim ilar stand was taken by the European Com m unity. The 
European Com m ission, on 16 N ovem ber, condem ned the U nilateral 
D eclaration o f Independence as, indeed, tw o resolutions o f the E uropean 
Parliam ent.5 A lso, the European Parliam ent R esolution o f 13 Septem ber 
1985 stressed that there w ould be no recognition o f the “TR N C ” or o f the 
constitutional developm ents in  the northern part o f the island.
The C ouncil o f Europe, on the other hand, through a decision o f 
the Com m ittee o f M inisters based on a recom m endation o f the 
Parliam entary A ssem bly, considered the TRN C declaration legally  void. 
Particularly, in  R esolution (83) 13 on Cyprus, the C om m ittee o f M inisters 
o f the Council o f Europe:
‘1. Deplores the declaration by the Turkish Cypriot leadership of the purported 
independence of a so-called “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus”;
2. Considers the declaration of referred to above as legally invalid and calls for its 
withdrawal;
3. Declares that it continues to regard the Government of the Republic of Cyprus, 
which is represented in the Committee of Ministers, as the sole legitimate 
Government of Cyprus;
4. Calls for the respect of the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and unity 
of the Republic of Cyprus.’
Likewise, the Commonwealth Heads of State, at the New Delhi Conference, 
condemned the declaration to create a secessionist state in northern Cyprus, called 
upon all states not to assist the secessionist entity, and claimed the implementation of 
the relevant resolutions of the United Nations.
4 Emphasis supplied.
5 OJ No. C342, 19.12.1983, p.52.
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(2). J u s  G e n tiu m  a n d  P o sitiv ism
In accordance w ith positivism , the obligation to  obey international 
law  derived from  the consent o f  states. O ppenheim ’s In ternational Law  
provides the m ost influential expression o f positiv ist theory. International 
law  was seen as the law  existing betw een civilized nations. In 1859 the 
B ritish Law  O fficers spoke o f international law  as it has been  hitherto 
recognized and now  subsists by the com m on consent o f C hristian 
nations.6 M em bers o f the society w hose law  was in ternational law  w ere 
the European States betw een w hom  it evolved from  the fifteenth  century 
onw ards, and those other States accepted expressly or tacitly  by the 
original m em bers into the society o f N ations; for exam ple the U nited 
States o f A m erica and Turkey.7 R ecognition, express or im plied, solely 
created their m em bership and bound them  to obey in ternational law .8 
States not so accepted w ere not bound by international law . O nly States 
recognised and accepted as States into international society, w ere bound 
by international law  and w ere international persons. States solely and 
exclusively are the subjects o f International Law .9 T hrough recognition 
only and exclusively a S tate becom es an International Person and a 
subject o f In ternational L aw .10
2.1 T h e  C o n stitu tiv e  th e o ry
The constitutive view  w hich deduces the legal existence o f new  
States from  the w ill o f those already established dates back to H egel, one 
o f the spiritual fathers o f the nineteenth-century doctrines o f  positiv ism  
and o f the absolute sovereignty o f the State in  the in ternational sphere.11 
M ost o f the adherents o f the constitutive view  o f recognition are also
6 Oppenheim, International Law (1st edn.) 17.
7 Ibid. p. 18. On Turkey’s membership see Hall, International Law (2nd edn. 1884), p.40.
8 Oppenheim, International law, supra p. 17
9 Ibid. p. 18. By “States” Oppenheim meant recognized States.
10 Ibid. p. 108.
11 Lauterpacht, Recognition in International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1947) p.38.
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positivist in  outlook. S ir H ersch Lauterpacht, how ever, w ho w as not a 
positivist, was one o f the m ost persuasive exponents o f  the constitutive 
p o s itio n .12 Lauterpacht form ulates the position as follows: The full 
international personality  cannot be autom atic. A s its ascertainm ent 
requires the prior determ ination o f difficult circum stances o f  fact and law, 
there m ust be som eone  to perform  that task. In  the absence o f a preferable 
solution, such as the setting up o f an im partial in ternational organ to 
perform  that function, the latter m ust be the fu lfilled  by  States already 
existing .13
In m odem  international law  this argum ent is no t applicable at large. 
D eterm ination o f the legality  o f the use o f force, o r the violation or 
term ination o f a treaty, m ay involve difficult c ircum stances o f fact and 
law, but it could not be contended that the view s o f  particu lar States as to 
such m atters are conclusive. I f  that w as the case, every ru le  o f 
international law  w ould be the subject o f an autom atic reservation w ith 
respect to every S tate .14 It is o f interest though that L auterpacht allow ed 
the possibility  o f an invalid  act o f recognition.15 A nother objection to the 
constitutive approach is its relativism . K elsen says tha t ‘it follow s from  
constitutivist theory that legal existence o f a State has relative character. 
A State exists legally only in  its relations to o ther States. There is no such 
thing as absolute ex istence’.16 Lauterpacht, w ho accepts the relativ ity  o f 
recognition as inherent in  the constitutive view , refers to it as a ‘glaring 
anom aly casting grave reflection upon international law ’.17
12 Lauterpacht adopts the view that prior to recognition, the community in question possesses neither 
the rights nor the obligations which international law associates with full Statehood.
13 Lauterpacht, Recognition in International Law, supra p.55.
14 See Crawford, The Creation o f States in Modern International Law, p. 18.
15 Lauterpacht regarded Italian and German recognition of the Franco regime as ‘illegal ab 
initio' .Recognition in International Law supra p. 234 fn. 3.
16 Kelsen, p. 609.
17 Lauterpacht, Recognition in International Law, supra p. 67.
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2.2  T h e  d e c la ra to ry  th e o ry
A ccording to this theory, a State exists as a subject o f  international 
law -i.e. as a subject o f international rights and duties- as soon as it exists 
as a fact, i.e. as soon as it fulfils the conditions o f  statehood as la id  dow n 
in  in ternational law .18 If  recognition is purely  declaratory  o f an existing 
fact w hat is, then, its ju rid ical significance? The answ er often given is 
tha t recognition is a political rather than a legal act.19 O thers m aintain  that 
its sole legal effect is to establish ordinary diplom atic relations betw een 
the recognizing and the recognized S ta te .20 This probably  is also the 
in ten tion  o f a large num ber o f adherents to the declaratory  doctrine for 
w hom  recognition signifies the acceptance o f the State as a m em ber o f 
the in ternational com m unity.21 O thers still explain the declaratory effect 
o f  recognition in  the sense that although prior to  it the new  State 
possesses all rights w hich international law  grants to  States, it is  only 
after recognition that it is assured o f enjoying them .22 
A  passage o f  T aft C .J.’s judgm ent in  the Tinocco Arbitra tion  is 
considered as the classical piece o f reference: The non-recognition by 
other nations o f a governm ent claim ing to  be a national personality, is 
usually  appropriate evidence that it has not attained the independence and 
control entitling it by international law  to be classed as s u c h .23 A 
G erm an-Polish  m ixed Tribunal, in  reference to the existence o f the new  
State o f  Poland, stated: ‘the recognition o f a S tate is not constitutive but
18 Lauterpacht, Recognition in International Law, ante, p.41; Crawford, Recognition in International 
Law, p.20: according to the declaratory theory, recognition of a new State is a political act which is in 
principle independent of the existence of the new State as a full subject o f international law; Brierly, 
The Law of Nations (5th ed. 1955) pp. 131-2: the better view is that the granting of recognition to a new 
state- is not a constitutive but a declaratory act; it does not bring into legal existence a State which did 
not exist before. A State may exist without being recognized, and if it does exist in fact, then, whether 
or not it has been formally recognized by other States, it has a right to be treated by them as a State.
19 See Brierly, The Law of Nations (3rd ed. 1942) p.i00;also see Hague Recueil, vol. LVIII (1936) (iv), 
p. 52, where Professor Brierly further says that ‘international law prescribes the objective conditions on 
which States are bound to base their decision in the matter’.
20 Lauterpacht, Recognition in International Law, supra, p.42.
21 Ibid. p.42.
22 Ibid. p.42.
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m erely declaratory. The State exists by itse lf and the recognition  is 
nothing else than a declaration o f this existence, recognized  by the  States 
from  w hich it em anates’.24 O f great im portance in  this regard  is the report 
o f the C om m ission o f Jurists on the A aland Islands. The passage o f the 
R eport dealing w ith the independence o f F inland reads: “these facts by 
them selves do not suffice to prove that Finland, from  this tim e onw ards, 
becam e a sovereign S ta te ... The sam e legal value cannot be  attached to 
recognition o f new  States in  w ar-tim e, especially  to  that accorded by 
belligerent pow ers, as in  norm al tim es ...In  addition to  these facts w hich 
bear upon the external relations o f Finland, the very  abnorm al character 
o f her internal situation m ust be brought out. This situation was such that, 
for a considerable tim e, the conditions required  fo r the form ation o f a 
sovereign State did not ex ist’.25 The crucial poin t above is that conditions 
are required  for the form ation o f  a sovereign State apart from  recognition. 
It is evident that the declaratory doctrine prevails am ong w riters. 
B row nlie sum m arizes the position thus: ‘R ecognition, as a pub lic  ac t o f  
State, is a an optional and political act and there is no legal duty in  this 
regard. H ow ever, in  a deeper sense, i f  an en tity  bears the m arks o f 
statehood, o ther states pu t them selves at risk  legally, if  they ignore the 
basic obligations o f S tate re la tions’. 26 N evertheless, States do not 
practically regard  recognized States as exem pt from  international law .27
23 (1924) 18 American Journal o f International Law 147-74, 154.
24 Deutsche Continental Gas Gesellschaft v. Polish State (1929) 5 Annual Digest o f Public 
International Law Cases No.5.
25 League o f Nations Official Journal, Supp. No. 4 (1920), 8.
26 Principles o f Public International Law, 94 (emphasis original); Writers sharing the declaratory view 
include: O’Connell, International Law I, pp. 123-34; Starke, Studies in International Law, pp.91-100; 
Fawcett, The Law o f Nations (2nd ed., 1971), p.49, 55; Higgins, The Development of International Law 
through the Political Organs of the United Nations (London, pp. 135-6; Akehurst, Modern Introduction 
to Internatonal Law, pp. 60-63; Waldock (1962), 106 Recueil des Cours\ Chen, The International Law 
of Recognition (ed. L.C. Green, London, 1951); Brierly, The Law of Nations, ante, p. 139.
2 Brownlie, Principles o f International Law, supra, p.92 fn; Brownlie, Recognition in Theory and 
Practice, BYBIL : the declaratory view militates in favour o f a legal and objective method of analysing 
situations. Whiteman, 2 Digest o f International Law (Washington, 15 vols. 1903-1973), pp. 604-65; 
Brownlie, International Law and the Use o f Force by States, ante p.380: non-recognition of North
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(3) States created as a result o f illegal use o f force and the 
“TRNC”
It is established principle that territory m ay no t be acquired by the 
illegal use o f force. 28 The entities created during W orld  W ars by illegal 
use o f force w ere regarded as puppets and thus no t independent. The 
puppet S tate situation illustrates the difficulty  in  any consideration o f the 
relation betw een statehood and the illegal use o f  force. E ither the entity 
ow es its existence directly and substantially to the illegal intervention- in  
which case it is unlikely to be independent- or it does not, in  w hich case 
the norm al criteria for statehood w ould presum ably apply.29 
The term  “puppet S tate” is used to describe nom inal sovereigns under 
effective foreign control, especially  in  cases w here the establishm ent o f 
the puppet S tate is intended as a cloak for m anifest illega lity .30 It is 
applicable to tw o E uropean “States” established in  G erm an occupied 
territories. S lovakia was a nom inally  independent part o f C zechoslovakia 
under G erm an protection from  1939 to 1945. C roatia w as also established 
on occupied Y ugoslavian territory at the sam e period. A  U.S. 
International C laim s C om m ission held  that Y ugoslavia w as not, either 
factually or legally, a successor to Croatia:
“At all times during the period of its (Croatia’s) existence as a so-called independent 
State, forces headed by Mihalovic and Tito conducted organized resistance within it. 
At no time was Croatia’s control of its territory and population complete. It was
Korea and of Israel was not regarded as precluding the application of international law rules to the 
Korean and Middde East wars).
28 Whiteman, 5 Digest 874-965
29 Crawford, The Creation o f States in Modern International Law, ante, p. 108. For example, in the 
Manchurian crisis the question whether Manchukuo could have become an independent State 
notwithstanding the illegal Japanese intervention was never really in issue, since the puppet nature of 
the Manchukuo regime was and remained evident (Ibid, p. 107).
30 Ibid. p. 62.
138
created by German and Italian forces and was maintained by force and the threat of 
force, and as soon as the threat subsided Croatia ceased to exist... It appears well 
established that Croatia was during its entire 4-year life subject to the will of Germany 
or Italy. It was not established through any dereliction on the part of the Government 
of Yugoslavia... Croatia is defined by contemporary writers as a ‘puppet state’ or 
‘puppet government’...A  puppet state or local de facto  government such as Croatia 
also possesses characteristics of ‘unsuccessful revolutionists’ and ‘belligerent
*  » 31 occupants .
In  the above m entioned cases the factors considered include that the 
entities w ere established illegally  by the use o f external m ilitary  force, 
and that they d id  not have the support o f the vast m ajority  o f  the 
population  they claim ed to govern.32
It is also necessary in  this context to explore the re la tion  betw een 
self-determ ination and the rules relating to the use o f force. A pparently  
the tw o legal principles are linked. A ccording to A rticle 2 (4) o f  the U.N. 
C harter prohibits the use o f force ‘in  any other m anner inconsistent with 
the Purposes o f the U nited N ations’. O ne o f  these purposes is respect for 
the principle o f equal rights and self-determ ination o f peoples. O n the 
assum ption that legal personality  derives from  the legal righ t to self- 
determ ination o f the entity in  question, it seem s unlikely that the use o f 
force to assert that right should be illega l.33 It is notew orthy tha t the 
D eclaration  on Principles o f International Law  approved by R esolution 
2625 (X X V ) states that ‘every state has the duty to refrain  from  any 
forcib le action w hich deprives peoples referred to in  the elaboration o f 
the principle o f equal rights and self-determ ination o f their righ t to self-
31 Socony Vacuum Oil Claim (1954) 2 1 ILR 55, 58-62.
32 It was not regarded as relevant that certain groups in the territory carried out administrative functions 
if  the elements mentioned were present. In such circumstances, any acts of puppet entity must be 
regarded as void ab initio, except to the extent that they can be regarded as acts of the belligerent 
occupant itself (Crawford, The Creation o f States in Modern International Law, ante, p. 65); with 
regard to the puppet governments in Greece during World War II see Tenekides (1947), 51 Revue 
General de Droit International Public 113-33.
33 Ibid. p. 110.
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determ ination and freedom  and independence’. T he principle o f  self- 
determ ination thus takes priority  over the prohibition  o f the use o f  force 
against the territorial in tegrity  o f a State.
H ow ever, the issue in  the present analysis is w hen an entity is 
created in  v iolation o f an applicable righ t to self-determ ination by 
external illegal force. In such a case, the illegality  o f  the en tity ’s origin is 
confirm ed by the m axim  ex injuria ju s  non oritur. Therefore, some 
particular situations o f m ilitary in tervention in  aid  o f self-determ ination 
have to be hereby discussed. The tw o m ost re levant cases are M anchukuo 
and B angladesh. There are tw o possibilities. It m ay be that the 
effectiveness o f the em ergent entity is in  all situations to be regarded as 
param ount, so that its illegality  o f origin- how ever serious w ill not 
im pede recognition as a State. It m ay be that the illegality  o f origin 
should be regarded as param ount in  accordance w ith  the m axim  ex  injuria  
ju s  non oritur. 34 “M anchukuo” cam e into being after Japan invaded 
M anchuria, a province o f China, in 1934. N ext year Japan  recognized 
“M anchukuo” as an independent State. Its territory w as that o f M anchuria. 
The League o f  N ations dispatched the L ytton  C om m ission to 
“M anchukuo” to find out the fac ts .35 The C om m ission reported  the 
fo llow ing:’
‘In the Government of Manchukuo”, Japanese officials are prominent and Japanese 
advisers are attached to all important Departments. Although the Premier and his 
Ministers are all Chinese, the heads of the various Boards of General Affairs, which, 
in the organization of the new State, exercise the greatest measure of actual power, are 
Japanese. They are doubtless not under the orders of the Tokyo Government, and their 
policy has not always coincided with the official policy of the Japanese Government. 
But in the case of all-important problems, these officials and advisers, some of whom 
were able to act more or less independently in the first days of the new organization,
34 Crawford, The Creation o f States in Modern International Law, ante, p. 114.
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have been constrained more and more to follow the direction of the Japanese official 
authority.’36
A s  C raw ford observes, the Lytton C om m ission’s finding was that 
M anchukuo  was not a genuine and spontaneous independence 
m ovem en t.37 H e goes on to say that given its total lack  o f independence 
th e  question w hether, had it been effectively independent, it w ould have 
b e en  deprived o f  statehood because o f Japanese violations o f the 
C ovenan t and the Paris Pact, did not really  arise.38 In the ligh t o f the 
C om m ission ’s Report, on February 24, 1932, the L eague o f N ations 
A ssem bly  resolved that ‘the sovereignty over M anchuria  belongs to 
C h in a ’.39
Interestingly , the puppet state o f “M anchukuo” situation prom pted the 
S tim son  D octrine o f  N on-recognition. On January 7, 1932, Stim son, the 
U n ited  States Secretary o f State for Foreign A ffairs, sent a note to the 
Japanese  and C hinese G overnm ents, stressing the illegality  o f the 
estab lishm ent o f the “M anchukuo” State.40 The A ssem bly o f  the League 
o f  N ations, using identical phraseology w ith the one em ployed in  the 
S tim son  note, reso lved  that ‘it w as incum bent upon the M em bers o f the 
L eague o f N ations not to  recognize any situation, treaty or agreem ent
35 For an account of the facts, see Harris, Cases and Materials in International Law (London: Sweet 
and Maxwell, 1996), p. 109-110.
36 See Harris, Cases and Materials on International Law, ante, p.109-110. The Commission went on to 
say expressly that ‘this authority, in fact, by reason of the occupation of the country by its troops for the 
maintenance of its authority both internally and externally,... possesses in every contingency the means 
of exercising an irresistible pressure.’
37 Crawford, The Creation o f States in Modern International Law, ante, p. 108. The independence 
movement was only made possible by the presence of Japanese troops and for this reason the present 
regime cannot be considered to have been called into existence by a genuine and spontaneous 
independence movement.
38 Ibid. p. 108.
39 League o f Nations Official Journal, Special Supp. No. 112, p. 75 (1933)
40 Extract from the note, formulating what was to become the Stimson Doctrine read as follows: the 
American Government deems it to be its duty to notify both the Imperial Japanese Government and the 
Government of he Chinese Republic that it cannot admit the legality of any situation de facto...and  that 
it does not intend to recognize any situation, treaty, or agreement which may be brought about by 
means contrary to the covenants and obligations of the Pact of Paris of August 27th, 1928, to which 
treaty both China and Japan, as well as the United States, are parties (Harris, Cases and Materials on 
International Law, supra, p.219).
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w hich m ay be brought about by  m eans contrary to the C ovenant o f the 
League o f N ations, or the Pact o f P aris’.41 This resolution was a strong 
indication that the Stim son D octrine was a landm ark in international law  
and relations.
L et us now  turn to the B angladesh case. Pakistan, until 1971, 
consisted o f E ast and W est Pakistan, w ith India betw een the tw o parts. In 
M arch 1971, E ast Pakistan declared itse lf independent under the nam e o f 
B angladesh. Evidence suggests that India, w hich by the tim e had taken 
into its territory about one m illion refugees from  E ast Pakistan, had 
m ilitarily assisted the insurgents, and Indian troops cam e to close quarters 
with Pakistani ones in  the border area. In D ecem ber Pakistan launched an 
attack against India. O n the declaration o f w ar on both  sides fierce 
conflict com m enced. Eventually  Pakistan surrendered, and B angladesh 
has received recognition including that o f Pakistan since D ecem ber 
1971.42
Clearly, the Indian in tervention was decisive, in the events w hich 
occurred, bringing about the creation o f Bangladesh. There was a lo t o f 
support for independence. A s C raw ford suggests, ‘there can be no doubt 
that Indian in tervention w as the dom inant factor in  the success o f the 
independence m ovem ent’. 43 Yet, B angladesh, despite the Indian 
intervention, was rapidly  and w idely recognized  as a State. The Indian 
intervention was criticized by  m any governm ents as v iolating the U.N. 
Charter, but that illegality  d id  not affect the recognition process.44
41 League of Nations Official Journal, Special Supp. No. 101, pp. 87, 88 (1932).
42 For an extensive account of events surrounding the Bangladesh case, see Harris, Cases and Materials 
on International Law, ante, pp.892-3.
43 Crawford, The Creation of States in Modern International Law, ante, p. 115.
44 On the illegality of the Indian intervention, see Franck and Rodley (1973), 67 American J.I.L 
pp.275-305.
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Thus, the issue w hether E ast Bengal was a self-determ ination unit prior to 
independence is o f im portance,45 because, if  it w ere not, or i f  recognition 
was granted on the basis o f  effective control in d isregard  o f the legality  o f 
the Indian intervention, then there w ould be no legal criterion 
determ ining the creation o f States through external illegal force.
A num ber o f  w riters have supported the view  that E ast Bengal d id  indeed 
have a right to self-determ ination. As noted above, this is not to suggest, 
how ever, that the Indian intervention was a legal act.
The case o f the “Turkish R epublic o f N orthern  C yprus” is different, 
though, from  the one o f B angladesh exam ined above. W here a State 
illegally intervenes and instigates the secession o f part o f a m etropolitan 
State (as the case w ith the “TR N C ” is), o ther states are under the sam e 
duty o f non-recognition as in  the case o f illegal annexation o f  territory.46 
A n entity created  in  v iolation o f the rules relating to  the use o f force in 
such circum stances w ill no t be regarded  as a State. O n the Cyprus issue, 
C raw ford states:
‘The situation in Cyprus after the Turkish intervention in 1974 is illustrative. It is not 
thought that a Turkish State on Cyprus created as a result of the intervention would 
have been recognized or accepted: indeed, despite their support of partition, the 
Turkish government appears to have accepted in practice the formal requirement of a 
unified Cypriot State’.47
It is necessary to explore in  this context the doctrine o f non­
recognition. The m odern law  o f non-recognition m ay be form ulated in  the 
follow ing term s. A n act in  violation o f a norm  having the character o f ju s  
cogens  is illegal and is therefore null and vo id .48 This applies to the
This conclusion is reached by Crawford, ibid. p. 116-117. He also argues that genocide is a clear case 
of abuse of sovereignty, and this factor, together with the territorial and political coherence of East 
Bengal in 1971 probably qualified East Bengal as a self-determination unit.
46 See Crawford, The Creation o f States in Modern International Law, ante, p. 118.
47 Ibid. p. 118 fn; also see A.V.W. Thomas and A.J. Thomas (1975), 29 Southwestern Law Journal 513- 
46, 526-7.
48 See Dugard, Recognition and the United Nations (Cambridge University Press, Grotius Publications)
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creation o f States, the acquisition o f territory and other situations. States 
are under a duty no t to recognize such acts.49
T he object o f the policy or the obligation o f non-recognition is not to 
render illegal an otherw ise law ful and valid  act; its object is to prevent the 
validation o f w hat is a legal nullity .50 The jurisprudential basis o f the 
principle o f non-recognition is the fundam ental m axim  ex injuria ju s  non  
oritur , a “general principle o f law  recognized by civilized nations” .51 A n 
illegality  cannot, as a rule, becom e a source o f legal right to the 
w rongdoer. The principle o f  ex injuria ju s  non oritur  provides a sound 
basis for the duty o f non-recognition, particularly  w here the illegality  has 
been  confirm ed by the political organs o f the U nited N ations. In the 1971 
N am ibia  Opinion  the International C ourt o f Justice stated:
“A binding determination made by a competent organ of the United Nations to the 
effect that a situation is illegal cannot remain without consequence. Once the Court 
faced with such a situation, it would be failing in the discharge of its judicial functions
if it did not declare that there is an obligation, especially upon members of the United
53Nations, to bring that situation to an end”.
Jus cogens is a central feature o f the m odem  doctrine o f non-recognition 
since violation o f a ju s  cogens norm  is a prerequisite for the illegality  that 
resu lts in  non-recognition. Thus, b rief consideration o f the doctrine o f ju s  
cogens  is im perative. Jus cogens has its roots in  the N atural Law  doctrine 
o f  international law, and was revived by the International Law  
C om m ission for the purpose o f the C onvention on  the Law  o f Treaties. In
49 This formulation substantially accords with that of the 1981 Draft of the American Law Institute’s 
Restatement of Foreign Relations Law of the United States which provides that “A State is required not 
to recognize or treat as a State an entity that has attained the qualifications of statehood in violation of 
international law”(Tenatative Draft No. 2, pp.3,8).
50 Lauterpacht, Recognition in International Law, ante, p. 413.
51 Statute of the International Court of Justice, Article 38 (3).
52 Lauterpacht, Recognition in International Law, supra, p.420; also see Corpus Juris Civilis, Digest 
50.17.134.i: “ Nemo ex suo delicto meliorem suam conditionem facere potest”; but, illegality may, if 
the rigid conditions of lapse of time and of other requirements have been complied with, crystallize into 
a legal right as the result of the operation of prescription (acquisitive prescription): H. Lauterpacht, 
Recognition in International Law, supra, p.
53 1971 I.C.J. Reports 16, 54.
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1953, in  his R eport to the International L aw  Com m ission, S ir H ersch 
Lauterpacht raised the notion o f ju s  cogens w hen he proposed  that the 
C onvention include a provision that a “treaty is void  if  its perform ance 
involves an act w hich is illegal under in ternational law  and if  it is 
declared so to be by the International C ourt o f Justice.54 A rticle 53 o f the 
V ienna C onvention on the Law  o f Treaties gives the final fo rm  to the 
deliberations o f the C om m ission on ju s  cogens.55 W riters have form ulated 
the principle o f ju s  cogens in a w ay that does not confine it to the 
invalidity  o f treaties. V erdross, a m em ber o f the In ternational L aw  
Com m ission, wrote:
“In the field of general international law there are rules having the character of jus  
cogens. The criterion for these rules consists in the fact that they do not exist to satisfy 
the needs of individual States but the higher interest of the whole international 
community. Hence these rules are absolute”.56
D ugard, regards that the prohibition o f the use o f  force as enshrined in  
A rticle 2(4) o f the U .N  C harter provides an exam ple o f a ju s  cogens rule. 
H e goes on to argue that the “TR N C ” has been created by the illegal use 
o f force, and therefore it bears no legal validity .57
54 Lauterpacht stated: “It would thus appear that the test whether the object of the treaty is illegal and 
whether the treaty is void for that reason is not inconsistency with customary international law pure and 
simple, but inconsistency with such overriding principles of international law which may be regarded 
as constituting principles of international public policy” (1953 I.L.C. Yearbook II 154-156); also see Sir 
Gerald Fitzmaurice, Third Report on the Law of Treaties, 1958 I.LC. Yearbook II 40; Sir Humphrey 
Waldock, Second Report on the Law of Treaties 1963 I.L.C. Yearbook II52-53.
55 “For the purposes of the present Convention, a peremptory norm of general international law is a 
norm accepted and recognized by the international community as a whole as a norm from which no 
derogation is permitted...”; see further Rosenne, The Law of Treaties: A Guide to the Legislative 
History o f the Vienna Convention o f the Vienna Convention (1970) 290-293.
56 Jus Dispositivum ans Jus Cogens in International Law (1966) 60 American J.l.L. 55,58; also see 
Conference on International Law, Lagonissi, April 3-8, 1966, Papers and Proceedings: The Concept of 
Jus Cogens in International Law (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace); dictum in the 
Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company Case, 19701.C.J. Reports 3, 32.
57 Recognition and the United Nations, ante, p. 110. For the relevant complexities of the Palestinian 
Question, see Elihu Lauterpacht, Jerusalem and the Holy Places, Anglo-Israel Association, Pamphlet 
No. 19 (1968); Melinda Crane “Middle East: Status of Jerusalem” (1980) 21 Harvard International 
Law Journal p. 784; the offer to the Palestinians by Barak at Camp David during July-December 2000, 
could, I submit, provide a framework for a just and viable settlement of the issue: 96 percent of the
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(4) Classic Criteria fo r  Statehood58 and the “TRNC”
A rticle 1 o f the M ontevideo C onvention 1933 form ulates the criteria for 
statehood:
‘The State as a person of international law should possess the following 
qualifications: (a) a permanent population; (b) a defined territory; (c) government; and 
(d) capacity to enter into relations with other States’.59
These criteria are based on the principle o f effectiveness. A lso, they 
correspond to the declaratory  theory o f recognition  and are seen as 
objective criteria for statehood. It is now  im perative to explore them  w ith 
reference to the ‘Turkish R epublic o f N orthern C yprus’.
4.1 Defined Territory
‘Territorial sovereignty involves the exclusive righ t to display  the 
activities o f a S tate’.60 A  State m ust possess som e territory. H ow ever, no 
rule exists requiring a m inim um  area o f  the territory .61 A  new  State m ay 
be in  existence in  spite o f claim s to its territory. T hree situations m ay be 
envisaged: a claim  relating to the entire territory o f the new  State, one 
relating to the boundaries o f  the State, the tw o claim s going side by  side.
The case o f Israel is an illustration o f the third situation. Israel was 
adm itted to the U nited N ations on 11 M ay 1949.62 It is  interesting to note 
w hat Jessup argued for Israel’s adm ission:
‘One does not find in the general classic treatment of this subject any insistence that 
the territory of a State must be exactly fixed by definite frontiers...The formulae in 
the classic treatises somewhat vary, but both reason and history demonstrate that the 
concept of territory does not necessarily include precise delimitation of the boundaries
West Bank, 100 percent of the Gaza Strip, a sovereign Palestinian State, an end to the occupation, the 
uprooting of most of the settlements, and sovereignty over Arab East Jerusalem
5 On Criteria see Higgins, The Development o f International Law through the Political Organs o f the 
United Nations, ante, p. 11-57, Brownlie, Principles o f Public International Law, ante, pp. 74-82, 
Lauterpacht, Recognition in International Law, ante, pp.26-32, Whiteman, I Digest o f International 
Law, ante,221, Akehurst, Modern Introduction to Intenational Law (7th ed. Routledge, 1997), pp. 77-81.
59 165 League o f Nations Treaty Series 19.
60 Island of Palmas Case (1928) I Reports o f International Arbitral Awards, per  Judge Huber.
61 Thus, States may cover only a small area. Monaco’s area, for example, is 1.5 square kilometres, and 
the Vatican’s 0.4 km.
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of that territory. The reason for the rule that one of the necessary attributes of a State 
is that it shall possess territory is that one cannot contemplate a State as a kind of 
disembodied spirit...There must be some portion of the earth’s surface which its 
people inhabit and over which its Government exercises authority. No one can deny 
that the State of Israel responds to this requirement’.
The International C ourt o f Justice has confirm ed the rule:
‘The appurtenance o f a given area, considered as an entity, in  no w ay 
governs the precise delim itation o f its boundaries... There is for instance 
no rule that the land frontiers o f a State m ust be fully delim ited and 
defined, and often in  various places and for long periods they are not, as 
is shown by the case o f the entry o f A lbania into the L eague o f 
N ations’.63
H iggins, how ever, states that ‘w hen the doubts as to the future frontiers 
are o f a serious nature, statehood becom es in  doubt. Thus w hen in  1919 
Estonia and L atv ia w ere recognized by  the A llied  Pow ers, no recognition 
was granted to L ithuania on the express ground that its frontiers w ere not 
yet fixed’.64 C raw ford, on the other hand, objects to the above view  and 
the specific exam ple o f L ithuania.65 It seem s that a territorial dispute is 
not enough to bring statehood into question. The only requirem ent is that 
the State m ust consist o f a certain  coherent territory effectively  govem ed- 
w hich dem onstrates that the requirem ent o f territory is ra ther a 
constituent o f governm ent.66
In the case o f the ‘Turkish Republic o f N orthern C yprus’, there was no 
already existing territory the aboriginal population o f w hich undertook to 
govern. In  fact the territory claim ed by the ‘T R N C ’ is the very  one which
62 G.A. Assembly Res. 273 (IE) (37-12:9); S.C. Res. 70 (9-1 (Egypt): 1 (U.K.)).
631.C.J. Reports, 1969 p.3,32.
64 Higgins, The Development of International Law through the Political Organs o f the United Nations, 
ante, p.20 fn
65 Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law, ante, p.39: It is true that de jure recognition 
of Lithuania by the Allies was refused, but this action appears to have been politically motivated.
66 Ibid. p.40.
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w as m ilitarily  occupied during the Turkish arm ed in tervention o f 1974. 
A s already shown, the territory o f the ‘T R N C ’ w as acquired by  the illegal 
use o f  force, therefore it cannot qualify  as legal criterion for statehood. It 
should also be noted that Turkish Cypriots and G reek C ypriots coexisted, 
w ith the exception o f the 1963 and 1967 hostilities, quite peacefully, 
scattered  over the w hole territory o f the Cyprus Republic. The Turkish 
C ypriots w ere not living in a separate area exclusively  o f their own. A part 
from  that, governm ental control o f this territory is in the hands o f a 
belligeren t occupant. A s a result, the independence criterion for statehood 
to  be explored below  m ay not be m et by the alleged territory  o f the 
‘T R N C ’.
4.2 Permanent Population
A  perm anent population is necessary for statehood. States are required to 
have a perm anent population .67 The view  has been stated that persons 
hab itually  resident in  the territory o f the new  State autom atically  acquire 
the nationality  o f  that State, for all in ternational purposes, and lose their
/ J O
form er nationality. The better view  seem s to m e to be the one put 
forw ard  by  O ’Connell:
‘A lthough inhabitants o f territory ceded or seceding from  the C row n lose 
their B ritish nationality, it does not follow  that they acquire either 
autom atically  or by subm ission that o f the successor State. The latter m ay 
w ithhold  the granting o f its nationality  to all portions o f  the persons 
co n ce rn ed ...it cannot be asserted w ith any m easure o f confidence that 
in ternational law, at least in its present form  o f  developm ent, im poses any 
duty  on the successor State to grant nationality’69.
W ith  regard  to  the ‘T R N C ’, the grant to  the Turkish  Cypriots o f 
citizenship  o f the  declared State should be seen as unlaw ful, once again
67 See Crawford, The Creation o f States in International Law, ante, p.40.
68 Ibid. p.41; Brownlie, (1963) British YB.l.L. pp.284-364, 320.
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taking into account that the entity in  question is the product o f an illegal 
m ilitary intervention and, therefore, its actions have no legal validity. 
Secondly, in  1974, the perm anent population (c.200,000) o f the presently  
occupied part o f  the R epublic territory w ere forced to abandon their 
hom eland, bu t nevertheless have since never given up dem anding that 
their properties be returned  to their law ful ow ners. Thirdly, m ost o f the 
inhabitants o f the territory claim ed by the ‘T R N C ’ are settlers illegally  
brought from  m ainland Turkey; it is notew orthy that the overw helm ing 
m ajority  o f Turkish  C ypriots have m igrated and been dispersed to  various 
parts o f the world, because o f alleged inhum ane treatm ent tow ards them  
on part o f the belligerent occupant’s regim e.
4.3 Government
‘G overnm ent or effective governm ent’ is obviously a basis for the other 
central requirem ent o f  independence. 70 C raw ford observes that 
international law  defines territory not by  adopting private law  analogies 
o f real property, but by  reference to the extent o f governm ental pow er 
exercised, w ith respect to  som e area and population.71 The O pinion o f the 
C om m ission o f Jurists appointed by  the League o f N ations to report on 
aspects o f the A aland Islands dispute states accurately the requirem ent o f 
governm ent:
‘...Political and social life was disorganized; the authorities were not strong enough to 
assert themselves...the Government had been chased from the capital and forcibly 
prevented from carrying out its duties; the armed camps and the police were divided 
into opposing forces, and Russian troops, and after a time Germans also took part in 
the civil war. It is therefore difficult to say at what exact date the Finnish Republic, in 
the legal sense of the term, actually became a definitely constituted sovereign State.
69 O’Connell, State Succession in International and Municipal Lawl, pp . 503
70 Nationallity (Secession of Austria) Case 2 1 JLR 175 (1954);
71 Crawford, The Creation o f States in Modern International Law, ante, p.42.
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This certainly did not take place until a stable political organization had been created, 
and until the public authorities had become strong enough to assert themselves 
throughout the territories of the State without the assistance of foreign troops. It 
would appear that it was in May 1918, that the civil war was ended and that the 
foreign troops began to leave the country, so that from that time onwards it was 
possible to re-establish order and normal political and social life, little by little’.72 
As regards the TRN C, its governm ent is the product o f illegality , since 
the ‘T R N C ’ itse lf is the resu lt o f the illegal use o f arm ed force. A lso, the 
adm inistration o f the entity  largely  depends upon financial and m ilitary 
assistance provided by Turkey. In  effect, it is no t a stable political 
organization.
4.4 Independence
This is a basic criterion o f statehood. In  the Island  o f  Palm as  Case, it was 
held:
‘Sovereignty in the relations between States signifies independence. Independence in 
regard to a portion of the globe is the right to exercise therein, to the exclusion of any 
other State, the functions of a State. The development of national organization of 
States during the last few centuries, and, as a corollary, the development of 
international law, have established this principle of the exclusive competence of the
State in regard to its own territory in such a way as to make it the point of departure in
73settling most questions that concern international relations’.
A bsence o f independence m ay render an entity  an inseparable part o f a 
dom inant colonial State, in  w hich case the form er m ay better be classified 
as protectorate. On the o ther hand, in  the case o f ‘puppet S tates’ 
independence is legally invalid. In the Austro-G erm an Custom s Union 
Case,74 the term  independence was explored. The C ourt gave advice as to
72 League o f Nations Official Journal Special Supp. No. 4 (1920), 8-9.
73 Netherlands v. U.S. (1928) 2 Reports o f International Arbitral Awards, 829, 838 (per Judge Huber)
74 Permanent Court o f International Justice Reports, Series A/B No. 41 (1931).
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w hether a custom s union betw een A ustria and G erm any w ould  be 
consistent w ith obligations undertaken by A ustria according to the Treaty 
o f Saint-G erm ain.75 B y eight votes to seven, it was held  that the union at 
issue was illegal. A lthough it was agreed by  the m ajority tha t the 
independence o f A ustria was not strictly threatened w ithin the m eaning o f 
A rticle  88, the C ourt w as o f O pinion that the proposed union was a 
special regim e calculated to threaten in d ep en d en ce .76 The case, how ever, 
has been  fiercely c ritic ised .77 The m ajority  O pinion w ent on  to  put 
fo rw ard  a definition o f independence in  the particular circum stances o f 
A ustria; thus, an independent State is a separate State w ith the sole right 
o f decision in  all m atters econom ic, p o litica l...these  d ifferent aspects o f 
independence being in  practice one and indivisible. 78 Judge A nzilotti 
gave a m ore satisfactory definition and need be cited:
‘Independence as thus understood is really no more than the normal condition of 
States according to international law; it may also be described as sovereignty 
(suprema potestas), or external sovereignty, by which is meant that the State has over 
it no other authority than that of international law... ’ ,79
(5) Self-determination and the “TRNC”
The issue w hether there exists a right o f self-determ ination has been a 
subject o f great debate. D ebatable is also the issue w hether self­
75 Article 88 of the Treaty of St.-Germain ,1919 provided that ‘Austria’s independence was inalienable 
except with the consent of the League Council: Austria undertook to abstain from any act which might 
directly or indirectly or by any means whatever compromise her independence by participation in the 
affairs of another Power’: for details, see Crawford , The Creation o f States in International Law, ante, 
p. 49fn. 89.
6 See Opinion of Judge Anzilotti, P.C.I.J. Reports, supra, p.64.
77 Morgenthau, Politics among Nations (5th edn., 1973)p. 426; Brierly, The Basis o f Obligation in 
International Law and Other Papers (ed. H. Lauterpacht and C.H.M. Waldock, Oxford, 1963), p.242-9, 
H.Lauterpacht, Development of International Law by the International Court (London, 1958), pp.47-49
78 Crawford is sceptic as to whether this definition is most appropriate: ‘as a general definition of 
independence as the criterion of statehood it is much too absolute’ (The Creation o f  States in Modern 
International Law, ante, p.51).
79 He further stated the following: ‘...It also follows that the restrictions upon a State’s liberty, whether 
arising out of ordinary international law or contractual engagements, do not as such in the least affect 
its independence. As long as these restrictions do not place the State under the legal authority of
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determ ination is a legal righ t or a political p rin c ip le .80 H ere, it is 
subm itted that there is a righ t to self-determ ination, w hich is a 
fundam ental criterion for statehood. It is useful in  this regard  to explore 
the principle as it stood before 1945 and in the U.N. C harter context.
Self -D eterm ination  w as raised in  the A aland  Islands  Case. The islands 
population dem onstrated their w ish to form  part o f Sw eden instead o f 
Finland, w hen the latter was becom ing independent from  the R ussian 
Em pire. A n International C om m ission o f Jurists was appointed by  the 
C om m ission to exam ine the affair. In the opinion o f the C om m ission, 
F inland was not a new ly established State and has alw ays em braced the 
A aland Islands. N o room  w as left for applicability o f  the self- 
determ ination principle. The Jurists reported the following:
‘The principle is not, properly speaking a rule of international law and the League of 
Nations has not entered it in its Covenant. This is also the Opinion of the International 
Commission of Jurists... To concede to minorities, either of language or religion, or 
to any fraction of the population the right of withdrawing from the community to 
which they belong, because it is their wish or their good pleasure, would be to destroy 
order and stability within States and to inaugurate anarchy in international life; it 
would be to uphold a theory incompatible with the very idea of State as a territorial 
and political unity. The separation of a minority from the State of which it forms a 
part and its incorporation in another State can only be considered as an altogether
exceptional solution, a last resort when the State lacks either the will or the power to
81enact and apply just and effective guarantees’.
another State, the former remains an independent State however extensive and burdensome those 
obligations may be'(Permanent Court o f International Justice Reports, ante, p. 57-58).
80 Suffice it here to quote Crawford, ‘it is an overtly political principle’ (The Creation o f States in 
Modern International Law, ante, p.85); Brownlie has combined the phrases ‘legal right’ and ‘political 
principle’ to conclude that self-determination is at present a ‘legal principle’ (Principles o f Public 
International Law, ante, p. 577).
81 Report of the Committee of Rapporteurs, League o f Nations Official Journal Special Supp. No. 3 
(Oct. 1920) 22-3.
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A lthough the legal principle was not accepted in this case, it  should be 
noted  tha t even now adays it is  m ost doubtful w hether in ternational law  
w ould accom m odate the principle in a situation like the A aland Islands.82
T he U.N. C harter on  the other hand, clearly  refers to self- 
determ ination. A ccording to A rticle 1(2), one o f the purposes o f the 
U nited  N ations is the developm ent o f friendly  relations am ong nations 
based  on  respect for the principle o f equal rights and self-determ ination 
o f peop les.83 G eneral A ssem bly resolutions define m ore accurately the 
content o f  the principle. The Colonial D eclaration  (clause 2) stated that 
‘all peoples have the right to self-determ ination; by  virtue o f  that right 
they freely  determ ine their political status and freely  pursue their 
econom ic, social and cultural developm ent.84 R esolution 2160 (XXI) 
stated:
‘Any forcible action, direct or indirect, which deprives peoples under foreign 
domination of their right to self-determination and independence and of their right to 
determine freely their political status and pursue their economic, social and cultural 
development constitutes a violation of the Charter of the United Nations... \ 85 
Further, R esolution 2625 {D eclaration on Principles o f  Friendly  
R elations betw een States) reads:
‘By virtue of the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples enshrined 
in the Charter...all peoples have the right freely to determine, without external 
interference, their political and to pursue their economic, social ,and cultural 
development, and every State has the duty to respect this right in accordance with the 
provisions of the Charter’.
82 Crawford, The Creation o f States in International Law, supra, p. 86. Crawford also observes that the 
Commission of Jurists stated that Finland was a ‘people’ whereas the population of the Aaland Islands 
was not; therefore the secession of Finland from the Russian Empire was justified. He goes on to say 
that this may not be the principle of self-determination, but it is certainly like it (The Creation of States 
in International Law, supra, 87).
83 See also U.N. Charter, Art. 55.
84 G.A. Res. 1514 (XV), 14 Dec. 1960. (89-0:9),Declaration of the Granting of Independence to 
Colonial Countries. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, proclaimed by the United 
Nations General Assembly, has adopted, in article 1(1), clause 2 of the Colonial Declaration.
85 3Nov. 1966 (98-2:8).
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I t should be m entioned, though, that the resolutions only  have 
recom m endatory  capability, as the G eneral A ssem bly has no law -m aking 
capacity . Focussing on the C harter provisions on the principle, tw o 
conclusions m ay be drawn: first, self-determ ination m ay be the right o f 
the  State to choose its ow n form  o f governm ent w ithout intervention, and 
second that self-determ ination could m ean the righ t o f a people  to  choose 
its ow n governm ental system  (internal).86 The form er is surely accepted 
b y  in ternational law.
It is useful to go through the relevant case law  o f the In ternational C ourt 
o f  Justice. In the N am ibia  A dvisory O pinion , the IC J held:
‘...the subsequent development of international law in regard to non-self-governing 
territories, as enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations, made the principle of 
self-determination applicable to all of them... All those which did not acquire 
independence, remain under United Nations tutelage. This is but a manifestation of
o<7
the general development of which has led to the birth of so many new States’.
The above extract was cited by  the C ourt in  the W estern Sahara C ase . In 
tha t case the right o f the people o f W estern  Sahara to determ ine their 
political organization w as stated em phatically .88 In the O pinion o f Judge 
D illard  it was pronounced:
‘...a  norm of international law has emerged applicable to the decolonization of those
non-self-governing territories which are under the aegis of the United Nations...It is
89for the people to determine the destiny of the territory.
T he self-determ ination principle also receives im portant academ ic 
support.90 H ow ever, som e objection has been raised against the principle, 
no tab ly  by  Sir Ivor Jennings: ‘On the surface it seems reasonable: let the 
people decide. It is in  fact ridiculous because the people cannot decide
86 Crawford, The Creation o f States in International Law, ante, p.90.
871.C.J. Reports 1971 p.6, 31.
881.C.J. Reports 1975 p. 12, 31.
89 I.C.J. Reports 1975 p. 12, 121-2.
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until som ebody decides w ho are the peop le’.91 C raw ford gives an answ er 
by saying that in  fact certain  rules enable us to identify  w ith reasonable 
precision the units to w hich self-determ ination applies.92
A part from  IC J case law, it is necessary briefly  to  explore the state 
practice on the relation betw een the principle o f self-determ ination and 
statehood, especially  the case o f Rhodesia.
D espite the U nilateral D eclaration o f Independence o f R hodesia in  1965, 
no State has recognized it as independent. The Security C ouncil and 
G eneral A ssem bly resolved ‘to call upon all States not to recognize this 
illegal racist m inority regim e in  Southern R hodesia’.93 A nother Security  
C ouncil R esolution confirm ed that the independence declaration had no 
legal validity  and spoke o f the Sm ith adm inistration as an illegal 
authority.94 In these circum stances, the self-determ ination principle 
prevented the creation o f  a State, even though the entity in question was 
adm inistered by an effective governm ent. Faw cett sum m arized the 
position in  this way:
‘to the traditional criteria for the recognition of a regime as a new State must now be 
added the requirement that it shall not be based upon a systematic denial in its 
territory of certain civil and political rights, including in particular the right of every 
citizen to participate in the government of his country... This principle was affirmed 
in the case of Rhodesia by the virtually unanimous condemnation of the unilateral 
declaration of independence by the world community, and by the universal 
withholding of recognition of the new regime which was a consequence. It would 
follow that the illegality of the rebellion was not an obstacle to the establishment of 
Rhodesia as an independent State, but the political basis and objectives of the regime 
were, and that the declaration of independence was without international effect’.
90 See e.g. Higgins, The Development o f International Law through the Political Organs o f the United 
Nations, ante, pp. 90-106; Brownlie, Principles o f Public International Law, ante, pp. 575-8; Akehurst, 
Modern Introduction to International Law, ante, pp. 281-4.
911. Jennings, The Approach to Self-Government (1956), p. 56.
92 The Creation o f States in International Law, ante, p.99.
93 S.C Res. 216 (1965), 12 Nov. 1965(10-0:1), para. 2.
94 S.C Res. 217 (1965) (10-0:1) para. 3.
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5.1 Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot arguments on Self- 
Determination
The Turkish position is that the righ t o f self-determ ination w as exercised 
in  1960 jo in tly  by the tw o com m unities w hich w ere recognized  as co­
founders o f the bi-com m unal Republic o f C yprus.95 This argum ent stem s 
from  the fact that independence was not granted as a m ere unilateral act 
on  the part o f the U nited  K ingdom , but w as the consequence o f the 
conclusion o f a num ber o f Treaties betw een C yprus, the U nited  K ingdom , 
Turkey and G reece 96 The representatives o f the tw o com m unities signed 
the relevant docum ents so that sovereignty derived  from  both  o f the 
com m unities conjointly, irrespective o f their num erical size. A s corollary 
o f this, the w ords ‘com m unities’ and ‘peoples’ are synonym ous.97 It is 
notew orthy that Lennox-B oyd, B ritish C olonial Secretary in  1956, stated: 
‘it will be the purpose of Her Majesty’s Government to ensure that any exercise of 
self-determination should be effected in such a manner that the Turkish Cypriot 
community, shall, in the special circumstances of Cyprus, be given freedom to decide 
for themselves their future status. In other words, Her Majesty’s Government
recognize that the exercise of self-determination in such a mixed population must
98  •include partition among the eventual options’. This, as w ell as the rest o f the 
argum ents o f the Turkish Cypriot com m unity are based on a Legal 
O pinion given by  Professor Sir E lihu Lauterpacht Q .C .99 In Part I o f  the 
docum ent, entitled  The Status o f  the C ypriot Com m unities in the Context
95 S/PV 2498 of 17 Nov. 1983, p. 27: speech of the then Permanent Representative of Turkey to the 
U.N., before the Security Council
96 Necatigil, Cyprus and the Turkish Position in International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1993), p. 222.
97 Ibid. p.222
98 H.C. Debates, Hansard, 19 Dec. 1956. This is, however, a political statement which, it is submitted, 
does not necessarily reflect the most appropriate way in which the legal principle of self-determination 
should be applied to the Cyprus case.
99 See E. Lauterpacht, The Turkish Republic o f Northern Cyprus- The Status o f the two Communities in 
Cyprus, 10 July 1990 (http://www.cypnet.eom/.ncvprus/cvproblem/) : the Opinion may also be found in 
the book of Munir Ertecun, former judge of the Supreme Constitutional Court of the Republic of
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the Settlem ent o f  the Cyprus Question sta ted  Lauterpacht states that ‘the 
tw o parties are separate com m unities o f equal standing in the negotiations, 
each exercising its righ t to determ ine its ow n future and neither being 
subordinate to the o ther’. H e states that the M em orandum  setting out the 
A greed Final Settlem ent o f the Problem  o f Cyprus, signed in  L ondon on 
19 February 1959, took note o f the D eclaration by the R epresentative o f 
the G reek C ypriot com m unity and the R epresentative o f the Turkish 
C ypriot com m unity that they accept the docum ents annexed to  the 
M em orandum  as the agreed foundation for the final settlem ent o f  the 
problem  o f Cyprus. Lauterpacht also quotes provisions o f the Z urich  
A ccords, inter alia  paragraph one100-w hich was to becom e A rticle  1 o f 
the
Constitution- to conclude that no statem ent w as contained o f any superior 
constitutional status for the G reek C ypriot com m unity. H e further says 
that the ‘B asic structure’ or fundam ental elem ents o f the Cyprus 
Constitution w ere internationalized by treaties (T reaties o f E stablishm ent 
and G uarantee) contem poraneously concluded betw een Cyprus, G reece, 
Turkey and the U nited K ingdom .101
A nother argum ent put forw ard by  the Turkish C ypriots is that the 
G reek C ypriot com m unity has violently  prevented the T urkish  C ypriot 
com m unity from  playing its ro le  in  the Cyprus G overnm ent.102 T hat the 
G reek C ypriots instigated the 1963 intercom m unal strife and had  in  m ind 
union w ith G reece.103 It is also alleged that the G reek C ypriot H ouse o f
Cyprus and Zaim Necatigil, The Right o f  the Turkish Cypriot People to Self-Determination (TRNC’s 
P.I.O., 199), Appendix I, p.31.
100 gtate 0f Cyprus win shall be Republic with a presidential regime, the President being Greek 
and the Vice-President Turkish elected by universal suffrage by the Greek and Turkish communities of 
the Island respectively”.
101 E. Lauterpacht, Opinion, Ibid. p.3: “thus essential ingredient of the coming into being of the 
Republic of Cyprus was the balanced and guaranteed participation of both communities, Turkish no 
less than Greek in every basic aspect of the Government of Cyprus”.
102 Necatigil, The Turkish Position in International Law, ante, p. 223.
103 Ibid. p. 223.
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R epresentatives has enacted law s w hich changed the basic articles o f the 
C onstitution, and provided for the illegal operation o f the organs o f 
governm ent by  excluding the Turkish C ypriot participation .104
A  further argum ent is that, according to U .N . docum ents, the 
constitu tional negotiations on  Cyprus should be conducted on the basis o f 
equality. The G eneral A ssem bly resolution 33/15 o f  N ovem ber 9 1978, 
c ited  by N ecatig il,105 calls for resum ption o f the negotiations under the 
auspices o f the Secretary-G eneral between the two com m unities  and for 
these to  be conducted freely on an equal fo o tin g .106 In  his opening 
statem ent o f the in ter-com m unal negotiations on 29 June 1989, the 
Secretary-G eneral m ade reference to the principle o f equality  o f  the tw o 
com m unities and the bi-com m unal nature o f the federation (agreed in 
1977 by  M akarios and D enktash as fram ew ork for settlem ent o f the 
C yprus issue) that are to be ‘reflected  in  the equal ro le  o f the two 
com m unities in  the establishm ent o f the federation, in  the need for their 
jo in t approval in adopting the constitution and in  the equality and 
identical pow ers o f the tw o federated states’.107 In 1990, the Secretary- 
G eneral also said that the sought solution m ust be acceptable to both  
com m unities , w hose participation in  the process is on an equal fo o tin g  
and w hose relationship is not one o f m ajority and m inority .108
It is also w orth m entioning a Turkish C ypriot position by  w hich the 
unilateral declaration o f independence by  the ‘T R N C ’ does not purport to 
be a final political solution o f the C yprus p rob lem .109 It even aims at
104 Ibid. p. 224.
105 Ibid. p. 229.
106 Emphasis supplied.
107 S/21183, p.7; E.Lauterpacht, Opinion, Ibid., pp.6-7.
108 (emphasis added); the U.S. policy on the question of self-determination was stated by Ambassador 
Nelson Ledsky, the White House Coordinator for Cyprus in 1990: ‘our view is that neither community 
has the right of self-determination if by that one means the right to choose whatever political future that 
entity wishes to have. Each has the right of political equality with the other, the right to set its 
relationship with the other inside a federation, inside a single State of Cyprus’.
109 Necatigil, The Turkish Position in International Law, ante, p. 227.
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facilitating the establishm ent o f a federal republic o f C yprus on the basis 
o f equality and double-sovereignty. The Turkish C ypriot poin t o f  v iew  is 
that a federation can be form ed by  the voluntary w ill o f tw o equal self- 
governing u n its . . . 110
In sum, the m ost im portant Turkish C ypriot argum ents are (a) the 
right o f self-determ ination was exercised by  the tw o com m unities, or 
‘peop les’, jo in tly  in  1960, as co-founders o f the Cyprus Republic, and (b) 
from  D ecem ber 1963 onw ards, the governm ent o f  Cyprus was replaced 
by tw o exclusive adm inistrations, the G reek C ypriots having attem pted to 
deny the right o f the Turkish Cypriots to participate in  governm ent.
(c) A ccording to U.N. form al papers it is for the tw o com m unities to 
reach a settlem ent o f the Cyprus issue on the basis o f equality.
A t the very beginning, it should not be overlooked that the phraseology 
em ployed in  U.N. docum ents, nam ely tha t the com m unities m ust 
participate in the process o f dispute settlem ent on an equal fo o tin g , was 
m ost unfortunate.
If  by (political) equality  is m eant that the Turkish C ypriots could choose 
the form  o f governm ent they w ould w ish to enjoy or that they, in  spite o f 
their num erical inferiority-to  say the least, should be equally  represented 
at the level o f central governm ent, i.e. to the sam e extent as the G reek 
Cypriots, that is a very am bitious assertion, evidently far from  law ful. If, 
o f course, by that one m eans that the hum an rights o f the Turkish 
Cypriots should be safeguarded, in  the sense that the Turkish  C ypriots as 
m uch as the G reek C ypriots should be granted the equal pro tection  o f  the 
laws in  a given governm ental system, then I w ould be a m ost fervent 
proponent o f such a legal proposition.
110 Ibid. p. 228. It seems, however, that Necatigil contradicts himself on this occasion. Having 
expressed the aforementioned view, he goes on to say: ‘but supposing for a moment that a federal 
solution for Cyprus, which is now being negotiated, does not work, why should the right of Turkish
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Looking now  at one o f the m ain argum ents o f the Turkish  Cypriots, 
that the 1963 hostilities, allegedly stirred up by the G reek  Cypriots, 
ju s tified  the w ithdraw al o f the Turkish C ypriot parliam entarians (and 
la ter the UDI), it is necessary to refer in  this regard  to the doctrine o f 
necessity . The constitutional order o f the Cyprus R epublic was 
m ain tained  by reference to the doctrine o f necessity .111 T he doctrine was
in troduced through the case o f Attorney G eneral o f  the Republic  v.
1 1 0
M usta fa  Ibrahim. The case evolved around the constitutionality  o f Law  
33 o f  1964 w hich m erged the Suprem e C onstitutional C ourt w ith the 
H igh  Court. It was alleged that this law  was not enacted according to the 
1960 C onstitution. The A ttorney-G eneral argued that its passing was 
p rem ised  upon the doctrine o f necessity. The doctrine o f necessity  was 
the vehicle w hich preserved the political continuity  o f  the R epublic and 
the valid ity  o f the C onstitution after the 1963-64 in ter-com m unal fighting. 
S ince 1964, a series o f law s have been passed based  on the doctrine. It 
has to  be  noted that these law s m eet som e com m on requirem ents, nam ely: 
the existence o f an em ergency or exceptional circum stances w hich cannot 
be tackled under the C onstitution, the necessity  cannot possibly be 
tackled, the m easures have to be proportionate to the necessity, and the 
m easures have to be tem porary, depending on the duration o f the 
exceptional circum stances.
W ith  regard to the first, and, m ost im portant argum ent articulated 
by  the Turkish C ypriot com m unity, nam ely that the T urkish  Cypriots 
constitu te  a ‘peop le’ and are entitled to the right o f self-determ ination, 
and therefore to the establishm ent o f an independent State, certain vital
Cypriots or Greek Cypriots to secede from that federation, and try to transpose it into a looser form of 
association be prevented?’ (The Turkish Position in International Law, supra, pp. 231-2).
111 The principle was formulated by Cicero in this way: salus populi, suprema lex. It reflects the theory 
of parliamentary supremacy. Also see Dicey, An Introduction to the Study o f the Law o f the 
Constitution, 10th ed. Pp.411-414; Criton Tomaritis, The Principle o f Necessity and the Cypriot Legal 
System (Nicosia, 1978).
1 2 (1964) 1 Cyprus Law Reports pp. 195
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considerations need be m ade. It seems, prim a facie, that the Turkish 
C ypriots form  a m inority  ra ther than ‘peop le’. Peoples and m inorities 
have been defined113as tw o distinct concepts, because only peoples are 
entitled  to self-determ ination. A ttem pts have been  m ade to  keep the 
concept o f peoples separate from  that o f m inorities such as the 
International C ovenant on Civil and Political R igh ts114 and the H elsinki 
D eclaration .115 A rticle 1 o f the International C ovenant grants peoples the 
righ t to self-determ ination and A rticle 27 protects the rights o f m inorities. 
It sim ply protects the m em bers o f m inorities from  being denied the right 
to  enjoy their ow n culture, practise their ow n relig ion, or use  their ow n 
language.116 A  m inority  is not entitled under A rticle  27 to a righ t o f self- 
determ ination. It cannot determ ine its ow n political status, un like a people 
under A rticle 1. In the H elsinki D eclaration Principle V II paragraph 4, 
protection o f national m inorities is stipulated. H ow ever, according to 
Principle VII, self-determ ination is not envisaged fo r m inorities.
D espite  the above m entioned international instrum ents, m any ethnic 
groups w hich are m inorities claim  to be a people entitled  to self- 
determ ination. Since only peoples are entitled to self-determ ination in  
contem porary international law, m inorities have to  prove that they are 
peoples, so that they m ay qualify  for self-determ ination. Som e w riters 
have put forw ard the v iew  that m inorities do constitu te peoples. Erm acora, 
pointing out that both peoples and m inorities occupy a specific territory 
and possess cultural or religious characteristics, concludes that m inorities
113 In the Greco-Bulgarian Communities case, the Court defined a minority as a group characterized by 
attributes of race, religion, language and tradition and which has possessed a sentiment of solidarity 
(Permanent Court o f International Justice Reports, Series B, No. 17, p. 4; Capotorti described minority 
thus: ‘a group numerically inferior to the rest of the population of a State, in a non-dominant position, 
whose members-being nationals of the State- possess ethnic, religious or linguistic characteristics 
differing from those of the rest of the population and show, if  only implicitly, a sense of solidarity, 
directed towards preserving their culture, traditions, religion or language’.
114 (1976) 999 United Nations Treaty Series, p.171.
115 (1975) 14 International Law Materials, p. 1292.
116 See Antonio Cassese, ‘The Self-Determination of Peoples’ in Louis Henkin (ed.) The International 
Bill o f Rights (1981), p.96.
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can also be considered holders to the righ t o f  self-determ ination and m ust 
be considered as peop le.117 Sim ilar, albeit w ith im portant differences, was 
the B adinter A rbitration C om m ission’s O pinion o f January  1992.118The 
issue at stake was w hether the Serbian m inorities o f C roatia and B osnia- 
H erzegovina had a right o f self-determ ination. The C om m ission found 
that the Serbian m inorities w ere peoples and that A rticle 1 o f  the 
International C ovenant o f C ivil and Political R ights w as applicable to 
them , thus giving them  the righ t to self-determ ination. But, although 
A rticle 1 provides that people are entitled  to determ ine freely their 
political status, 119 the C om m ission held  that the righ t o f  self- 
determ ination m ust not involve changes to  existing fron tiers.120 In  the 
case o f the Serbian m inorities this m eant that they had  the righ t to choose 
affiliation to a religious or linguistic group. A lthough the B adinter 
C om m ission identified the concept o f m inorities to that o f peoples, this 
did not m ean that the Serbian m inority groups acquired the right to 
determ ine their political status according to their w ishes. They w ere 
certainly not entitled  to determ ine their political status through secession, 
w hich was their political goal.121
It has already been subm itted that the Turkish C ypriot com m unity 
cannot qualify as ‘peop le’. The crucial question then is w hy is this so, in 
other w ords w hy the TR N C  is not a self-determ ination unit. B efore 
exam ining the term  ‘peop le’, I feel I should say a w ord or tw o on  the 
relevant argum ent for the TRN C put forw ard by Professor Eli 
Lauterpacht; in  particular, that the Z urich and L ondon Treaties, 
establishing the Republic o f Cyprus, w ere signed and accepted by both
117 Felix Ermacora, The Protection of Minorities Before the United Nations (1983), p.327.
118 (1992) 31 International Legal Materials, p. 1497
119 The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Art. 1, para. 1 (1976) 999 United Nations 
Treaty Series pp. 171-3.
120 (1992) 31 International Legal Materials pp. 1497-8.
121 Ibid., p. 170.
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the Turkish  C ypriots and G reek Cypriots, so the tw o com m unities are 
separate parties o f equal standing to the present negotiations for 
settlem ent o f the C yprus issue. It seem s to m e a ra ther legalistic argum ent. 
The fact that the tw o com m unities gave their consent to the A ccords 
should not suggest that they both exercised the righ t to self-determ ination. 
The right to self-determ ination was exercised by the ‘peop le’ o f Cyprus 
as a whole  which is one and indivisible. In fact, it should be  brought to 
attention that according to A rticle II o f the Treaty o f G uarantee, w hich 
form ed part o f  the constitutional order o f the new ly bom  R epublic and 
was concluded by both the G reek C ypriot and  Turkish C ypriot 
representatives in the 1959 A greem ents, ‘Turkey, G reece, and the U nited 
K ingdom  undertook to prohibit activity aim ed at prom oting directly or 
indirectly  either union o f Cyprus w ith any other State or partition  o f the 
island’. The unlaw ful dem and o f the Turkish  C ypriot com m unity- 
supported by Turkey- for self-determ ination and recognition o f  its entity 
(TRNC) clearly  violates the above provision .122
L et us now  explore the term  ‘people’. The principal G eneral 
A ssem bly R esolutions dealing with self-determ ination refer to ‘peoples’ 
in  a m anner identifying them  w ith ethnic groups. B oth R esolutions 
1514(XV) and 2625(XXV) declare that ‘peoples have the righ t not only 
to determ ine their political status but also to pursue their econom ic, social 
and cultural developm ent’. W riters have also provided useful definitions 
o f the term. D instein asserts that several peoples can exist in  a single 
State, and defines people in term s o f ethnic criteria:
‘Peoplehood must be seen as contingent on two separate elements, one objective and 
the other subjective. The objective element is that there has to exist an ethnic group 
linked by common history... It is not enough to have an ethnic link in the sense of
122 Eli Lauterpacht mentions that ‘the Republic of Cyprus undertook not to participate in any political 
or economic union with any State, but does not make reference to Article II of the Treaty of Guarantee 
(E. Lauterpacht Opinion, ante, p. 3).
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past genealogy and history. It is essential to have a present ethos or state of mind. A
people is both entitled and required to identify itself as such’.123
A lso, B row nlie defines .people in  term s o f ethnic requirem ents:
‘The principle of self-determination appears to have a core of reasonable certainty. 
This core consists in the right of a community which has a distinct character to have 
this character reflected in the institutions of government under which it lives. The 
concept of distinct character depends on a number of criteria which may appear in 
combination. Race or (nationality) is one of the of the more important of the relevant 
criteria, but the concept of race can only be expressed scientifically in terms of more 
specific features, in which matters of culture, language, religion and group 
psychology predominate’124
T he International C om m ission o f Jurists gave the follow ing definition:
‘If we look at the human communities recognised as peoples, we find that their 
members have certain characteristics in common, which act as a bond between them. 
The nature of the more important of these common features may be: historical, racial 
or ethnic, cultural or linguistic, religious or ideological, geographical or territorial, 
economic and quantitative’. 125
In  view  o f the aforem entioned definitions the Turkish C ypriot com m unity 
cannot, prim a facie, m eet the above criteria and qualify as a ‘peo p le ’. The 
num bers o f the Turkish C ypriots (18%  of the Republic o f the Cyprus 
population) suggest that they rather form  a m inority  and  not a ‘peop le’ 
entitled  to self-determ ination. A lso, the Turkish Cypriots and, indeed, the 
so called  Turkish Republic o f N orthern Cyprus are econom ically  
dependent upon the State o f Turkey. T heir dreadful financial condition 
m ay  attest to the validity o f this assertion. Further, their actual relation 
w ith  the territory o f Cyprus, in com parison to the one that the G reek 
C ypriots have had, has only been tem porary. A lthough, prior to  the events 
o f  1974, som e o f them  lived in their own  v illages scattered all over the
123 Collective Human Rights o f Peoples and Minorities (1976).
124 Ian Brownlie, ‘The Rights of Peoples in Modem International Law’ in James Crawford (ed.) The 
Rights o f Peoples (7988).
125 International Commission of Jurists, East Pakistan Staff Study (1972), p.49.
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place, their presence only dates back to 1571 (w hen the island cam e 
under the O ttom an rule), w hich falls into the m odem  period  o f the 
is lan d ’s history. 126 It is therefore very difficult fo r them  to claim  
geographical contiguity w ith the territory.
O n the other hand, considering the definitions o f  the te rm  ‘people’, 
largely  given in  national criteria, I am  tem pted  to  concede that the 
T urkish  C ypriots form  a separate ‘peop le’. Their ethnic orig in  prim arily  
supports this view . It is no t accidental that A rticle  1 o f the Cyprus 
C onstitu tion  declares that the State o f C yprus is com posed o f  G reeks and 
Turks.127 The constitutional provision is a legal confirm ation o f  the m ere 
fac t that one o f the C ypriot com m unities is o f Turkish  origin. A lso, the 
com m on relig ion o f the Turkish Cypriots, w ho are M uslim s, is another 
im portan t feature indicating that they m ay be a separate ‘peop le’ w ithin 
the C yprus Republic. It should be rem em bered that the  relig ious elem ent 
has been  a cause o f fierce inter-com m unal conflict in  the 1960s. N eedless 
to  m ention that the com m on language o f  the Turks o f  Cyprus shows that 
they  m ay be seen as d istinct ‘peop le’. H ow ever, there is a further feature 
applicable in this context w hich should not escape notice. It is w ell 
spotted  by  the International C om m ission o f Jurists. In their Study, 
referred  to above, the Jurists elaborate on the com m on features o f  peoples 
in  this way:
‘This list, which is far from exhaustive, suggests that none of the elements concerned 
is by itself either essential or sufficiently conclusive to prove that a particular group 
constitutes a people...we have to realise that our composite portrait lacks one 
essential and indeed indispensable characteristic- a characteristic which is not 
physical but rather ideological and historical: a people begins to exist only when it 
becomes conscious of its own identity and asserts its will to exist’.
126 It should not be surprising that members of the Right Wing Party have from time to time suggested 
that the Turkish Cypriots should be deported to mainland Turkey, and be given compensation 
accordingly.
127 Emphasis my own.
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It is by  virtue o f this very last elem ent that it is really  d ifficult to concede 
in  the end that the Turkish C ypriots constitute a ‘peop le’. U nlike the 
G reek  Cypriots, w ho can claim  a record  o f uninterrupted history  on the 
island  a t least from  the 15th century B .C., the Turks have only  been  there 
since 1571 A .D .128 It should be noted that betw een 1878 -w h e n  Cyprus 
becam e part o f the B ritish Em pire- the overw helm ing m ajority  o f Turks, 
apart from  few , left Cyprus. Sim ultaneously, by A rticle  23 o f the Treaty 
o f  Lausanne, Turkey renounced any claim s or dem ands w ith regard  to 
sovereignty over Cyprus. Eventually  it is all a m atter o f international 
history. H istory speaks for itself, and historical facts are unquestionable 
and unshakeable. It w ould be absurd for one even  to suppose that 
H ellenistic archaeological sites, B yzantine m edieval castles, and 
C hristian  churches in  the occupied part o f C yprus belong to  the Turks or 
that they  should com e under Turkish adm inistration by an act o f 
recognition  o f  the ‘Turkish Republic o f N orthern C yprus’, follow ing the 
grant o f  the righ t to self-determ ination to the T urkish  Cypriots. The 
elem ent o f history, as the International C om m ission o f Jurists put it, is 
linked  w ith an ideological elem ent or w hat I w ould  call psychological 
(along the lines o f B row nlie who labels it ‘group psychology’). L ack of 
h istorical continuity apart, the Turkish Cypriots have not developed a 
consciousness o f identity  o ther than the T urkish  one. This should not 
surprise, as there is no such thing as C ypriot national identity. This is so 
sim ply because there is no Cypriot nation.
But, again, considering this last argum ent, could  it no t be the case 
that the Turkish C ypriots are indeed a separate people precisely because, 
o ther things apart -such as com m on relig ion and language- the State o f 
C yprus is com posed by  tw o entirely different ethnic groups  each o f
128 This is so, despite attempts by Mr Denktash, leader of the Turkish Cypriot community, to present 
the year 1571 as the starting point of what he calls Early History of Cyprus (The Cyprus Triangle, ante,
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w hich has always aspired to its ow n national iden tity? E ven  if  this is the 
case, it is m y subm ission that the Turkish C ypriots cannot or should not 
determ ine their political status or system  o f governm ent w ithout having 
regard to possible legitim ate counter claim s o f the G reek Cypriots. This is 
so, because deeply rooted  historical and psychological factors together 
m ilitate for the overw helm ingly G reek character o f C yp ru s .129 B iased 
though it m ay sound, such a view  is prem ised upon historical facts which 
should, in  m y opinion, not be overlooked, especially  w hen the m atter o f 
recognition o f the ‘T R N C ’ is at stake. A t the sam e tim e, it is no t to be 
thought that the hum an rights o f the Turkish C ypriots should not be 
safeguarded. I strongly subm it that any future settlem ent o f the Cyprus 
issue has to protect the legal rights o f the Turkish C ypriot com m unity. In 
this way, the com m unity m ay exercise, albeit to  a lim ited  degree, the 
right to (internal) self-determ ination.
(6) UNILATERAL SECESSION, SELF-DETERMINATION 
AND THE TRNC
In view  o f occasional threats by the Turkish  C ypriot adm inistration 
as w ell as the G overnm ent o f Turkey that the part o f  Cyprus presently  
under m ilitary occupation shall be annexed to the State o f Turkey, it is 
necessary to explore at this stage the relevant in ternational practice on 
unilateral secession.
Secession is the process by w hich a particular group seeks to 
separate itse lf from  the state to  w hich it belongs, and to  create a new  state 
on part o f the territory o f that state or to be annexed to another state.
State practice to be explored w ill cover im portan t cases o f non­
colonial territories seeking secession since 1945. A s prelim inary rem ark,
pi ) .
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it should be stressed that outside the colonial context, the U nited N ations 
is extrem ely reluctant to adm it a seceding entity to m em bership against 
the w ishes o f the governm ent o f the state from  w hich it has attem pted to 
secede.
B an g lad esh  is a peculiar case. E ast Pakistan (otherw ise know n as E ast 
B engal) was a geographically  separate part o f Pakistan, w hich had been 
created w hen B ritish India becam e independent in  1947. Its population 
was m ore than ha lf the population o f Pakistan. In  1970 national elections 
w ere w on by. the A w am i League, a party  based in  E ast Pakistan, which 
obtained 167 out o f 313 seats in  Parliam ent. The m ilitary leadership o f 
Pakistan refused to accept the elections result, and the A w am i League 
leader declared the independence o f Pakistan. The m ilitary governm ent o f 
Pakistan responded w ith bom bing and a civil w ar broke out. R oughly 9.5 
m illion refugees fled to India, and the latter declared w ar on Pakistan in 
the same year (1971). O n 6 D ecem ber 1971 India recognised the 
independence o f Bangladesh. The G eneral A ssem bly on 7 D ecem ber 
called for w ithdraw al o f Indian forces. O n 16 D ecem ber, Pakistani forces 
in  East B engal surrendered, and the A w am i League acquired de facto 
control o f  the territory o f E ast Bengal. H ow ever, B angladesh was 
adm itted to the U nited N ations only in 1974, 130 shortly after its 
recognition by Pakistan, despite the fact that it had already been 
recognised by  m any states.
The B altic  States w ere occupied and illegally  annexed by the Soviet 
U nion in 1940. In  1990, L ithuania declared its independence in  M arch 
1990. In  January it resisted  an attem pt on part o f the Soviet troops to 
force it to w ithdraw  the U nilateral D eclaration o f Independence. A
129 See Tomaritis QC THE Greek Character of ...
130 See S.C. Res. 351, 10 June 1974; G.A. Res. 3203 (XXIX), 17 Sep. 1974. On the case of Bangladesh, 
see further Crawford, The Creation o f States in International Law, ante, pp. 115-17; Franck and Rodley,
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referendum  held  in February 1991 favoured independence from  the 
Soviet Union. In  Estonia, the Suprem e Soviet declared  independence on 
20 A ugust 1991. In L atvia a referendum  in 1991 again favoured 
independence and the Latvian Suprem e Soviet declared independence in 
the sam e year. In Septem ber 1991, the State C ouncil o f the Soviet U nion 
recognised  the independence o f the B altic States. The U nited N ations 
Security  C ouncil recom m ended their adm ission to the O rganisation. The 
President o f the Security C ouncil stated:
‘The independence o f the B altic States w as restored  peacefully, by  m eans 
o f  dialogue, with the consent o f  the parties concerned , and in  accordance 
w ith  the w ishes o f  the three peoples’. 131
Thus, the position o f the Soviet authorities w as treated  as highly 
significant even in  a case o f suppressed independence.
T he eleven successor states o f the form er Soviet U nion achieved 
independence by a form  o f breakaw ay from  the form er Soviet U nion. The 
R ussian  Federation accepted the em ergence to independence o f the other 
republics (for exam ple A rm enia and A zerbaijan) and supported their 
applications for U nited N ations m em bership.
T h e  su ccesso r S ta te s  o f  th e  fo rm e r  Y ug o slav ia  cam e into  existence 
through a v iolent process (not yet resolved) against the opposition o f the 
B elgrade governm ent claim ing to represent the predecessor state. The 
C onference on Y ugoslavia 1991 established an A rbitration C om m ission 
presided  over by Badinter, P resident o f the F rench C onstitutional C ourt to 
give advice on legal issues related to the crisis. The C om m ission 
expressed the view  that the situation in  Y ugoslavia w as one involving the 
dissolution o f  the Federal Republic and the em ergence o f its constituent
‘After Bangladesh: The Law of Humanitarian Intervention by Military Force’ (1973) American J.I.L. p. 
275.
131 SCOR, S/PV/3007, 12 Sep. 1991 (emphasis supplied).
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republics as independent states. The C om m ission said in  its O pinion N o 8 
o f  4  July 1992:
‘The dissolution o f a State m eans that it no longer has a legal personality, 
som ething w hich has m ajor repercussions in  international law. It 
therefore calls for the greatest caution. The C om m ission finds that the 
existence o f a federal State, w hich is m ade up o f a num ber o f  separate 
entities, is seriously com prom ised w hen a m ajority  o f these entities, 
em bracing a greater part o f  the territory and population, constitute 
them selves as Sovereign States w ith the resu lt that federal authority  m ay 
no longer be effectively exercised. 132 B y the sam e token, w hile 
recognition o f the a State by other States has only declaratory  value, such 
recognition, along with m em bership o f in ternational organizations, bears 
w itness to these S tates’ conviction that the political entity  so recognized 
is a reality  and confers on  it certain  rights and obligations under 
international law .133
The appropriateness o f the international response to  the Y ugoslav crisis 
continues to be debated. The early recognition o f  C roatia and Bosnia- 
H erzegovina by m em ber states o f the European U nion continues to be the 
subject o f controversy, as also the delayed recognition o f ‘M acedonia’, 
contrary to the advice o f the C om m ission and out o f opposition by  G reece 
regarding the nam e o f the new  republic. C ertain points need  be made. 
Firstly, the A rbitration C om m ission, w hich provided the underlying legal 
rationale for the positions taken by the m em bers o f the European 
C om m unity and eventually by  m ost m em bers o f  the U nited  Nations,
132 Let us reverse the position for a moment and apply it to the Cyprus issue. Could the Turkish 
Cypriots, clearly representing a minority determine the political system of the Republic in disregard of 
the wishes of the Greek Cypriot majority? Can they demand dissolution of the Cyprus Republic and 
establishment of a separate state, namely the ‘TRNC’? I should think not. Conversely, the Greek 
Cypriot majority should not be entitled to implement a governmental system, which would exclude 
participation of the Turkish Cypriots.
33 Conference on Yugoslavia, Arbitration Commission, Opinion No. 8, 4 July 1992: 92 International 
Law Reports 199, pp. 201, 202.
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proceeded  on the basis that the process o f breaking up o f the Y ugoslav 
R epublic  was a m atter o f  fact.
Secondly, it d id  not m ention any prior right to independence on the part 
o f  the constituent republics. It did not rely  on  any righ t to self- 
determ ination. Its focus was on the breakdow n o f the federal 
arrangem ents for pow er sharing.
Thirdly, a critical factor was that the breakdow n w as accom panied by 
large-scale ethnic conflict, w hich lead to w ar crim es and crim es against 
hum anity  (such as ethnic cleansing).
Fourthly, it should be noted that none o f the constituent republics was 
adm itted  to the U.N. prior to the adoption by Serbia-M ontenegro o f a new  
constitution, w hich excluded the other four form er repub lics.134 
Fifthly, in m y opinion the Y ugoslav crisis is not a precedent for a righ t to 
secede in  international law .135 As the C om m ission o f  Jurists said  in  the  
A a la n d  Islands Case, international law  does not recognize the righ t o f 
units to secede from  the state o f  w hich they fo rm  a part by  the sim ple 
expression o f a wish.
The separation o f the C zech  R ep u b lic  and S lo v ak ia  w as clearly  a 
consensual process. D issolution was achieved by  parliam entary  action 
under a C onstitutional A ct o f 1992, rather than by a secession referendum  
as provided  for in a C onstitutional A ct o f 1991. The arrangem ents had 
been  w orked out by agreem ent betw een the tw o governm ents. O n 31 
D ecem ber 1992, the state o f C zechoslovakia ceased to exist.
K osovo  was an autonom ous region w ithin the R epublic o f Serbia; it had  
nearly  2 m illion inhabitants o f w hom  90%  w ere ethnic A lbanians. Its
134 See Mark Weller, ‘The International Response to the Dissolution of the Socialist Federal Republic 
of Yugoslavia’ (1991) 86 American J.I.L. p. 596.
135 To the same effect, see the view of James Crawford, Report, State Practice and International Law 
in Relation to Unilateral Secession, (http://canada .justice.gc.ca/en/news/nrl997/factum/craw), p. 17.
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autonom y w as term inated by  the governm ent o f Serbia in  1990, and there 
has been serious indication o f repression. M ore than one sixth o f the 
population fled  abroad. The A lbanian leadership o f K osovo declared its 
independence in  O ctober 1991, but this has only  been  recognized by 
A lbania.136
The C h ech n y a  incident is relevant, too. Chechnya declared its 
independence from  the Soviet U nion in  1991 and its governm ent 
m aintained effective control over the republic. In D ecem ber 1994 the 
R ussian A rm y m ade a large-scale attem pt to suppress the separatist 
m ovem ent. H ow ever an arm istice was agreed betw een the Russian 
Federation and the C hechen R epublic and then a Joint D eclaration in 
1996 w hich referred to the recognised right o f peoples to self- 
determ ination and produced the fram ew ork o f  an agreem ent to be 
achieved by January  2001. In spite o f  the R ussian m ilitary  defeat, no 
international recognition has been granted to  Chechnya. A lthough, m any 
governm ents have criticised the conduct o f R ussian force in C hechnya on 
grounds o f  the use o f disproportionate force, violations o f international 
hum anitarian law  and breach o f arm s control agreem ents,137 it has been 
accepted that the conflict w ithin Chechnya is an internal conflict, and that 
the principle o f  territorial integrity  applies.138 A s C raw ford said, the point 
is that, even though other governm ents qualified the Chechens as a 
‘peop le’, and even though this people was subject to violations o f hum an 
rights and hum anitarian law  on a large scale, the principle o f territorial
136 There is a lot of international politics surrounding the Kosovo crisis, especially in view of the 1999 
NATO military intervention, which need not us here.
137 See for example the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, Paris, 19 November 1990 
(1991) 30 International Legal Materials 1 Art. V.
138 The British Government stated that: ‘the exercise of the right of self-determination must also take 
into account questions such as what constitutes a separate people and respect for the principle of 
territorial integrity of the unitary state. In the case of Chechnya no country has recognised President 
Dudayev’s unilateral declaration of independence, but we have repeatedly called on the Russians to 
work for a political solution which would allow the Chechen people to express their identity within the 
framework of the Russian federation’ {House o f Lords Debates, vol. 563, col.476, 18 April 1955; 
(1995) 66 British Y.I.L. p. 621.
172
integrity  was respected .139 The relations betw een the R ussian Federation 
and Chechnya were, and rem ain, a m atter for negotiation betw een 
them .140
C ertain conclusions have to be draw n from  the preceding 
discussion. First, in  international practice, outside the colonial context, 
there is no recognition o f  a right to unilateral secession  based  on a 
m ajority vote o f the population o f a territory, w hether o r no t that 
population constitutes a people. Even w here there is a strong call for 
independence, it is a m atter o f the State concerned to  decide how  to 
respond.141 That governm ent is not required  to grant independence, and 
m ay take into account the national interest.
Second, in  pursuance to the above point, the U nited  N ations has 
never granted m em bership to a seceding entity  against the w ishes o f the 
governm ent o f the State from  w hich it has purported to secede. W here the 
parent State agrees to allow  a territory to separate, rapid  adm ission to  the 
U nited N ations w ill follow . The practice o f States is reflected  in  the fact 
that since 1945 no new  state has been created  outside the colonial context 
by way o f unilateral secession, w ith the exception o f B angladesh. Even in 
that case, B angladesh re lied  on m ilitary intervention by  Ind ia  to defeat the 
arm ed forces o f Pakistan in  Bangladesh. A ctually, B angladesh was not 
adm itted to the U nited N ations until it was recognised by  Pakistan  four 
years after its unilateral declaration o f independence.
Third, in  international law, self-determ ination for peoples w ithin an 
independent State is achieved by participation in the governm ental 
system  o f the State. A  State that is dem ocratically  governed and respects 
the hum an rights o f all o f its people com plies w ith the righ t o f self­
139 Crawford, Report, State Practice and International Law in Relation to Unilateral Secession, ante, p. 
22.
140 Ibid.
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determ ination and is entitled  to protection o f its territorial integrity. The 
people o f such a State exercise their right o f self-determ ination through 
their equal participation in its system  o f governm ent. It is subm itted that 
this should be the case w ith the Turkish Cypriots w ith in  a un ified  State o f 
Cyprus.
It is im portant in  this context to m ake reference to  the recent 
decision in the Quebec  C ase142. The Suprem e C onstitutional C ourt o f 
Canada, though, a N ational Court, gives very useful insights as to the 
in ternational practice on seceding entities. T he R eference required  the 
C ourt to decide on m om entous questions that go to  the heart o f the 
system  o f constitutional governm ent. As The C ourt m ade a sim ilar 
observation in  the R eference re  M anitoba Language R ights, [1985] 1
S.C.R. 721 (M anitoba Language R ights Reference): as in  that case the 
present one com bines legal and constitutional questions o f  the utm ost 
subtlety  and com plexity  w ith political questions o f  great sensitivity” . The 
Q uestions posed by  the G overnor in  Council by w ay o f  O rder in  Council 
P.C. 1996-1997, dated Septem ber 30, 1996, read  as follows:
1. U nder the Constitution o f Canada, can the Assem bly, 
legislature or governm ent o f Q uebec effect the secession 
o f Q uebec from  C anada unilaterally?
2. D oes international law  give the N ational Assem bly, 
legislature, o r governm ent o f Q uebec the righ t to effect 
the secession o f Quebec from  C anada unilaterally? In this 
regard, is there a righ t to  self-determ ination under 
international law  that w ould give the N ational A ssem bly, 
legislature or governm ent o f Q uebec the right to effect the 
secession o f Q uebec from  C anada unilaterally?
141 Traditionally international law treated such issues as matters of domestic jurisdiction, as reflected in 
the minority rights clause, Article 27, of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
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L et us accurately pu t dow n the conclusions o f the C ourt in  this decision:
We have emphasized that the Constitution is more than a written text. It embraces the 
entire global system of rules and principles which govern the exercise of constitutional 
authority. A superficial reading of selected provisions of the written constitutional enactment, 
without more, may be misleading. It is necessary to make a more profound investigation of 
the underlying principles that animate the whole of our Constitution, including the principles 
of federalism, democracy, constitutionalism and the rule of law, and respect of minorities. 
Those principles must inform our overall appreciation of the constitutional rights and 
obligations that would come into play in the event of a majority of Quebecers votes on a clear 
question in favour of secession. The Reference requires us to consider whether Quebec has a 
right to unilateral secession. Those who support who support the existence of such a right 
found their case primarily on the principle of democracy. Democracy, however, means more 
than simple majority rule. As reflected in our constitutional jurisprudence, democracy exists 
in the larger context of other constitutional values. In the 131 years since Confederation, the 
people of the provinces and territories have created close ties on interdependence 
(economically, socially, politically and culturally) based on shared values that include 
federalism, democracy, constitutionalism and the rule of law, and respect for minorities. A 
democratic decision of Quebecers in favour of secession would put those relationships at risk. 
Accordingly secession of province under the Constitution could not be achieved unilaterally, 
that is, without principled negotiation with other participants in Confederation within the 
existing constitutional framework.
Quebec could not, despite a clear referendum result, purport to invoke a right of self- 
determination to dictate the terms of a proposed secession to the other parties to the federation. 
The democratic vote, by however strong majority, would have no legal effect on its own and 
could not push aside the principles of federalism and the rule of law, the rights of individuals 
and minorities, or the operation of democracy in the other provinces or in Canada as a whole. 
Democratic rights under the Constitution cannot be divorced from constitutional obligations. 
The other provinces and the federal government would have no basis to deny the right of the 
government of Quebec to pursue secession, should a clear majority of the people of Quebec 
choose that goal, so long as in doing so, a clear majority of the people of Quebec respects the 
right of others.
The negotiation process would require the reconciliation of various rights and 
obligations by negotiation between the legitimate majorities namely, the majority of the 
population of Quebec, and that of Canada as a whole. A political majority at either level that 
does not act in accordance with the underlying constitutional principles mentioned puts at risk
142 Reference re Secession of Quebec [1998] 2 S.C.R.
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the legitimacy of its exercise of its rights, and the ultimate acceptance of the result by the 
international community.
We have also considered whether a positive legal entitlement to secession exists 
under international law in the factual circumstances, i.e. a clear democratic expression of 
support on a clear question for Quebec secession. Some of those who supported an 
affirmative answer to this question did so on the basis of the recognized right to self- 
determination that belongs to all peoples. Although much of the Quebec population certainly 
shares many of the characteristics of a people, it is not necessary to decide the “people” issue 
because, whatever may be the correct determination of this issue in the context of Quebec, a 
right to secession only arises under the principle of self-determination of peoples at 
international law where a “people” is governed as part of a colonial empire; where a “people” 
is subject to alien subjugation, domination or exploitation; and possibly where a “people” is 
denied any meaningful exercise of its right to self-determination within the State of which it 
forms a part. In other circumstances, peoples are expected to achieve self-determination 
within the framework of their existing State. A State whose government represents the whole 
of the people or peoples resident within its territory, on a basis of equality and without 
discrimination, and respects the principles of self-determination in its internal arrangements, 
is entitled to maintain its territorial integrity under international law and to have that territorial 
integrity recognized by other States. Quebec does not meet the threshold of a colonial people 
or an oppressed people, nor can it be the suggested that Quebecers have been denied 
meaningful access to government to pursue their political, economic, cultural and social 
development. In the circumstances, the National Assembly, the legislature or the government 
of Quebec do not enjoy a right at international law to effect the secession of Quebec from 
Canada unilaterally.
Although there is no right, under the Constitution or at international law, to unilateral 
secession, that is a secession without negotiation on the basis just discussed, this does not rule 
out the possibility of an unconstitutional declaration of secession leading to a de facto 
secession. The ultimate success of such a secession would be dependent on recognition by the 
international community, which is likely to consider the legality and legitimacy of secession 
having regard to, amongst other facts, the conduct of Quebec and Canada, in determining 
whether to grant or withhold recognition. Such recognition, even if granted, would not, 
however, provide any retroactive justification for the act of secession, either under the 
Constitution of Canada or at International Law.
It has to be stressed that, taking into account the above conclusions, 
the chances for the ‘T R N C ’ to be granted in ternational recognition  are 
ra ther slim, i f  no t non-existent.
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(7) CONCLUSIONS
The follow ing conclusions m ay be draw n from  the preceding legal 
analysis:
1. Taking into account that the “Turkish R epublic o f N orthern  C yprus” 
has been  created as a result o f an illegal m ilitary intervention, it 
inevitab ly  follow s that it is a legally invalid  entity.
2. This is even m ore so, given the uprooting o f m ore than  200, 000 
refugees from  their hom eland and subsequent reduction to the tragic 
status o f  refugees. Further, the transfer o f foreign settlers from  m ainland 
Turkey  reveals the real intentions o f the State o f Turkey as w ell as the 
Turkish  C ypriot leadership, w hich do not seem  to a im  at facilitating 
settlem ent o f the C yprus issue (as was allegedly the purpose o f  the U D I ), 
bu t ra ther a t changing the dem ographic character o f the island.
3. A ccording to the classical criteria fo r statehood in  international law  
(w hich correspond to the declaratory theory o f recognition) the “TR N C ” 
cannot qualify  as an independent State. It should be noted tha t even if  
o ther States purport to grant recognition to the “TR N C ” in  the future, 
such an act has to be treated as unlaw ful and w ithout any effect. 
C onsidering the predom inant position o f  the declaratory  theory o f 
recognition am ong international law  ju rists, such an attem pt w ould have 
to  be  unsuccessful. H ow ever, the Republic, o f C yprus should not 
acquiesce for a m om ent to the de fa c to  situation created as a resu lt o f the 
illegal arm ed intervention o f Turkey in  1974.
4. In ternational O rganisations and the in ternational com m unity as a w hole 
have strongly condem ned the unilateral declaration o f independence o f 
the TR N C , have regarded it as legally  invalid, and recognise the
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G overnm ent o f the Republic o f Cyprus as the only legitim ate 
representative o f Cyprus.
5. It has been show n that the Turkish C ypriots are not entitled  to the 
exercise o f  the righ t o f self-determ ination. H ow ever, as it has already 
been  subm itted, any constitutional settlem ent o f the future should 
guarantee effective participation o f them  in  the governm ental system  of 
the State. Thus, the Turkish C ypriot com m unity m ay exercise, to som e 
extent, the right to internal self-determ ination.
6. T here is no right to unilateral secession in  international law . Further, it 
is a  dom estic m atter for the State concerned w hether or no t to grant 
recognition  to a people or peoples w ithin its territory. Therefore, even if  
the Turkish  Cypriots constitute a ‘peop le’, it does no t necessarily  follow  
that they can qualify  as a self-determ ination unit, and secede from  the 
R epublic  o f  Cyprus. It should be stressed that recognition o f  unilateral 
secession o f  the ‘T R N C ’ w ould form  a bad precedent in  international law  
and practice. Such a developm ent w ould open the w ay for o ther groups or 
peoples claim ing to have the right o f self-determ ination to secede. C learly, 
this w ould not be in  the interests o f  the in ternational society, especially  o f 
States facing im m inent danger o f  this sort such as Spain (the Basques), 
the U nited  K ingdom  (Scotland), France (the B retons and A lsatians) or 
Ita ly  (Padania). R ecognition o f the righ t to unilateral secession would 
lead  to fragm entation o f w orld legal order.
7. R ecognition o f the “TR N C ” on the part o f any State, contrary to 
in ternational law  prescriptions, w ould create an additional political 
p rob lem  o f  im m ense dim ensions. It w ould pu t the C yprus problem  
entirely  in to  the sphere o f international relations or pow er politics. 
R ecourse to  international legality w ould then play a m inim al, if  any, role
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in  the resolution o f the dispute. Thus, the risk  o f w itnessing the revival o f 
C old  W ar type incidents w ould be very high, indeed .143
143 Being familiar with the complexities of party politics in the Republic of Cyprus, I feel I should 
stress that the recent S-300 missile crisis may revive. Although I would myself consider that weapons 
of this kind should not in the first place be imported from Russia under any circumstances, it is more 
than certain that many politicians apart from Clerides, particularly of the left wing party (AKEL) as 
well as others, would see it imperative to pursue the policy of close military co-operation with Russia if 
need be.
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CHAPTER V
HUMAN RIGHTS
CHAPTER V: HUMAN RIGHTS
This short C hapter is intended to give briefly a picture o f the very recent 
hum an rights cases before the European Court o f H um an Rights, w hich have 
arisen because o f violations o f hum anitarian law o f arm ed conflict and the hum an 
rights law at large during the Turkish m ilitary intervention o f Cyprus. The cases to 
be exam ined are the Loizidou Case and the inter-state case Cyprus v. Turkey.
I should like to stress at the outset that this C hapter is intended to be 
descriptive and further to serve as introduction to the legal and political argum ent 
in C hapter VIII as to m y proposed settlem ent to the conflict. The way in which the 
im portant field o f H um an Rights m ay be used in reaching a solution to the 
problem  is discussed in that context.
1. Loizidou Case1
The Court exam ined the argum ent o f the Cyprus G overnm ent and applicant 
Loizidou the ever since the Turkish occupation o f the northern part o f Cyprus she 
was denied access to her property and had, as a result, lost all control over it. This 
constituted, they argued violation o f A rticle Protocol 1 o f the European 
Convention on H um an Rights.
1 Loizidou v. Turkey (Merits), Judgement 18.12.1996
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The Turkish G overnm ent’s allegation was that the process o f taking o f 
property in the northern part o f Cyprus, which started in 1974 had ripened into an 
irreversible expropriation by virtue o f the A rticle 159 o f the so-called TRNC 
Constitution o f 7 M ay 1985. A ctually the Turkish G overnm ent adm itted the taking 
o f properties in 1974 and tried to justify  them  under m easures purportedly taken 
by the “TRN C” . The Court o f H um an Rights, taking into account that the TRNC 
lacks recognition in international law, stated:
“It is recalled that C onvention m ust be interpreted in  the light o f the rules o f 
interpretation set out in the V ienna Convention o f 23 M ay 1969 on the Law of 
Treaties and that A rticle 31 para.3 o f theta at Treaty indicates that account is to be 
taken o f any relevant rules o f international law applicable in  the relations betw een 
the parties. In the C ourt’s view, the principles underlying the C onvention cannot 
be interpreted in and applied in a vacuum.
Against this background the Court cannot attribute legal validity for 
purposes o f the Convention to such provisions as A rticle 159 o f the fundam ental 
law on which the Turkish G overnm ent rely.
Accordingly, the applicant cannot be deem ed to have lost title to her 
property ...the  legitim ate G overnm ent o f Cyprus have consistently asserted their 
position that G reek C ypriot owners o f im m ovable property in the northern part o f 
Cyprus such as the applicant have retained their title and should be allow ed to 
resum e free use o f their possessions w hilst the applicant obviously has taken a 
sim ilar stance. It follows that the applicant, for the purposes o f article 1 Protocol 1
and A rticle 8 o f the Convention, m ust still be regarded to be the legal ow ner o f the 
land” .2
It is significant that the Court took into account, too, the State responsibility 
provisions under international law and held:
“R esponsibility  of a Contracting Party could also arise w hen as a consequence p f 
m ilitary action- w hether lawful or unlaw ful- it exercises effective control o f an 
area outside its territory ... w hether it (control) be exercised directly, through its 
arm ed forces, or through a subordinate local adm inistration ... It is obvious from  
the large num ber o f troops engaged in active duties in northern Cyprus that her 
arm y exercises effective overall control over that part o f the island. Such control, 
according to the relevant test and in the circum stances o f the case, entails the 
responsibility  o f for the policies and actions o f the ‘T R N C ’” .3
The C ourt found that there has been and continues to be a breach o f the 
right to property, im putable to Turkey, and confirm ed that the applicant, M rs 
Loizidou, rem ains the legal ow ner o f her properties, as is the case, for all other 
displaced persons who ow ned property in the occupied part o f Cyprus.
It reserved the question o f ju st and equitable satisfaction under A rticle 50 o f 
the Convention. In its later judgm ent on A rticle 50 the C ourt aw arded pecuniary 
dam ages for the loss o f use (300,000 Cyprus pounds) and very substantial costs 
and interest at the annual rate o f 8%.
2 Loizidou (Merits), paras. 39-47.
3 Ibid. paras. 52 and 56.
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It is im portant to stress that the right to property in  the occupied part o f the 
island has not been affected and still lies w ith its law ful owners that is the 
refugees. The applicant G overnm ent requested the C ourt to decide and declare that 
the respondent State is responsible for continuing violations o f A rticles 1, 2, 3, 4, 
5, 6, 8, 9, 10 ,13, 14, 17, and 18 o f the Convention and o f A rticles 1 and 2 o f 
Protocol No 1.
2. The Case Cyprus v. Turkey4
The allegations were invoked with reference to four categories o f 
com plaints: alleged violations o f the rights o f G reek Cypriot m issing persons and 
their relatives; alleged violations o f the hom e and property rights o f the displaced 
persons; alleged violations o f the rights o f enclaved G reek Cypriots in northern 
Cyprus; alleged violations o f the rights o f Turkish Cypriot com m unity in  northern 
Cyprus.
Two m ajor issues will be exam ined at som e length: the m issing persons and 
displaced persons rights. These are o f im m ense im portance, and the m ost tragic 
aspects o f the Cyprus question, but surely the rest o f the issues exam ined by the 
C ourt are too im portant.
A t the hearing before the Court the applicant G overnm ent stated that the 
num ber o f m issing persons was currently 1, 495 and that the evidence clearly 
pointed out that to the fact the at the m issing persons w ere either detained by, or
4 http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/hudoc/view
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were in the custody o f or under the actual authority o f and responsibility  of, the 
Turkish arm y or its m ilitia and were last seen in areas w hich w ere under the 
effective control o f the respondent state. They m aintained, in addition, that the 
C ourt should proceed on the assum ption that the m issing persons w ere still alive, 
unless there was evidence to the contrary. The C ourt at the pout set noted that the 
applicant G overnm ent have not contested the facts as found by the Com m ission. 
For its part, it did not see any exceptional circum stances w hich w ould lead it to 
depart from  the Com m issions findings bearing the la tter’s careful analysis o f all 
m aterial t evidence including the findings reached by it in its 1976 and 1983 
reports.
As to the m erits o f the com plaints, the applicant G overnm ent requested the 
C ourt to find  that the facts disclosed a continuing violation o f A rticle 2 from  the 
standpoint o f both the procedural and substantive obligations contained in the 
provision. A rticle 2 provides as relevant: E veryone’s right to life shall be protected 
by law.
In the applicant G overnm ent’s submission, the procedural violation alleged 
was com m itted as a m atter o f adm inistrative practice, having regard  to the 
continuing failure o f the authorities o f the respondent state to conduct any 
investigation w hatsoever into the fate o f the m issing persons. In particular, there 
was no evidence that the authorities o f the respondent state has caddied out the 
searches for the dead or wounded, let alone concerned them selves w ith the burial 
o f the dead. Furtherm ore, the respondent state, by  virtue o f the presence o f its
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arm ed forces , directly continued to prevent investigations in the occupied area to 
those persons who w ere still m issing and continued to refuse to account for their 
fate.
F rom  the standpoint o f substantive obligation contained in  A rticle 2, the 
applicant G overnm ent requested that the Court to find and declare to take the 
necessary and operational m easures to protect the4 right to life o f the m issing 
persons all o f w hom  had disappeared in life-threatening circum stances know n to, 
and indeed, created by, the respondent State.
The Com m ission found that the m issing persons had disappeared in 
circum stances which were life-threatening, having regard, inter alia, to the fact 
that their disappearance had occurred at a tim e w hen there was clear evidence o f 
large-scale killings including as a result o f acts o f unlaw ful behaviour outside the 
fighting zones.
The applicant G overnm ent further requested the C ourt to find and declare 
that the circum stances o f the case also disclosed a breach o f A rticle 4 on account 
o f the Convention, which states that no one shall be held in slavery or servitude” . 
Also, it stressed that A rticle 5 o f the Convention had been breached by the 
respondent G overnm ent as a m atter o f adm inistrative practice. A rticle 5 provides 
that “everyone has the no on e shall be deprived o f his security save in the 
follow ing cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law.
The applicant G overnm ent declared that it was an unchallengeable 
proposition that it was the respondent S tate’s actions which had prevented the
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displaced G reek Cypriots fro returning to their hom es, in violation o f A rticle 8 o f 
the Convention w hich provides:
1.“Everyone has the right to respect for his private and fam ily life, his hom e and 
his correspondence” .
2. “There shall be no interference with by a public authority w ith the exercise o f 
this right except such as the in accordance w ith the law  and is necessary in a 
dem ocratic society in the interests o f national security, public safety or the 
econom ic well-being o f the country, for the prevention o f disorder, for the 
prevention protection o f health, or for the protectioOn o f the rights and freedom s o f 
others” .
The applicant G overnm ent declared that the policy o f the respondent State 
aim ed at the division o f Cyprus along racial lines, affected 211,000 displaced 
G reek Cypriots and their children as well as num ber o f M aronites, A rm enians , 
Latins and citizens o f the Republic o f Cyprus who had exercised the option o f 
under the Constitution to be m em bers o f the G reek-Cypriot com m unity. They 
subm itted that the continuing refusal o f the TRN C authorities to  allow the 
displaced persons to return to the north violated not only the right to respect for 
their hom es but also the right to respect for their fam ily  life. In this latter 
connection the applicant G overnm ent observed that the im pugned policy resulted 
in the separation o f families.
In  a further subm ission, the applicant G overnm ent requested the Court to 
find that the facts also disclosed a policy o f deliberate destruction and
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m anipulation o f the hum an, cultural, and natural environm ent and conditions o f 
life in northern Cyprus. The applicant G overnm ent contended this policy was 
based on the im plantation o f m assive num bers o f settlers from  Turkey w ith the 
intention and consequence o f elim inating G reek presence in  the area. H aving 
regard to the destructive results brought about to the environm ent the respondent 
State, it could only be concluded that the rights o f the displaced persons to respect 
their private life and hom e were violated in this sense also. As the to m erits o f the 
com plaints concerning the plight o f the displaced persons, the Com m ission found, 
w ith reference to its conclusions in its 1976 and 1983 reports and the findings o f 
fact in the instant case, that these persons, w ithout exception, continued to be 
prevented from  returning to or even visiting their previous hom es in northern 
Cyprus. As to the respondent’s G overnm ent’s view  that the claim  o f Greek 
C ypriot displaced persons to return to the north and to settle in their homes had to 
be solved in the overall context o f the inter-com m unal talks, the Com m ission 
considered that these negotiations, which w ere still very far from  reaching ant 
tangible result on the precise m atter at hand, could not be invoked to justify  the 
continuing m aintenance o f m easures contrary to the Convention.
The Court observed that the official policy o f the “TR N C ” authorities to 
deny the right o f the displaced persons to return to their hom es is reinforced by the 
very tight restrictions operated by the sam e authorities on visits to the north by 
G reek Cypriots living in the south. Accordingly, not only are displaced persons
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unable to apply to the authorities to reoccupy the hom es, w hich they left behind, 
they are physically prevented from  even visiting them.
It is now im perative to cite the decision o f the Court, especially on the 
aforem entioned issues:
On the alleged violations o f the rights o f G reek C ypriot m issing persons and their 
relatives,
1. H eld unanim ously that there has been no breach o f A rticle 2 o f the Convention 
by  reason o f an alleged violation o f a substantive obligation under that A rticle 
in  respect o f any o f the m issing persons (paragraph 130);
2. H eld by  sixteen votes to one that there has been a continuing violation o f 
A rticle 2 o f the Convention on account o f the failure o f the authorities o f the 
respondent State to conduct an effective investigation into the w hereabouts of 
the and fate o f Greek Cypriot m issing persons who disappeared in life 
threatening circum stances (paragraph 136);
3. H eld unanim ously that no breach o f A rticle 4 o f the C onvention has been 
established (paragraph 141);
4. H eld by 16 votes to 1 that there has been a continuing violation o f A rticle 5 o f 
the C onvention by virtue o f the failure o f the authorities o f the respondent 
State to conduct an effective investigation into the w hereabouts o f the G reek 
Cypriots m issing persons in respect o f w hom  there is arguable claim  that they 
w ere in Turkish custody at the tim e o f their disappearance (paragraph 150);
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5. H eld unanim ously that no breach o f A rticle 5 o f the Convention has been 
established by virtue o f alleged actual detention o f the G reek C ypriot missing 
persons (paragraph 151);
6. H eld by 16 votes to 1 that it is there has been a continuing violation o f A rticle 
3 o f the Convention in respect o f the relatives o f the G reek Cypriot missing 
persons (paragraph 158).
W ith regard to alleged violation o f the rights o f displaced persons to respect for
their hom e and property, the Court:
1. Held by sixteen votes to one that there has been a continuing violation o f 
Article 8 o f the Convention by reason o f the refusal o f to allow the return o f 
any G reek C ypriot displaced persons to their hom es in  northern Cyprus 
(paragraph 175);
2. H eld unanim ously that, having regard to its finding o f a continuing violation 
o f A rticle 8 o f the Convention, it is not necessary to exam ine w hether there 
has been a further violation o f that A rticle by reason o f alleged m anipulation 
o f the dem ographic character environm ent o f the G reek C ypriot displaced 
persons’ hom e s in northern Cyprus (paragraph 176);
3. Held unanim ously that the applicant G overnm ent’s com plaint under A rticle 8 
o f the Convention concerning the interference w ith regard  to respect for 
fam ily life on account o f the refusal to allow the return o f any G reek Cypriot 
displaced persons to their homes in northern Cyprus falls to be considered in
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the context o f their allegations in  respect o f the living conditions o f the Karpas 
G reek Cypriots (paragraph 177);
4. H eld by sixteen voted to one that there has been a continuing violation of 
A rticle 1 o f Protocol N o 1 by virtue of the fact that the G reek C ypriot owners 
o f property in the northern Cyprus are being denied access to and control, use 
and enjoym ent o f their property as well as any com pensation for the 
interference w ith their property rights (paragraph 189);
5. H eld unanim ously that it is necessary to exam ine w hether in  this case there 
has been a violation o f A rticle 14 o f the Convention taken in conjunction w ith 
A rticles 8 and 13 o f the Convention and A rticle 1 o f Protocol 1, by virtue of 
the alleged discrim inatory treatm ent o f Greek Cypriots not residing in northern 
Cyprus as regards their rights to respect for their hom es, to the peaceful 
enjoym ent o f their possessions and to an effective rem edy (paragraph 199);
W ith respect to alleged violations regard the rights o f the Turkish Cypriots, 
including m em bers o f the gypsy com m unity, living in northern Cyprus, the Court:
1. H eld unanim ously that it declines jurisdiction to exam ine those aspects o f the 
applicant G overnm ent’s com plaints under the A rticles 6, 8, 10 and 11 o f the 
C onvention in respect o f political opponents o f the regim e in the TRNC as 
w ell as their com plaints under articles 1 and 2 o f Protocol 1 in respect o f the 
Turkish C ypriot G ypsy com m unity, w hich w ere held  by the Com m ission not 
to be w ithin the scope o f this case as declared adm issible (paragraph 335);
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2. H eld unanim ously that no violation of the rights o f the Turkish  Cypriots who 
are opponents o f the regim e in northern Cyprus under A rticles 3, 5, 8, 10, and 
11 if the Convention has been established by reason o f an illegal 
adm inistrative practice, including an alleged practice o f failing to protect their 
rights under these Articles.
3. Held by 16 votes to 1 that no violation of the rights o f the m em bers o f the 
Turkish C ypriot com m unity under Articles 3, 5, 8 and 14 o f the Convention 
has been established by reason o f the an alleged adm inistrative practice, 
including an alleged practice o f failing to protect their rights under these 
Articles (paragraph 353);
4. Held by 176 votes to one that there has been a violation o f A rticle 6 o f the 
Convention on account o f the legislative practice o f authorising the trial o f 
civilians by m ilitary courts (paragraph 359);
5. Held unanim ously that no violation o f A rticle 190 o f the Convention has been 
established by  reason o f an alleged practice o f restricting the right o f Turkish 
Cypriots living in northern Cyprus to receive inform ation from  the G reek -  
language press.
6. Held unanim ously that no violation o f A rticle 11 o f the Convention has been 
established by reason o f the interference w ith the righ t to freedom  of 
association or assem bly o f Turkish Cypriots living northern Cyprus.
7. Held unanim ously that no violation o f Article 1 has been established by reason 
of the an alleged adm inistrative practice, including an alleged practice of
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failing to secure enjoym ent o f their possessions in  southern Cyprus to Turkish 
Cypriots living in northern Cyprus.
Finally the issue o f “dom estic rem edies” as raised in the C ourt need be briefly 
pointed out. This is im portant in that it treats one o f the legal consequences o f acts 
done on part o f the “TR N C ” .
The Court held by  ten votes to seven that for the purposes o f form er Article 26 
(current A rticle 35 para. 1) o f the Convention, rem edies available in the “TR N C ” 
m ay be regarded as “dom estic rem edies” o f the respondent State and that the 
question o f effectiveness o f these rem edies is to be considered in the specific 
circum stances where it arises.
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PART III
THE FUTURE-THOUGHTS ON A SETTLEMENT
CHAPTER VI
INTERNATIONALISATION OF THE CYPRUS
PROBLEM:
THE UNITED NATIONS
CHAPTER VI: THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE CYPRUS
PROBLEM
In this chapter, the ro le  o f the U nited N ations in  the settlem ent o f 
the C yprus issue, in  term s o f peacekeeping, bu t especially  o f peace 
enforcem ent action, w ill be put under scrutiny.
F or this purpose, w hat I intend to do, is to identify  four phases 
corresponding respectively to (1) the period before the independence o f 
Cyprus; (2) the period after the inter-com m unal fighting until 1974; (3) 
the period from  the Turkish intervention 1974 to the present date.
(1). The period before Independence
In  1953, before the beginning o f the E .O .K .A . riot, the visit o f  the 
British Foreign M inister in  Greece was the p re tex t o f a w ould be 
controversy betw een G reece and G reat Britain. The refusal o f A ntony 
Eden to m eet w ith the G reek Prim e M inister, Papagos, to discuss the 
Cyprus issue outraged the latter, who then decided (w ith the subsequent 
exhortation o f A rchbishop M akarios) to place the C yprus problem  before 
the political organs o f the U nited Nations. The consequences o f this act, 
though, w ere not foreseen at the time. B oth the U nited  K ingdom  and the 
U nited States w ere firm ly opposed to such an action. O nly before the first 
attem pt o f the G reek G overnm ent at the U nited  N ations, 1954, Foster 
Dulles, sent a personal m essage to Papagos, advising h im  not to p lace the 
Cyprus p roblem  before the G eneral A ssem bly o f the U nited  N ations, and 
expressing the w illingness o f the U.S. G overnm ent to m ediate in  order 
that the dispute m ight be settled. D ulles stressed tha t the unity o f  the 
N orth A tlantic Treaty O rganisation should no t run the risk  o f breakdow n 
by a possible conflict betw een G reece and the allied Pow ers, that is the 
U nited K ingdom  and Turkey!
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D espite the U.S. piece o f advice, the G reek G overnm ent p roceeded w ith 
five successive applications to  the G eneral A ssem bly o f the U .N .1
On the 20th o f A ugust 1954, the perm anent representative o f 
G reece to the U nited N ations puts dow n to the Secretariat o f  the 
O rganisation an application, claim ing the im plem entation, under the 
auspices o f the U nited N ations, o f the principle o f equality  and self- 
determ ination o f peoples in  the case o f Cyprus. T he A ssem bly resolved 
not to deal further w ith the issue o f self-determ ination for the people o f 
Cyprus. F ifty  votes w ere cast for the adoption o f this resolution 
(including that o f Greece), and eight States abstained (including the 
Soviet Union, as it then was).
On the 21st o f Septem ber 1955, the Political A ffairs C om m ittee o f 
the G eneral A ssem bly discussed the issue o f w hether a renew ed claim  o f 
the G reek G overnm ent should be put on the A genda (although the G reek 
Foreign m inister had received a clear w arning by D ulles that the U.S. 
would vote against this). G reece did not even achieve the inclusion o f  the 
problem  in the agenda. The decision o f the Political A ffairs C om m ittee 
was approved by the A ssem bly (including N A TO  m em ber states, except 
Greece and Iceland).
In 1956, G reece, in  a third attem pt before the organs o f  the U .N ., 
was accused by B ritain  as instigating acts o f terrorism . O n the 22nd o f 
February, the G eneral assem bly issued a vague R esolution by w hich the 
settlem ent o f the C yprus issue should be dem ocratic and just, according 
to the purposes o f the U nited N ations and expressed the w ish that 
negotiations w ould com m ence for this purpose.2 H ow ever, the G eneral
1 For a detailed account, see Stephen G. Xydis, Conflict and Conciliation, 1954-1958 (The 
Ohio State University Press, 1967). This work could be seen as the standard textbook, the 
most exhaustive on this period of the Cyprus issue.
2 Review of the United Nations, December 1957, p. 48-57.
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A ssem bly  resolution did not m ention that the basis o f negotiations should 
be the principle o f self-determ ination, as prescribed b y  the U .N . Charter.
O n the 14th o f January 1957, a draft resolution was subm itted by 
the Political C om m ittee A ffairs to the G eneral A ssem bly, explicitly  
stating, for the first time, that negotiations should start, so that the 
princip le o f self-determ ination m ay be im plem ented in  the case o f Cyprus. 
A s a resu lt o f strong opposition, m ainly com ing from  the U .S., the 
m ajority  d id  not vote for the adoption o f the D raft R esolution.3
B y the tim e the fifth application was subm itted (1958), the policy  
o f C yprus had  changed. A rchbishop M akarios, in  an historic interview  to 
B arbara Castle, stated that the claim  for self-determ ination and possible 
U nion  o f  Cyprus w ith G reece had been abandoned. F rom  then on, the 
claim  for independence was put forward.
The G eneral applications o f G reece to the G eneral A ssem bly failed, 
because the W estern Pow ers, m uch like today, had  a predom inant 
position  in  the international com m unity, especially  in  the international 
O rganization. A lso, the grounds for failure are to be traced in the side o f 
the applicant State, too. The G reek State pursued conflicting policies, 
w hich eventually  w ere proved to be fruitless. O n the one hand, it w as (as 
alw ays has been) attached to the W estern A lliance, w hich was, according 
to experts, in the security in terest o f the country. O n the other hand, it 
w ould  w ish to see C yprus becom ing part o f  the m ainland, thus m aking 
the national ideal o f Enosis  com e true.
Further, the U nited States, close ally o f the U .K ., p layed decisive ro le  in 
turning dow n the applications o f G reece seeking for self-determ ination in  
the case o f Cyprus. It should be noted, albeit in  brief, that the U nited 
K ingdom , being the Im perial Pow er, reacted  in tensely  against the 
in ternationalisation o f the Cyprus issue.
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Certain m easures w ere em ployed to render unsuccessful the actions at the 
U.N. O rganisation. O ne such m easure was the 1955 T ripartite C onference 
in  London, which, though ending up in  failure, achieved an im portant 
diplom atic goal for the Foreign Office. The Cyprus dispute was dealt w ith 
in  the context o f the A nglo-G reco-Turkish relations. M ore im portantly, it 
brought Turkey at the forefront o f political developm ents. T urkey was 
thus presented as a directly in terested party in  the settlem ent o f the 
Cyprus issue, and as having equal status at the negotiating table to  that o f 
the G reek G overnm ent. It is notew orthy the B ritish  A m bassador in 
A thens, in  a letter to the G reek G overnm ent, says tha t the C yprus issue is 
not a m atter o f self-determ ination, but one o f defence o f the W est in  the 
Eastern M editerranean.4 The G overnm ent as well as the opposition  w ere 
agreed. Sophocles Venizelos, leader o f the Centre, stated that a possible 
denial on part o f A thens to com e to negotiations w ould p resent the 
G overnm ent as intransigent.5 A t the sam e tim e, though, A nkara u rged  the 
Turkish Cypriots to take up arm s and engage in inter-com m unal fighting 
in  order that coexistence betw een the tw o com m unities m ight be proved 
to be im possible.6
A nother o f these m easures taken by G reat B ritain  was the London 
C onference leading to the London Treaties o f February  1959, establishing 
an independent Cyprus Republic.7 W hat is re levant from  the A greem ents 
is that no provision was m ade by w hich possib le disputes could  be
2Ibid, p.48-57 (31-32-24).
4 See Linardatos, From Civil War to the Junta, 1952-1955 (in Greek, Athens, 1978), p.309.
5 Indeed, this argument was put forward by the Greek Government and the Republic of
Cyprus as justification for taking part in the inter-communal talks which followed, but was, in 
my view, the cause of a policy of constant concessions to Turkey.
6 The 1955 anti-Greek actions (massacres, vandalisms, and other criminal acts) in 
Constantinople and Smyrna were committed based on the same methodology of the Turkish 
State, namely to make the Greek State realize that the Greek populations of Constantinople, 
Imbros and Tenedos were held hostages as it were and could suffer enormously if the Greek 
State was to continue the policy of internationalisation of the Cyprus issue, clearly against the 
interests of Turkey.
7 On which, see above, Chapter 1.
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subm itted to an international body, like the IC J o r the  European C ourt o f 
H um an R ights (given that a case o f hum an rights v io lations arose). A ny 
controversy over the im plem entation o f the A greem ents w as to be settled 
by the parties to the Treaty. The parties to the C yprus Treaties w ere thus 
m oving aw ay from  the in ternationalization o f the C yprus issue.
2. The period after the inter-communal fighting until 1974
Cyprus, as an independent State, w as unanim ously  adm itted to 
m em bership o f the U nited  N ations on 20 Septem ber 1960. It w ill be 
recalled that this was the tim e o f the em ergence from  colonial ru le  o f 
m any new  States, m ainly in  Africa, w hich upon independence jo ined  the 
U nited N ations and thus transform ing its com position and voting patterns. 
A nd it was the tim e w hen K ennedy and K ruschev, respectively, the 
U nited States and the Soviet U nion w ere eagerly com peting for influence 
am ong the non-aligned new ly independent States. In  short, the 
circum stances w ere propitious and the delegation o f Cyprus had  the 
opportunity, through active participation on issues before the various 
U nited N ations organs, o f playing a role considerably  exceeding that 
w hich w ould be expected if  one only  took into account the country’s size 
and population. Cyprus m ade the U nited N ations and the principles o f the 
Charter central to its foreign policy and this had  a significant and direct 
effect upon subsequent developm ents.
In 1963 when, follow ing serious internal difficulties, the Republic 
o f Cyprus was confronted by serious threats and acts o f aggression by 
Turkey, it turned for protection to the U nited N ations. The O rganisation 
through its political organs, notably the Security C ouncil and the G eneral 
Assem bly, as well as the Secretariat, responded positively  to  this appeal. 
Thus, the standing o f Cyprus in  the U nited N ations and its policy  o f
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com m itm ent to the C harter principles, had  a direct effect upon the 
positive  response w hich was given by the O rganization to the plea for 
pro tection  and support against actions in  v iolation o f these sam e C harter 
princip les.8
The Cyprus problem  was form ally p laced before the U nited 
N ations on 26 D ecem ber 1963. The Cyprus G overnm ent, through a letter 
o f  its Perm anent R epresentative in  N ew  York, lodged a com plaint to the 
Security  C ouncil charging Turkey w ith acts o f aggression and 
in tervention against the C h a rte r .9 The com plaint was considered in an 
em ergency session o f the Security Council on 27 D ecem ber 1963, in  the 
ligh t inform ation received o f naval m ovem ents and other preparations for 
a T urkish  invasion am idst the inter-com m unal fighting. The m eeting was 
adjourned after a debate w ithout form al conclusion, and after some 
N A T O  initiatives, the issue was considered by the Council in  M arch 1964. 
The outcom e o f the deliberations was the unanim ous adoption on M arch 
1964 o f its landm ark Resolution 186 (1964), w hich has since been 
reaffirm ed and w hich provided the basic fram ew ork o f the Security 
C ouncil’s action. The R esolution was based on the legal prem ise that 
under A rticle  2(4) o f the Charter, “all M em bers o f the U nited  N ations 
shall refra in  in  their international relations from  the threat or use o f force 
against the territorial in tegrity  or political independence o f any State” . It 
p rovided  that (i) the above principle should be respected w ith regard  to 
C yprus; (ii) a U nited N ations Peace-K eeping Force in  Cyprus 
(U N FIC Y P) be set up, w ith the consent o f the G overnm ent o f  Cyprus, 
and la id  dow n its m andate; (iii) a U nited N ations
8 For reference see Cyprus: The Problem in Perspective, Republic of Cyprus: Public 
Information Office 1967, The Functions of the United Nations Force in Cyprus, Republic of 
Cyprus: Public Information Office 1967, The Cyprus Problem, 1975.
9 S/5488. This was inscribed on the Council’s agenda and, as subsequently supplemented, has 
been the basis of the item during the whole of this period of 1963-1974.
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m ediator be appointed for the purpose o f prom oting a peaceful settlem ent 
o f the p roblem  confronting Cyprus according to the C h a r te r .10
Let us now  turn to the enforcem ent o f this R esolution. W ith regard 
to  its first elem ent, Turkey continued the threat and use o f force against 
Cyprus and this necessitated additional Security C ouncil em ergency 
sessions, such as that o f A ugust 1964. As regards the second elem ent, 
U N FIC Y P was set up and it is generally acknow ledged that it has been 
discharging its functions as set out in  the R esolution and in terpreted from  
tim e to tim e in  the light o f factual developm ents by the Secretary-G eneral, 
in  a com m endable way. W hile it was set up for three m onths only, it has 
proven necessary for the Security C ouncil on  the recom m endation o f  the 
Secretary-G eneral, to renew  its m andate tim e and again in  six-m onthly 
intervals as its presence is still considered indispensable. In so far as the 
third elem ent is concerned, the Secretary-G eneral designated as U nited 
N ations M ediator originally M r. Tuom ioja (Finland) and after his sudden 
death, Dr. G alo Plaza (Ecuador). D r P laza’s Report, w hich he  subm itted 
to the Secretary-G eneral on 26 M arch 1965, w as a constructive docum ent, 
consistent w ith his m andate under paragraph 7 o f the R esolution 186 and, 
in  the opinion o f  im partial observers, at the tim e o f its issue, could have 
form ed the basis o f a fair, ju s t and viable solution to the Cyprus 
problem .11 The Report, it is necessary, that it is analysed in  som e length.
10 While the Council took no clear position as to the validity of the Treaty of Guarantee, by 
calling for the respect of the principle in Article 2(4) above, it could be argued that it 
indirectly vindicated the Cyprus Government’s claim that the Treaty conferred no right to use 
military force against Cyprus in violation of this peremptory norm of international law which 
prevails over any treaty which is in conflict with it. See further, Thomas Erlich, Cyprus 1958- 
1967: International Crises and the Role of Law(Oxford :Oxford University Press, 1974); 
Higgins, International Peacekeeping: documents and commentary (issued under the auspices 
of the Royal Institute of International Affairs by Oxford University Press, 1964-81).
11 In some of its observations, Dr. Plaza proved prophetic when one looks at his Report now 
in the light of the intervening developments, especially regarding the plans of Turkey against 
Cyprus. This text should have been studied very carefully by the Greek Government as well 
as the Republic of Cyprus, which has never happened.
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A t the very beginning, the Secretary-G eneral, notes, should 
prom ote a peaceful solution and an agreed settlem ent to the  p roblem  
confronting Cyprus, in  accordance w ith the C harter o f the U nited  Nations, 
having  in  m ind the w ell-being o f the people o f Cyprus as a w hole and the 
preservation  o f  international peace and security.
Dr. Plaza having spotted the deficiencies o f the C yprus 
C onstitution, stated w ith regard to A rchbishop’s M akarios Proposed 
A m endm ents: “The President did so on the grounds that in  its existing 
fo rm  the C onstitution created m any difficulties in  the sm ooth functioning 
o f the State and the developm ent and progress o f the country; that its 
m any sui generis provisions conflicted w ith in ternationally  accepted 
dem ocratic  principles and created sources o f friction betw een G reek and 
T urkish  Cypriots; and that its defects were causing the tw o com m unities 
to  draw  further apart ra ther than closer together” .12 H e w ent on to say that 
“several o f the m ost im portant am endm ents proposed by the  President 
reflected  deadlocks w hich had actually occurred in  the functioning o f  the 
C onstitu tion” . 13 A t paragraph 51, he m entions the obstacles fo r the 
peaceful coexistence betw een the tw o com m unities: “The physical 
im pedim ents to norm al contacts betw een the com m unities w ere serious 
enough; hardly  less so was the psychological im pedim ent caused by the 
suppression o f the healthy m ovem ent o f ideas, for w hich w ere substitutes 
slogans and counted-slogans shouted by propaganda across the dividing 
lines” .
Then, the m ediator clearly  identifies the position o f the parties concerned, 
and extensively m akes reference to the Turkish policy14.
12 The Galo Plaza Report on Cyprus, 1965 (http://www.cyprusconflict.net/galo plaza report.), 
para.39
13 Ibid. para. 40.
14 Turkish policy means both the policy of the Turkish State as well as that pursued by the 
Turkish Cypriot leadership. Both go along the same lines and are interdependent (see The 
Galo Plaza Report on Cyprus, 1965, supra, para. 78: The Government of Turkey, for its part,
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Insistence that the coexistence betw een Turkish C ypriots and G reek 
C ypriots is not feasible was a basic policy. A  second one w as the 
transform ation o f institutional federation, as provided for by  the Zurich- 
London Treaties, to territorial federation or partition, a strategic a im  o f 
Turkey. 15 H ow ever, considering that this w ould not be w illingly  accepted 
by  the G reek and C ypriot-G reeks” , they m odified  this concept to that o f 
creating a federation through physical separation o f the tw o 
com m unities.16 Third, achievem ent o f the separatist policy by  the m ethod 
o f  changing o f populations. “Their proposal envisaged a com pulsory 
exchange o f population in  order to bring about a state o f affairs in  w hich 
each com m unity w ould occupy a separate part o f the island. The dividing 
line w as in fact suggested: to run  from  the v illage o f Y alia on the north­
w estern  coast, extending tow ards the tow ns o f N icosia in  the centre, and 
Fam agusta in  the east.” 17 It is notew orthy tha t the m ediator w as stating 
these years before the intervention o f  Turkey in  Cyprus 1974. The 
m ediato r goes on to say that “the zone lying north o f the R epublic was 
claim ed by the Turkish C ypriot com m unity; it is said that they have an 
area o f  about 1,084 square m iles or 38 per cent o f the total area o f the 
Republic. A n exchange o f about 10,000 G reeks and about the sam e 
num ber o f Turkish fam ilies was contem plated” 18. Fourth, each o f the tw o 
separate com m unal areas would enjoy self-governm ent in  all m atters 
except for outside external a ffa irs .19 B ut even this concept o f  federal 
issues has proved to be a relative one, open to constraints w hich, m ight
indicated that it considered a solution along the lines of a federal state, and it communicated 
to the Mediator a note containing general principles similar to those referred to above in 
regard to the Turkish Cypriot community).
15 The Turkish Cypriots wished to be physically separated from the Greek community. (The 
Galo Plaza Report on Cyprus, Ibid, para. 72).
16 The Galo Plaza Report, Ibid. para. 72
xlIbid, para. 73.
nIbid. para. 73.
l9Ibid. para. 73
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lead  to  a total elim ination o f the central federal governm ent’s strength. 
F ifth , each  could have cultural and econom ic relations directly  w ith
G reece and Turkey as the case m ight be. Each area could also en ter into
20in ternational agreem ents w ith G reece or Turkey as the case m ight be. 
Such a th ing w ould am ount to an indirect annexation o f C yprus to Turkey 
and  G reece respectively21. Sixth, Turks w ould react forcefully  in  case an 
im position  o f Enosis  w as attem pted. “Serious w arnings have been given 
to  m e tha t that an attem pt to im pose such a solution w ould be  likely to 
p recip itate  not only a new  outbreak o f violence on  C yprus itse lf bu t also a 
g rave deterioration in  relations betw een T urkey on the one hand and 
C yprus and  G reece on the other, possibly provoking actual hostilities and 
in  any case jeopard izing  the peace o f the eastern M editerranean reg ion” .22 
This position indicates a clear m essage com ing from  the Turks. A  clear 
w arning (or threat, for the rather biased), w hich w as m aterialized ten 
years afterw ards.
F inally , it is necessary to  m ention the propositions o f  the m ediator, w hich 
are o f  u tm ost im portance. H e concludes that:
(1) the com m on objective w ould now  be the considerably  m ore 
precise: a “fully independent” State w hich w ould  undertake to 
rem ain  independent and to refrain from  any action leading to union 
w ith  any other State.23
20Ibid. para.73
21 It would not be surprising for one to suppose that this provision could be the future basis for 
the transfer of populations from Turkey. The Turkish Cypriot leadership at the negotiations 
have been persistent on the issue of sovereignty, demanding that they be given significant 
powers in external affairs in the context of the proposed federal State. This position should 
not be striking, Turkish settlers having been brought from Turkey following the 1974 
invasion.
22 The Galo Plaza Report on Cyprus supra, para. 146; also see para. 138: The question of 
Enosis has several aspects. If its imposition in present circumstances would be judged from 
the Turkish side as tantamount to an attempt at annexation to be resisted by force...mphasis 
supplied).
23 Op.cit. para. 147 (emphasis original)
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(2) T he next im portant point o f divergence betw een the parties 
concerns the structure o f the independent State. O n the one hand, 
the G reek C ypriot side leadership insists upon  a unitary  form  o f 
governm ent based on the principle o f m ajority  w ith protection o f 
the m inority. On the other hand, the Turkish  Cypriots envisage a 
federal system  w ithin w hich there w ould  exist autonom ous 
Turkish  C ypriot and G reek States, the conditions for whose 
existence w ould be created by the geographical separation, w hich 
they insistently  dem and o f the tw o com m unities. 24
(3) It is essential to  be clear about w hat this proposal im plies. To refer 
to  it as sim ply as federation is to oversim plify the m atter. W hat is 
involved is not m erely to establish a federal fo rm  o f governm ent 
but also to ensure the geographical separation o f  the two 
com m unities. The establishm ent o f a federal regim e requires a 
territorial basis, and this basis does not exist.25
D uring  the sam e period, the G eneral A ssem bly w as also seized o f the 
situation in Cyprus at the initiative o f the Cyprus G overnm ent. A s a result, 
the G eneral A ssem bly adopted on 18th D ecem ber 1965 R esolution 2077 
(XX ), w hich am ounted to  a full vindication o f  the C yprus G overnm ent’s 
position for the full sovereignty, independence, unity  and  territorial 
in tegrity  o f Cyprus and thus considerably strengthened the position o f the 
R epublic. It included a reference not only to the R eport o f  the U nited 
N ations m ediator Galo Plaza but also to  the D eclaration o f  In ten t and  
M em orandum  o f  the Cyprus G overnm ent (A /6039), w hereby it com m itted
24 Ibid. para. 149.
25 Ibid. para. 150. He further adds, “In an earlier part of this report. I explained why the 
island-wide intermingling in normal times of the Greek-Cypriot populations The events since 
December 1963 have not basically altered this characteristic; even if he the enclaves where 
numbers of Turkish Cypriots concentrated following the troubles, are widely scattered over 
the island, while thousands of Turkish Cypriots have remained in mixed villages.”
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itse lf to the full application o f hum an rights and to all citizens o f Cyprus, 
irrespective o f race and religion.
A gainst the attem pts fo r settlem ent o f the C yprus issue before the 
U .N . political organs, a Conference in  London w as held  on 15 January 
1964 betw een Turkey, Greece, the UK, and tw o C yprio t com m unities (no 
m ention was m ade o f the Republic o f  Cyprus ). M akarios reluctantly  
accepted to attend the Conference. The Turkish V ice-President o f the 
Republic, on the other hand, w illingly accepted to com e to the London 
Conference, and stated that the they w ish to  create a separate State, and 
will decide w hether the proposed States w ill rem ain  independent or will 
be annexed to Turkey. A t the sam e tim e the Foreign  M inister o f  G reece, 
X anthopoulos-Palam as, adopted a position against in ternationalisation o f 
the Cyprus issue and issued a statem ent to  the ex tent that placing the 
issue before the U nited N ations is not in  the interests o f either G reece or 
Turkey. A lso he said that “neither Greece nor Turkey have territorial 
dem ands. The defence system  o f the Balkans, the M iddle East, and the 
front against the com m on threat from  the N orth are based on  our 
countries” .26
The final stages o f the C onference w ere m arked by  an A nglo-A m erican 
Plan subm itted by  D uncan Sandys before the parties. The Plan proposed 
the establishm ent o f a Peace-keeping Force in  C yprus com posed o f 
regim ents from  N A TO  m em ber states. A  m ediator w ould be  elected by
26 It is important to quote the argument of Erkin, Turkish Foreign Minister, in this context, 
which is geopolitical and reflects the strategic interests of the Western Alliance: Firstly, 
being sufficiently large and with a suitable location in the Eastern Mediterranean the island 
constitutes a convenient base and holds the eastern Mediterranean under its control. In view 
of the progressing world strategy, Turkey is a country within the western and even the 
Atlantic area. Actually, Turkey logistics are closely tied up with sea communication routes of 
which, coming from the Atlantic towards the eastern Mediterranean, join up at the south 
Anatolian ports. All these supply routes are under the control of the island of Cyprus, only 40 
miles away from the southern coasts of Turkey. On the other hand, Cyprus constitutes a 
foothold behind Turkey’s, and consequently the West’s defence system which may be used in 
the direction of the Eastern Mediterranean and North African shores from the Middle East as 
well as the Balkans (the statement may be found in Tenekides, Cyprus: Athens 1981, p. 314).
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the three G uarantee Pow ers w ho should not be a U .S. citizen or a citizen 
from  the three G uaranteeing Powers. The plan, though w elcom ed by 
G reece and Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots, w as rejected  by  the G reek 
Cypriots.
T he 6-year period o f 1968 to 1974 was one o f re la tive quiet in  so far as 
the C yprus problem  the before the U nited N ations was concerned. The 
explanation  lies in  the fact that from  June 1968, the local in ter-com m unal 
talks on  the constitutional aspect o f the Cyprus p rob lem  w ere being  held 
in  N icosia. These w ere in itiated w ithin the fram ew ork o f the good offices 
o f  the Secretary G eneral and, as was m ade clear by h im  and accepted by 
the T urkish  C ypriot side, on the basis o f a unitary, independent and 
sovereign State in  Cyprus. These talks did not resu lt in agreem ent and 
w ere brought to an abrupt end by the events o f the sum m er 1974.
T he T urkish  invasion o f 20 July 1974, using the crim inal coup d ’etat as a 
pretext, led  to the occupation by Turkey o f a large part o f the territory o f 
the R epublic o f Cyprus. In relation to the U nited N ations it has becom e a 
test case o f  the ability o f the O rganization to m eet a challenge to  its basic 
principles. M uch o f the diplom atic activity o f the C yprus G overnm ent in  
projecting the C yprus cause has been perform ed through the U nited 
N ations. D uring the early stages o f the invasion and throughout the 
critical m onths o f July and A ugust 1974, the Security C ouncil w hich was 
already in  session on the Cyprus situation im m ediately  follow ing the 
coup, passed  a series o f resolutions beginning w ith R esolution 353 (1974) 
adopted on  20 July  1974 w hich, inter a lia , called  for a ceasefire and 
dem anded an im m ediate end to foreign m ilitary in tervention  and follow ed 
this up by R esolutions 354 (1974), 355 (1974), 357 (1974), 358 (1974), 
359 (1974), 360 (1974) and 361 (1974).27 By D ecem ber o f  the sam e year,
27 Regarding the texts, see The Cyprus Problem, Republic of Cyprus, Public Information 
Office, 1975.
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the Security C ouncil in  addition to renew ing the U N FIC Y P’s m andate 
(R esolution 364 (1974)), unanim ously adopted the im portant R esolution 
365 (1974) by  w hich it endorsed G eneral A ssem bly R esolu tion  3212, 
adopted earlier by the G eneral Assem bly.
(3) The period from the Turkish intervention 1974 to the present date
Follow ing the U nilateral D eclaration o f 13 February  1975, 
purporting to create the “Federated Turkish State” in  Cyprus, the m atter 
was again referred  to the Security Council by  the Cyprus G overnm ent. 
A fter protracted deliberations, the Council adopted on 12 M arch 1975 
Resolution 367 (1975) by w hich, inter alia, it regretted  the purported 
declaration, affirm ed that such a declaration does not prejudge the final 
political settlem ent, called for the urgent and effective im plem entation o f 
R esolution 3212 (X X IX ) endorsed by  its R esolution 365 (1974) and 
requested the Secretary-G eneral to undertake a new  m ission  o f good 
offices under his personal auspices tow ards the direction o f 
com prehensive negotiations. In June and D ecem ber 1975, the Security 
C ouncil held  tw o m ore debates on  the Cyprus situation and passed  two 
resolutions renew ing U N FIC Y P’s m andate and reaffirm ing its 
resolutions.28
As far as the G eneral A ssem bly’s action is concerned, every effort was 
also m ade to inform  its m em bers o f the true facts in  Cyprus and to enlist 
its support for a ju s t solution. The President o f Cyprus A rchbishop 
M akarios delivered tw o m ajor addresses as H ead o f S tate in  O ctober 
1975 and m ajor debates were held. A fter preparatory  w ork these debates 
resulted in  the G eneral A ssem bly R esolution 3212 (X X IX ) adopted 
unanim ously on N ovem ber 1974 and o f  G eneral A ssem bly R esolution
28 See S/RES/370 of 13 June 1975 and S/RES/383 of 13 December 1975 respectively.
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3395 (XX X ) adopted on 20 N ovem ber 1975, by a vote o f 111 in  favour 
w ith only Turkey voting against.
These can only be counted as diplom atic successes both  in  term s o f 
the overw helm ing support they received and in  term s o f their provisions, 
w hich, inter alia, called for respect o f the sovereignty, independence, 
territorial in tegrity  o f the Republic o f Cyprus; for the w ithdraw al w ithout 
their further delay o f all foreign forces from  it; for the re turn  o f  all 
refugees to their hom es as well as for m eaningful and constructive
29negotiations.
D uring the thirtieth session o f the G eneral A ssem bly, as a resu lt o f 
the Cyprus G overnm ent delegations efforts and despite the strenuous 
opposition o f Turkey, a separate resolution was adopted on 9 D ecem ber 
197530 requesting the Secretary-G eneral to exert every effort in  assisting 
the tracing and accounting o f m issing persons as a resu lt o f  the arm ed 
conflict in  C yprus and also to provide the relevant inform ation to  the 
H um an Rights Com m ission. In turn the C om m ission adopted on February 
1976 R esolution 4 (X X X IX ) by w hich it referred to the G eneral 
A ssem bly resolutions and the hum anitarian aspects o f the return  o f all 
refugees and o f the m issing persons. This was considered by  the 
ECO SO C which, on 12 M ay 1976, noted w ith approval the R eport o f  the 
C o m m issio n . 31
The tw o Sum m it A greem ents betw een A rchbishop M akarios and 
D enktash, leader o f the Turkish C ypriot com m unity, and President
29 The adoption of Resolution 3212(XXIX), endorsed by Resolution 365 (1974) of the 
Security Council, was in turn helpful for the adoption of the Declaration by the Kingston 
Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting of May 1975, which, in addition to 
expressing its solidarity with the Governments and people of Cyprus and reiterating the call 
for the implementation of the provisions of the United Nations Charter Resolution on Cyprus 
decided also the setting up of Commonwealth Committee of 7 members in order to assist in 
every possible way to that end.
30 See A/RES/3450 (XXX))
31 See E/SR 2002).
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K yprianou-D enktash respectively  constitute a landm ark in  the history  o f 
the Cyprus issue and especially the attem pts to reach  a peaceful 
settlem ent.
On the 12 M arch 1977 M akarios, d isappointed by  the inefficiency 
o f international organizations, m istakenly, in  m y view , concluded a H igh 
Level A greem ent w ith D enktash. It is now adays an undisputed fac t that 
he was clearly m anipulated into it by C lark Clifford, the U.S. P resident 
representative, who assured h im  that if  the proposals at the H igh Level 
M eeting w ere accepted, the U.S. w ould exert pressure upon T urkey to 
reach a settlem ent o f the dispute. On the other hand, M akarios was 
optim istic that the talks w ould be held on basis o f the U.N. decisions and 
C harter p rin c ip le s .32
The A greem ent bears no signatures, but is kep t w ith the Secretariat o f  the 
U.N. They indicate the insistence o f the Turks and interested third parties 
on the discontinuation o f the internationalisation process o f the Cyprus 
issue. The inter-com m unal talks w ere the preferred procedure. The 
G uidelines for the negotiators, as agreed betw een the President o f  the 
Republic A rchbishop M akarios and D enktash, at the U N FIC Y P 
H eadquarters w ere along these lines: (a) A n independent, bi-com m unal 
federation is sought for; (b) The territory to be adm inistered by each 
com m unity is to be discussed in  the ligh t o f econom ic grow th and land 
property; (c) M atters o f principle, like the right to property  and others are 
under discussion, given the principle o f a bi-com m unal federal system, 
and som e practical difficulties, w hich m ay com e up concerning the 
Turkish Cypriots; (d) the functions o f the central federal governm ent shall 
be such as to ensure the unity o f the country, taking into account the bi- 
com m unal character o f the state.
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The A greem ent does not refer to the U .N . decisions on C yprus and 
the principles therein on w hich a settlem ent o f the issue should be 
based .33 For the Turks, w ho w elcom ed the conclusion o f the A greem ents, 
these principles w ere to be set aside.
A lso, the principle stated by all R esolutions, by  w hich refugees have to be 
allow ed to re turn  to their hom eland and retain  their properties was 
ignored.
W hat follow s is the “Ten points” A greem ent betw een K yprianou 
and D enktash. The purpose o f this agreem ent is that inter-com m unal talks 
are continued on the basis o f  the M akarios-D enktash T reaty .34 It provided 
the follow ing: (a) respect for hum an rights and fundam ental freedom s o f 
the citizens o f the Republic, (b) the future dem ilitarization o f  the island, 
(c) the recognition o f the independence, sovereignty, and territorial 
in tegrity  o f the Republic- in  part or in all un ion o f  Cyprus w ith  a third 
country  being precluded as well as any form  o f  partition or division o f the 
island, (d) the priority o f resettlem ent o f  the Fam agusta residents in  their 
tow n, under the auspices o f the U nited Nations.
Poin t 6 o f the A greem ent should be noted. A ccording to it, it w as agreed 
to  abstain from  any action w hich m ight jeopard ize the outcom e o f  the 
talks. The Turkish Cypriots interpreted this provision broadly, so that 
they argued that the dialogue runs a risk  o f ending up w ithout success, if  
the in ternationalisation o f the Cyprus issue, especially  a process before
32 It also asserted that he accepted the Agreements, because he considered that the High Level 
Meeting was a chance to repel the accusation against him, maliciously spelled out by his 
opponents, that he had been intransigent (Tenekides, Cyprus, ante, p.289).
33 It is noteworhty that two leaders decided about the future form of the Cyprus State and its 
government. But, according to the principle of self-determination, it is for the people to 
decide about their own fate and system of government, not the elected leaders.
34 It has to be noted that on 2 September 1975, in a speech before the General Assembly of the 
United Nations, Kissinger presented five points for the settlement of the Cyprus issue, which 
included the need for protection of the Turkish Cypriots in the context of a bi-communal, bi­
zonal federation (see U.S. Department of State, Bureau Public Affairs, The Secretary of State , 
22 September 1975, pp. 4-5). For the text of the Treaties see Republic of Cyprus, Public 
Information Office, Cyprus Inter-communal Talks (Nicosia: PIO, 1979) p. 23.
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political organs o f the U nited Nations, was to be preferred by the G reek- 
C yprio ts as an alternative.35
W hy was then the process o f inter-com m unal talks to be preferred 
over the internationalisation o f the issue, and especially  its placem ent 
before  the political organs o f the international organization?
A s far as the Turks and Turkish Cypriots w ere concerned, the opportunity  
o f  inter-com m unal talks set aside w hat happened in  the past, and 
therefore any attem pt to place responsibility  upon Turkey for the 
in tervention in  1974. By referring to realism  and the prim ary im portance 
o f  fu ture decisions, the invasion, m ilitary occupation, v iolations o f 
hum anitarian  law  o f arm ed conflict and hum an rights are forgotten  (at 
least this is the im pression given). The inter-com m unal talks is the 
m ethod by w hich the principles o f International Law  are sacrificed upon 
expediencies.36
The aim  o f Turkey had  always been to elim inate the legal personality  o f 
the R epublic o f Cyprus. Thus, through the route o f  in ter-com m unal talks, 
the Cyprus issue is put outside its international context, by w hich the 
R epublic o f Cyprus is entitled to appear as the applicant S tate against the 
defendant State w hich is Turkey. O n the contrary, in  the context o f  the 
in ter-com m unal d ialogue the R epublic’s G overnm ent is underm ined by  
being presented as “G reek-Cypriot com m unity” , thus p laced on an equal 
fo o tin g  w ith the Turkish C ypriot com m unity. Therefore, the Turkish 
C ypriot com m unity does not accept any other process but the inter- 
com m unal dialogue, in  order that the international responsibility  fo r the 
p rob lem  w ould not be ascribed to A nkara, but to the Turkish  C ypriot
35 Thus, they achieved that the Cyprus Problem be deleted from the Agenda of the General 
Assembly of the United Nations in the fall of 1980.
36 Proof to this is the fact that in the context of the inter-communal talks an agreement was 
signed between Clerides and Denktash which the Turks and Turkish Cypriots interpreted as 
an exchange of population agreement. It is true that it contravenes the rights of man.
210
com m unity itself, w hose status is ra ther not easily  defined, and cannot 
reasonably or legally  be blaim ed for the invasion o f 1974.
In this way, the Turkish C ypriots succeeded in  gaining a lo t o f  advantages 
from  the process follow ed.37
As far as the international com m unity is concerned, especially  the 
U.S. and the States o f the W estern  A lliance, their stance against adoption 
o f U.N. R esolutions at the tim e, m anifests their oppositions to the 
international procedures as m eans o f reaching a peaceful settlem ent o f the 
dispute. It shows, on the contrary, that they prefer the process o f talks 
behind close doors. In fact, they  w ere in favour o f this process since the 
very beginning, in order to give Turkey, their greatest ally in  the 
M editerranean region, the chance to retain  control o f C yprus and get 
aw ay from  a possible international outcry against her, w hich w ould have 
been caused, had the political organs o f the international organisation 
form ally declared that it had  violated in ternationally  accepted rules. Such 
an eventuality w ould have been negative to its European U nion path.
In 1978 the U nited N ations Secretary-G eneral adopted a Plan 
subm itted on part o f the U .S38. The N im etz P lan  was presented  by on 10 
N ovem ber 1978 by  the U .S D epartm ent o f S tate adviser, and supported 
by the governm ents o f C anada and the U nited K ingdom 39.
37 It has to be said that, interestingly, in a Conference on the “Security of the Mediterranean” 
held at Monaco, in February 1981, a Turkish high ranking official said that “Turkey, while 
not prepared to make any concessions in matters concerning the Aegean, in the case of the 
Cyprus problem there is no ground for anxiety, since most aspects of it have been solved 
already”. (Tenekides, Cyprus, supra , p.322, fn.129). It is obvious that the Turks had gained 
the utmost benefit they could have hoped for, namely the de fa c to  recognition of the situation 
created as a result of the use of force in 1974.
38 See Fram ework f o r  a Cyprus Settlem ent P repared  by the U.S., British  an d  Canadian  
Governments, Republic of Cyprus, Public Information Office, Cyprus Inter-com m unal Talks 
(Nicosia: PIO, 1979), pp.62-65.
39 That is why the Plan is known as ABC plan (ABC standing for the initials of the countries 
which supported it). Diplomatic sources stressed that the U.K. played a decisive role in the 
drafting of the plan, but the United States put it forward.
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This Plan was the first m ediation attem pt o f the U .S. tow ards a settlem ent 
o f the Cyprus issue since the Turkish invasion. This attem pt was due to 
the fact that the inter-com m unal talks for im plem entation o f the M akarios 
and D enktash A greem ents reached a stalem ate. This was also due to the 
initiative taken by  President to contribute to the settlem ent o f the problem . 
The Plan proposed a form ula by w hich Turkey and  the T urkish  Cypriots 
should give back  m uch o f the territory occupied  in  return  for 
constitutional privileges. In fact, the proposed  solution was a 
confederation based on the political equality o f the tw o com m unities. A 
“positive” elem ent o f the Plan was the proposal fo r resettlem ent o f the 
residents o f the city o f Fam agusta under the auspices o f the U nited 
Nations. H ow ever, the negative aspects o f it w as that, w hile referring to 
the U.N. resolutions, and recognizing the need for im plem entation o f the 
hum an rights o f all Cypriots, it curtailed these very  righ ts by  referring to 
the M akarios-D enktash A greem ent and the Zurich and L ondon Accords. 
A lso the m atter o f the w ithdraw al o f Turkish troops was le ft open for 
negotiation. B oth parties expressed reservations on the Plan and 
eventually re jected  it.40
In 1984, the U.N. Secretary-G eneral, offering his good offices, in 
the context o f the internationalisation o f the C yprus issue, lead  the w ay to 
a fresh round o f inter-com m unal talks, the perm ission o f the Security 
Council having been given in  A ugust 1984. Perez de C uellar41 presented
40 The U.S. saw the “Nimetz Plan” as a lost opportunity for the settlement of the Cyprus issue. 
The ensuing Cold war strengthened the negotiating position of Turkey and, because of this 
Washington declared that could not exert pressure upon the former to reach a settlement of 
the Cyprus issue. This was the position of the two Reagan administrations, especially after the 
Unilateral Declaration of Independence of the “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus” in 
1983.
41 Before taking up his duties as Secretary-General of the United Nations, Xavier Perez de 
Cuellar was the Special Representative in Cyprus of the former United Nations Secretary 
General.
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an O utline for agreem ent w hich was discussed in  N ew  Y ork by 
K yprianou and D enktash. 42
This initiative was also unsuccessful because it left open for negotiation 
such basic issues as the w ithdraw al o f Turkish troops, the international 
guarantees for security, and the so called “three basic freedom s” . The 
Secretary-G eneral put forw ard revised proposals, w hich w ere then 
com m ented upon by both sides. The G reek C ypriot party to  the dialogue 
suggested that an international Conference be held  to deal w ith the issue 
o f dem ilitarisation.43 The talks reached a deadlock. 44 
In July 1989, D e C uellar presented to the Cyprus G overnm ent and the 
Turkish Cypriots another O utline for the settlem ent o f the Cyprus issue 
which represented a revised version o f the 1985 one. This O utline was 
also identical w ith the N im etz Plan, and w as evidently  in  contradiction to 
U.N. R esolutions, thus dim inishing the prestige and efficiency o f the 
O rganisation as such. The Outline: (1) provided for the establishm ent o f a 
loose federation; (2) extended, as com pared to the 1960 Constitution, the 
veto rights o f the Turkish Cypriots and separate voting rights in  the 
H ouse o f R epresentatives, thus recognising the presence o f  tw o politically  
equal com m unities in  the constitutional settlem ent o f the C yprus issue 
(ignoring the m ajority-m inority relationship); (3) lim ited the 
im plem entation o f the three basic freedom s; (4) presented the Cyprus 
G overnm ent proposal for dem ilitarisation o f C yprus as an aim  for the 
future. (5) proposed the balance o f m ilitary strength am ong the two 
parties; (6) recognised the need for the continuous presence o f  Turkish 
troops at a h igher level than those provided for by  the 1960 constitution
42 For the texts, see United Nations, S/18102/Add. I, Annex I, II, V.
43 For the position of the parties, Ibid.
44 Again, the U.S., that had supported the initiative of the Secretary-General, saw this as a lost 
opportunity, and warned that the future proposals would be worse that the ones already submitted. Also, 
they as well as Turkey claimed that the Kyprianou and Papandreou (Greek) Governments respectively
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and stipulated for the preservation o f T urkey’s rights o f intervention; (7) 
did not include clear proposals for the w ithdraw al o f  Turkish settlers; (8) 
left the territorial aspect o f the issue to be discussed in  future negotiations 
and suggested that com pensations be given to  refugees, so that the inter- 
com m unal character o f the federation m ight be em phasised (this im plying 
the need for a Turkish C ypriot m ajority in  the N orth  in  order tha t bi- 
com m unal federation m ight be properly established); (9) im posed  on  the 
G reek Cypriots certain financial obligations in favour o f the Turkish 
Cypriots; (10) underm ined the Republic o f Cyprus by granting the two 
parts o f the federal State lim ited  international personality  (o r lim ited 
external sovereignty). O verall, this O utline provided for partition  o f 
Cyprus and the transform ation o f the Republic o f C yprus in to  a Turkish 
protectorate as it were.
D espite the deadlock w hich this new  initiative reached, N elson 
Ledsky45 believed that he could  keep the inter-com m unal dialogue going 
and find a form ula for the tw o com m unities. O n 26 o f  February 1990, the 
Secretary -G en era l, on the advice o f Ledsky, convened a H igh Level 
M eeting in  N ew  Y ork betw een President Basileiou and M r D enktash. The 
Secretary-G eneral, and M r. Ledsky, w ho was present at the talks, stressed 
that the reconstructed Cyprus R epublic w ould no t be based  on  the 
m ajority-m inority relationship  betw een the tw o com m unities, bu t on that 
o f equal footing o f the two parties. H e also presented new  constitutional 
proposals the basis o f w hich was the establishm ent o f a C onfederated 
State. A fter five days o f intense talks, the M eeting failed. D enktash, and
were responsible for the deadlock, though the Cyprus Government made a number of concessions in 
the context of implementing the Makarios-Denktash Agreements.
45 In June 1989, Nelson Ledsky was appointed Coordinator for the Cyprus Problem at the U.S. 
Department of State. His tasks were to support the initiatives of the United Nations Secretary General. 
This appointment indicates the diplomatic contribution of the United States io reaching a settlement of 
the Cyprus issue (ostensibly) under the auspices of the United Nations.
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clearly  the Secretary-G eneral were using te rm in o lo g y 46 w hich was 
inconsistent w ith the one used until then at the various preceding talks 47 
A fter the failure o f the H igh Level M eeting, the Cyprus issue was 
discussed in  the U .N  Security Council in M arch 1990. R esolution 649 
w as unanim ously approved w hich was prepared by  N elson Ledsky, the 
U nited K ingdom  and the Secretary-G eneral, w hich, in  m y view , proved 
to be o f negative force for the Cyprus issue, despite the rhetoric o f 
political victory in  N icosia and A thens, m ainly pu t forw ard fo r internal 
politics purposes. W hat is the content o f R esolution 649? W hy did it not 
have positive im pact on the interests o f Cyprus? H ow  is it indicative o f 
the fact that the U.S. policy was identical w ith that pursued  by the 
Secretary-G eneral? W hy is it one o f the very few , i f  not the only one, 
accepted by both  the U.S. and Turkey? The answ er is given by its 
provisions: (1) It sees the Cyprus issue as a b i-com m unal problem , 
requiring constitutional settlem ent and not as an in ternational issue o f 
foreign intervention and occupation; (2) It calls for negotiations on the 
basis o f equality o f the two com m unities, as Turkey w as requesting since 
the very beginning o f the problem ; (3) W hile referring to the param eters 
o f the constitutional and territorial aspects o f the issue, it does not m ake 
specific reference to the concessions w ith regard  to territory, the 
w ithdraw al o f the Turkish settlers and army, the re tu rn  o f  refugees, or the 
three “basic freedom s” ; (4) It underm ines the sovereignty o f  the Cyprus 
Republic; (5) O nly im pliedly does it recognize the unanim ous resolutions 
o f the U .N  Security C ouncil on Cyprus.
46 Notably by referring to the right of self-determination for the two communities, etc.
47 Politicians in Washington and the United Nations said that the responsibility for failure should be 
with Nelson Ledsky. However, the U.S. claimed that the repetition of dialogue was necessary despite 
the huge differences between the two Communities positions. Ledsky coordinated his efforts with those 
of the Secretary-General to such an extent that they looked as though they were identical.
48 This point is of crucial importance, because the Cyprus Republic had accepted the solution of 
federalism, but only in the context of an overall settlement of the problem which would cover such 
issues as the return of refugees, rights of intervention on part of Turkey, etc.
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L et us now  see the situation created after the K uw ait crisis.
T he Iraqi invasion o f K uw ait on 2 A ugust 1990, had  a positive outcom e 
on  the strategic im portance o f Turkey, and brought about a close 
rela tionsh ip  betw een Presidents B ush and Ozal. This developm ent 
affected  the Cyprus R epublic in tw o ways. O n the one hand, the Cyprus 
G overnm ent faced serious pressure on part o f the U .S. for engaging into a 
new  inter-com m unal dialogue for the settlem ent o f the issue. O n the other 
hand, it w as hoped that the K uw ait crisis could  fo rm  a precedent for 
im plem entation o f all U .N. R esolutions on  C yprus.49 
W ith  the strategic im portance Turkey had  acquired, it was im possible for 
there to  be  a progress w ith regard  to the Cyprus issue. A fter the end o f the 
G u lf war, W ashington took up new  initiatives through Jam es B aker and 
N elson  L edsky to bring about a final settlem ent to the issue. President 
B ush repeatedly  stated that the U.S. supports a  settlem ent through 
negotiations under the auspices o f the U .N . Secretary-G eneral. The 
A m erican optim ism  was due to the follow ing reasons: (1) The A m erican- 
Soviet relations o f cooperation in  the U nited N ations strengthened the 
prestige o f  the International O rganization as w ell as the negotiating 
strength o f  the Secretary-G eneral; (2) The Secretary-G eneral was 
determ ined  to find a settlem ent before the end o f  his service; (3) The 
relations betw een A nkara and W ashington w ere very  close, especially  as
49 The U.S. and Turkey were firmly opposed to this second standpoint of the Cyprus Government, on 
the ground that, contrary to the case of Iraq, Turkey had the right to intervene militarily under the 
Treaty of Guarantee 1960. Turkey also added that her intervention in Cyprus was similar to that of the 
U.S. in the Persian Gulf. While the American intervention was necessary for the liberation of Kuwait, 
conversely, it was argued, the Turkish one was necessary to prevent the Union (Enosis) of Cyprus with 
Greece. The U.S. Secretary of State, James Baker, in a statement before Congress in 1991, said that the 
U.N Security Council Resolutions on Cyprus, in contrast to those on Kuwait, are of procedural 
character, viz they proposed settlement of the issue through negotiations. The Spokesman of the U.S 
State Department had clarified the position of the Secretary of State by saying that Resolutions on 
Cyprus also include substantive provisions, but that the settlement of the issue should be reached via 
negotiations and not through the implementation of the U.N. Resolutions. In April 1991, the Foreign 
Relations Committee of Congress put forward this view: that while the Resolutions on Kuwait come 
under Chapter VII of the U.N Charter (ACTION WITH RESPECT TO THREATS TO THE PEACE, 
BREACHES OF THE PEACE, AND ACTS OF AGGRESSION), those on Cyprus come under
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betw een the Presidents o f the tw o countries; (4) Turkey realized  that the 
Cyprus issue was an obstacle to her relations w ith the European 
Com m unity; (5) The relations betw een A thens and W ashington were 
friendly, during the Prem iership o f M itsotakis, w ho m ade the relations o f 
the tw o countries m uch better after the PA SO K  office in  G reek 
G overnm ent; (6) President Basileiou gave assurances that he w ould  do 
his best to solve the issue peacefully by w ay o f negotiations.
A  C onference to be held  in  the U nited States was proposed by 
Turkey and the U .S., bu t the Turkish elections o f  20th O ctober 1991 put 
the initiative to a standstill. The new  Turkish Prim e M inister was against 
the policy follow ed by Ozal until then. It was expected that Suleym an 
D em irel m ight adopt harder positions than those o f O zal in  Turkish 
foreign policy.50 Perez de C uellar retired, and was succeeded by Butros 
Ghali, who continued the coordination w ith N elson Ledsky.
In the m idst o f w arnings by  G hali that the U nited N ations Peace K eeping 
Forces (U N FICY P) w ould be rem oved from  the island  in  view  o f  the 
failure o f the negotiations and the need for peacekeepers in  other parts o f 
the globe, the Secretary-G eneral subm itted a R eport on C yprus.51 It is o f 
crucial im portance, because it com prises the eight points w hich the two 
parties had discussed under the auspices o f the U .N . Secretary-G eneral 
until the year 1991. C learly, disagreem ent still exists on the m atters o f 
refugees, territory, and Executive. The R eport w as adopted, w ith  the 
exception o f paragraph 26, by the Security C ouncil.52
Chapter VI (PACIFIC SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES). See further Dimitri Constas, The Greek- 
Turkish Conflict in the 1990’s- Domestic and External Influences (LondonrMacmillan, 1991), pp.40-56.
50 Nine days before the elections in Turkey, Security Council Resolution 716 called the “two parties” in 
Cyprus, as well as Greece and Turkey to take up negotiations. But the attempts on part of the 
Secretary-General and Nelson Ledsky to call a Conference on Cyprus were in vain, because the new 
Turkish Government would not accept.
51 S-23780
52 SC Res. 750, 10th April 1992.
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L et us now  turn to  the period from  1991 to the present.53 In A pril 
1992, a Set o f Ideas was subm itted by the Secretary-G eneral, B utros 
G hali. P roxim ity talks w ere held in N ew  Y ork and H igh Level M eetings 
in  1992, but w ere eventually  fruitless. C onfidence B uilding M easures 
w ere proposed as a first step for an overall settlem ent o f the issue. The 
G hali Se t o f  Ideas  was accepted by the Cyprus G overnm ent as a basis for 
a settlem ent o f the Cyprus issue, in  spite o f statem ents o f President 
B asile iou  h im self to the extent that it was accepted only as a basis for 
further negotiations. The Ghali Set o f  Ideas  provided fo r the 
establishm ent o f a loose federation, w ithout m aking reference to the rest 
o f  the thorny issues such as the Turkish troops w ithdraw al, the territorial 
adjustm ents, and the “three basic freedom s” . H aving nothing to fear out 
o f  the non-im plem entation o f the Security C ouncil R esolutions, w hich 
stipulated for a C yprus State w ith a single legal personality  and 
sovereignty, the Turkish Cypriots openly rejected the idea o f federation 
and insisted  upon recognition o f the “Turkish R epublic o f N orthern 
C yprus” .
A s from  1995 onw ards, the U.S. and the U .K .54 took  the in itiative 
to  m ake possible the com m encem ent o f a fresh round o f  talks under the 
good offices o f  the U .N . Secretary-G eneral. These initiatives were 
accelerated  due to the tension in the relations betw een G reece and Turkey
53 It should be noted that the United States are particularly keen on a settlement of the issue during this 
period, for the following reasons: (a) The U.S. role in the U.N. and NATO has been strengthened, 
mainly because of the dependence of Russia upon the West, as well as the absence of EU Common 
Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP); (b) the important strategic position of Turkey in the post-Cold 
War era in South-Eastern Europe, Eastern Mediterranean, and the Middle East; (c) fears for a 
possibility of constitutional crisis in Turkey, because of the Kurdish problem and the country’s 
financial difficulties; (d) the deadlock in the attempts for a settlement of the Middle East problem; (e) 
the possibility for a Greco-Turkish crisis in the Aegean and Cyprus, especially after the Imia crisis in 
the Fall of 1996 and the keen interest on part of the Cyprus Government for purchase of the Russian 
missile system S-300.
54 Two points need be made with regard to the motives of the Anglo-American policy at this stage: (a) 
the U.K. and the U.S.A. aimed at linking the EU accession of Cyprus with the imposition of a 
constitutional settlement based on loose federation; (b) the U.S.A. impliedly adopted the Turkish 
position that a possible accession of Cyprus into the European Union, without the Cyprus problem
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after the Im ia crisis in  the A egean Sea, and the killings o f G reek C ypriot 
citizens in  D eryneia (Fam agusta province) by Turkish  C ypriots extrem ists 
and Turkish terrorists.
Indeed, H igh Level Talks took place under the auspices o f the new 
U .N . Secretary G eneral, Kofi Annan. President C lerides and M r. 
D enktash m et at Troutbeck, N ew  York, from  9 to 13 July 1997. A  second 
round o f talks follow ed at G lion o f Sw itzerland from  11-15 A ugust 1997. 
These m eetings w ere coordinated by the U.N. Secretary G eneral’s 
Special R epresentative D iego Cordovez. Again, these talks w ere 
eventually unsuccessful, because o f serious different standpoints am ong 
the parties, despite pressure exerted by  the U .S. upon the Secretary- 
G eneral to give continuation to the dialogue, thus giving the chance to the 
com m unities to reach  a peaceful agreem ent.55
The only positive outcom e from  the talks in  G lion was the agreem ent on 
hum anitarian issues, notably on m issing persons.
N ext com es the im portant negotiations in  N ew  Y ork under Kofi 
Annan, w hose opening statem ent constitutes a landm ark in  the process 
for settlem ent o f the Cyprus issue. On 12 Septem ber 2000 the Secretary- 
G eneral stated: “the equal status o f the parties m ust expressly  be 
recognized” . The talks ended up in  failure, no t surprisingly, but the above 
statem ent, interpreted as im plying that the political equality  o f  the two 
com m unities has to be recognized in  the context o f an ostensibly  federal 
(actually confederate state), has been subject to fierce critic ism  by G reek 
Cypriots.
being solved, and without Turkey becoming member of the EU, will be the ground for the formal 
division of the island.
55 The initiative of the Americans continued under the Clinton administration when Richard Holbrooke 
was appointed as representative of the U.S. President on Cyprus. Holbrooke had successive meetings in 
1997 with President Clerides and Mr Denktash in Nicosia. Holbrooke accepted that the U.S. had made 
mistakes with regard to its policy on Greece and Cyprus until 1994 (Statement to the Cyprus 
Broadcasting Corporation, November 1997).
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C ertainly, none o f the above initiatives has had substantial resu lts for the 
settlem ent o f the Cyprus issue.
(4) Evaluation of U.N. Political Organs’ role in International Dispute 
Settlement
It has already been em phasized that the U nited  N ations ro le  in  
term s o f Peacekeeping in  the case o f C yprus56 has been  satisfactory, w ith 
the exception o f their inaction during the 1996 events at D eryneia, 
Fam agusta. O n the other hand, there is no justification  for the lack o f 
effective (enforcem ent) action on part o f the U nited Nations. W hat I shall 
do is to  attem pt to give an explanation.
Firstly, the point has to be m ade that clear in junctions are 
in terpreted  by others as no m ore than conditional recom m endations. So, 
the Turkish representatives allege that G eneral A ssem bly and even 
Security  C ouncil R esolutions, so long as they do no t com e under C hapter 
V II o f the U.N. Charter, are m erely recom m endations.
The question still rem ains: w hy cannot the U nited N ations take 
enforcem ent action? The answ er m ay be found in the com position o f  the 
U nited  N ations. The U nited N ations is not a w orld  governm ent nor a 
super-State. It is an association o f sovereign States. A lthough the 
decisions taken under C hapter V II o f the U .N . C harter m ust be enforced
56 See generally, Rosalyn Higgins, United Nations Peacekeeping: Documents and Commentary 
(Published under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs RIIA by Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1969-1981); Idem: Problems and Process: International Law and How We Use It 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994); Idem: The Development of International Law through the 
Political Organs of the United Nations (London and New York, 1963 ); Idem: The New United 
Nations: appearance and reality (Hull University Press, 1993); Jacovides Andreas, A view from within: 
the role o f the small States and the Cyprus experience in Higgins, Rosalyn, International Organization: 
law in movement (London, New York, Oxford University Press for the Royal Institute of International 
Affairs, 1974); Bowett D., United Nations Forces: a legal study o f United Nations practice (London: 
Stevens, 1964) esp. chapter on UNF1CYP; Idem, The Law of International Institutions (London: 
Stevens, 1982); Goodrich and Hambro, Charter of the United Nations, Commentary and Documents 
(Boston: World Peace Foundation, 1949); Kelsen, The Law of the United Nations: a critical analysis of
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and com plied with, because o f  political expediencies, the practical 
m easures are rather different. The veto provision, either used or 
threatened as a deterrent against a resolution addressed to one o f the 
Security C ouncil M em bers, surely has prevented the im plem entation or 
enforcem ent o f Resolutions. It is because o f this that it has been  argued 
that there is no such thing as In ternational C om m unity , bu t rather an 
international society.
It is true that pow er politics often go against im plem entation o f 
International L aw  principles.
D espite this the U nited N ations has an im portant role to play. Through its 
C harter principles and resolutions on Cyprus, it provides the fram ew ork 
for the settlem ent o f the issue. A s put by an International Law  scholar, 
“the U nited N ations is still the conscience o f m ankind and an im portant 
forum  in  w hich our case is heard and through w hich international public 
opinion can be m obilized further” .57 To quote A rchbishop M akarios:58 
“A nd if  the talks are not resum ed or if  they fail after resum ption, I 
consider it im perative a new  recourse to the U nited N ations. I w ill not 
argue that the international O rganization w ill definitely give a  solution to 
the problem . It can how ever, contribute to  a solution and, i f  nothing else, 
it can help keep the Cyprus problem  on the international scene and give it 
international d im ensions” .
H ow ever, I w ould be a b it sceptical in  accepting the full 
im plication o f the above proposition. As it has been shown, the U nited 
Nations political organs do not always decide w ith sufficient clarity on 
whose side the law  is. Sim ultaneously, they function in  collaboration w ith 
pow erful States to such an extent that their decisions and actions or non­
its fundamental problems (New York, 1951);Hart, H.L.A. The Concept o f Law (Oxford Oxford 
University Press, 1961), where Hart launches a major attack on the non-efficacy of international law.
57 Jacovides, A. in Attalides(ed.), Cyprus Reviewed (Nicosia 1977) p. 196.
58 VRADYNI, Athens Newspaper, 6 May 1975.
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actions are influenced by these States. It is m y subm ission that the Cyprus 
issue need better be settled by m eans o f negotiation and  m ediation jo intly , 
and if  need be under the auspices o f the U.N. Secretary-G eneral. D espite 
the negative elem ents o f this process, especially  the danger o f  having 
negotiations on a non-principled basis or a possib le bias on  part o f a 
m ediator tow ards a specific party ,59 it is perhaps the m ost effective one in 
the im perfect system  o f International D ispute Settlem ent. W ith regard  to 
Cyprus, given the strategic expediencies o f various countries involved, I 
w ould subm it that the in terested  parties’60 ro le  in  the settlem ent o f  the 
Cyprus dispute is o f crucial im portance, certainly fo r the benefit o f the 
Cyprus Republic, and need be taken into account.
59 See further Merrills, International Dispute settlement (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1998), p. 36: “The value of mediators are not infallible and often have interests of their own which may 
influence what they say and how their messages are received” .
60 In particular that of the U.K. and the U.S.
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1. Turkish promotion of federation
“The proposed creation of two separate states or zones in a small 
country of the size of Cyprus under the ostensible pretext of the security of the 
Turkish Cypriot community has no other purpose than under the guise of 
federation to achieve a partition of the island and eventually satisfy the 
expansionist aims of Turkey which has been aspiring at such a solution since 
1955”.
This statement, made by Criton Tomaritis Q.C., formerly Attorney-General of 
the Republic of Cyprus, biased though it may seem, remains to be confirmed in 
the context of statements made by Turkish politicians.
The Turkish Foreign Minister the late Zorlu, made no secret at the 
Tripartite Conference on Eastern Mediterranean and Cyprus held in London in 
August-September, 1955 that Turkey had claims on Cyprus. He stated on the 
1st September, 1955: “Turkey is not only in her rights in making such a claim, 
but it is also in duty to do so. For the importance of Cyprus to Turkey does not 
arise from a single cause; it is a necessity which emanates from the exigencies 
of history, geography, economy and military strategy, from the right to 
existence and security, which is the most sacred right of every State, in short, 
from the very nature of things”.1
He supported that in case of self-government, the Greeks and Turks should be 
treated on a full equality basis without any consideration of numerical 
majorities and he concluded that, in case the then status quo was disturbed, 
Cyprus should revert to Turkey. The people of Turkey, he said, cannot 
conceive in any other way the fate of the island which is of vital importance for 
the defence of their own soil.
That Turkey raised claims over Cyprus for its own interests rather than 
the protection of the Turkish Cypriots appears from what the Turkish Foreign 
Minister, Mr. Erkin, said at the London Conference on the 16th of January,
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1964. After referring to the familiar argument, that of the strategic importance 
of Cyprus to Turkey, and the geographical position of Cyprus as being a 
continuation of the Anatolian peninsula he concluded that part of his address 
remarking: “all these considerations clearly demonstrate that Cyprus has a vital 
importance for Turkey not merely because of the existence of a Turkish 
community on the island, but also on account of its geo-strategic bearing”.
M r Erkin, furthermore in June 1964, in a newspaper interview in Athens said 
that the radical solution would be to cede one part of Cyprus to Greece and the 
other, closest to the Asiatic coast, to Turkey.2
A clear indication of the tactical nature of the use of federation as an 
official camouflage of partition is contained in the statement of the then 
Turkish Prime Minister Ismet Inonu in his address to the Turkish National 
Assembly on the 8th September, 1964: “officially* we promoted the federation 
concept, rather ‘than the partition thesis so as to remain within the provisions 
o f the Treaty’’.3
It is significant that Mr. Gunes, the Turkish Foreign Minister, put the 
matter thus:
“Prior to the presumption of the enlarged local talks in Cyprus there were 
certain agreements referring to the principles on which a possible solution to 
the Cyprus problem should be based. The granting of local autonomy to the 
Turkish Cypriot community and the preservation of the fundamental principles, 
on which the 1960 international agreements are based, were among these 
agreements. As long as these agreements were respected, some progress was 
made in the course of the local talks. The difficulties arose when these 
agreements, which should be respected to the end, were affected by a tendency 
not to recognise any more the status of partner,4 enjoyed by the Turkish Cypriot
1 Cmnd. 9595
2 Vema Greek Newspaper, 1964
3 Emphasis supplied. The statement may be found in Criton Tomaritis, Cyprus and its Constitutional 
and Other Legal Problems, ante p. 1.
4 The Turkish side used to put forward the allegation that the Republic of Cyprus was run in 
partnership between the Greek and the Turkish communities, as if  it were a joint business concern. 
From a strict legal point of view, that is not correct. The 1960 Constitution does not contemplate any 
notion of partnership. The concept was taken from the Macmillan Plan for the solution of the Cyprus
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community on the basis of equality with the Greek Cypriot community 
regarding the participation in the independence, sovereignty and territorial 
integrity of the state. Consequently, if this tendency were to be abolished and 
the above agreements as well as the bi-communal character of the Cyprus state 
were to be respected, I think that it would not be difficult to solve the Cyprus 
problem in a way satisfying all the parties concerned. For this reason the parties 
concerned must examine the question sincerely, in a constructive way without 
insisting on matters of terminology. They must work to find a solution in 
accord with the island’s realities.5
2. The Concept of Federalism
Before embarking upon a detailed examination of the issue whether the 
federal system may be implemented in the case of Cyprus and particularly, 
whether it would be compatible with the notion of human rights, let us consider 
what is meant in public law by federalism and federal state.
The states from a constitutional law standpoint and according to the 
structure of the state power are classified in simple or unitary and composite 
states. In the unitary state the state power is one and indivisible comprising all 
the state functions and is vested in the legal person of the state, which through 
its organs exercises such power on all physical and legal persons within its 
territory. The composite state on the other hand consists of the linking together 
by legal bonds of two or more states, which constitute a union of states. When 
by the union a new state is created such state is a composite state in contrast to 
the unitary state.
Whilst in the unitary state power is one and indivisible, in the composite 
state such power is distributed between the composite state and its constituent 
members, each of which within its own sphere is sovereign and exercises
problem under which a scheme of partnership was proposed for the government of Cyprus between the 
three Guarantor states of Great Britain, Greece and Turkey (Foot, A Start in Freedom, London, 1964, 
pp. 168-170). There could be a partnership between states in the administration of a certain territory 
(such as the condominium in international law as to which see Oppenheim-Lauterpacht, International 
Law, vol. I, London 1955, pp. 453— 455), but not partnership between two communities.
5 Interview to the Greek Newspaper Vema, June 1974.
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exclusively the state power conferred on it. In the composite state, the main 
form of which is the federal state,6 the political power is divided between the 
federal state itself and its component parts, which usually are states or other 
territorial areas under various names such as provinces, cantons, regions, 
having the status of states.
Federalism is a sociological phenomenon. The federal state is 
constituted by the permanent union of states of restricted competence under a 
common government and organs.7
In the federal state the federal government prevails, which, according to 
Professor Wheare, “is a system of government which embodied predominantly 
a division of powers between the general and regional authorities, each of 
which in its own sphere is co-ordinate with others and independent of them”.8 
Federal government is governed by the federal principle which, according to 
Professor Wheare, “is the method of dividing the powers so that the general 
and regional governments are each, within a sphere, co-ordinate and 
independent, the important point being whether the powers of government are 
divided between the co-ordinate independent authorities or not”.9 The powers 
granted to the federal state are of legislative, executive and judicial kind. These 
powers are exercised by the federal state through its own organs.
3. Federal state for Cyprus: A Constitutional Law perspective
Can a federal state be established in Cyprus? It is my submission that 
such a form of state and system of government would be a very difficult 
constitutional system. This proposition remains to be examined in the context 
of constitutional law and history. By the Turkish Cypriot proposals submitted
6 Confederacy constitutes a more loose form of federation between two or more confederated states 
linked together by a recognised international treaty into a union, for the maintenance of their external 
and internal independence. History, however, proved that the confederation of states has not been 
satisfactory. Such confederations were those of the United States of America from 1778 to 1787, of 
Germany from 1815 to 1866, of Switzerland from 1291 to 1798 and from 1815 to 1848, and the 
Republic of Central America, which comprised the sovereign states of Nicaragua, Honduras and San 
Salvador from 1895 to 1898.
7 Oppenheim-Lauterpacht, International Law ante, p. 175.
8 Wheare, Federal Government, London, 4th ed., 1963, p.33.
9 Ibid, p. 10.
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at the Geneva Conference, the Republic of Cyprus shall be composed of two 
federated states with full control land autonomous within the boundaries of 
their respective geographical boundaries. The area of the Turkish-Cypriot 
Federated State shall cover 34 per centum of the territory of the Republic 
falling north of the a general line starting from the Limnitis -Lefka area in the 
West and running towards the east, passing through the Turkish controlled part 
of Nicosia, including the Turkish part of Famagusta and ending at the port of 
Famagusta. The area so claimed by the Turkish Cypriot side coincides with that 
of the Attila line. And it is of an extent of 1075.20 sq. miles (out of 3572 square 
miles of the whole area of Cyprus) with a total population of 183, 859 
inhabitants (out of 577,625 the whole population of Cyprus on the census of 
1960). Out of the 183,859 inhabitants of the area 128, 5863 are Greek Cypriots 
and 55,296 are Turkish Cypriots the percentage of Greek Cypriots being thus 
69,92 per centum and of the Turkish Cypriots 30.8 per centum. In that area 
there are 94 purely Greek villages with a population of 72,546 44, purely 
Turkish villages with a population of 15,170, and 444 mixed towns and villages 
(including the whole town of Kyrenia and part of the town of Famagusta ) with 
a population of 56,017 Greek Cypriots and 40,126 Turkish Cypriots . The total 
number of the villages in Cyprus is 625 out of which 392 are Greek Cypriots, 
120 Turkish Cypriots and 113 mixed villages.
The prerequisite for the establishment of a federal state is the prior co­
existence of two or more independent states or another independent territorial 
units exercising regional government which desire, for one reason or another 
such as common defence, economic advantages, geographical factors, to be 
independent of foreign powers, pre-existing political association and the like, 
to be under the single independent government for some purposes at any rate 
whilst at the same time they like to maintain their independent status for some 
other matters.
Such was the case in Switzerland, which is due to an historical 
evolution. The Swiss cantons were not formed on the basis of a deliberate 
application of the principle of nationalities but they were political
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organisations, which were formed for a number of historical reasons. It is 
important to remember that the cantons pre-existed the Swiss confederation, 
which for the first five hundred years of its existence was composed of entirely 
German cantons. From 1291 until the end of the 13th century the three forest 
cantons -W aldstatten Uri, Schwyz and Nidwalden forming a union by virtue of 
the Convention of Friendship of 1291 to which until the 16th century another 10 
civil German cantons had acceded by virtue of the Convention of Stans. The 
Swiss confederation was recognized by the Treaty of Westphalia of 1968. 
During the French Revolution and the Napoleonic wars in 1798 a new 
constitution was imposed under which Switzerland ceased to be a federation, 
the cantons lost their status as independent states and the Swiss Republic was 
created as a unitary state and associated by alliance with France. It was only 
with the Act of Mediation of Napoleon of 1803, which was based on federal 
principles that six French and Italian-speaking cantons were added to the 
already existing thirteen making a total of nineteen, a number increased with 
the addition of three more French-speaking cantons at the Conference of 
Vienna 1815 bringing the total number to the present twenty two. On the 12th 
September 1848 a new constitution of the Swiss state, which though called 
Confederation is a federal state, was introduced. This constitution was 
extensively revised in 1874 and finally in 1964.
Switzerland is a federal state consisting of sovereign cantons which exercise 
their sovereign state power in so far as such power is not restricted to by the 
federal constitution. The federal state guarantees the constitutions of the 
cantons (article 13). The federal constitution describes in detail the subjects 
which fall within the competence of the central government and that of the 
cantons (articles 7-10, 20-41).
Also in the United States of America the federal state of the United 
States was established in 1787, by the thirteen then British colonies, which 
constituted separate states in the Federation.
I could multiply the examples by referring to other federal states such as 
Canada, the federal states of South America, Australia, U.S.S.R, Austria,
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Yugoslavia, Federal Republic of Germany, India, Burma, the new African
federal states and others, in all of which the constituent parts pre-existed the 
federal state.
The Turkish side by its proposals submitted at the Geneva Conference 
supports the adoption of the partition of one and indivisible territory of the 
Republic of Cyprus into many states or zones or cantons for the purpose of 
changing the unitary Republic of Cyprus into a federal state. The prerequisites 
for the federal state of the type she propounds do not exist, as there were not 
separate geographical units, which could form the constituent parts of the 
proposed federal state.10 Such a course would be against not only the principles 
of public law but also contrary to the prevailing constitutional practice. The 
federation aims at uniting already existing separate territorial units and not at 
artificially creating separate territorial areas within an existing unified territory 
for the aim of achieving the establishment of a federal state.
The ostensible reason put forward by the Turkish side is that such region is 
required for the physical protection of the Turkish Cypriots and to prevent the 
Greek Cypriots from destroying or enslaving them. But even such allegation is 
correct one fails to see how the proposed extensive Turkish region could afford 
any such protection. The majority of the population in the region will be Greek 
Cypriots. Unless not all of the Greek Cypriot refugees are to return (which 
would virtually mean violation of human rights) or/and Turkish settlers from 
mainland Turkey are to be accepted as Cypriot citizens (which would mean to
10 Lord Radcliffe in paragraph 28 of his Report says: “But can Cyprus be organised as a federation in 
this way? I do not think so. There is no pattern of territorial separation between the two communities 
and, apart from other objections, federation of communities, which does not involve also federation of 
territories seems to me to be a very difficult constitutional form. (Lord Radcliffe, Constitutional 
Proposals fo r Cyprus, London 1956, Cmnd. 42.
And Dr. Galo Palza in paragraphs 149 and 150. observes, on the other hand, “the Turkish Cypriots 
envisage a federal system within which there would exist autonomous Turkish Cypriot and Greek 
Cypriot States, the conditions for whose existence would be created by the geographical separation, 
which they insistently demand of the two communities. (Galo Plaza Report op. Cit).
150. “It is essential to be clear what this proposal implies. To refer to it simply as federation is to 
oversimplify the matter. What is involved is not merely to establish a federal form of government but 
also to secure the geographical separation of the two communities. The establishment of a federal state 
regime requires a territorial basis, and this basis does not exist. In an earlier part of this report, I 
explained the island-wide intermingling in normal times of the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot 
populations. The events since December, 1963, have not basically altered this characteristic; even the
229
legalise a war crime), so that separate majorities can be effected in the areas 
administered by the two communities respectively. Conversely, such a 
settlement would be problematic, as Turkish Cypriots might want to return to 
their properties in the State under Greek Cypriots administration.
It looks as though it would be necessary to have an exchange of 
populations so as to turn the predominantly Greek region into a Turkish one. 
The exchange of populations has been alluded already in 1965 to the United 
Nations Mediator Dr. Galo Plaza by the then leader of the Turkish Cypriot 
community Dr. Kutchuk. But an exchange of populations, even on a voluntary 
basis11 is not an easily feasible matter. It entails many financial, but mainly 
humanitarian repercussions leaving apart its remote consequences and is not 
looked upon favourably in public law.12
4. Federation and Human Rights Law
In this section what is to be explored is whether federation for Cyprus 
could safeguard human rights of the people of Cyprus.
It is here submitted that bi-communal bi-zonal federation in the case of Cyprus 
cannot properly provide for adequate implementation of human rights. The first
enclaves where numbers of Turkish Cypriots concentrated following the troubles are widely scattered 
over the island, while thousands of other Turkish Cypriots have remained in mixed villages”.
11 It is noteworthy that the Republic of Cyprus Government has repeatedly stated in public that what is 
sought for in the context of a settlement is to secure the right to return. But has stressed, nevertheless, 
that the conditions in the Turkish Cypriot administered state of the federation could be so burdensome 
for the Greek Cypriots that the refugees might not choose to return. It is here submitted that rights that 
cannot be implemented are not rights at all and that the aforementioned stance on part of the Cyprus 
Government constitutes political hypocricy.
12 After the disaster in Asia Minor in 1922 about one and a half million Greeks had to leave their 
homes. The Conference at Lausanne was faced with a fait accompli and by the Convention VI attached 
to the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923 a compulsory exchange of populations was provided (see 
Oppenheim-Lauterpacht, International Law, op.cit. p.553, note 1). Such a course today would be 
against the accepted principle of self-determination of peoples (Article 1 of the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights) and the individual right of residence and movement (Article 12 of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political rights and relevant articles of the European Convention of 
Human Rights). Same considerations may be applicable to the voluntary exchange of populations of 
which we have two examples in the diplomatic history; that under the Treaty of Trianon of the 27th 
November, 1919, between Greece and Bulgaria, concerning the Greek minority in Bulgaria and the 
Bulgarian minority in Greece respectively; and the Albanese declaration for the protection of minorities 
of the 2nd October, 1920.
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and foremost human right, which would be violated is that of self- 
determination.
The concept of self-determination of peoples was developed especially 
after World War I.13 Under the U.N Charter it became the cornerstone of the 
General Assembly’s decolonisation policy of the 1960s and 1970s.
The Charter of the United Nations, in Article 1, paragraph 2, indicates, as one 
of the purposes of the United Nations “to develop friendly relations among 
nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination 
of peoples”. Articles 55 and 56 of the U.N. Charter develop further this very 
purpose and have direct relevance to non-self-governing territories. “With a 
view to promoting the creation of conditions of stability and well-being which 
are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations based on 
respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, the 
United Nations shall prom ote...”14 In the Declaration on the Granting of 
Independence to Colonial Territories and Peoples, in paragraphs 1 and 2, the 
General Assembly declared that: “the subjection of peoples to alien 
subjugation, domination and exploitation constitutes a denial of fundamental 
human rights, is contrary to the Charter of the United Nations and is an 
impediment to the promotion of world peace and co-operation. All peoples 
have the right to self-determination; by virtue of that right they freely 
determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and 
cultural development15”.
So, the concept of self-determination consists in the liberty of the 
peoples to determine on the internal plane their own government without any
13 See generally, Cassese, Self-Determination of Peoples (1995); Mullerson, International Law, Rights 
and Politics (1994), Chapter 2; Shaw, Title to Territory in Africa (1986).
14 U.N Charter Article 55. Article 56 of the Charter reads: “All members shall pledge themselves to 
take joint and separate action in co-operation with the organisation for the achievement of the purposes 
set forth in Article 55”.
15 G.A. Resolution 1514 (XV), December 14, 1960, G.A.O.R. 15th Session, Supp. 16, p. 6 6 . Also see 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966, Article 1, para 1: “All people have the right 
of self-determination”, The issue of self-determination was further developed by the International 
Court of Justice in the Western Sahara Case (Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1975, p. 12).
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foreign intervention -internal self-determination -  and on the external field 
their fate and international status -external self-determination.16
The latter has two aspects, a positive one and a negative one. Under the 
positive aspect peoples may secede from the state to which they belong either 
by joining another state or by establishing a state of their own whilst under the 
negative aspect the peoples cannot be exchanged or ceded against their will, 
enjoying in this respect a right of independence.
It has to be noted that the right is seen by a large number of writers as a rule of 
ius cogens17
It is worth noting that self-determination was openly violated when in 
1977 and 1979 the people of Cyprus, Greek Cypriots as well as Turkish 
Cypriots did not decide about their own fate.
Referendum means the process by which the population of a state living 
in a specific territory decides on the future of that territory. The great number 
of referenda in history concerns cases of annexation of territories. A 
referendum can actually bring about three main alternative results: either 
annexation, or independence, or federal settlements.
It has to be stressed that the power to conduct the referendum is in the 
hands of the government, a Joint Committee or an International commission. 
It is here submitted that the referendum regarding acceptance or rejection of 
federation as constitutional framework for settlement of the Cyprus issue 
should have been held immediately after the High Level Agreements of 1977 
and 1979 respectively. Deliberate delay of this process, unfortunately on part of 
successive Cyprus Governments, aims at exerting pressure upon the people to 
cast a vote in favour of federalism upon agreement of a final settlement, at a 
stage when it would be rather difficult to decline this governmental system.
16 See Emerson, Self-determination, American .J.l.L. (1971) vol. 65, p. 465. For the application of the 
right of self-determination to the Turkish Cypriot community, see the discussion in the context of the 
“TRNC”, in Chapter 5 above.
17 See for example Espiel, in Cassese, ed. U.N Law /  Fundamental Rights: Two Topics in International 
Law (1979), p. 167. See also Calogeropoulos-Strastis, The Right of Peoples to Self-determination (in 
Greek) Athens, 1977 p .335.
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It is submitted that the violation of the principle of self-determination, 
by far the most important human right, brings with it the non-implementation 
of other basic human rights, namely the right of each Greek Cypriot citizen to 
settle, to establish himself, to acquire property, to work wherever he pleases. 
Bi-communalism and the bi-zonal character of the federal state would not 
allow for implementation of these and other equally important rights. Will the 
members of the Greek community who will be living in the Turkish zone (and 
will therefore be a minority) have guarantees for exercising the freedom of 
religion, of education or of language? 18 The reservation is worth taking into 
account. It has already been pleaded before the European Court of Human 
Rights that the obligation of non-discrimination gives way to regional 
homogeneity; 19in its decision on the case related to certain aspects of the laws 
on the use of language in education in Belgium, the European Court of Human 
Rights seems to have approved this thesis which- it must be recognised- ruins 
to a large extent the scope of the general principles that one had thought oneself 
able to deduce. Some elements of an answer appeared in Article 20 of the 1960 
Constitution, which gave to each community the task o f seeing to the education 
needs of the whole of the territory. Elements of an answer appear especially in 
the Greek proposals (list of regional powers) of April 1977 which give 
exclusive competence to the regions in matters of culture, teaching, and 
education but, in doing do, take equal account of the liberty given to the 
minority community to establish and to make its own schools function (which 
cannot be of an inferior quality to the minimum requirements of the public 
schools of the region). This formula would allow, at least in the field of 
teaching and in matters annexed to answer the needs expressed by a minority
18 Similar argument could be made for the Turkish Cypriot community; but, one should be careful to 
see that the Turkish Cypriots as already shown in Chapter V above, cannot exercise the right to self- 
determination and establish a state of their own in a separate region, which has historically been 
predominantly Greek; it has also been indicated that Turks and Greeks lived peacefully together 
dispersed in various parts of the northern as well as the southern part of the island.
19 European Court of Human Rights, A matter relative to certain aspects o f the linguistic system of 
education in Belgium, vol. 2 Strasburg 1968, p. 135. Similarly, the last paragraph of the proposals of 
the Turkish Cypriot community also provides that the rights will in principle be safeguarded and on 
condition that similar observances be submitted to the laws and regulations of the federated state and
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community and would give it the opportunity not to disappear. It is noteworthy 
that article 27 of the pact of the Unite Nations related to civil and political 
states particularly that in States where ethnic, religious, or linguistic minorities 
exist, the individuals belonging to these minorities cannot be deprived of the 
right of having together with other members of the group, their own cultural 
life, of exercising and practising their own religion or to use their own 
language. Must it also be recalled that the Permanent Court of International 
Justice remarked, in its notice of 6 April 1935, on the minority schools of 
Albania (series A/B, no. 64 p. 17) that “the ideas, which form the basis of the 
treaties for the protection of minorities, are to ensure that the social groups 
incorporated in a state whose population is of different race, language, or 
religion from their own, have the possibility of peaceful co-existence and of 
cordial collaboration with this population, while at the same time maintaining 
the characteristics, which distinguish them from the majority”. It is 
nevertheless, put forward, that the aforementioned rights could not be 
effectively exercised in the framework of a federation in the case of Cyprus. 
The effective exercise of rights is provided for in article 25, para.l of the 
European Convention of Human Rights. The right to settle, to movement, to 
acquire property, (what are usually called the three basic freedoms) will not be 
effectively put in practice, simply because the majority of Greek Cypriots 
would be reluctant to be ruled by the Turkish Cypriots in the land which has 
always been their own and run by themselves. It has already been stated above 
that federation is a sociological phenomenon and this aspect of it should not be 
ignored. There is no need why the Greek Cypriots should live under the 
Turkish Cypriots. There are no needs, dictating the establishment of a 
federation. More importantly, the right to education and religion, which are 
fundamental, the cornerstone of national identity, will not again be effectively 
implemented, as the meaning of religion, and especially education, in a region 
under Turkish Cypriot administration will fade away. What would be the point,
do not harm the territorial integrity and homogenity of the population of the Turkish federated State of 
Cyprus.
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for example, of teaching the values of Greek history, particularly that of 
freedom, if the Greeks, the original population of the territory are to be 
governed unwillingly, if not subjugated -to put the matter rather crudely- by the 
Turkish Cypriots. This clearly stems from that they have not freely exercised 
the right of self-determination. Also, who, among young Greek Cypriot 
scholars and scientists, would go to the State administered by the Turkish 
Cypriots to practice his profession and, therefore, effectively exercise the right 
to work? I would certainly not as I am sure a large percentage of the Greek 
Cypriot youth would not.
The question of political rights by the minority community in a region 
can no longer be evaded. Is it sufficient to give them the right to vote? In the 
best hypothesis, it would be useful to appoint to the assembly or the federal 
council a representative of the other community within a federated assembly. 
The constitutional proposals seem, in fact, to exclude the possibility of electing 
a representative of the minority to the assembly of the majority community: no 
Greek Cypriot in the Turkish federated assembly; no Turkish Cypriot in the 
Greek federated assembly. The question is important both on the level of 
doctrine and on the level of politics. But, on the other hand, would there be two 
categories of citizens in the State, those who will have the power to exercise 
the political rights recognized to the citizens and who exercise them at all 
levels of power and these who would have certain prerogatives withdrawn from 
them, because of their minority status, or who would not be able usefully to 
exercise them because of the general structure of the State? A positive answer 
would deprive the declarations of adherence to human rights -and  in particular 
those to the political rights of the citizen- of sufficient credibility. A negative 
answer forces one to suggest techniques and procedures that would allow the 
minority members of a community to attach themselves theoretically and not 
territorially to their community, in order to exercise these rights more 
effectively. The Greek proposals of 6 April 1977 carry some elements of an 
answer to this issue. They state in point 3.2 that each citizen must, at least in 
what concerns the federal state, be able to exercise political rights whatever
235
their location on the territory of the Republic. This formula is particularly 
interesting. It arises from the idea that the federal authorities are called to 
exercise their powers, however reduced they be, over the whole of the territory 
of the State. Taldng into account the criteria of balance of power fixed 
elsewhere for the representation of the communities, it is justifiable to allow all 
citizens to compete directly for the appointment of these authorities. Nothing, 
for example, would prevent the nationals of the Greek community living in the 
North of the island from joining the votes with those of the south in electing 
their representatives to the federal assembly; the same solution would apply to 
the Turkish Cypriots living in the south of the island.
What is more, no suggestion is made for the exercise of political rights 
regarding the administration of the region in which the citizen resides; it is 
simply noted that this question should be the subject of constitutional 
arrangements. The problems of local administration, particularly that of towns, 
also remain in their entirety. The constitutional proposals formulated from both 
sides are discreet on this subject.
Furthermore, it should be noted that in the context of bi-zonal bi- 
communal federation, the democratic principle is further violated, at the level 
of central government. It was obvious, since the Zurich Agreements and 
subsequent 1960 Constitution that the ratio of participation of Turkish Cypriots 
in central government was not proportionate to their population percentage. 
Actually, it far exceeded this percentage. At points it even reached 40%. It is 
clear that at the Executive, participation of the Turkish Cypriots to such an 
extent would be in violation of the accepted constitutional principle of 
democracy.20 The one extreme of democratic theory says that peoples that 
should properly be treated as minorities cannot be granted privileges that are 
not proportionate to their numbers. At the other end, there are advocates of the 
opinion that they should be given the governmental positions that do not 
necessarily equally correspond to their numeric capability. 21
20 See extensively, Ivor Jennings, The Law and the Constitution, 1959 Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.
21 See Vemon Bogdanor, The Democratic principle (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990)
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In my view, the proposed constitutional form will be worse than 
partition. The repercussions from such a solution would be catastrophic for 
both communities of Cyprus. I should like to make clear that, as a matter of 
principle I would never adhere to partition as possible settlement to the Cyprus 
issue. However, I must note that a bi-communal federal, or a confederate state, 
under the camouflage of federation, would bring about the end of the Cyprus 
Republic. It is essential that human rights are properly and fully safeguarded 
and expressly stipulated in any settlement plan. Deviations from human rights 
should not be acceptable for and by either community.
5. European Union role in the settlement of the Cyprus issue
Given the accession process of Cyprus into the European Union it is 
important to see if the Acquis Communautaire could bring about 
implementation of human rights in Cyprus. In an Opinion, the European 
Commission concluded: “On the subject of respect for democracy and human 
rights, two points must be taken into account, namely that the island’s forced 
partition alone represents a serious infringement of the fundamental freedoms 
of citizens of Cyprus, and the rights of victims of the events of 1974 have not 
yet been restored owing to the lack of a political settlement. The presence of a 
considerable number of Turkish settlers and the demographic changes that 
result from this are also considered as an infringement of the political and 
economic rights of the people, including some sectors of the Turkish Cypriot 
public opinion. Apart from the direct and indirect consequences of the partition 
of the island, the human rights situation is as follows. The constitution of 
Cyprus protects the rights of people belonging to the three national minorities 
and establishes freedom of speech and the right to free assembly, equality of all 
before the law and bans all forms of discrimination. The independence of the 
judiciary is guaranteed. All these provisions are effectively respected. 
However, in the north of the island, opposition parties have mentioned certain 
constraints and restrictions in their activities, in particular as regards access to
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the media”.22 It goes on to say that “a settlement would open the way to the full 
restitution of human rights and fundamental freedoms throughout the island, 
and would encourage the development of a pluralist democracy”.
Also the opinion says: “As result of the de facto division of the island into two 
strictly separated parts, the fundamental freedoms laid by the Treaty, and in 
particular freedom of movement of goods, people, services and capital, the 
right of establishment and the universally recognised political, economic, social 
and cultural rights could not today be exercised over the entirety of the island’s 
territory. These freedoms and rights would have to be guaranteed as part of a 
comprehensive settlement restoring constitutional arrangements covering the 
whole of the Republic of Cyprus”. 23
The Commission also refers to the political rights that should be 
safeguarded in the context of a settlement of the Cyprus issue. “This Opinion 
has also shown that Cyprus’ integration with the Community implies a 
peaceful, balanced and lasting settlement to the Cyprus question -a settlement 
which will make it possible for the two communities to be reconciled, for 
confidence to be re-established and for their respective leaders to work 
together. While safeguarding the essential balance between the two 
communities and the right of each to preserve its fundamental interests, the 
institutional provisions contained in such a settlement should create the 
appropriate conditions for Cyprus to participate normally in the decision­
making process of the European Union and in the correct application of 
Community law throughout the island”24.
The possible scenarios, however, vary. One such scenario is that 
accession of Cyprus into the European Union can take place before a settlement 
of the Cyprus issue is found. Such a development would, according to one 
view, facilitate settlement, and European Community Law-especially the 
relevant corpus on human rights- would have to be implemented in any such 
settlement in the future. Another view, though, says that such a possibility is
22 Bulletin of the European Communities, 5/1997.Ibid. para. 17
23 Ibid. para. 10.
24 Ibid. para. 47
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rather distant, because the December 1999 Helsinki summit, noted that a 
political settlement was not a prerequisite to Cyprus’ accession, but all factors 
should be considered in the decision on whether to proceed. The Turkish 
Government have put forward legal arguments with regard to this, that Cyprus 
EU accession is illegal, basing their claim on the Cyprus Treaty of Guarantee. 
Professor Mendelson25 has given legal Opinion to the Government of Turkey 
maintaining that Article 1, paragraph 2 of the Treaty of Guarantee 1960, by 
which the Republic of Cyprus undertakes not to participate, in whole or in part, 
in any political or economic union with any state whatsoever and it accordingly 
declares prohibited any activity likely to promote, directly or indirectly, either 
union with any other state or partition of the island, runs contrary to Cyprus’ 
accession to the European Union, because (a) it would amount to participation 
in whole in an economic union, (b) to the extent that the EU also constitutes a 
political union, this undertaking would also be infringed, (c) it would be likely 
to promote directly or indirectly union with Greece, the name of the European 
Union bears out the fact that it is about union between its members, (d) Cyprus 
had promised to refrain from any activity aimed at promoting directly or 
indirectly its union with any other State. In a footnote, he makes reference to 
the Austro-German Customs Union Case of the of the Permanent Court of 
International Justice, which held that Austria’s entry into a customs union with 
Germany would constitute an alienation of its economic independence., 
contrary to Protocol I of the 4th October. The arguments of Mendelson have 
been repelled by Professors Crawford and Pellet, who refer to the travaux 
preparatoires of the Treaty of Guarantee. Specifically, they refer to point 22 of 
the Basic Structure of the Republic of Cyprus, signed at Zurich on the 11th 
February 1959. According to this, “it shall be recognised that the total or partial 
union of Cyprus with any other state, or a separatist independence for Cyprus 
(i.e. the partition of the island into two independent states) shall be excluded. 
By referring to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties they argue that 
the interpretation must be based on good faith and that the language must be
25 Professor of Public International Law, University of London
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seen in tits context and in the light of its purpose. By reference to Articles 50 
and 169 of the Cyprus Constitution which speak of international organizations 
and pacts of alliance or international agreements with a foreign State or any 
international organization relating to commercial matters, economic 
cooperation they point out that the Treaty distinguishes between political and 
economic union with any other State and other forms of international 
cooperation. They say that what is prohibited is union with another State, not 
cooperation with a group of States in establishing a supranational organisation 
of a political and /  or economic union and that a distinction has always been 
drawn between membership of multilateral organisations of States and the 
political or economic union with another State. The EU is not a State, it is a 
supranational organisation or an independent legal order, a legal system of a 
transnational character, although it aspires to more perfect union. Therefore 
membership of the EU does not involve political or economic union with any 
state. They further clearly distinguish the Austro-German Customs Union Case 
from the case of Cyprus, as the latter would be less independent on any single 
such membership in contrast to the then eventual domination of Austria by 
Germany.
The Copenhagen summit meeting of 12 December 2002, however, has 
proved wrong the view above cited. At the Summit, the Cyprus Republic has 
become member of the European Union without preconditions.
A second scenario has been put forward by two experts in International 
Relations, namely Henri Barkey, Cohen Professor of International Relations at 
Lehigh University and a former member of the State Department’s Policy 
Planning Staff, and Philip Gordon, Senior Fellow in Foreign Policy at the 
Brookings Institution and former Director for European Affairs at the National 
Security Council. According to this scenario, an option supported by many 
pro-European intellectuals and government officials in Turkey would be for the 
United States to encourage the EU to offer Turkey a date for the start of its own
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OfiEU accession negotiations in exchange for a deal on Cyprus. Turkey has long 
resented the fact that the EU offered Turkey candidacy status only reluctantly 
and under American pressure. This has led many Turks to conclude that the 
offer was not sincere, and that Turkey will never be allowed into the EU. A 
concrete date for starting accession negotiations -  for example by 2004, when 
many of the other candidates are expected to join the EU would go far to 
change these perceptions.27 There are problems with this approach, however. 
Most importantly, Washington would find it difficult to successfully persuade 
the EU to give Turkey the date it seeks. Brussels does not want to depart from 
its traditional process whereby accession negotiations begin when the 
Copenhagen Criteria are met, and not the other way around. The resurgence of 
the right in recent European elections this year, combined with growing 
European concerns about southern immigration waves, makes it even less 
likely that European leaders will want to make near-term overtures to Turkey.
Another scenario, enthusiastically endorsed by the American policy 
makers, is that if an early Cyprus settlement cannot be reached is to seek to link 
a Cyprus deal to Turkey’s eventual EU accession. The biggest problem with 
the EU ’s regional accession process is the fact that the timetables for Cyprus 
and Turkey are so different. With Turkey’s accession so distant, Ankara has 
little incentive to press for Turkish Cypriot concessions as a means of 
facilitating its own EU entry. Deferring a comprehensive Cyprus solution until 
the time when Turkey’s accession is possible deals with this major problem. 
The United States should focus initially on minimizing the damage from a 
divided Cyprus’ accession and keeping regional cooperation on track. Instead 
of denouncing the Turkish Cypriots and Turkey, Greece and the Greek 
Cypriots would explicitly state that the door to a Cyprus settlement and 
Turkey’s EU accession remains open and that they look forward to working 
toward that goal. If the Greek Cypriots refused to show such magnanimity, 
Washington would remind them that they would be writing off any prospect for
26 See Henri Barkey and Philip Gordon, Avoiding a Cyprus Crisis, Policy Brief-July 2002, 
www.brook.edu/comm/policybriefs/pbl0 2 .htm.
27 Ibid, p. 4.
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a future settlement to the Cyprus deal, and buying themselves a tense 
relationship with Turkey that could not possibly be. in their interest.28 The 
United States and Europe would also need to persuade Turkey not to carry out 
its threats to incorporate northern Cyprus into Turkey or take other provocative 
measures, which Washington would feel obliged to denounce in the UN 
Security Council and which could provoke even harsher measures from U.S. 
congress or EU Parliament. Turkey would instead have to acknowledge the 
reality that the ultimate settlement of the Cyprus conflict will require territorial 
concessions and acceptance of Cypms as a loosely united entity. To bolster 
their cooperation while a long-term Cyprus solution is pursued, Greece and 
Turkey should commit to further progress in their ongoing economic and 
diplomatic reapprochement.29
Deferring a Cyprus settlement until Turkey can join the European Union would 
reassure the Turkish Cypriots, who understandably worry about their future 
within an EU that would not include Turkey as a counterweight to Greece and 
the Greek Cypriots. It would not only give Turkey an added incentive to 
continue down the European path, but it would give Greece and Turkey an 
added incentive to promote Turkey’s EU membership with all the positive 
benefits for Turkish society, democracy, and relations with its neighbours that 
this would entail (even though such an eventuality seems to be rather difficult, 
because of influence of the Turkish military regime in the running of the state).
However, even if a settlement to the Cyprus issue along the lines of bi- 
communal federation is to be found after the accession of Cyprus to the EU 
(which is now the only prospect), it has to be noted that the federal system, 
given the particular circumstances of Cyprus, would be -according to the 
preceding analysis- ab initio in open violation to the acquis communautaire, 
especially that part of it dealing with human rights. In the ex parte Brunner 
Case, tried in the aftermath of the Maastricht Treaty before the Supreme 
Constitutional Court of Germany, it was held that the “member States are the
28 Ibid., p.5.
29 Ibid., p.5.
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masters of the Treaties”. The clear implication of this important decision is that 
European Community Law is made by consent of the States members. Since, 
therefore, the communities of Cyprus have decided that the framework for a 
settlement is a bi-communal federation, which clearly stands in contradiction to 
human rights principles, then the European Union cannot rectify, so to speak, 
possible deficiencies of such a settlement. It can make sure, for instance, that 
no more settlers are brought from Turkey, that all refugees are granted the right 
to return, but the structure of the state, the governmental system as agreed at 
the High Level meetings between Makarios and Denktash in 1977 cannot be 
altered.
6. The principles pacta sunt servanda and rebus sic stantibus
The aim of this section is to prove that the Agreement concluded by 
Makarios and Denktash is not valid or has been void ab initio.
On the one hand, according to the international law principle pacta sunt 
servanda, as the name of the maxim goes, the parties to an Agreement have to 
comply with the agreement provisions. It is an axiom of International Law, 
going back to the London Declaration of 1871, that international treaties 
concluded by consent of the parties are to be respected.
Following this principle, the High Level Agreements of 1977 and 1979 
respectively are legally valid.
On the other hand, international Agreements are. not binding and 
therefore become ineffective if the consent given by a party is not genuine or 
has been extracted by coercion.
Writers on international law appear to be unanimous in the opinion that, with 
the possible exception of treaties of peace, which are often imposed by the 
victorious belligerent upon a State, which has been defeated in war, freedom of 
consent by the parties is an essential condition of the validity of a treaty. 
Grotius maintained that the law of nature required the observance of the
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principle of equality in the making of treaties, that there ought to be freedom of 
choice by the parties and that their consent should not be induced by fear.30 
To this principle he recognized one exception, which he said had been 
introduced with the consent of nations, namely that where a war has been 
publicly declared and waged on both sides all promises made in the course of 
the war for the purpose of terminating it are valid to the extent that they cannot 
be made by reason of fear unjustly inspired, except with the consent of the 
party to whom the promise has been made.31
Vattel also likewise recognised the treaties of peace constituted an exception to 
the general rule of freedom of consent. As to this he said:
“A sovereign cannot dispense himself from  observing a treaty o f  peace by 
alleging that it was extorted to him by fear or by constraint. In the first place, i f  
this plea were admitted, it would make it impossible fo r  any reliance to be put 
upon treaties o f  peace. For there are few  such treaties against which that plea 
could not be brought as a cover fo r  bad faith. To authorize such an evasion 
would amount to an attack upon the common safety and welfare o f  nations; the 
principle would be condemned as abhorrent by the same reasons, which make 
the faithful observance o f treaties a universally sacred duty. Besides the plea 
would almost always be disgraceful and absurd. It hardly ever happens at the 
present day that a Nation waits until it is reduced to the last extremity before 
making peace; it may have been defeated in several battles, but it can still 
defend itself; and it is not without resources so long as it has men and arms. I f  
a Nation finds it prudent to procure, by a disadvantageous treaty, a necessary 
peace, i f  it delivers itself from  imminent danger, or from  complete destruction, 
by making great sacrifices, whatever it thus saves is an advantage, which it 
owes to the treaty o f  peace; it freely chooses a loss that is present and certain, 
but limited in extent, in preference to a disaster, not yet arrived, but very 
probable, and terrible in character”.
30 De Jure Belli ac P ads, lib. II, Chapter XII, section. 10, Classics of International Law, Kelsey trans., 
p. 348.
1 Ibid., lib. II, Chapter XVII, section 19, and lib. in , Chapter XIX, section 11, Kelsey trans. Pp. 445 
and 798.
32 Droit des Gens, lib. IV, Chapter IV, section 37, Classics of International law, Fenwick trans., p. 356.
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Nonetheless, Vattel admitted that it was possible to conceive of treaties 
of peace so unjust and oppressive that the plea of constraint would be justified.
The Harvard Draft Convention on International Law states the position 
clearly: “As the term is used in this Convention, duress involves the 
employment of coercion directed against the persons signing a treaty on behalf 
of the a State or against the persons engaged in ratifying or acceding to a treaty 
on behalf of a state; provided that, if the coercion has been directed against a 
person signing a treaty on behalf of a state and if with the knowledge of this 
fact the treaty has later been ratified by that Sate without coercion”.33.
The High Level Agreements of 1977, according to the learned writers 
quoted above, have to be considered as legally invalid, as great pressure was 
exerted on Makarios upon signing the treaty. There is ample evidence to 
suggest that Clifford, the special representative of the U.S. President, exerted 
heavy pressure upon Makarios, so that he might persuade him to accept the 
Agreements.34 The treaty was not a treaty of peace, despite views to the 
opposite, that is the armed conflict between Turkey and Cyprus in 1974 could 
have been entirely catastrophic for the Republic of Cyprus; in other words, had 
the treaty not been signed, the whole territory of the Cyprus would have been 
occupied by the Turkish troops. The Turkish intervention, furthermore, was an 
illegal act, and the occupation, a de facto situation created thereafter as a result, 
a manifest illegality in international law. Debellatio35, that is total subjugation 
of the Cyprus State, has never been the case.
Also, the 1977 Agreements ought to be considered invalid, because a 
principle of utmost importance so dictates, namely, rebus sic stantibus. This 
very principle requires elaborate analysis36.
33 Harvard Law School, Harvard Draft Convention on International Law, American J. I. L 1934, p. 
1096-1097..
34 For details, see above the Chapter on the United Nations and the Cyprus Problem.
35 On which, see generally Schwarzenberger, Manual o f International Law.op.cit..
36 See McNair, The Law of Treaties, ante, p.6 8 ; British YB.I.L. 11 (1930), P. 109. But see Waldock, 
Second Report, p.83. It would seem that both in Greece and Rome the were certain circumstances 
under which it was permissible to break a treaty. Thus the argument that a complete change of 
circumstances existing at the time of the conclusion of treaty of alliance gives release from the 
obligations of the treaty made by Lycius, the envoy at Sparta, with regard to the treaty between the 
Spartans and the Aetolians (“If the circumstances are the same now as at the time of the time when you
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Some writers asserted that the doctrine originated in Roman Law, in the sense 
that every contract carried with it the implied condition of rebus sic stantibus. 
Roman Law as it is laid down in the Corpus Juris Civilis of Justinian, did not 
know the clause rebus sic stantibus, as a legal institution in the sense in which 
we understand it today. From the point of view of rebus sic stantibus, the most 
important institution of Roman Law was the legis action per condictionem, one 
of the five actiones, through which the law recognised as a basis for claim the 
fact that one party had been unjustly enriched at the expense of the other.37A
0 0
special case of the condictio casus a date a causa non secuta was one of the 
rules of Roman Law from which the doctrine of rebus sic stantibus was 
subsequently derived. The particular rules which give the party concerned the 
right of rescission or withdrawal from the contract on account of the 
supervening changes in the circumstances are to be found in the various places 
of the Corpus Juris Civilis of Justitnian. It was in fact as a result of the work of 
the glossators and commentators, extending over many centuries that a 
principle rebus sic stantibus was derived from unconnected individual cases 
scattered in various texts of Roman and Canon Law and worked into a 
comprehensive theory.
On the assumption that legal relationships between states were not 
basically different from those between individuals, the early writers on 
International Law transplanted the doctrine, together with a number of private 
law institutions, into the general corpus of International Law.
The first writer to mention the doctrine in a work entirely devoted to a 
question of International Law appears to have been Gentili, who conceives the 
doctrine as a general mental reservation implied in wills, and contracts.39 His 
most significant contribution to the doctrine of rebus sic stantibus is its 
application to peace treaties. At the time of the general recognition of the
made alliance with the Aetolians, then your policy ought to remain on the same lines. That was your 
first proposition . But if they have been entirely changed, then it is fair that you should now deliberate 
on the demands made to you as on a matter entirely new and unprejudiced. (Polybios, Historiae,IX, 
37).
37 Nicholas, Roman Law, London, 1975
38 Institutes of Gaius, n, Commentary, p. 141, n.3 (ed. F. de Zulueta, Oxford University Press, 1953)
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doctrine, Grotius appears to have been the first to reject it, though his attitude 
towards rebus sic stantibus is not devoid of ambiguity. His innovation is to 
treat the whole question of changed circumstances as basically a problem of 
treaty, interpretation and so to give the rule of rebus sic stantibus a juridical 
foundation in the contractual intention of the parties. His overt rejection and at 
the same time covert admission of the clausula as a rule of treaty interpretation 
made it possible to both adherents and opponents of the doctrine o f rebus sic 
stantibus to appeal to Grotius. He became, because of his great authority, the 
source of divergent, often contradictory view on the doctrine.
Vattel developed the Grotian interpretation and scrutinized the juridical 
foundation of the doctrine rebus sic stantibus. His theory derives the rule rebus 
sic stantibus from the intention of the parties at the time of the making of the 
treaty and thereby places the whole question of changed circumstances within 
the field of treaty interpretation.40 He thus connected the doctrine with the 
notions of the motive of the promise. Thus Vattel’s contribution has decisively 
influenced successive generations of jurists and has become one of the main 
constructors of the doctrine.
It is the work of the International Law Commission and the resulting 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969 that the doctrine of rebus sic 
stantibus has reached the last phase of its development and is now interpreted 
as an objective rule of law. The preponderance of the opinion of the 
Commission has already had a decisive influence on the views of writers41 and 
is believed that it will determine the future position of the doctrine.
39 De Jure Belli Libri Tres: The reservation is: provided affairs remain in the same condition.
40 If it is certain and evident that the consideration of the circumstances existing at the time entered into 
the motive of the promise, that the promise was made in view and because of those circumstances, the 
promise is dependent upon the continued existence of the same circumstances. This is evident, since 
the promise was only made upon that supposition. When therefore, the circumstances essential to the 
promise, and without which it certainly would not have been made, happen to change, the promise falls 
when its basis is destroyed; and in particular cases, when circumstances cease from time to time as be 
the same as those which brought about or helped to bring about the promise, an exception should be 
made to its enforcement (Le Droit des Gens , 1758, vol. I l l , p. 211).
41 See for exampole, Brownliwe, Principles o f Public International Law, op. cit, pp. 616-18; 
O’Connell, International Law, ante, p. 278, fh.
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Already in the Harvard Draft Convention on International Law 1934,42 
the principle was laid down explicitly. Article 28 stipulates: (a) A treaty 
entered into with reference to the existence of a set of facts the continued 
existence of which was envisaged by the parties as a determining factor moving 
them to take the obligations stipulated may be declared by a competent 
international tribunal or authority to have been ceased to be binding, in the 
sense of calling for further performance, when that state of facts has been 
essentially changed, (b) Pending agreement by the parties upon decision by a 
competent international tribunal or authority, the party, which seeks such a 
declaration, may provisionally suspend performance of its obligations under the 
treaty, (c) A provisional suspension of the performance by the party seeking 
such a declaration will not be justified definitely until a decision to this effect 
has been rendered by the competent international tribunal or authority. 
Paragraph (a) envisages a declaration by a competent international tribunal or 
authority that a treaty has ceased to be binding, in the sense of calling for 
further performance, provided: first, that the parties entered into the treaty with 
reference to the existence of a certain state of facts; second, that the continued 
existence of this state of facts was envisaged by the parties as determining 
factor moving them to undertake the obligations stipulated; and third, that this 
state of facts has been essentially changed. The declaration is to be that the 
treaty has ceased to be binding in the sense of calling for further performance; 
it is to have no effect, therefore, upon stipulations of the treaty which have been 
performed prior to the occurrence of the change. The term international tribunal 
or authority would include such bodies as the International Court of Justice, 
arbitral tribunals, the U.N. Security Council, etc. The possibility will tend to 
discourage a provisional suspension of performance by a party unless it has 
substantial grounds to expect that a competent international tribunal or 
authority will render a decision declaring that the Treaty is no longer binding 
and that the provisional suspension was definitely justified.43
42 See Harvard Law School, Draft Convention on International Law, 1934 American
43Instances of application of the doctrine include: the separation of Belgium from Holland in 1830/3—
1839, the cession of Savoy and Nice to France in 1860, the unification of Italy in 1859-61, the
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Even though it has been subbed that justification of recourse to the 
doctrine of rebus sic stantibus could be derived from criteria, this is not to say 
that the opinion of the parties could be ignored altogether in this matter. In fact, 
when it can be established that at the time of the conclusion of a treaty the 
parties agreed that the presence of certain circumstances was a fundamental 
consideration, the treaty may be terminated by applying the doctrine of rebus 
sic stantibus in the event of a supervening change of circumstances. But a State 
claiming that a change of circumstances has occurred which in its opinion 
justifies the application of the doctrine, has in general no right to terminate, 
suspend, or modify unilaterally the operation of the treaty.44
Once it is recognized that the doctrine rebus sic stantibus is a lawful 
ground for the termination of treaties, it is possible to explain its proper 
relationship to the rule pacta sunt servanda. This is necessary because in a 
number of cases an intended termination of a treaty by virtue of that rule was 
met with the objection that treaties were to be observed according to the rule 
pacta sunt servanda. This objection implies that this rule has priority over, and 
therefore excludes, the operation of the rule rebus sic stantibus. This however, 
is not the case. According to a widely accepted view, the particular rule rebus 
sic stantibus forms a special exception to the general norm pacta sunt 
servanda. This exception finds its juridical basis in the higher principles of 
good faith and justice, which, in certain recognized cases, set limits to the 
requirement of faithful performance of treaties.45 Although this view is
arrangement concerning the international status of Luxembourg in 1867, the abolition of the Anglo- 
French financial control of Egypt in 1882-83, the abrogation of the treaties relating to the international 
status of Belgium by Article 31 of the Versailles Treaty in 1919, the revision of the Lausanne 
Convention in 1936, especially the arguments of Turkey, Greece and the Soviet Union, the revision of 
the Italian Peace Treaty in 1951 and 1954.
44 Such rule was expressed by the following States: The Netherlands in 1930-31, the Great Britain and 
France in 1846, Denmark, Great Britain, France, Russia, Sweden and Norway in 1864, France in 1882, 
the United states in 1896, Great Britain in 1906, Austria, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Russia 
and the United States in 1914 and 1922-23, France in 1928 and 1932, Great Britain, Italy, France, 
Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Spain, and the Council of the League of Nations in 1935-36, Great Britain in 
1947, Great Britain, the United States and France and the Federal Republic of Germany in 1958, Iraq in
1969, and Great Britain in 1973. (U.S. Digest o f International Law, op.cit. pp. 184-5)
45This view was developed by municipal courts in order to justify termination or modification of
contracts on account of changes of circumstances in the absence of a customary or statutory rule. This
view is now generally accepted in municipal law, especially in English, German, Swiss, French law.
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inadequate to reconcile the principle of rebus sic stantibus with that of pacta 
punt servanda, it fails to go to the root of the problem. In order to do so, one 
must start from the true meaning of both rules. Pacta sunt servanda means that 
every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by 
them in good faith.46 A Treaty, which is not in force either because it is invalid 
from origin (void) or because it has lost its force by virtue of its own terms or 
by operation of law, is not governed by the rule pacta sunt servanda. The range 
of the application of the rule does not extend so to speak beyond two points, 
that is, where a legitimate ground for terminating, revising or suspending the 
treaty such as rebus sic stantibus, has begun to operate. Within this range pacta 
sunt servanda admits no exception. Pacta sunt servanda means that treaties are 
inviolable, but it does not mean that treaties cannot be terminated or modified. 
Where it is by law established that by lawful procedure a rule for the 
termination or revision of the treaty applies, the rule pacta sunt servanda 
ceases to operate. The sphere of its application ends where that of the doctrine 
rebus sic stantibus begins. The rule rebus sic stantibus is not in conflict with 
the rule with the rule pacta sunt servanda. It follows that objections to the 
doctrine of rebus sic stantibus on pacta sunt servanda grounds cannot be 
maintained, unless it is admitted that the purpose of such objections is merely 
to provide a procedural safeguard against the arbitrary application of the 
doctrine in the absence of compulsory international adjudication.
In the light of the above discussion, it may be inferred that the High Level 
Agreements 1977 and 1979 between Makarios and Denktash, and Kyprianou- 
Denktash respectively are no longer legally valid. The fundamental change of 
circumstances in the intervening years leads to this conclusion; particularly the 
Unilateral Declaration of Independence of the “Turkish Republic of Northern 
Cyprus” in 1983 (as well as of the “Turkish Federated State of Cyprus” which 
preceded it) is a clear indication that the circumstances have severely changed, 
because of the Turkish insistence on the creation of two separate States on
46 Article 26 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.
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Cyprus. The Turkish plans to promote partition of the island have been pointed 
out at the beginning of this Chapter.
Also the argument put forward by Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot Leadership, 
(unfortunately adopted impliedly in the U.N. Secretary General’s Statement 
2000, “the equal status of the parties must expressly be recognised”47) namely 
that Confederation and not federation should be the constitutional framework 
for a settlement to the Cyprus issue, is indicative of the Turkish disregard of the 
High Level Agreements, and the real intentions under the fig leaf of federalism.
47 See above the Chapter United Nations and the Cyprus Problem.
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CHAPTER VIII: SOLUTION PROPOSAL AND POLITICAL
PARAMETRES
1. Suggested Solution
In view o f the above what is the suggested settlement to the Cyprus Problem?
In my opinion, a possible one is the renegotiation o f  the Acheson Plan. It has to be
noted, by the way, that any Plan so far submitted for the Cyprus could come beck
(
to the table o f the negotiations in one way or another.
The Plan in its amended form can provide the framework for a viable settlement to 
the issue. It takes into account the national aspirations o f both Greeks and Turks of 
Cyprus and their respective motherlands; further it satisfies the strategic needs o f 
both Greece and Turkey as well the W estern alliance. H ere is what the Plan 
provided in its final
1. Immediate Union (Enosis) o f Cyprus w ith Greece. This would be 
accompanied with recognition o f  the sovereignty o f  the Greek Crown, the 
Greek Central Government, the Greek Parliam ent (now the Republic o f 
Greece) over Cyprus.
2. A General Commander (or Commissioner) at ministerial level with the duty 
and political responsibility o f implementing the governmental decisions.
3. A military base on a fifty year lease is granted to Turkey the area o f which 
does not is not more than 4,5% o f the territory o f Cyprus.
4. The commitment is undertaken that the six eparchies o f Cyprus shall not 
come to over the number o f eight.
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5. A  position o f  Counsel on M uslim  A ffairs is established w ho shall assist the 
G reek M inister (C om m issioner General).
6. The Turkish Cypriot status shall be that o f  a m inority as the one functioning 
in G reek Thrace for the Turkish m inority there.
7. A  representative o f  the U nited N ations O rganisation shall superintend the 
im plem entation o f  the m inority status, according to the agreem ents.
8. A  Greece and Turkey are recognised the right o f  petition to the, according to 
the Treaty o f  Rom e, for hum an rights. For this purpose the A greem ent shall be 
signed by Greece and Turkey.
9. The G reek sovereignty w ill extend over K arpas peninsula, though despite its 
lease as base to Turkey.
10. The m ain villages o f  K arpasia shall be excluded from  the area to  be 
controlled by Turkey. A lso excluded shall be the m onastery o f  A postle A ndreas 
and a passage is granted establishing com m unication o f  the villages and the 
monastery.
11. A  com m on security body betw een G reece and Turkey is to  be established 
in strengthening the friendly relations betw een the tw o states. A n A m erican 
representative w ill also take part in this body.
12. The security institution activity w ill not be confined to  m ilitary cooperation, 
but w ill extent over tourist and political ones.
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13. The representative o f  the G reece and Turkey to the security institution shall 
m eet often and unite their efforts for the developm ent and progress o f  
cooperation for the benefit o f  the tw o states.
14. Turkey undertakes to accept w ithout exceptions the return o f  all those 
expelled from  Constantinople and other Turkish cities, and recognises for them  
the same m inority status as that applicable for the Turks in G reek Thrace and 
Greek Cyprus.
Turkey undertakes to  respect her international obligations relating to the islands 
o f  Imbros and Tenedos.
It is notew orthy that the spokesm an o f  the party o f  George Papandreou the 
elder, then Prim e M inister o f  G reece, declared that the G reek party  had never 
accepted the A cheson Plan. Sim ply, in coordination w ith the General Grivas, 
Mr. Papandreou had accepted the lease o f  a m ilitary base to Turkey (not in the 
area o f  the K arpas peninsula though) only for 30 years. The proposal was 
rejected by Turkey as w ell as by A rchbishop M akarios.
The General G rivas, on the other hand, w as a fervent exponent o f  the 
arrangem ent. W hen Grivas cam e to Cyprus in 1964, he m ade statements 
assuring the Turkish Cypriots for his friendship, indicating indirectly his 
disapproval for the assassination o f  hostages, and insisting upon a plebiscite 
which w ould confirm  the view  o f  the majority. D uring secret talks in A ugust 
and July 1964, he suggested the U nification w ith G reece as a  settlem ent, w ith 
com pensation given to the Turks who would w ish to m igrate and a Turkish
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Base w hich w ould be established next to a B ritish one. A s a realist, he w ould 
not ignore or disregard the strength o f  Turkey and her security needs.
G rivas cam e to  the island w ith 3,000 troops ,. A m ericans did not oppose this 
m ove , and it is possible that this was because they w ould like to  get M akarios 
under the control o f  A thens, and encourage Grivas in prom oting the A cheson 
P la n .1
The preferred settlem ent, however, w ould be the reestablishm ent o f  an 
independent Cyprus State. The public opinion is very m uch in favour o f  such 
an eventuality. A lthough the proposed settlem ent is along the lines o f  
federation, the tacit m ajority o f  the population is rather opposed to it. The 
election results at any tim e has never been a safe guide tow ard confirm ing the 
w ishes o f  the people, w ho cast their vote on the basis o f  criteria o ther than the 
view s o f  candidates on the national problem .
I strongly subm it that a return to the status o f  A n independent Cyprus 
Republic, w ould be the panacea to the long standing and thorny Cyprus issue. 
Such an arrangem ent w ould be along the lines o f  the Zurich and London 
A greem ents, w ith additional am endm ents to the benefit o f  both  com m unities 
o f  Cyprus. The Thirteen Points subm itted by M akarios in 1963 can provide the 
starting point for negotiations on the matter. It is to  be noted that the Turkish 
Cypriots accepted the proposals in 1973, only a year before the Turkish 
intervention was launched.3
1 See Purcell, Cyprus, London 1969, p. 348. 9 5 5
2 Hence, the need, among other reasons, for a plebiscite, discussed in the preceding Chapter,
3 See Chapter 1 above, The D iplom atic Context o f  the Cyprus Question.
Such a settlem ent would, o f  course, respect the Treaty o f  G uarantee between 
Greece, Turkey and the U nited K ingdom  (although this could be a m atter for 
negotiation, especially regarding the num ber o f  troops to  be stationed on the 
island, and m ost im portantly the right to unilateral m ilitary in terven tion ).
The B ritish Sovereign Base Areas, I submit, should rem ain utterly unaffected 
by this arrangem ent, unless the U nited K ingdom , in a diplom atic m ove o f  good 
will, w ould w ish to return part o f  the A rea territory to  the R epublic o f  Cyprus. 
In any event, the Bases, could in m y opinion play a very constructive and 
useful role in the security o f  the island in virtually protecting the independence, 
territorial integrity and constitutional order o f  the Republic, from  external 
dangers in the w ider region o f  the M iddle E ast as w ell as internal threats. The 
periodical dem onstrations by a tiny m inority against the rem aining o f  the 
British Bases on the island should be view ed as a rather negligible and isolated 
incident.
The role o f  N A TO  in the suggested settlem ent has to be taken into account, too. 
The security o f  the island could be placed under the aegis o f  N A TO . I f  such an 
proposition w ould be unw anted on part o f  the interested governm ents, the 
U nited States alone should be w elcom e to have an im portant role in 
m aintaining peace and security on the island. The m ilitary base in  Lefkonico, 
presently in the occupied part, could o f  course continue to operate w ithout 
interruption, and the troops It has to be m ade clear though that this propositions 
and even m ilitary concessions cannot be m ade in a vacuum . The U nited States 
m ust use their influence, to persuade.Turkey that the above m entioned solution
is the best for the interests o f  all. The U nited K ingdom , w hich already has 
undertaken, by virtue o f  the Cyprus Treaty o f  Guarantee, to the safeguard the 
independence and territorial integrity o f  the island
H as to  take decisive steps tow ard the sam e direction. Treating Turkey as the 
m ost im portant strategic ally in the region and looking dow n upon Cyprus (and 
G reece) is not the m ost intelligent path to pursue. In their attem pt to  achieve 
the  policy o f  containm ent o f  the form er Soviet U nion (a Cold W ar goal which, 
it seem s, still goes on), and thereby prom oting good relations w ith Turkey at 
the expense o f  peace in Cyprus, they eventually lead things to  the opposite 
resu lt from  the one w ished for. Such a line stir up the possibility  o f  a Greco- 
Turkish conflict, which, i f  ignited, w ould alm ost certainly bring about 
involvem ent o f  Russia.
It is im perative that such a settlem ent respects the hum an rights o f  both 
com m unities. It is precisely because o f  the need to  protect hum an rights o f  both 
com m unities that this arrangem ent is here suggested. The Turkish Cypriots will, 
be guaranteed proportional participation in Governm ent. N eedless to  m ention 
in this regard that all human rights  have to  be im plem ented as these are 
stipulated in all international instrum ents, including the European Convention 
on H um an Rights.
A  short discussion com es next on how  hum an rights should be enforced.
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2. Human Rights in Foreign Policy4
Pending international problem s, the non-im plem entation o f  hum an rights 
becom es ,an indication o f  serious inefficiency o f  the international system.
There is an inescapable tension betw een hum an rights and foreign policy. Their 
constituencies are seem ingly different. The Foreign Policy according to  some 
view s shouild be conducted am ong states in disregard o f  the global 
com m unities’ and individuals’ rights. It m ight be then, that the w ay for a 
m inister o f  foreign affairs to resolve the inescapable tension betw een hum an 
rights and foreign policy is to deny that hum an rights is part o f  his job. To the 
entrenched sceptic w ho dism isses this as soft law, the reply now  is to point out 
to the judicial decisions w hich m ake such basic rights, such as freedom  from 
slavery, perem ptory norm s o f  international law .5 W hat this international law 
o f  hum an rights suggests is that foreign m inisters no longer have a choice about 
the inclusion o f  hum an rights. They cannot escape the tension betw een hum an 
rights and foreign policy sim ply by declaring that the form er have no place in 
the latter. They are obliged to  pay attention to hum an rights w hether they like it 
or not. They are bound, according to  the conventions o f  positivist international 
law, by their explicit agreem ents and by custom .
There is also a deeper sense in w hich hum an rights arrived in foreign policy 
that w hich observes the presence in foreign offices o f  desks bearing that title. 
H um an R ights now  play a part in the decision about the legitim acy o f  a State 
(and o f  other actors and institutions) in international society. A bout w hether
4 See Vincent, Human Rights in Foreign Policy^QiLmbridge: Cambridge University Press.
5 Brownlie, Principles Public InternationalLaw, 3 ed. Oxford: University Press 1979), pp. 596 and 
512-15.
w hat it is or w hat it does is sanctioned or authorised by law. It is no t enough for 
a state to be, and to  be recognised as sovereign. N or is it enough for it to  be a 
nation-state in accordance w ith the principle o f  self-determ ination. It has to act 
in such a w ay as not to offend against the basic rights and groups in other 
countries.
The concept o f  security in foreign policy is too narrow ; too narrow  in being 
concentrated on safety against m ilitary threats. The task  that need to  be done is 
to  ask  the follow ing questions: w hat are the present costs for a G reat State (in 
reputation and credibility) o f  locating a m ilitary base w ithin a gangster 
regim e ?6 Further, in planning foreign policy J should w e not decide w hat w e 
are for in the w orld and prom ote it, as well as m erely know ing w hat w e are 
against and fighting it? 7 Planning Policy staffs introduces the problem  o f  
getting beyond the short term, or rather o f  getting consideration o f  the longer 
term  into short tern decision-m aking, a problem  w hich is a  professionals’ 
barrier into including hum an rights Policy Planning staffs produce w ise papers 
that nobody reads except perhaps the research staff. B ut i f  foreign policy is 
actually to be a policy rather than m erely reaction to  the circum stances, the 
skill o f  its practitioner is to see beyond the short term  and have this vision 
affect action in the short term. Sensitivity to  the quality o f  hum an rights 
observance am ong both friends and adversaries m ight p lay a part in facilitating 
this vision. H um an rights in foreign policy are not m erely about standard 
setting public pronouncem ents, or finding form ulae for the pacification o f
6 These questions were prompted by Ullman, BothM ational Security and Human Rights
7 This is the argument o f  Vincent, The Reagan Administration and America’s Purpose in the World, 
Yearbook o f  World Affairs, vol. 37 (1983).
noisy  unim portant dom estic pressure groups. They are also m atters which 
affect the great purposes o f  the state in securing and nourishing its citizens and 
the citizens o f  the w orld at the same time. This is the point o f  the extension o f  
the concept o f  security to  cover the long term  and the unconsidered threat. The 
flood o f  refugees that m ight result from the denial o f  hum an rights, even from  a 
country o f  w hose existence w e are only scarcely aware. A nd the likelihood o f  
choosing the w estern  w orld as a destination , should focus bureaucratic 
attention on the practicality o f  hum an rights observance as a m ode o f  
preventive diplom acy.
The sm all states, conversely, should do w hatever they can to prom ote hum an 
rights at the international level, particularly in international organizations.
In the case o f  Cyprus, the Cases tried before the European C ourt o f  Hum an 
R ights referred to  above should be constantly prom oted. Foreign Policy  o f  the 
R epublic o f  Cyprus should be conducted at the level o f  H um an Rights.
H um an R ights Law  should be the basis o f  any future settlem ent to  the issue. I f  
hum an rights are not safeguarded in their entirety then any attem pt to  find a 
peaceful, viable a n d  ju s t  resolution to  the problem  will be doomed.
3. Strategic considerations
In  order that a settlem ent m ay be reached strategy, w hich is o f  crucial 
im portance need be considered. Two issues w ill be here analysed. The m ilitary 
cooperation betw een G reece and Cyprus and the m ilitary-political cooperation 
betw een Cyprus (and Greece) and Is ra e l axis betw een Turkey and Israel.
The D octrine o f  the Com m on D efence A rea betw een Greece and Cyprus, on 
the one hand, constitutes no doubt the m ost im portant option o f  the Cyprus 
G overnm ent from  the strategic point o f  view  since 1974. The D octrine was 
laid dow n by the G reek Prim e M inister A ndreas Papandreou and G reek Cypriot 
President G lafkos Clerides in A thens 1993.
The purpose o f  the D octrine is to suggest on part o f  A thens and N icosia the 
adoption o f  a preventive  strategy , w ith  the sole aim  o f  effectively facing the 
Turkish threat. A ccording to the D octrine any attem pt on part o f  Turkey to, 
launch an attack against the State o f  Cyprus or get its troops beyond the buffer 
zone w hich divides the occupied part o f  the island from  the G reek Cypriot 
controlled area, shall be constitutes casus belli and shall be m ilitarily resisted to. 
For the purpose o f  laying down a w ell organised strategy, the tw o governm ents, 
the M inisters o f  the respective D efence M inistries as w ell as C hief 
Com m anders o f  the A rm y H eadquarters m eet regularly in both  N icosia and 
Athens.
Further, preventive strategy , as the nam e goes, aim s at preventing Turkey from 
undertaking a m ilitary operation against Cyprus. B y this very strategy Turkey 
is to be persuaded that i f  she attem pts to  prom ote any plans w hich could 
possibly have a negative im pact on the vital interests o f  G reece and Cyprus, 
then any benefits from such an attem pt w ould be severely outnum bered by the 
losses (m ilitary, financial diplom atic).
It would be useful in this regard to point out the m ilitary strength o f  Turkey and 
Greece respectively. Turkey has a b o ilm a n  pow er o f  about 579.200.T Infantry
num bers 470.000 m en, the N avy 52.000 and the A ir Force 57.200. The It is 
notew orthy that the tanks com e to about 3.783, the navy has abou tl5  
subm arines am ong other vessels, and the A ir Force has 650 aircrafts in its ranks. 
G reece has 158.500 soldiers, 1.879 tanks, 1.908 Fire A rm s in the Artillery 
D ivision, 10 subm arines and 448 aircrafts (M irage, F-16, F-104, F-5A) etc.8 
The num bers are im portant, but not conclusive. The result o f  a possible 
conflict is unpredictable. The relative Turkish superiority is not enough to 
m ake sure that the Turks w ould prevail in a future conflict betw een Greece and 
Turkey. O n the contrary, the G reek capability as it now adays stands, indicates 
that a possible Turkish attack m ay not only end up w ith severe losses on part o f  
Turkey, but even w ith its total defeat. Turkey, it should be recalled, is facing a 
num ber o f  internal as w ell as external problem s., such as the K urdish problem , 
the Islam , differences w ith  Syria, neighbouring Iraq, Iran and even Russia in 
m any respects. These fronts surely keep busy a big num ber o f  its m ilitary 
forces.
A  conclusion G reece, for Turkey, is a country strong enough, especially 
m ilitarily. G reece’s support in the defence o f  Cyprus adds considerably the to  
the risk o f  T urkey’s having to pay  a severe cost i f  she attem pts to launch a raid 
or attack against the area presently under the control o f  the Cyprus Governm ent. 
On o f  the basic conclusions o f  this b rie f recourse to  the m ilitary capacity o f  
Greece and Turkey is that Cyprus, w ithout the consistent and strong support o f  
Greece, both in the m ilitary and diplom atic fields, is vulnerable to a Turkish
8 See Aristos Aristotelous, The Doctrine of Con$t2n Defence Area between Greece and Cyprus,
Nicosia, 1997.
threat, im m inent as it is in the view  o f  the thousands o f  Turkish troops illegally 
stationed on the island.
Thus, the view  that Greece is too far away to protect Cyprus and contribute to 
the security o f  the G reek Cypriots is, form  the strategic standpoint, utterly 
w rong. Such a position rather shows lack o f  know ledge in  m ilitary affairs.
I f  this w as the stance taken by G reece in the case o f  the A egean islands, too, 
then the result w ould  be total catastrophe for H ellenism .
It should be stressed, nevertheless, that one o f  the m ain purposes o f  the 
doctrine, under the present circum stances is to strengthen the position o f  the 
Cyprus G overnm ent at the negotiations aim ing at reaching a peaceful 
settlem ent to  the Cyprus problem.
O n the other hand, m oving to the co-operation betw een Cyprus and Israel, three 
m ajor issues need be briefly stressed. These issues have to be seen in the 
context o f  the m ilitary axis betw een Turkey and Israel w hich has affected in a 
seriously negative m anner the relations betw een Cyprus and the Israel.
Firstly, Cyprus and Greece have to do their best so that the peace process m ay 
be progress in the M iddle East. On the basis that peace in  the M iddle East does 
is no event in the interests o f  Turkey, peace especially betw een Israel and Syria 
m ust be prom oted at once. In the absence o f  such an enem y, so far a traditional 
enem y o f  Israel, the axis betw een Turkey and Israel can autom atically be 
dim inished to a large extent.
Secondly, the relations between the G reek w orld at large and Israel rem ain 
rather undeveloped. Cyprus traditionally keeps better relations w ith  Israel than
G reece does. This strategic advantage has to be properly be taken into account. 
A t the final analysis, the survival o f  the State o f  Israel depends not on any kind 
o f  relation or cooperation w ith Turkey, but on the friendly relations w ith the 
W est, particularly w ith the U nited S ta tes .9 These relations inevitably go 
through stability in the Eastern M editerranean. A ny control o f  the M iddle East 
by countries by countries not particularly friendly to  the interests o f  Israel, 
nam ely Turkey, is not com patible w ith the notion o f  survival o f  the State o f  
Israel. In  this region, Cyprus as well as Greece could play a very  im portant role 
so that peace and stability can be achieved and retained. M ilitary cooperation 
betw een Cyprus and Israel tow ards this direction w ould surely be a  gradual 
step forward Thus, again, the axis betw een Turkey and Israel could possibly be 
further dim inished i f  not eliminated.
Secondly, Cyprus can play a vital, i f  not decisive, role in  fulfilling Israel’s 
aspiration for jo in ing  the European Union. A s a full m em ber o f  the EU  and 
having close relations w ith G reece and other European countries, Cyprus 
perhaps holds the key to Israel’s future accession to the European Com m unity. 
Conversely, a future settlem ent o f  the Cyprus issue goes through Israel, in that 
Israel could play  a very im portant role in this process, given its close ties w ith 
the U nited States and the U nited K ingdom , key actors in the Cyprus Question.
9 Indicative of the close relations between Israel and the United States of America on Strategic affairs, 
is the Memorandum o f  Understanding Between the Government o f  the United States and the 
Government o f  Israel on Strategic Cooperation, the Preamble of which reads: This memorandum of 
understanding reaffirms the common bonds of friendship between the United States and Israel and 
builds on the mutual security relationship that exists between the two nations. The parties recognize the 
need to enhance strategic cooperation to deter aflweats from the Soviet Union to the region (Shai 
Feldam, The Future o f  U S. Israel Strategic Cooperation  (Washington, 1996)
Thirdly, Cyprus has to m ake clear that the Turkish aggression tow ard Cyprus 
(and G reece in the A egean especially) raises the risks o f  an armed 
confrontation in the region. Such an eventuality w ould certainly bring about 
catastrophic consequences to the region and the South-eastern N A TO  flank.
4. E p ilogue
H aving said the above, I w ould like to em phasize finally that it is, and has 
always been, the intention o f  the political leadership o f  the Cyprus Republic, 
and the people as w ell, to m ake every effort in good w ill, so that a settlem ent to 
the Cyprus issue m ay be reached through peaceful means.
H ow ever, i f  all attem pts fail, and not because o f  our intransigence, then the 
people o f  Cyprus should seriously have to consider resorting to arm ed force 
and engage into a N ational L iberation struggle, itse lf perm itted under 
International Law. I shall not now  go through a theory o f  ju s t war. This has 
been done elsew here in the present thesis10. Suffice it here to  repeat that part o f  
A dm iral D em osthenes’ speech, as reported by the A thenian historian 
Thucydides, w hich constitutes the first authoritative statem ent on unilateral 
hum anitarian intervention:
“M en, w ho have gathered together in this venture, let no one o f  you wish to  be 
esteem ed a m an o f  intelligence; but rather, w ith p lain courage, w hich casts 
aside reflection let him , together w ith the others, attack against the opponents 
and even opponents, and even be optim istic that he shall eventually be proved
-_______________________  265
10 See Chapter III, above.
victorious. W hen m atters reach appoint o f  necessity, as the present 
circum stances are, crude rationalism  is least needed” .
Let the em ploym ent o f  these words not be taken as an indication o f  w arlike 
attitude or excessive nationalism . But, i f  need be, the G reeks o f  Cyprus shall 
fight for their own country and shall never surrender, in order that international 
legality m ay be restored.
Even i f  every one citizen is sacrificed for freedom , posterity  shall be able to see, 
through a clear instance o f  sacrifice, that national dignity is m ore im portant 
than life itself.
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